PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

3.2 The South Sudan review

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### Revision history

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<tr>
<th>Rev.</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
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<td>10/02/2017</td>
<td>AIES, A.Kammel</td>
<td>Final Submission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 CONTENTS

GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE COUNTRY ..................................................... 5
ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................... 8
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 10
2 Conflict mapping .................................................................................................. 12
2.1. Conflict context ............................................................................................... 12
   2.1.1. The history of South Sudan – from two Civil Wars to the Comprehensive Peace
          Agreement (CPA) .......................................................................................... 12
   2.1.2. The Creation of the SPLA and a new vision for Sudan ............................. 14
   2.1.3. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement – leading to independence of South
          Sudan ............................................................................................................. 17
2.2. Root causes, permissive conditions of the conflict, conflict triggers .................... 19
2.3. Parties to the conflict ....................................................................................... 22
2.4. Consequences of war ...................................................................................... 24
2.5. Dynamics/development of the conflict ............................................................ 24
2.6. Goals, interests, contrasting beliefs of the parties in conflict .............................. 26
2.7. Role of international actors and potential for regulation .................................... 28
   2.7.1. Sudan ........................................................................................................ 29
   2.7.2. Ethiopia .................................................................................................... 30
   2.7.3. Uganda ..................................................................................................... 30
   2.7.4. Kenya ........................................................................................................ 31
   2.7.5. The United States ...................................................................................... 32
   2.7.6. China ........................................................................................................ 33
   2.7.7. United Nations ......................................................................................... 34
2.7.8. IGAD .......................................................................................................................... 35
2.7.9. Outlook ......................................................................................................................... 36
3. The CSDP mission/operation and the conflict ................................................................. 38
  3.1. General approach of the EU to the conflict ................................................................. 38
  3.2. State of the conflict at the time of the establishment of the CSDP mission/operation ................................................................................................................................. 39
  3.3. Establishment of CSDP mission/operation ................................................................. 40
4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 44
List of Interviews ............................................................................................................... 46
List of Reference ............................................................................................................... 48
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE COUNTRY

General information about the country

Official name: Republic of South Sudan

Date of formation: 9 July 2011

Capital: Juba

Population: 11.91 million (2014)

Population density: 17.9 capita per square kilometer

Total area: 644.329 sq. km

Geography: Northeastern Africa

Neighbours: Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic

Official Language: English

Religion: Traditional African Religion, Christianity, Islam

Ethnic mix: about 200 ethnic groups (e.g. Dinka, Nuer, Bari)

Government: Presidential Republic (President: Salva Kiir Mayardit)

Economy: subsistence economy, strongly oil dependent

Export earnings: oil accounts for 99% of exports, 95% of government revenue and about one-half of the GDP

Currency: South Sudanese Pound (SSP)

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### ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHoM</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Mission / Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUAVSEC</td>
<td>European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity (from 2005)</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan (before 2005)</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan (from 2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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D3.2 The South Sudan review

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (formerly IGADD, Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification)</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<td>JMEC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front (became NCP)</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>SPLM/A-IO</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition</td>
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<td>SSNPS</td>
<td>South Sudan National Police Service</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGoNU</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This IECEU project deliverable 3.2, The South Sudan review, assesses the contribution by the EU CSDP mission EUAVSEC to the overall security of the state of South Sudan. EUAVSEC South Sudan was launched in July 2012 following the South Sudan's request for EU support to strengthening security at Juba International Airport, as part of the international community’s overall assistance to the country. A key challenge for South Sudan after independence was to establish a fully operational transport hub for commercial and passenger purposes. Improving airport security will not only contribute to the fight against crime and international terrorism, but also enable the increased flow of people and goods, thus helping to boost trade and promote regional integration. After the security situation in South Sudan deteriorated in December 2013, the mission – although not formally terminated was evacuated and brought to an end when fulfilling its mandated deployment period in January 2014. Although having trained 350 personnel, the contribution to the overall security in South Sudan and its ability to support the South Sudanese Government in terms was limited. However, this does not mean that the mission would not provide valuable information and lessons for the future CSDP missions and operations.

This deliverable explains the historic context of gaining independence in South Sudan after decades of intense civil wars in Sudan which is a pre-condition for understanding the particular contexts in which the EU and especially EUAVSEC South Sudan was functioning, in order to assess, on a strategic level, the processes that led to the mission and to its ultimate closure. The deliverable is divided in two parts. The first part maps out the conflict and the second part describes the particular context in which EUAVSEC was functioning, assessing the mission through its changing activities, as a part of the international effort to strengthen security and stability in South Sudan.

The first part of this deliverable analyses, by using research literature, interviews with EU and mission officials as well as media, the struggle of independence of South Sudan and the development of the internal conflict, starting from its historic roots. This history explains large parts of the volatility of the conflict and many of the conflict related difficulties that the EUAVSEC South Sudan faced. The complex nature of changing allies and partnerships in the
context of tribal, religious and politically motivated dynamics on the ground did not facilitate the EU deployment.

The European Union did not have a strong stance with regard to the independence of South Sudan. This development was mainly driven by the United States and China as well as the international community which saw the potential of a new-born resource rich country that could prosper and lead to economic benefits. Already at the independence celebration of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, in which the author of this analysis personally participated, the subordinated role of the EU became obvious. The former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Baroness Ashton was among the last political leaders to address the cheering population in the act of independence. Therefore, it is no surprise that the EU needed to find its role in the new state of South Sudan. The deployment of the EUAVSEC mission at the airport of Juba in order to enhancing airport and aviation security was only a minor step in the context of developing the country. Therefore it is also no surprise that the mission itself is much unknown in South Sudan today.³

When the EU deployed the mission to South Sudan, the country was on the one hand still in the process of realizing its independence, especially also that the common enemy, the government in Khartoum had disappeared and internal disputes among the top government officials arose. Therefore the EU's desire to establish a mission to tackle especially these problems is understandable, however, considering the difficult context of South Sudan, a better coordination with other actors in the field would have been helpful. Therefore, this deliverable also explains the constellation of regional as well as international actors and closes with providing an outlook of possible future engagement in South Sudan.

³ The majority of interviewees coming from South Sudanese authorities, security organisations and NGOs had only limited knowledge about the mission in particular. The overall EU engagement was positively commented, however, knowledge about the mission itself remained at the real security experts level.
1 INTRODUCTION

The EU’s engagement in South Sudan, the newest state in the world needs to be seen in the EU’s comprehensive approach for Sudan and South Sudan agreed by the EU Foreign Ministers in June 2011. This approach defined the EU’s strategy to post-independent South Sudan, covering all aspects of the EU’s support to this country: political/diplomatic, security and rule of law, stabilisation, development, human rights, humanitarian and trade. Especially in the field of CSDP, EU engagement remained rather low key. Following the request of the South Sudan government to help improving aviation security, the EU decided to launch EUAVSEC South Sudan in July 2012.

