

PROJECT TITLE:**Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU Conflict Prevention****1.4. Identifying the Success Factors (indicators)**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Deliverable 1.4 provides an analytical guide for IECEU partners and end users¹ seeking a deeper understanding of concrete factors furthering the effectiveness and impact of European Union (EU) external action, especially within Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) crisis management missions and operations. The analytical guide facilitates identification of key issues for success such as coordination and cooperation between actors, who can enhance efficiency and effectiveness of crisis management in the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR), through resource allocation and mandate fulfilment. The first part of Deliverable 1.4. defines 'effectiveness', including both what is achieved in a CSDP mission/operation and the way in which it is sought achieved. The definition integrates an internal EU perspective and an external conflict prevention perspective.

The next part of the deliverable develops a set of 'effectiveness criteria' and success indicators, which allow analysts (in work packages 2-4 of this project) to:

1. examine different types as well as levels of effectiveness in individual missions/operations,
2. and compare these across several missions/operations as well as conflicts/countries/regions.

The final part of the deliverable discusses success factors and whether categories of conditions - necessary and/or conducive - for effectiveness in EU conflict prevention (incl. crisis management and capacity building) missions/operations can be identified:

- A. internally within the Union, and/or
- B. externally outside the EU.

The identification of success factors helps analysts (in work packages 5-7 of this project) to:

3. draw lessons from past missions/operations to future missions/operations, and
4. consider whether 'pooling and sharing' or other such measures can increase effectiveness.

¹ End users of this deliverable may be practitioners, evaluators and researchers within and beyond EU institutions, structures and Member States, international organisations, universities and research centres, training institutions for CSDP mission personnel as well as other research projects and consortia.

1 INTRODUCTION

In 2003 the European Union (EU) started deploying civilian missions and military operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, later CSDP) (Council of the European Union, 2001). The total number of EU personnel in the field has grown from 715 in 2003 to nearly 6,000 in spring 2015 (Tardy, 2015). CSDP staff has been deployed – in military and/or civilian capacity – both on and far beyond the European continent (Blockman & Vessel, 2009). In total 33 missions and operations have been launched so far, 17 are still ongoing (European External Action Service, 2015).

The IECEU project posits that best practices, lessons learned and new improved approaches to EU conflict prevention can be identified through case studies of such missions/operations. This in turn can enhance the effectiveness of capabilities in EU conflict prevention, including short term crisis management and medium term peacebuilding to achieve long term stability. Identifying success factors and indicators therefore facilitate further analysis of effectiveness and (how to increase) the likelihood thereof in past, present and future CSDP missions/operations.

Deliverable 1.4 provides an analytical guide for IECEU partners and end users seeking a deeper understanding of concrete factors furthering the effectiveness and impact of European Union (EU) External Action, in particular, an operational conflict prevention through CSDP crisis management in the form of civilian missions and military operations. The definition and criteria for effectiveness developed in this deliverable and implemented in subsequent work packages of the project will produce practicable information directly relevant for EU decision-makers and crisis management personnel. Other end users of this deliverable may be practitioners, evaluators and researchers within as well as beyond EU institutions, structures, training programmes and Member States, international organisations, universities and research centres, including other projects and consortia.

2 ANALYTICAL STARTING POINT AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Deliverable 1.4 builds on existing knowledge. Prior to its production, a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art scholarship as well as policy practice related to conflict prevention and crisis management, including civilian missions and military operations, both within and outside the EU, was undertaken. A wide range of experts (practitioners and researchers) were consulted through semi-structured interviews, quantitative and qualitative survey questions, visits to headquarters and field missions as well as informal conversations in person, by phone and email. The individuals consulted have contributed significantly to the development of this deliverable.

In accordance with the Grant Agreement, this deliverable took its starting point in the notion of success in conflict management and how to analyse, achieve and improve it, which featured in: Annemarie Peen Rodt, 2014. *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success* (London: Routledge). That volume contains a detailed description of the academic literature review, expert interviews and field work conducted as well as in-depth discussions related to success factors in EU military conflict management operations, specifically.

Follow-up field visits and deliberations regarding how to further develop existing knowledge through the IECEU project and Deliverable 1.4. in particular were conducted in Brussels during and after the IECEU Kickoff Plenary Session (Rodt, 2015) as well as at the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (Follow-up, 2015). A consortium-wide survey followed by methodological discussions during an IECEU workshop in Finland helped direct this deliverable (IECEU –project, 2015).

Finally, the report has been through thorough and repeated peer review by IECEU project partners, amongst others. The knowledge sharing and feedback provided by all of the above is gratefully acknowledged, although responsibility for the deliverable, any opinions, mistakes or misconceptions it may contain remains that of the author alone.

3 A NEW LOGIC OF EFFECTIVENESS

Deliverable 1.4. redefines 'effectiveness' and develops corresponding effectiveness criteria, success factors and indicators to facilitate a deeper understanding of EU external action, specifically regarding the effectiveness of CSDP missions/operations in conflict prevention.

"The need for an objective assessment of the pertinence of CSDP is not contested. Yet this has to be reconciled with the political nature of CSDP, which may mean that, at the end of the day, an operation is the response opted for by states despite what a rational assessment would suggest, or on the contrary that the EU commitment has to be short term irrespective of the long term needs of a particular situation." (Tardy, 2015, 14)

"Overall, the (EU) benchmarking and evaluation system is a work in progress. Indicators/benchmarks are almost exclusively quantitative and no qualitative data is being systematically collected, while arguably many critical facets of peace and security cannot be quantitatively measured. Furthermore, the measure of task performance and achievement may not always be pertinent to the measure of success. In the end, the reports produced tend to downplay potential difficulties and only provide a partial vision of a mission's overall performance (...)" (Tardy, 2015, 38).