In this paper focus is given to the politico-strategic level by analysing i.e. the foundations of EU’s policy towards Sudan and South Sudan and maps out the strategic level thinking behind the mission by providing answer to the question stated in the Grant Agreement to assess the contribution by the CSDP mission EUAVSEC South Sudan to the overall security in South Sudan. It also draws upon the findings of a field trip to South Sudan in April 2016 which due to increasing security tensions in Juba had to be delayed several times and could only take place in a limited timeframe. However, the field trip took place at a time when the return of the government in opposition was envisaged and fears arose that this return could be paired with a new phase of violence in South Sudan.

Methodologically this deliverable combines analysis of research and media sources to the tentative use of interview material. The latter is to be fully utilized in the coming phase of the project. The desktop research focuses on the relevant literature that is mainly driven by think tank publications. This includes the independence process of South Sudan, the outbreak of the internal conflict in South Sudan and the role of other international actors and world politics. Interview material is used more towards the end of this deliverable to analyse the more operational functions of EUAVSEC and how the problems perceivable through the research material were faced on operational level. In accordance with the Grant Agreement, the whole methodological framework for field WPs (WP2, WP3, WP4) rests on the theoretical considerations done within several deliverables of WP1, most importantly D1.4 (Identifying the Success Factors - Indicators) and D1.5 (Conceptual Framework and Methodology).
The Structure of the deliverable is as follows: The first part of this deliverable seeks to analyse in-depth the political context in which the mission was deployed. Beginning with a look to the history of Sudan and South Sudan, the main political actors on both sides, Sudan and South Sudan are described as their role and activities already in unified Sudan are crucial for better understanding the dynamics of the conflict. The different concepts of how South Sudan should develop within the ruling party, the SPLM, can still be witnessed today as well as alliances within South Sudan that date back for more than thirty years. Therefore, South Sudan and its leading elite can best be described as fragmented society based on tribal, religious and political-military traditions and mindsets which is the core source for the conflict till to date. The deliverable then describes the outbreak of the conflict in South Sudan in 2013 and names the different conflicting partners and their political aims. The deliverable then moves to the analysis of the CSDP mission EUAVSEC South Sudan. The mission is first described in short, after which the mission and its rationale is contextualized with the broader EU approach to South Sudan. Finally the mission is assessed against its operational context, the conflict in South Sudan. This deliverable closes with a short outlook at the possible future developments in South Sudan, discussing these from the perspective of establishing another CSDP mission.
2 CONFLICT MAPING

2.1. Conflict context

2.1.1. THE HISTORY OF SOUTH SUDAN – FROM TWO CIVIL WARS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (CPA)

When analyzing the conflict context in South Sudan it is imperative to link it with the history of Sudan which itself is reflecting the historic evolution out of the ancient Kingdom of Kush via the Turkiya (1820-85) and the Mahdiya (1885-98) followed by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial periods till the independence of the country on 1 January 1956. When Muhammed Ali of Egypt sent his soldiers to the South, there was no single name for the lands to conquer. For centuries, the belt of Africa south the Twentieth Parallel North had been known generally as Bilad al-Sudan, the “Land of the Black”, but on the predominantly empty spaces of the maps which showed the territories south of Egypt there were multiple names – Nubia, Kordofan, Sennar and Darfur.\(^4\) Names that are nowadays very often linked with terms such as conflicts, violence, internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Since colonial times, tensions have existed between the Northern and Southern part of Sudan resulting in two civil wars between 1955-1972 and 1983-2005. This conflict has often been portrayed as an ethnic conflict between the largely Arab, Muslim North and the predominantly Christian, African, Animist South. However, the root causes go deeper and can best be described as conflicts between politically and economically marginalized groups in the peripheral areas of the country and the elites of the major urban center in the capital, Khartoum.\(^5\)

This could clearly be witnessed already at the beginning of the first civil war when the departure of the British colonial power was greeted with jubilation in the North and foreboding in the South, where the British were very popular. In fact, the southern Sudanese had always regarded the British as their deliverers and protectors, while they viewed the northerners as slave traders and tormentors.\(^6\) In the first democratic elections in independent Sudan in 1958,

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\(^5\) Keen (2001), 220.
\(^6\) Natsios (2012), 41.
the two major Islamic parties won almost half of the seats in the National Assembly and the new government was accompanied by high public expectations which were soon disappointed and led to a bloodless coup by General Ibrahim Abbud, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Military. Abbud and his fellow generals believed that the only way to unify and control the country was to extend Arab culture and Islam to the South, which they proceeded to do so, also by restricting the activities and presence of Christian missionaries in the South. This caused an outflow of many Southerners to neighboring Uganda and Kenya and tensions against the leadership arose reaching its peak in 1964 when student turmoils led to mass demonstrations and popular uprising which came to be known as the “October Revolution”. Although major civilian bloodshed could be avoided, the Abbud regime was confronted with a phenomenon that could be later again witnessed in the history of Sudan, namely the Khartoum professional elites, labor unions and students bringing down dictatorships through mass, if mostly peaceful demonstrations.\(^7\) In the Southern part, no political leader emerged out of this new developments. As the Abbud regime was not able to transform the country and re-start the economy leading to another bloodless coup by Colonel Jaafar al-Numayri on 25 May 1969, a new regime which stayed in power until 1985.

Despite the fact that the first years of the Numayri government proved to be the most prominent ones for solving the Southern problem, however, also in the South, forces joined up under the leadership of Joseph Lagu and supported by Israeli weaponry to combat the Karthoum regime. By 1971, it became obvious that the problem of the South could not be solved militarily. Numayri tried to solve the issue in a peaceful manner by bringing the different party fractions together in Addis Ababa to bring an end to the civil war. At the side of Joseph Lagu, a young officer caught particular attention, John Garang who would later on become the founding father and spiritus rector of South Sudan. In 1973, Numayri drafted a secular constitution which declared Sudan to be both, Arab and African, creating a secular state that would not impose Islamic law on nonbelievers. His reforms were strictly opposed by the Islamic parties in the National Assembly and led to a failed coup against him on 2 July 1976. As a consequence, Numayri changed his moderate political course and began to adopt an Islamic agenda for Sudan and the Addis Ababa talks found an abrupt end. On 5 June 1983, President Numayri announced the promulgation of Republican Order Number One, which broke the South into three separate capitals, replaced the southern Regional Assembly in Juba with three much weaker legislative bodies without independent fiscal authority, eliminated the separate

\[^7\] Ibid., 45.
southern army units and substituted Arabic for English as the official language. Already a bit earlier, the so-called Bor mutiny had triggered the second civil war at a time when Numayri had started to redeploying southern troops to the North. One battalion, the Bor battalion, refused this order. It was led by John Garang. In the following outbreak of the civil war, Garang and his troops withdrew to Ethiopia. About 3,000 southern troops deserted the Sudanese Armed Forces and joined the civil war. All in all, this force grew to 10,000 troops within two years, with another 20,000 being trained in Ethiopia. On 31 July 1983, Garang as commander-in-chief announced the creation of both the unified Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) as its civilian arm. By the end of 1985, Garang was in control of most of the South.\(^8\)

### 2.1.2. THE CREATION OF THE SPLA AND A NEW VISION FOR SUDAN

In the beginning, the SPLA/M was a mixture of Maoist and Marxist militarism, drawn largely from the Ethiopian neighbor and became quickly a popular force against the SAF and the government in Khartoum.\(^9\) Garang started to work out a new vision for Sudan and especially for its southerners. He argued that the Nile River Arabs were taking the resource from the periphery of the country inward to fund a higher level of development, education and standard of living and developed a “center versus the periphery” concept which kept its importance throughout the years to come. Secondly, Garang was in favor of the Sudan as a multiethnic, secular state against the overall understanding of an Arab Islamist state. Thirdly, he advocated a reformed, but united Sudanese state, although the majority of SPLA generals that fought in the civil wars supported complete independence which made the argument of unity the most problematic part of Garang’s vision.\(^10\) With the Civil War continuing, Garang evolved from a Bor County Dinka to the leader of the southern Sudanese civil war.

In 1985, while Numayri was on a visit to the United States, the SAF took over control again, ousted Numayri and called for parliamentary elections which brought a victory for the Umma party of Sadiq al-Mahdi. Sadiq’s main strategy was to keep the civil war away from Khartoum in the South which led to a further raise of the popularity of Garang and the SPLA. At the same

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\(^8\) Ibid., 66.  
\(^9\) Le Riche/Arnold (2012), 64.  
\(^10\) Natsios (2011), 68.
time, a humanitarian crisis in the South erupted leading to mass migration of young men to the Ethiopian refugee camps that Garang converted into SPLA training camps. Ironically, Sadiq had become the chief recruiter for the expansion of SPLA.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, he tried to revive the idea of holding peace talks with Garang which infuriated a group of Islamist driven politicians, including his foreign Minister Hassan al-Turabi. On 30 June 1989, just at a point when Sadiq was about to leave the country for peace negotiations with Garang, a group of mid-ranking army officers led by Brigade General Omar al-Bashir staged a coup in order to stop the peace talks. The third period of democratic rule in modern Sudanese history came to an end. Bashir set up new internal security apparatus in order to stop any Western influence and introduced for the first time a regime based on repression. Bashir together with Turabi also changed the foreign policy of the country, withdrawing it from the west and focusing on partnerships with other Islamic countries to provide for a worldwide Islamic revolution. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, traditionally supportive to SPLA activities saved Sudan which suffered defeat after defeat in the Second Civil War whereas Garang’s military grew steadily from the start of war in 1983 until 1991.\textsuperscript{12}

After the coup in Ethiopia by Meles Zenawi, however, the traditional support lines for Garang and SPLA ceased to exist leading to internal fights within SPLA. Garang and the SPLA/M were forced to become more like a classic revolutionary movement, one relying on the public for support.\textsuperscript{13} In August 1991, three senior commanders, Riek Machar, a Nuer, Lam Akol, a Shilluk, and Gordon Kong, another Nuer – later known as the “Nasir Faction”\textsuperscript{14} broadcasted that they had removed Garang. In their leadership, there was no place for any Dinka commander. This revolution reached its peak in the Bor massacre when the Nasir Faction attacked Bor County and massacred and displaced the majority of the population. It also became obvious at that time that the Khartoum government was supporting Machar and his rebel colleagues. Bashir continued the strategy started by Sadiq al-Mahdi to crush Garang’s forces by turning one tribe against another using weapons, patronage and money. Effectively the obvious split among the southerners, also among their tribal lines gave a failing northern military campaign a new life. Years of darkness, serious struggle and negotiations followed. In

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, 77.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 97.
\textsuperscript{13} Le Riche/Arnold (2012), 93.
\textsuperscript{14} Natsios (2012), 98.
1994 a National Convention was held, giving new impetus for SPLA/M and Garang. Garang won the elections with another leading commander, Salva Kiir chosen as his deputy.\textsuperscript{15} At the same time, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) began mediating between the warring parties. The first milestone was a Declaration of Principles (DoP) achieved in September 1994, postulating the right of Southern self-determination through a referendum and secular democracy within a unified Sudan. Although the ruling party in Khartoum, the National Congress Party (NCP) disagreed on most of the points raised within the DoP, the talks continued and a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains was perceived as a litmus test for the warring parties’ sincerity with regard to more comprehensive peace efforts.\textsuperscript{16} The years of IGAD-led discussions were finally formalized in the so-called Machakos Protocoll that provided the basis for the subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) process and later on became known as chapter 1 of the CPA related to broad principles of governance and government. Over 2003 and 2004, the subsequent six thematic protocols were negotiated and signed in Naivasha, Kenya:

- The Protocol on Power Sharing (or Chapter II), on 26 May 2004
- The Agreement on Wealth Sharing (or Chapter III), on 7 January 2004
- The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area (or Chapter IV), on 26 May 2004
- The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (or Chapter V), on 26 May 2004
- The Agreement on Security Arrangements (or Chapter VI), on 25 September 2003
- The Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (or Annexure I), on 30 October 2004 and
- The Implementation Modalities and Global Implementation Matrix and Appendices (or Annexure II), on 31 December 2004.

The final, comprehensive agreement was signed on 9 January 2005 and marked the commencement of implementation activities or as John Garang stated: “The biggest challenge will be the implementation of the peace agreement.”\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Le Riche/Arnold (2012), 95.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 108.
\textsuperscript{17} Garang speech at CPA signing, 9 January 2005, Naivasha, Kenya.
2.1.3. THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT – LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH SUDAN

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, also referred to as the Naivasha Agreement, is the most crucial milestone in the ongoing political development of Sudan, ending Africa’s bloodiest war between the northern and the southern part of the country. In fact, the agreement established a seven-year transition period, de-facto autonomy for southern Sudan, a unity government in Khartoum, and incorporated agreements on security, boundaries, revenue sharing from southern oil fields and the administration of three contested areas straddling North and South. The CPA also led to the elaboration of a new constitution foreseeing national elections to be held in 2009, followed by a referendum on independence for the South in 2011.

The CPA’s Interim Period began on 9 July 2005 when John Garang was sworn in as First Vice-President and declared that the Interim Period represented the “Second Republic of New Sudan’ as it would lead to peaceful, democratic unity for Africa’s biggest state.” All this euphoria however was punctured when Garang under mysterious circumstances was killed in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005. He was replaced by Salva Kiir Mayardit and, although delayed, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) was established on 20 September, the autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS) came into existence on 22 October.