As illustrated by Tardy above, an outside perspective on CSDP missions/operations is needed. It should appreciate the complex context – within the EU – in which these endeavors are undertaken. However, it must focus more than the Union itself does on its effectiveness in preventing (a particular) conflict, taking into account local, national, regional and international security needs as well as external factors that (may) influence its chances of success in this regard (Rodt, 2014). Deliverable 1.4 provides an analytical starting point for the empirical enquiries in this project, which takes into account both the internal EU context and an external perspective on conflict prevention. The logic is to recognize the political nature of CSDP and its structural constraints within as well as beyond the Union, offering a broader perspective and analysis that complements the EU's existing evaluation processes (IECEU –project, 2015).

The added value of this deliverable is that it provides a practical guide for those – inside and outside the IECEU project – seeking a deeper understanding of concrete factors by which to analyse the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention capabilities in CSDP missions/operations. The deliverable enables focused and structured, qualitative as well as quantitative data gathering and

analysis. This logic carries whether the evaluation takes place during desk studies, expert panel discussions, surveys, interviews, field work, single or comparative case studies, for analytical purposes or to inform decision-making before, during or after CSDP missions/operations. To this end, Appendix 1 synthesizes the deliverable in a user-friendly guide, which includes a series of suggested research questions, based on the definitions of effectiveness, effectiveness criteria, success factors and indicators developed below.

4 EFFECTIVENESS: WHAT IS IT?

The purpose of the IECEU-project – as its name reveals – is to ‘improve the effectiveness of capabilities in EU conflict prevention’. In order to improve effectiveness, a necessary first step is to define what is meant by ‘effectiveness’ in this particular realm. As this deliverable, in accordance with the Grant Agreement, develops effectiveness criteria for analyzing EU CSDP missions and operations, its focus is on operational conflict prevention and shorter term policy tools in particular (IECEU, 2015). A corresponding conceptualization of ‘effectiveness’ must consider, according to the logic introduced above, the intervener (EU), the target (conflict and country in which it takes place) and the aspect of the missions/operations focused on in this enquiry (conflict prevention). Moreover in accordance with IECEU ambitions, the analysis of ‘effectiveness’ must include not only what missions/operations achieve, but also the ways in which they seek to achieve what they do. The following framework establishes a relative importance of means and ends in such endeavours. In other words, assessing not only whether the EU did the right thing, but also whether it did that thing right. Thus, the notion of ‘effectiveness’ encompasses impact as well as efficiency, and the enquiry compares and contrasts input, output and outcomes of EU conflict prevention. In sum, **effectiveness** or success in this deliverable is when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner, seen from the perspective of the EU and the specific conflict in which it intervenes (at least in part) to prevent (further) violent conflict.

Effectiveness is when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner both from the perspective of the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent

5 EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND KEY PERSPECTIVES ON SUCCESS

According to the definition developed above, corresponding criteria should consider and combine perspectives both internal and external to the European Union to evaluate its effectiveness.

The **internal perspective** should reflect the extent to which CSDP missions/operations succeed according to the EU's politico-strategic goals and operational objectives, as well as whether their implementation went well according to the Union's plans, procedures and principles. In other words, the internal perspective assesses the EU on its own merits. That is, whether it achieved what it set out to do in the way that it set out to do so – strategically as well as operationally. As argued above, one must consider the internal EU context and its constraints to assess performance against what was possible rather than what would have been ideal. (Rodt, 2015. Tardy, 2015)

The **external perspective** should assess missions/operations according to the overall purpose of conflict prevention; namely, to prevent (further) violent conflict. It considers the effectiveness of short term EU crisis management with regard to medium term peacebuilding and long term stability. The external perspective bases its assessment on what can reasonably be expected of operational conflict prevention and examines the ways in which missions/operations seek to prevent (more) violent conflict to determine whether prevention efforts are proportional to the challenge at hand.(Rodt, 2014).

Bridging both perspectives, IECEU combines existing knowledge and practice to better pinpoint potential ways of improving the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention. Likewise, by integrating means as well as ends in the analysis, the project will provide a fuller picture of the Union's current capabilities, potential for improvement and priorities in this regard.

Four **effectiveness criteria** are developed to facilitate further analysis of 'effectiveness' in CSDP missions/operations. These are listed below alongside corresponding research questions:

1. Internal goal attainment
 - To what extent does the mission/operation achieve what the EU set out to do?
2. Internal appropriateness
 - To what extent is the mission/operation implemented according to EU plans?

3. External goal attainment

- To what extent does the mission/operation help prevent (further) violent conflict?

4. External appropriateness

- To what extent is the mission/operation proportionate in its preventative measures?

The criteria and corresponding research questions allow further analyses (in later work packages) to examine different types as well as levels of effectiveness in individual missions/operations. They are useful for comparing and contrasting effectiveness in a structured and focused way across several missions/operations, including in various conflicts, countries and/or regions. This facilitates a better understanding of what works (best) and what does not work, but also how conditions internal or external to the Union might affect its success. Case studies structured around these criteria will identify lessons from past experiences to future missions/operations and inform decision-makers to what extent 'pooling and sharing' and/or other cooperation and coordination measures can increase the effectiveness of EU capabilities in conflict prevention.