The CPA offered a new system of sharing wealth and power between north and south and promised a new political dispensation in the whole country. However, it followed more the Khartoum Peace agreement rather than the original IGAD declaration in somewhat tacitly accepting the cultural dominance of Islam and accepting the NCP’s vision of the state. The original SPLA/M vision of a new, secular Sudan was abandoned.

The CPA also foresaw two referenda that were supposed to be held by the January 9th 2011 deadline. The first stipulated a vote on the future status of South Sudan. The second would determine whether Abyei, a region which straddles the North and South, will maintain special administrative status in the North, as defined under the CPA, or become part of the South, “irrespective of the outcome of the south’s own referendum on secession” (IRIN 2010). As foreseen by the CPA, a referendum on the independence of South Sudan was held in January

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18 Garang speech, 9 July 2005, Khartoum.
19 Le Riche/Arnold (2012), 115.
2011. With an overwhelming majority, the South Sudanese population voted in favor of separation from Sudan. It has to be noted that contrary to the outside expectations, the referendum was held in a fair and peaceful manner. Already in the forefront of the proclamation of the referendum results, Sudanese President Bashir\(^{21}\) publicly stated that he would accept the outcome: “Today we received these results and we accept and welcome these results because they represent the will of the southern people.”\(^{22}\)

South Sudan’s establishment as a nation ended a painful transformation: from being a contested region within the country (“Southern Sudan”) to being an independent state (“the Republic of South Sudan”).\(^{23}\) Nonetheless, it became obvious that some important issues between the two split states had not been entirely resolved before the break-up of Sudan - to large extent leftovers of an incomplete implementation of the CPA. Interdependences still exist in areas such as oil, border demarcation and grassing rights, expats and citizenship, debts and sanctions as well as the unresolved issue of the contested region of Abyei.

While 9 July 2011 signaled the end of the CPA’s interim period, Sudan’s and South Sudan’s transition to peace is still far from complete – the ongoing violence in the border areas is threatening to spiral out of control, many of Sudan’s humanitarian and political problems remain unresolved and there are serious threats to civilians in both Sudan and South Sudan.

After more than two decades of civil war, it was hoped that this separation would finally lead to a peaceful coexistence of the two states.

In mid-December 2013 however, after just two and a half years of being an independent state, conflict in South Sudan broke out again resulting in Civil War. The conflict started by the accusation and imprisonment of senior government figures by President Kiir accusing them of mismanagement and corruptive practices, among them Foreign Minister Deng Alor, but also leading SPLA/M officials like Secretary General Pagan Amum and moreover the sacking of Vice-President Riek Machar.

In fact, being one of the most fragile countries worldwide, South Sudan deals with serious religious, gender and tribal divides that deeply fracture its society. Therefore, the violence quickly spread from the capital to other locations as well – across the Greater Upper Nile Region, including Jonglei and Unity -, resulting in a wide political and security crisis. The

\(^{21}\) It was his firm position that the only way of ending the war would be the independence of South Sudan, see Interview No 22.

\(^{22}\) Financial Times (2011).

\(^{23}\) LeRiche/Arnold (2012), 1.
conflict combines various aspects, such as: continuing tensions in key areas along the border with neighbour Sudan; incessant rebel militia activities in different states; sporadic cattle raids; ethnic disputes reinforced by a weak South Sudanese national identity; the ever-present threat of the emergence of new security challenges and the lack of political will, both from the government and from the opposition, to take the negotiations seriously and make necessary compromises. In addition to all that, essential issues including border demarcation and oil have not yet been satisfactory resolved. Although South Sudan has plenty of oil reserves, the only pipeline runs through Sudan and therefore oil has been a contentious issue between the two neighbours.24

2.2. Root causes, permissive conditions of the conflict, conflict triggers

South Sudan’s independence declared in 2011, backed by the vote of 99 percent of its population did not bring expected peace nor stability to the country.25 What seemed to be a promising beginning brought another civil war instead. The conflict has its roots in longstanding political issues and a dysfunctional political system. Permanent disagreements within the ruling party Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)26 and the army, different interests of the leading actors and their competition for power, weak institutions, and state corruption led to the escalation of the situation in the newest country of the world.27

Moreover, the renewed conflict was triggered by tensions having an ethnical dimension, which created mistrust between President Kiir as a member of the Dinka ethnic group and former Vice president Machar of the Nuer ethnic group. The origin of the conflict is dated back to the events of July 2013, when President Salva Kiir dismissed his entire cabinet including Vice-

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President Machar after being accused of having dictatorial tendencies.\textsuperscript{28} Clashes erupted on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of December between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and former Vice-President Machar on the streets of Juba after an infiltrated leadership meeting of the SPLM.\textsuperscript{29} Kiir adhered to the violence as being a coup attempt by Machar, who in response denied this statement.\textsuperscript{30} The presence of ethnic militia groups, an armed opposition and easy access to weapons and ammunition as well as lack of capacity to prevent the illicit flow of armaments allowed the violence to quickly spread to Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states.\textsuperscript{31}

Persisting tensions over the sharing of oil revenues and the unresolved status of the contested Abyei region also presents an endangering aspect to peace and security. As crude in South Sudan constitutes 90 percent of its income, this resource has become of significant importance to the militant groups in the key town of Bentiu and other concerned areas.\textsuperscript{32}

The ongoing civil war is marked by brutal violence against civilians, leaving high rates of death, displaced civilians, wide-spread sexual abuses against women and the use of child soldiers. Tens of thousands have died in the fighting, 1.66 million people have been internally displaced during the past years and another 646,000 citizens fled to neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{33} South Sudanese society is characterized as being patriarchal which has in a significant way affected the development of the nation and caused major gender inequality.\textsuperscript{34} Therefore, it is important to involve men and woman in better understanding of gender mainstreaming and the promotion of woman´s rights by implementing advocacy projects that intend to educate the general public.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect \url{http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-south-sudan} quoted 7.4.2016.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Matt Purple \url{http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-sudan-forgotten-still-turmoil-13969} quoted 7.4.2016.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Peace Direct \url{http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/south-sudan/conflict-profile/} quoted 7.4.2016.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Matt Purple \url{http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-sudan-forgotten-still-turmoil-13969?page=2} quoted 7.4.2016.
\item \textsuperscript{33} United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) \url{https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/2016_SouthSudan/SouthSudan_HNO_2016.pdf} quoted 7.4.2016.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Jane Kani Edward \url{http://www.suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/Gender-EqualityfmtSR.pdf} quoted 7.4.2016.
\end{itemize}
on the importance of the role women and men have in political, economic aspects within the society.\textsuperscript{35}

Women in South Sudan experience inequality worsened by the effects of the conflict in obtaining their basic rights. The main problems with which the South Sudanese women tackle are:

a) High illiteracy rates (84\%\textsuperscript{36}) and thus inability to participate in politics and public affairs of the country (Only 27\% of parliamentary seats are held by women\textsuperscript{37})

b) Health challenges (81 \% births are unattended\textsuperscript{38})

c) Poverty and food insecurity

d) Practices such as early marriage and gender-based violence

e) The gendered division of labour (restrict women from accumulating wealth and achieve economic independence)

f) Education

g) Sexual violence (worsened by the conflict)\textsuperscript{39}

South Sudan’s 2005 Interim Constitution guarantees human rights and equality for all (GoSS, 2005), however numerous rules of customary law continue to violate women’s rights. The 2005 Interim Constitution remains the highest law of the country until a final constitution is drafted. About 40 laws have been drafted for the new state, within these also legislation that has direct impact on women’s security, such as the Penal Code Act (2008), which sets out various criminal offences.\textsuperscript{40} Although the gender issue became part of political discussions, decisions and is being addressed by the South Sudanese government as well as international

\textsuperscript{35} SSuDEMOP \url{http://ssudemop.org/programs/engagements} quoted 8.4.2016.