6 SUCCESS INDICATORS

To enable both single and comparative case studies of various missions/operations, it is useful to identify specific indicators by which to analyze different types and levels of effectiveness in accordance with the above definition of and criteria for effectiveness in EU conflict prevention. Traditionally, the field of conflict prevention has an overemphasis on quantifiable indicators, just as the emerging evaluation processes of CSDP missions and operations tend to favour quantifiable benchmarks, although conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding often include both outcomes and impacts that are not necessarily easily or accurately quantified (OECD, 2007; Tardy, 2015). Instead the indicators identified below allow for both qualitative assessment and quantitative measurement, reflecting IECEU's mixed methods research design.

6.1 Indicators of internal effectiveness

A mission/operation must be internally effective in order to qualify as an overall success. Two key criteria are developed to determine whether the main objectives of an EU mission/operation are successfully obtained and whether the way in which these are sought achieved was appropriate – again from the intervener's perspective. These two internal effectiveness criteria are referred to as internal goal attainment and internal appropriateness, respectively.

6.1.1. INTERNAL GOAL ATTAINMENT

Missions/operations are goal orientated in nature. Their success is typically thought of in terms of fulfilling their mandated objectives. EU missions/operations must, thus, be analyzed according to whether they achieve their intended purpose and the tasks they set out to do. To this end, the first effectiveness criterion is internal goal attainment. The indicators of internal goal attainment must reflect the key objectives and overall mandate of each individual mission/operation. As there may be significant differences between the *operational objectives* and *politico-strategic goals* of a

mission/operation, both must be considered. Likewise, missions/operations often pursue multiple, potentially shifting, goals, which may change over time, often making goal attainment a matter of degree. Examining internal goal attainment must reflect these nuances and take such developments into account, so as to account and allow for operational flexibility, which may well be an appropriate response to a changing situation on the ground. Furthermore, as all goals are not equally important to the intervener, evaluating their achievement evenly would be misleading. It is, therefore, useful in analytical terms to rank politico-strategic and operational objectives to identify the EU's main goals in each mission/operation in order to determine whether it successfully obtained its *raison d'être* as defined by the Union. While not constituting a full analysis of a mission/operation, internal goal attainment is a necessary first criterion for overall effectiveness in any mission/operation – after all if the EU does not believe it is achieving what it set out to do in these endeavours, which are often risky and costly in broad sense of both these terms, it is unlikely to continue (to launch) such efforts and thereby increase its effectiveness in operational conflict prevention. (Baldwin, 2000, 167-182; Pushkina, 2006, 133-149; Ross & Rothman, 1999).

6.1.2. INTERNAL APPROPRIATENESS

Complementing internal goal attainment with an internal appropriateness criterion allows one to examine whether the way in which a mission/operation is implemented is appropriate, seen from the intervener's perspective. Internal appropriateness assesses whether a mission/operation is implemented well on the ground and has the desired politico-strategic effect at home as well as abroad. *Timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness* are three key indicators of internal appropriateness.

Timeliness refers to early warning as well as early response. It includes efficient decision-making and goes hand in hand with efficient and appropriate budgeting, planning, preparation, generation, training and deployment of personnel and hardware, as mandates, mission and operation plans are agreed. The EU has developed a Crisis Management Concept to guide this process, which allows for fast track procedures if necessary. In order for a mission/operation to implement its mandate in an appropriate manner on the ground, it is essential that it be deployed without significant delays. This includes not only the arrival of the first set of boots on the ground, but also timely and otherwise efficient implementation of the mandate. An effective mission/operation

should implement its mandate as quickly and efficiently as possible without compromising its effect. (Diehl, 1994, 33-61)

In order to achieve full internal effectiveness, a central concern is that the costs of an operation do not outweigh its benefits for the intervener. Evaluating any policy based on its achievements without taking into account its cost is, as Baldwin has suggested with regard to Foreign Policy Analysis, like assessing a business solely in terms of its sales disregarding its expenses. (Baldwin, 2000, 167-182). Costs are a crucial part of assessing implementation from an internal perspective. Here it is important to remember that the financial burden of military operations is for the most part covered by contributing Member States, whereas the internal success of these operations like the civilian missions is evaluated from the perspective of the Union as a whole. Moreover, costs and benefits are political as well as material. Cost-effectiveness must, thus, include political costs for the EU. Casualties among its personnel are, for example, considered a very high political cost within the EU, just as mission failure, which seems to constitute an unacceptable risk to the Union altogether. As a senior military official representing the Union in-theatre put it: 'The EU will not launch an operation, if it is not sure that it will succeed'. One might be, and many observers are, tempted to criticize the Union's determination to secure success; however, it is important to recall that ensuring a reasonable prospect of success and protection for one's own personnel is a fundamental premise for legitimate deployment and use of force, whether it be violent or not. (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, 20-21 and 31-32).

In sum, internal effectiveness and success for the EU depends on its internal goal attainment and appropriateness. Indicators of the former are the mission/operation's politico-strategic and mandated objectives, whereas the level of the latter is assessed against the timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of their implementation. As such, the internal perspective on effectiveness considers both the Union's institutional efficiency and political visibility of CSDP missions/operations.

6.2 Indicators of external effectiveness

In order to assess the extent to which an EU mission/operation is effective overall, the analysis must also consider whether and how the target conflict and country benefitted (or not) from the intervention. In other words, whether the overall purpose of operational conflict prevention is achieved. A successful mission/operation must help prevent (further) violent conflict, but only by appropriate preventative means. The external perspective on effectiveness must, thus, first assess

whether a mission/operation contributes in a meaningful way to the prevention of (further) violent conflict, and then examine whether the ways in which it seeks to do this are proportionate measures of prevention. Therefore, the internal effectiveness criteria must be complemented by two external effectiveness criteria: external goal attainment and external appropriateness, which are described below.