\textsuperscript{36} Women for Women International \url{http://www.womenforwomen.org/what-we-do/countries/south-sudan} quoted 8.4.2016.

\textsuperscript{37} See above.

\textsuperscript{38} See above

\textsuperscript{39} Jane Kani Edward \url{http://www.suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/Gender-EqualityfmtSR.pdf} quoted 8.4.2016.

\textsuperscript{40} Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) \url{http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3562.pdf} quoted 8.4.2016.
organizations (Women for women international\textsuperscript{41}) women still highly suffer from discrimination, marginalization, human rights abuses and gender-based violence.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite the fact that South Sudan’s 2008 Child Act forbids the use of child soldiers, a minimum age of 18 is set for any conscription or voluntary recruitment into armed forces or groups, child soldiers in South Sudan still remain a common reality.\textsuperscript{43} The brutality of the civil war had devastating effects on the children in South Sudan. According to UNICEF, in the past year more than 16,000 children were recruited and used as soldiers by SPLA and SPLA in opposition, although this is considered to be a war crime.\textsuperscript{44} A large increase in the number of violations with a total of 514 incidents affecting 16,307 children could be seen in the country in the past year. The violations were associated with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (310) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) (108), but also with the South Sudan National Police Service, the South Sudan Wildlife Service, the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army-Cobra Faction (SSDM/A-CF), the White Army.\textsuperscript{45} According to the latest OCHA South Sudan report, nearly one in every three schools in South Sudan has been destroyed, damaged, occupied or closed and this had an impact on the education of more than 900,000 children.\textsuperscript{46}

\section*{2.3. Parties to the conflict}

The main parties of the conflict, which broke out in December 2013 and is due to end by April 2016, are on the one hand factions loyal to President Salva Kiir and on the other hand the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{41} Women for Women International \url{http://www.womenforwomen.org/what-we-do/countries/south-sudan} quoted 8.4.2016.
\bibitem{42} Nada Mustafa Ali \url{http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR298.pdf} quoted 8.4.2016.
\bibitem{44} UNOCHA \url{https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/2016_SouthSudan/SouthSudan_HNO_2016.pdf} quoted 9.4.2016.
\bibitem{45} Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict \url{https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/south-sudan} quoted 9.4.2016.
\bibitem{46} UNOCHA \url{https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/2016_SouthSudan/SouthSudan_HNO_2016.pdf} quoted 9.4.2016.
\end{thebibliography}
supporters of former Vice President Riek Machar. The conflict is often presented as a personal competition of power between the two but in fact, there are powerful blocs of actors supporting each side. Since President Kiir is an ethnic Dinka - the largest ethnic group in the country - and his opponent Mr. Machar belongs to the Nuer, which is the second largest group, the conflict quickly turned into an ethnic one as well.

*Ethiopia*, the only country in the region having common borders with both Sudan and South Sudan, generally seeks to promote friendly relations. The erupted crisis has provoked an influx of large numbers of refugees into Ethiopia, which poses a direct security threat to the country.47 *Kenya* would also suffer from South Sudan’s territorial disintegration and is therefore also in favor of ending the conflict as soon as possible. In contrast, for neighbor *Sudan* a protracted civil war in South Sudan would be in some ways beneficial, helping it reestablish its influence over South Sudanese politics. Various regional organizations that seek to mediate have so far been unsuccessful, mostly because their members also have competing interests.

The *United Nations*, mainly through UNMISS, is strongly involved in protecting civilians, with currently up to 12,500 military and 1,323 police personnel.48 Mediation efforts by the *East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development* (IGAD) and the so called *Troika*, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway, were not as successful as originally hoped. To overcome the various challenges, IGAD announced a revised, expanded mediation, the now called IGAD-PLUS, including the AU, UN, China, U.S., UK, EU, Norway and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), which so far has failed to gain the necessary backing from the wider international community.49 The *European Union*, notably through the Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, strongly supported and encouraged the above mentioned mediation efforts and also announced that it will impose targeted sanctions, against individuals obstructing the South Sudanese peace process, in order to avoid further escalations in the region (10th July 2014).50 *China*, which in the meantime has extensive oil and infrastructure investments in the Republic of South Sudan, as well as similar interests in

Sudan, needs a regional stability in order to further advance its political and economic interests there and has therefore also taken on an important mediator role.\textsuperscript{51}

### 2.4. Consequences of war

The outbreak of an armed conflict following the events of December 2013 has drastically changed the prospects for South Sudan. Human rights violations and atrocities against civilians are immense, mortality rates especially amongst women and children continue to rise, famine and the prospects of a major humanitarian disaster are looming. The wider implications for the whole region cannot be underestimated either. So far, during the civil war, more than 2 million South Sudanese were displaced internally while some 628,000 fled across borders, stretching the finances and capabilities of neighboring states.\textsuperscript{52} Nearly 3 million people are in need of emergency food assistance and the numbers of those seeking shelter and protection in UN bases continues to rise. In 2015 the European Union and its Member States contributed €384 million in humanitarian funding whilst the UN has declared South Sudan a level-3 emergency – the highest level of humanitarian crisis. The crisis also affected children which have been recruited as child soldiers in large numbers since the outbreak of the conflict. Economically, it is estimated that the conflict has cost the country approximately 15\% of its potential GDP in 2014.\textsuperscript{53} Oil production has decreased significantly, while military expenditure and the depth poverty have increased.

### 2.5. Dynamics/development of the conflict

The start of the conflict is dated back to the aforementioned dismissal of the cabinet and Vice-president Machar by President Kiir in July 2013. The conflict turned into a civil war by the escalation of violence in late December 2013 after an infiltrated SPLM leadership meeting.