6.2.1. EXTERNAL GOAL ATTAINMENT

Violence is never a given. It is neither necessarily a constant nor a logical linear stage of conflicts, which may indeed move back and forth between different stages of violence and non-violence. If a conflict does become (more) violent, however, there are five different processes by which this may take place: namely, through *initiation*, *continuation*, *diffusion*, *escalation* and/or *intensification* of the (potentially) violent conflict. Initiation is when a conflict turns violent in the first instance. This may be expected or not, but it is never automatic. Continuation is when the violent aspect of a conflict continues over time, which may occur over shorter or longer periods, sometimes with non-violent ‘interruptions’. Diffusion is a process by which violent conflict in one geographic area directly or indirectly generates violent conflict in another area. It can take place either within or across state borders. Escalation occurs when new actors become involved in an existing conflict. Such actors may be neighbouring states, ethnic kin, diaspora or others, who become actively involved in the violent conflict. Intensification refers to a process by which the violence itself increases; and can include both an increase in the number and nature of violent incidents, albeit for our purposes only those directly related to the conflict are included. Although these are five conceptually distinct processes, initiation/continuation, diffusion, escalation and/or intensification of violence may well occur simultaneously. (Gleditsch, 2007, 293-309; Lobell & Mauceri, 2004, 1-10, Rodt, 2014). The five processes are summed up in Table 1.

Initiation	Violent conflict begins
Continuation	Violent conflict continues over time or reoccurs
Diffusion	Violent conflict in one geographic area spreads to another
Escalation	New actors become involved in an existing violent conflict
Intensification	Increase in number and/or nature of violent incidents

TABLE 1: FIVE DIFFERENT WAYS CONFLICTS BECOME (MORE) VIOLENT

To fulfil the external goal attainment criterion, a mission/operation must have a positive and sustainable impact on the (potentially) violent conflict on the ground. (Stedman, 2001; Reimann, 2004, Bercovitch & Simpson, 2010, 68-103). This might seem an obvious criterion for success, but it is all too often bypassed or misinterpreted when missions/operations of this nature are assessed. Goal attainment from an external conflict prevention perspective is not necessarily achieved by a mission/operation which merely fulfils its mandate. However, it is also not necessary – however desirable – that all underlying issues (root causes) related to the conflict are resolved. After all, these must be resolved by the parties to the conflict not by CSDP missions/operations. (Johansen, 1994, 307-310; Reagan, 1996, 336-359). EU missions/operations are sometimes undertaken in the hope that they might help bring about peaceful resolution of a conflict, but this is never been their primary purpose. Conflict prevention must not be confused with conflict resolution. There is a significant difference between successful conflict prevention (particularly of the operational kind) and successful conflict resolution. This distinction is imperative in order not to confuse the responsibilities of EU personnel and decision-makers with that of others involved in the conflict or indeed its resolution. In the end, it is adversaries, not international interveners, who must resolve conflicts (Johansen, 1994, 307-310; Wolff, 2006). The primary purpose of operational conflict prevention is *to prevent (further) violent conflict* and in this way help to bring about conditions under which the conflict can be resolved by the parties involved. The external goal attainment criterion has been developed to help assess whether a given mission/operation is effective in this regard in the specific context in which it engages. The indicators of external goal attainment are, thus, whether if this has not already taken place there is an initiation of violent conflict or if the violent conflict is already underway whether it continues, diffuses, escalates or intensifies.

CSDP missions/operations only rarely seek to prevent (more) violence through their own presence – either directly through containment or indirectly through deterrence. More often, they subscribe to theories of change, which propose that peace and stability will result from gradual change in the society, security sector, distribution of power, etc., which they seek to bring about through external intervention. Either way, it is important to recognise that change can be negative as well as positive – and at times continuity may be the best possible outcome. Regardless, CSDP missions/operations must be assessed for the extent to which they make a *meaningful, positive and sustainable contribution* to preventing (further violence).

EU missions/operations are usually part of wider efforts to prevent or even resolve the conflict(s) in question. The external goal attainment criterion must consider CSDP missions/operations in light of these broader efforts – by the EU and other actors involved. Does it make a meaningful

contribution to the EU's comprehensive approach towards the conflict/country or region? Does it facilitate successful cooperation and coordination with international, regional, national or local actors involved in preventing (further) violent conflict? Does it strengthen peacebuilding, stabilisation and Security Sector Reform in the country? Whether civilian or military – an EU mission/operation is only effective in terms of its external goal attainment, when it fulfils its potential role within this wider conflict prevention process and contributes meaningfully to it. That is, through a positive and sustainable impact (however small) with regards to preventing (more) violent conflict.

6.2.2. EXTERNAL APPROPRIATENESS

The final effectiveness criterion is one, which has been much neglected in the analysis of EU missions/operations; namely, external appropriateness. Appropriateness, in this enquiry, assesses the ways in which a mission/operation seeks to achieve its purpose. Unlike internal appropriateness, which evaluates operational effectiveness according to internal indicators (timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness), external appropriateness evaluates the implementation of a mission/operation according to a set of standards focused on appropriateness in operational conflict prevention, because as Lund points out, 'misapplied preventive efforts, even if timely, may be worse than taking no action at all' (Lund, 2009).