\textsuperscript{51} Alex Fielding \url{http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/06/south-sudan-china-africa/} quoted 10.4.2016.
\textsuperscript{52} Kate Almquist Knopf \url{http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ARP-4-EN.pdf} quoted 10.4.2016.
Fighting broke out between the forces loyal to President Kiir and forces loyal to former Vice-President Machar after Kiir accused Machar of plotting to overthrow him. The violence quickly spread to Juba and to Unity and Jonglei States. The Dinka members of the Presidential Guard attacked the Nuer, whereby the White Army of Nuer responded by targeting their enemy.54

The conflict is marked by significant brutality leaving ten thousands dead. Rebel factions attacked several regional towns and forced many civilians to flee the country. In January 2014 a ceasefire was signed but broken subsequently. The further talks in February did not end the violence, moreover caused the displacement of more than a million people by April. Former Vice-President Machar fled the country and was as follows charged with treason. April was marked by grave killing, which was conducted by the Machar forces near the town of Bentiu and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. By the end of May 2014 the conflict displaced more than a million people and brought five million people in need of humanitarian aid. In fact, in July 2014 the UN Security Council described the food crisis in South Sudan as the worst the world has ever seen. August 2014 was marked by peace talks in Addis Ababa held after months of fighting.

At the beginning of the year 2015 the planned General elections due in June were cancelled because of the ongoing violence. Following March 2015 after successful negotiations with UNICEF rebels released 250 child soldiers. According to UNICEF, more than 16,000 child soldiers are involved in the conflict. August 2015 brought another ceasefire signed by President Salva Kiir under which fugitive Machar is expected to return as vice-president. This peace-deal called for a formation of a transitional government for three years.55 The expected process has been slowed down by the unilateral decision of President Kiir to split South Sudan´s 10 states into 28, which almost triples the awaited number. This act undermined a fundamental pillar of the power-sharing deal.56

Despite some missed deadlines, the beginning of the year 2016 seems to be a promising start to an end. There is hope that the conflict may take a peaceful path. On the 12th of January South Sudanese parties agreed to reveal the names of ministers that they have chosen in order to compose the cabinet and form a transitional government of national unity, which is a

major step forward. The parties also agreed to maintain humanitarian access across the country. The TGoNU should be formed by 22 January 2016 according to a statement from JMEC. The government will run for the period of thirty months as a coalition government, afterwards elections will take place in 2018.\textsuperscript{57} Former vice-president Machar was about to return to the national capital, Juba, to make the new government formation complete by mid-April.\textsuperscript{58} His arrival was postponed several times but he finally returned to Juba after having provided with many security guarantees on 26 April 2016 and sworn-in as Vice-President of the new Unity Government.

2.6. Goals, interests, contrasting beliefs of the parties in conflict

After gaining independence in 2011, the world’s youngest country was economically, socially and politically unstable, and has faced diverse problems. The transformation of the SPLM liberation movement into South Sudan’s ruling political party lacked checks and balances and instruments to address grievances.\textsuperscript{59} The fighting in South Sudan erupted at the end of 2013 between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and those associated with former Vice President Riek Machar.\textsuperscript{60} The reasons for the unrest were manifold, associated with failure to resolve disputes within the ruling party and the army, wide-spread state corruption, weak institutions, the presence of violent ethnic militias, a dysfunctional political system and a competition in oil resource interests.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{57} Sudan Tribune \url{http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57670} quoted 12.4.2016.
\textsuperscript{58} See above.
\textsuperscript{60} Human Rights Watch \url{https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/south-sudan} quoted 12.4.2016.
As South Sudan is a petro-state with crude constituting 90 percent of its income, persistent tensions over the oil revenues occur between the militant groups in the key town of Bentiu\textsuperscript{62} and other areas constantly ambushing peace.\textsuperscript{63}

South Sudan’s ongoing conflict has its roots in a long-running competition for power and profit within the elite class. From 10 to 20% of the country’s revenue is received by the states and rural areas, but the rest remains in Juba and this has become the prize in which the country’s armed actors are interested in.\textsuperscript{64} However, there is more to the conflict. South Sudan is very diverse having 17 different ethnic groups and 2 official languages.\textsuperscript{65} Tensions began to increase between the two largest ethnic groups of South Sudan -the Dinka and the Nuer -and as a result political rivalries evolved to an ethnic conflict.\textsuperscript{66} Ethnic differences between President Kiir, being a member of the Dinka group and the former Vice-President, member of the Nuer, created mistrust between the two main actors of the turmoil, which started with the events of July 2013. After South Sudan’s President Kiir’s leadership was challenged and after he was accused of dictatorship and repression of free speech by his cabinet, Kirr responded by dismissing his entire cabinet including Vice-President Machar. (The two leaders had previously fought for power in the SPLA’s fight for independence from Khartoum in the 1990’s see chapter 2.1.).

In November 2013 the President announced the dissolution of all internal party structures after the tensions continued. The situation escalated following a meeting on 15 December 2013 that was allegedly infiltrated by former Vice-President Machar, subsequently Kiir accused Machar of attempting a coup and ordered the arrest of several political and military figures. In response, Machar alleged President Kiir of initiating ethnic violence. After these events fighting broke out between Nuer and Dinka members of the presidential guard.\textsuperscript{67} The fighting quickly spread to

\textsuperscript{64} The Sentry \url{https://thesentry.org/reports/south-sudan/} quoted 13.4.2016.
Juba and in Unity and Jonglei States. The Dinka members of the Presidential Guard showed violence against Nuer, whereby the White Army of Nuer, responded by targeting their enemy.68

In January 2014 a ceasefire was signed but was broken several times in the upcoming weeks, and subsequent talks in February failed to end the violence that caused the displacement of more than a million people by April 2014. After the aforementioned events Machar fled the country and was charged with treason.69 After several peace talks and under the pressure of UN sanctions in August 2015, President Kiir signed an internationally-mediated ceasefire, which included the return of fugitive Machar as Vice-President. This peace-talk called for a formation of a transitional government for three years.70

24 November was a deadline set for a rebel delegation - including Machar - to return to Juba and begin work as part of a “transitional government of national unity”, however this deadline was not met. At the end of the year 2015 low-level fighting continued in the northern and southwestern parts of the country.71

With the beginning of the year 2016 new hope arose that a two year brutal civil war may come to an end. Warring parties are about to form a Transitional Government of National Unity. A new cabinet has been decided upon, concerning 16 ministries going to the government, 10 to the main opposition, two to the group of the Former Detainees, and two ministries to other opposition parties. Despite a few missed deadlines a significant progress in achieving the goal of national unity has been made in the process.72

2.7. Role of international actors and potential for regulation

The reactions of the international actors on the outbreak of the civil war in South Sudan in late December 2013 were diverse, due to the competing interests of the countries involved.

70 See above.
71 See above
2.7.1. SUDAN
Starting with the neighbouring Sudan, this country continues to complicate peace with South Sudan by providing southern rebels with weapons, funds and ammunition. The status of the contested Abyei region and the interests in oil revenues constitute a challenge to peace and security in South Sudan.73 The rebels from Sudan joined the fight on the side of Juba after the outbreak of the clashes and thus triggered fights over the sharing of oil revenues in the region. Khartoum’s 2013 rapprochement with Juba largely survived the war’s onset. Sudan’s largely constructive position and participation in the mediation is part and parcel of its efforts to rehabilitate its international reputation. This change of perception has been ordered top down and President Bashir is trying to move his country back to the international organisations.74

Support to the SPLM/A-IO has been far less than most anticipated. Sudan is able to work with both the government and Machar, and while it is not enamoured with either, the current constellation keeps the FD (some are its most hardline opponents) in political exile, perhaps the most important point for Sudan. It also raises the stakes of the SPLM dialogue process. However, for the SPLA-IO, even the relatively small amount of war material it receives from Sudan and the ability to operate relatively freely in its territory are critical, and represent most of its external support.75 From an economic perspective, Sudan (together with China) has expressed its support for Kiir´s forces in order to stabilise the flow of southern oil through its territory, as oil represents one of the main sources of income for Sudan. Sudan’s reaction also reflects a means to address its internal issues. President Omar al-Bashir has an interest in weakening the Popular Movement-North that is opposed to his rule, through supporting President Kiir.76 Due to Sudan’s multiple interests, it will continue to support the IGAD mediation, seek to protect the Upper Nile oil fields and use Juba’s challenges to its benefit. Nonetheless, Sudan has proven to be a stable force within the region and thereby also stabilizing neighboring South Sudan.77

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74 See Interview No. 22.
77 See Interview No. 23.
2.7.2. ETHIOPIA

As to South Sudan’s neighbour country Ethiopia, its role is becoming crucial and its influence on the states in the region is constantly increasing. Ethiopia was one of the first countries which showed concern over the crisis, whereas Addis Ababa is maintaining negotiations with South Sudan in order to reach a political solution to the crisis. This is very much due to the fact as the chair of IGAD. There is a widespread perception that Addis Ababa is the driving force behind the mediation between Kiir and Machar and that it carefully protects this role. In general, Ethiopia believes that its national interests are best served by a policy of neutrality. South Sudan borders Ethiopia’s restive Gambella state, inhabited by Anuyak and Nuer (who also reside in South Sudan). The area is the location of significant foreign investment in large agriculture schemes. Addis Ababa would like to avoid further upsetting the delicate ethnic balance between Anuyak and Nuer in Gambella or otherwise adding to insecurity. There are also economic interests in trade and infrastructure development that were increasing before the war.78

2.7.3. UGANDA

The relations between Sudan and South Sudan have underwent turbulent histories and became stormy in the 1970s, when General Idi Amin overthrew President Obote in a military coup. From the point of view of Khartoum, Uganda under Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni was becoming a rear base for the SPLA. Therefore, Sudan always supported elements fighting the government in Kampala such as the Okellos and starting in 1993, Joseph Kony’s Lord Resistance Army (LRA). This was also in line with the Sudanese approach in destabilizing the new GoSS in Juba by supporting the LRA.

Uganda has benefited economically from the CPA. South Sudan being oil-rich, but unindustrialized, imports many goods from Uganda and also employs many Ugandan skilled workers. In economic terms, South Sudan could be described as a Kenyan/Ugandan colony, a state of affairs that has caused much resentment on the Sudanese side and has fed border

When examining the regional interactions with the crisis, it is clear that Uganda’s forces participated along with the forces of President Kiir and thus strengthened the involvement of the country in the crisis. President Yoweri Museveni can thus be considered as Juba’s staunchest ally and Uganda is perceived as the kingmaker in the whole struggle in South Sudan. Uganda’s posture is shaped by deep animosity toward Sudan and an often visceral dislike of former South Sudan Vice President Riek Machar, now head of the SPLM/A-IO. Complicating matters, some Former Detainees (FDs) are among Uganda’s strongest ideological allies, while some in Kiir’s inner circle have strong links with Sudan. Although the Ugandan troops have withdrawn from South Sudan, Uganda is maintaining its presence and interests in South Sudan in order to support its exports to this country and is showing efforts to stabilize the conflict. Uganda recognises the conflict has no military solution yet maintains its original deployments, having neither increased its troop numbers nor significantly expanded its areas of operation for over a year. Kampala is not opposed to a deal yet it has also failed to solidly promote a political solution, leaving IGAD without the full support of one of its critical members as it establishes the parameters of a peace agreement, including transitional governance arrangements and third-party security.

2.7.4. KENYA

Although Kenya has been used as a rear base by the SPLA/M during most of the civil war, the country always had largely non-conflictual relations with the government in Khartoum. This was very much based on the fact that Kenya was an economic and refugee rear base for the struggling southern Sudanese movement but never a military rear base. Kenya thus also had a rather neutral stance with regard to the developments in South Sudan. Nairobi’s South Sudan policy is guided by the desire for stability necessary to secure its economic interests and growing diplomatic profile in the region and beyond. The economic interests include the East African Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor infrastructure project building a trade corridor from a new mega-port near Lamu, Kenya. Transport of South Sudan’s oil is important to the project’s economic viability. See Crisis Group Report, South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, op. cit., pp. 18-19.


The economic interests include the East African Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor infrastructure project building a trade corridor from a new mega-port near Lamu, Kenya. Transport of South Sudan’s oil is important to the project’s economic viability. See Crisis Group Report, South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
became a market for Kenyan entrepreneurship during the war and there are many plans for further developing this economic partnerships including also an oil pipeline and a railway line. However, unlike the CPA negotiations, Kenya has rarely led during this process, preferring to stay neutral among sparring neighbours and between the warring parties. In 2014, Kenya secured the FDs’ release and hosted them in a secure location in Nairobi and a year later their return to Juba. However, Kenya’s overriding focus on security issues at home and in Somalia and its complex interests in South Sudan mean it is likely to continue seeking middle-ground and a solution that secures its economic interests and limits calls for criminal accountability.

2.7.5. THE UNITED STATES

For over two decades, the United States has been an important partner in trying to solve the internal struggles in Sudan. During the early years of the South Sudanese liberation struggle, the United States maintained good relations with the government of Sudan till the coup led by President Bashir. From that moment onwards, Sudan and especially the Bashir Government were considered as rogue state and sanction on the regime were imposed leading to an anti-American climate especially in North Sudan. Also the United States continued to favour South Sudan over Sudan and keeping the latter on its black list.