The external appropriateness criterion takes as its starting point that an intervention must do more good than harm. This is equally important for civilian missions and military operations (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007). *Proportionality* should govern any type of external intervention, including preventive measures and non-coercive as well as coercive policy tools. Foreign interventions, which are inherently intrusive to national sovereignty and local ownership, must always be proportional to the challenge at hand (Bellamy, 2006, 127-137). Therefore, the concept of *necessity*, which condemns unnecessary interventions or measures as illegitimate, must be considered in deliberations concerning external appropriateness (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, 144-151). Operational conflict prevention requires that analyses take these principles beyond the battlefield, where they traditionally apply, and assess any impact – intended or not – to the lives and wellbeing of populations in areas where the EU engages as well to its own personnel and any (potential) adversaries or spoilers to its missions/operations. Because if an actor like the EU

engages in coercive measures – of any kind for any purpose – it is important to scrutinize its actions according to widely accepted principles governing the legitimate use of force, whether it be violent or not. As the focus of this enquiry is on operational conflict prevention by both civilian and military means, it is important that these principles are applied to a wider spectrum of interventions i.e. different types of missions and operations as well as a broader concept of ‘coercion’, not necessarily physical, violent or lethal. With regard to physical force, which is rare but sometimes mandated in CSDP endeavours, external appropriateness scrutinises the appropriateness of use as well as non-use thereof.

External appropriateness in operational conflict prevention is best understood as ‘proportional prevention’, which allows one to assess whether more good than harm is done as well as ensuring that what is done is done by proportionate means of power and persuasion to facilitate effective prevention of (more) violent conflict. External appropriateness is closely linked to external goal attainment in the sense that it explores whether the contribution that the mission/operation makes is meaningful (positive and sustainable) enough to justify the measures (necessary and sufficient) taken to make that contribution.

In sum, the success indicators developed with regard to the four effectiveness criteria above are:

- Internal goal attainment: fulfilment of politico-strategic goals and operational objectives
- Internal appropriateness: timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in implementation
- External goal attainment: initiation, continuation, diffusion, escalation & intensification of violence
- External appropriateness: proportional prevention i.e. more good (positive and sustainable contribution to preventing violent conflict) than harm (force, coercion and other negative effects)

It is important that these are not used as a black and white binaries of success and failure, but rather as indicators by which to categorize and explore operational conflict prevention efforts to understand what it takes to succeed or at least improve the effectiveness of EU capabilities in this regard. Figure 1 breaks down the definition of effectiveness into criteria and indicators and illustrates the relationship between them. Appendix 1 provides a series of suggested research questions to help analysts (in subsequent work packages) to assess effectiveness according to the criteria and indicators illustrated below.




FIGURE 1: EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND INDICATORS OF SUCCESS

7 IDENTIFYING SUCCESS FACTORS

This final section discusses key issues in identifying success factors in operational conflict prevention. Success factors are conditions that enhance the likelihood and level of effectiveness in CSDP missions/operations. Naturally, the specificities of success depend to a large extent on the context in which any given mission/operation is undertaken and the means at its disposal. However, by considering and comparing such factors across time, space and function, thereby including different (types of) missions/operations, conflicts and contexts within and beyond the EU, IECEU will be better able to draw lessons from the past and suggest improved practices to enhance the effectiveness of EU capabilities in conflict prevention in the future – e.g. by identifying priorities for pooling and sharing or other such measures corresponding to success factors without which effectiveness is unlikely or decreased.

Two analytical distinctions are particularly useful in identifying such success factors:

- 1) Distinguishing between necessary and conducive conditions for effectiveness, and
- 2) Distinguishing between internal and external conditions for effectiveness.

The following will explain why and how these are useful distinctions to make both in case studies of various missions/operations (work packages 2-4) and when identifying lessons, best practices and new approaches (workpackages 5-7) to improve EU effectiveness in conflict prevention.

7.1 Necessary and conducive conditions for success

When cataloguing lessons to be learned (work package 5), determining potential for pooling and sharing (work package 6) and developing new approaches to improve effectiveness in EU conflict prevention (work package 7), it is pertinent to study actual attempts by the Union to help prevent (more) violent conflict through crisis management missions/operations, including capacity building and support for security sector reform (work packages 2-4). The two distinctions outlined above and explained below help focus data gathering and analysis on what does (not) work, in which circumstances and why, so that the IECEU conclusions and recommendations can help the Union

prioritise scarce resources in times of austerity in a way that still improves effectiveness in conflict prevention. Put simply, this is about how to do more with less.

First, one can distinguish between factors that are necessary for a mission/operation to succeed and factors that are conducive to improving effectiveness and thereby the likelihood and level of success in EU conflict prevention. If something constitutes a necessary success factor, a mission/operation cannot succeed without it, whereas a factor that is 'only' conducive to success can increase a mission/operation's effectiveness, without it necessarily succeeding according to all four effectiveness criteria, introduced above.

Applying analytical categories of (1) necessary and (2) conducive conditions to success can help identify and distinguish between factors that must be in place for a mission/operation to be effective (i.e. necessary conditions), and factors that are useful to have in place, because they improve effectiveness and thereby the level and likelihood of success (i.e. conducive conditions). Necessary conditions are not necessarily, however, sufficient for a mission/operation to succeed. For example, several necessary conditions may need to be in place at the same or indeed at a certain time or sequence. It is, therefore, important to study the relationship between success factors as well as identifying those (types of) factors that (may) exist. Likewise, conditions – necessary or conducive – cannot in themselves guarantee success, as success ultimately depends on the individuals involved in the conflict and its prevention. Therefore, one can at best identify conditions without which it is impossible (necessary conditions) or unlikely (conductive conditions) that a mission/operation will be effective. This would help focus decision-making on initiatives that will make a difference on the ground, e.g. by prioritising pooling and sharing of necessary resources, fostering cooperation and coordination between certain actors and initiatives or developing new approaches or strategies, but it may also help determine when (not) to launch missions/operations, what one tries to achieve with them and how. Thus, increasing the EU's likelihood as well as its level of success, whilst improving its effectiveness in operational conflict prevention on the ground. Or in the worst instance, avoiding failure – a key priority for the Union.

Finally, success factors may overlap, intertwine or work against each other in practice, e.g. a mandate limited in time, space and function might enhance the likelihood of internal effectiveness (mandate fulfillment) but decrease the chance of external success (preventing (more) violent conflict). In that case, the Union would have to decide whether it is able and willing to increase resources and in effect the likelihood/level of success or whether to settle for a lower level of external effectiveness. But the absence of failure does not equal success – or vice versa. Sometimes a lower level of external effectiveness might in fact save more lives than a higher level

of internal effectiveness. If the Union wanted to take this into account, it would have to shift its attention from necessary conditions for internal success to (include and improve) necessary conditions for external success.

7.2 Internal and external conditions for success

A second analytical distinction that is useful in identifying success factors in EU conflict prevention is whether these conditions exist internally within or externally outside the EU. The distinction is useful, because it helps identify whether the necessary success factors for a given mission/operation to be effective exist within the Union or whether it may need (to foster) help from outside. In turn, the EU can make better informed decisions regarding whether it is willing and able to bring about the necessary conditions for success. E.g. if the necessary amount of helicopters for a given operation are not made available by EU Member States, is the Union willing and able to persuade Russia to provide them? If this is (likely to be) a regular challenge, is it worth seeking a more permanent arrangement with Russia? Or are there alternative partners the EU could consider and consult?

Naturally, there is a (potential) relationship between the two categories, as the EU may be able to affect – positively or negatively – the external environment in which it operates, be it at the local, national, regional or international level, complicating analysis and making it all the more important study the ways in which different factors relate to one another. For example, can the EU through advocacy for a mission/operation increase the level of support for it – at home and/or abroad – and in this way enhance its effectiveness and chance of success? If the host nation is hesitant to support an EU intervention, it may be more likely to perceive it as legitimate if it has a UN mandate, which EU Member States in the Security Council may be able (or not) to bring about. These analytical distinctions are useful in understanding why missions/operations are (more or less) effective (in one way or another – cf. the effectiveness criteria). Thus, they are key issues to consider not only academically but in decision-making regarding the launch, implementation, support for and withdrawal of EU missions/operations. If a necessary condition is not in place, for example, because it requires external support, beyond the Union's own capabilities, and the EU cannot bring this about, then it may be best not to launch, to change plans/practice or withdraw completely. Finally, it must be recognized that success factors – like missions/operations and the conflicts they seek to prevent – are not constant. Therefore, it is important to understand the ways in which they (may) change over time or in different environments.

8 CONCLUSIONS

To make these analytical distinctions, practitioners, evaluators and researchers must have the right data. It requires up-to-date and accurate conflict analysis to successfully assess effectiveness in its prevention. Such conflict analysis should include (1) perspectives of all contending parties, (2) identify key driving factors of the conflict, (3) highlight positive factors in the conflict situation and/or actors exerting an influence towards peace, (4) show the dynamics/relationships among the driving factors, (5) map stakeholders and other key actors, and (5) reflect the current stage of conflict. All of this is easier, when one knows what to look for, which is why this deliverable provided an guide for analysts seeking deeper understanding of concrete factors furthering the effectiveness EU missions and operations. This includes – but is not limited to – identifying success factors such as coordination and cooperation between actors, which can enhance efficiency and effectiveness in operational conflict prevention (including crisis management, capacity building and SSR), e.g. through resource allocation to ensure appropriate mandate fulfilment and impact on the ground. The first section of Deliverable 1.4. defined 'effectiveness', including both what is achieved and the way in which it is achieved (or not), introducing an internal EU perspective as well as an external conflict perspective to the analysis. The second section of the deliverable develops a set of 'effectiveness criteria' and success indicators therefore, which allow analysts (and later work packages of this project) to:

1. examine different types as well as levels of effectiveness in individual missions/operations,
2. and compare these across several missions/operations and conflicts/countries/regions.

The final part of the deliverable discussed success factors and whether (categories of) conditions - necessary and/or conducive to effectiveness in EU conflict prevention (incl. capacity building) missions/operations - can be identified:

- A. internally within the Union, and/or
- B. externally outside the EU.

This will allow analysts (and later work packages of this project) to:

1. draw lessons from past missions/operations to future missions/operations, and
2. consider whether 'pooling and sharing' or other such measures can increase effectiveness.

To this end, Appendix 1 provides a series of suggested research questions to be asked in relation to each of the effectiveness criteria and indicators of success in their application. It is important, however, to note that these are research rather than necessarily interview questions, and that they are suggested starting points rather than a finite list of relevant questions to be asked.

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
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APPENDIX 1: GUIDE TO ANALYSE 'EFFECTIVENESS'

1. Breakdown of 'effectiveness' into 'effectiveness criteria'

Figure 1 illustrates the conceptualization of 'effectiveness' in operational conflict prevention, as conducted by EU missions/operations. 'Effectiveness' is broken down into 'effectiveness criteria' and 'success indicators' thereof. These enable identification and analysis of different types and levels of effectiveness (or lack thereof).



2. Breakdown of effectiveness criteria into success indicators

The tables below facilitate analytical categorization of the case specific data gathered into (a) success, (b) partial success or (c) failure according to the success indicators for each of the four effectiveness criteria. This allows for quantitative as well as qualitative analysis and categorization of data gathered. It also moves beyond the success-failure dichotomy, and allows for further unpacking of what lies between the two. So far 'partial success' and the reasons for it are relatively underexplored, although it is arguably the most common outcome in this type of mission/operation.

Internal goal attainment: extent to which EU achieves what it set out to do

	Success	Partial success	Failure
Politico-strategic aims			
Operational objectives			

Internal appropriateness: extent to which implementation goes according to EU plan

	Success	Partial success	Failure
Timeliness			
Efficiency			
Cost-effectiveness			

External goal attainment: extent to which (further) violent conflict is prevented

	Success	Partial success	Failure
Initiation			
Continuation			
Diffusion			
Escalation			
Intensification			

External appropriateness: extent of proportionality in prevention effort & effect

	Success	Partial success	Failure
More good than harm done			

3. Breakdown of 'success indicators'

The tables below give further explanations and examples of how to measure (quantitatively) and/or assess (qualitatively) the effectiveness of operational conflict prevention in EU missions/operations. These are of things to consider rather than necessarily requirements to be fulfilled. Suggestions are also given as to where one might find appropriate data and sources.

Internal goal attainment: extent to which EU achieves what it set out to do*Politico-strategic objectives*

- according to official EU strategies (regional, country, conflict, thematic), Council discussions and decisions (official documents, recordings, statements, press releases, etc.)
- but also including non-official opinions, non-explicit, covert & wider interests and intentions (elite and expert interviews at EU institutions & permanent representations, secondary sources, press coverage, etc.)

EU interests	Power (material, normative, etc.), influence (promotion or damage to) explicitly articulated core EU values (Human Rights (incl. minority protection), democracy & rule of law)
EU intentions	Regional, country, conflict, thematic (incl. conflict prevention) strategies and explicit expectations rg. conflict prevention (e.g. ensure no major violent conflicts within the EU, neighbouring areas (not only in geographical sense) or in areas where/in which the EU has decided to actively engage)

Suggested research questions:

- What are the strategic objectives at the beginning of the Council deliberations?
- Do the strategic objectives change during the Council deliberations?
- Who are the drivers for deployment?
- What are the strategic objectives of the actual mission/operation?
- What is the most important strategic objective? For whom? Why?
- What is the EU's interest in this mission/operation?
- What are member state(s)'s interest in the mission/operation?
- What is the procedure for the election of the first (& following) Head of Mission?
- Who/what decides the final budget?
- What decides the structure of the mission/operation?
- Have the strategic objectives been met?
- To what extent?
- Why (not)? How?

Operational objectives

- according to mission mandate and operation plan (OPLAN), PSC, 6-monthly plans, Operations Commander & personnel (internal documents, elite interviews can be used also to ask about classified documents), as well as observers

Overall goal	Mission/operation purpose achieved
Key objectives	Mandated (sub) goals achieved

Suggested research questions

- What are the operational objectives in the Council decision?
- How are these translated into the Mission Implementation Plan?
- What are the factors that translate Council decision to operational objectives?
- How was the operational concept formulated? What were the priorities?
- What are the most important MIP actions?
- Do the operational objectives change during the mission/operation? If yes, why?
- Has the mission/operation met its operational objectives? To what extent?
- Why (not)? How?

Internal appropriateness: extent to which implementation goes according to EU plans

Timeliness

- according to mission implementation plan (MIP), internal reviews, Head of Mission and staff, experts and observers (interviews)

Decision making	Before launch & during operation (extension of mandates, etc.)
Deployment	Launch, Initial Operating Capability, Full Operating Capability
Withdrawal	Exit strategy (end state/date), (possible) handover of mandate, equipment, personnel, etc.

Suggested research questions

- Was there a (intended) timeline for deployment? (planning, preparation, force generation (personnel, hardware, training), political negotiations for (force) entry/launch, IOC, FOC, exit, (potential) handover – feasibility assessments, process, specific conditions that should/would result in withdrawal?)
- What was the (intended) timeline for deployment?
- Was the timeline appropriate?
- Was the timeline met? Why (not)? (incl. factors outside EU such as host country, third parties (others in the region)?)

Efficiency

- according to mission implementation plan (MIP), internal reviews, Head of Mission and staff, experts and observers (interviews)

Sufficient/ appropriate commitment & capabilities	Political will, force generation, financial contributions, equipment, appropriate resources for appropriate tasks, etc.
Sufficient/ appropriate planning	Appropriate analysis (before, during & after) of relevant (f)actors: threat/risk analysis, contingency planning and intervention paths; appropriate planning (for launch, implementation & withdrawal), incl. mandate, OPLAN, MIP, RoE, PME-cycle, budget. Clear overall mandate, goal and sub-goals that support overall goal, plan of action; appropriate evaluation (during & after deployment), incl. benchmarking and lessons learning (bottom-up/top-down)
Mission implementation	Appropriate adaptability/flexibility (room for in-theatre adjustments) vs. clear mandate/maintaining intent (necessary/-li paradox)? Quality of mission management structures (in/between HQ & field); leadership staff, organization, skills, communications, culture; intelligence/information sharing; (air)

	transportation - integrated communications; coordinated logistic support, etc.
Integrated response	Coherence, complimentarity, coordination, division of labour/expertise, interoperability between interveners/-tion(s)/instruments/policies: (a) internally between EU institutions, instruments, MS, in HQ as well as in the field (e.g. pooling & sharing, training & education, standards & procedures, comprehensive approach) and (b) externally with local, national, regional & international actors (partners and others), private sector, NGOs - (when) was it integrated enough?

Suggested research questions

- To what extent was the mission/operation appropriately mandated?
- To what extent was the mission/operation appropriately manned?
- To what extent was the mission/operation appropriately equipped?
- To what extent was the mission/operation personnel appropriately trained?
- Was there sufficient political backing for the mission/operation? From EU institutions? Member States?
- Was the mission/operation integrated with the wider EU initiatives? How? Why not?
- Was the mission/operation integrated with the wider conflict prevention initiatives? How? Why not?
- What were the main lessons identified – in terms of efficiency (all of the above)?
- What were the main gaps (weaknesses)? Why?
- What were the barriers? internal barriers (within EU, e.g. other institutions/instruments) and external (local, national, regional & international) barriers?

Cost-effectiveness

- according to mission implementation plan (MIP), internal reviews, Head of Mission and staff, experts and observers (interviews)

Material costs	Availability of sufficient and appropriate resources (start-up funds (seed funding), finance, equipment, skills, systems, processes); resource efficiency: balance between tasks and resources, maximizing the use of available resources to get to a set goals, minimizing duplication and waste, financial alternatives
Other costs	Political costs, welfare of personnel

Suggested research questions

- Were the available resources appropriately allocated – within the mission/operation – for running mission/operation, operational activities & operational objectives?
- Were the available resources appropriately used – within the mission/operation?

- What were the gaps & barriers?
- Were there any political and diplomatic consequences? Were these foreseen in the planning?

External goal attainment

(Further/expected) violent conflict prevented

- according to data on (potential) violence: death/casualty/(mass)atrocities/crime, refugee/IDP/material & infrastructural damage figures, risk assessments, early warning systems (EWS), state fragility/failure indexes, conflict analyses, public opinions, in-country field work, elite and expert interviews, (participant) observations, etc.

Conflict prevention

- assessed against level/absence/risk of (expected):

Initiation	Violent conflict begins
Continuation	Violent conflict continues over time or reoccurs
Diffusion	Violent conflict spreads to another geographic area
Escalation	New actors become involved in the violent conflict
Intensification	Increase in number and/or nature of violent incidents

Suggested research questions

- To what extent has there been initiation, continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violence since the launch of the mission/operation? (separate questions) Is it expected?
- To what extent did the mission/operation prevent the conflict initiating, continuing, diffusing, escalating and/or intensifying? (separate questions)
- What key events, actions etc. led to the external goal attainment outcome?
- What (in-)significance did other actors (host country, NGO's etc.) have to the outcome?
- (How) did other EU institutions/instruments contribute to the outcome?
- Were there any barriers? Internal barriers (within EU, e.g. other institutions/instruments) and/or external (local, national, regional, international) barriers?

Positive contribution (meaningful/positive/sustainable contribution to conflict transformation)

- think contribution as part of wider conflict prevention efforts (by and beyond the EU)
- consider that sometimes change and sometimes continuity is desirable

EU role & contribution	(In-) significance (positive/negative/none) to overall conflict prevention (see above), linkage to the wider peace process(es)
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Sustainability	Lasting results in the short, medium and long term, local impact (needs met), ownership/engagement and perceptions (positive), sensitivity; (help) building peace, e.g. through (supporting) institutional change, addressing root causes/link to development/ humanitarian aid, DDR, reducing freedom from fear & want
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Suggested research questions

- Did the mission/operation improve conditions for structural conflict prevention?
- Was the knowledge learned from this mission passed on to further prevention initiatives (either by the EU or other actors) in order to address the structural issues (root causes of violence) in the conflict area?
- (To what extent) was the mandate sufficient in order to make a positive/meaningful impact on the conflict?
- To what extent was the mission/operation appropriately manned/equipped/trained in order to achieve a positive impact on the conflict?
- Was the contribution to the conflict made by the mission/operation sustainable? (Did it lead to (e.g. peace/ceasefire) agreements? And if so were they sustainable?)
- To what extent did the mission/operation contribute to a (expected) long-term/lasting sustainable peace?

External appropriateness: extent of proportionality in prevention effort & effect

Proportional prevention

- according to data on (potential) violence: death/casualty/(mass)atrocities/crime figures, risk assessments, early warning systems (EWS), state fragility/failure indexes, Eurobarometer, conflict analyses, public opinions, in-country field work, elite and expert interviews, (participant) observations, etc.

Timely response	Early warning -> early response to (potential) violent conflict
More good than harm done	Positive, sustainable contribution, which outweighs any (potential/expected/actual) harm done, best possible outcome, good enough?
Appropriate means	All appropriate measures considered (incl. non-intervention), (most) appropriate means selected and appropriately applied (no targeting (intentional or not) of civilians (do no harm principle), discrimination between combatants/non-combatants, proportional response/prevention), clarity of intent

Suggested research questions

- To what extent was the conflict warned at an early stage? Could this process have been run more appropriately?

- Was information leading to early warning gathered, analyzed, communicated?
- Did early warning lead to early action? If not, why not?
- What consequences did the mission/operation have for the conflict area? (civil society, local governmental structures and national governmental structures)
- Was discrimination between combatants and non-combatants conducted in an appropriate manner?
- Were these consequences necessary in order to obtain the impact on the conflict contributed by the mission/operation?
- Were these consequences proportionate to the good done by the mission/operation?
- To what extent were the means used appropriate?
- (How) could other means have contributed positively?
- Was the intention of the EU response clear for the country in which the conflict was situated?