Relations between the SPLA/M and the US begin to expand in the early 1990s and the US took clear stance for the independence of South Sudan. The US was the strongest international supporter and largest donor of South Sudan since the gained independence in 2011. Regarding the recent civil war, the US policy towards South Sudan has changed in terms of supporting the members of the insurgency. Washington called for the release of political prisoners through the means of the UN Security Council with the aim to support the demand


84 During the CPA negotiations, Kenya was the IGAD Chair while Ethiopia is the current IGAD chair and thus leading the mediation.
86 Dagne (2012), 12.
87 See Interview No. 23.
88 See Interview No. 22.
made by former Vice-President Machar.\textsuperscript{89} The US is laying pressure on the regime in South Sudan to achieve its foreseen interests. US stated that there can be no military solution to this conflict.\textsuperscript{90} However, the US has rarely been able to influence the process in ways it desires, either as a donor or political partner.\textsuperscript{91} There seemed to be limited political will and interest by the administration in the US to invest in South Sudan and the region to end the conflict has not matched U.S. objectives. By the end of 2014, the U.S. was growing increasingly disenchanted with IGAD. Proposals to provide greater support to and gain more influence over IGAD through high-level engagement were scuttled in Washington. There was, perhaps, a partisan reluctance to use senior figures from past administrations as well as an unwillingness to significantly challenge Ugandan policy.\textsuperscript{92} Looking at the peace talks, the US administration especially got frustrated when IGAD charted its own path. The US-backed sanctions appear designed to appease domestic constituencies by making a stand against mass atrocities at a time they were occurring on an unprecedented scale, rather than to end the war.

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2.7.6. CHINA
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The conflict also serves as a means of equalizing the Chinese presence in Juba. Since South Sudan´s independence, bilateral economic cooperation with China has grown significantly. Oil continues to present the most crucial component of this bilateral relationship. China’s diplomatic involvement in South Sudan is conducted through permanent presence in the ongoing Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led mediation process and mainly remains at the governmental level. China showed efforts to engage in the crisis resolution attempts and diversified its diplomatic outreach by engaging with all the key actors of the conflict. Shortly after the turmoil Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with representatives of the South Sudanese warring parties and showed readiness to engage both parties in the process
\end{tabular}
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of ending the fighting. In fact, China is strengthening its economic support towards South Sudan in hope of creating a basis for post-civil war rebuilding. Both Sudan and South Sudan represent the largest overseas achievements for Chinese oil companies. These efforts can be seen also from the enhanced dialogue, China and South Sudan signed two agreements in 2014 proposing 0 tariff on 97 percent of exports to China. There was a common perception in the African hemisphere that as South Sudan’s economy declines, China will feel compelled to engage more to ensure regional economic stability. As its interests in South Sudan and the region are directly challenged and the U.S. is unwilling to take a greater role, many in IGAD are looking east for support.

Besides the traditional actors, also Norway and the United Kingdom also played a role in regard of helping to fund the peace process.

### 2.7.7. UNITED NATIONS

The UN has played a limited political role since the conflict began. The Security Council immediately backed the IGAD peace process and indicated its willingness to adopt sanctions at the region’s request. The decision not to create an International Contact Group to facilitate discussion and coordination between international actors under UN auspices in mid-2014 left IGAD in the driver’s seat. UNMISS has not engaged in the peace process due to controversies surrounding its actions between 2011 and 2013, however UNMISS took an unprecedented role in the crisis with the main aim to protect civilians. In May 2014, UNMISS released a report on the developments in South Sudan stressing that gross violations of human rights and violation

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93 Hang Zhou

94 Patey (2014), 274.


97 IGAD did not request the Security Council to, on 1 July, apply sanctions to six South Sudanese generals. U.S. officials say that decision was based in part on AU support for individual sanctions and an arms embargo. U.S. officials have not pushed for an arms embargo.
of international law have occurred. The United Nations Security Council passed a Resolution 2132 on 24 December 2013. This report doubled the number of troops of UNMISS to 14,000 in order to increase the overall troop and police strength of the Mission.98 The interim troop level of UNMISS was raised as well as the police component, including sufficiently formed police units. UNMISS has eight compounds across the country, where civilians can seek shelter, these compounds reported several attacks with the attack in Bor camp being the most grave.99 However, international observers stated the need for a stronger support for IGAD by the UN.

2.7.8. IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification was established in 1986 with a focus on drought and desertification, and relaunched in 1996 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with an expanded mandate that included conflict resolution.100 The expansion of the mandate was due in part to IGAD member states' long history of cooperation and conflict with one another. Given IGAD’s history it was perceived as the right format to take the lead role in mediating South Sudan’s war.101

The IGAD mediation is led by a chief mediator, the former Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin, who was joined by mediators from Kenya, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, and Sudan, General Mohammed al-Dabbi. It is overseen by the Heads of State (HoS), also including

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100 The decision to revitalise IGAD was made by the IGAD heads of states (HoS) and governments at a meeting held in Addis Ababa on 18 April 1995. At the 12th ordinary summit in 2008, the HoS again expanded IGAD’s mandate to include regional economic integration. Medhane, Tadess, Turning Conflicts to Cooperation: Towards an Energy led Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa (Addis Ababa 2004), 121-129; Korwa G. Adar, “Conflict Resolution in a Turbulent Region: The Case of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Sudan”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 1, no. 2, (2000), 43-46.
Uganda. The warring party delegations have three levels: the principles (President Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar), the leadership committee (attended by the parties’ chief mediators: Nhial Deng Nhial, Juba; Taban Deng Gai, SPLM/A-IO; and an FD member), and technical or thematic committees (such as security, leadership, economic, etc.). The FDs’ role took an ambivalent role in on the one hand mediating between the parties and on the other acting as an independent third party to the talks. They were joined by opposition political parties, civil society and women and religious leaders. The mediation was supported by an unprecedented eight IGAD Heads of States summits but regional divisions rendered IGAD incapable of putting unified pressure on the South Sudanese parties who were unable to reach agreement.

IGAD-PLUS was announced in March 2015 following fifteen months of unsuccessful mediation. IGAD-PLUS members include the African Union (AU), UN, European Union (EU), the Troika (U.S., UK and Norway), China and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). IGAD provided the parties the “key provisions” of the larger agreement in a “synopsis” document in early June and subsequently launched IGAD-PLUS at the AU summit in mid-June. The synopsis outlined the basics of a power-sharing ratio and transitional governance and security arrangements, including a third-party force to guarantee the transitional government’s security. The parties received the draft agreement on 24 June 2015. There will be a period of internal consultations and, following that, there is an opportunity for the parties to address outstanding issues. An IGAD-PLUS summit-level meeting be held on 17 August 2015 to finalised an agreement to implement an interim unity government under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) for the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan chaired by the former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae which held its first meeting on 27 November 2015 in Juba.

2.7.9. OUTLOOK

Diplomatic efforts failed to end the armed conflict in South Sudan till 2016, despite the ceasefire agreements negotiated by IGAD in January 2014 and May 2014 clashes still continue. In order to end the conflict new strategies are needed in several directions. Ways to limit foreign involvement and reduce armed groups; to cut arms supply flow to the parties; to stop use of oil revenues to fund the war have to be sought. Deep engagement of powerful actors as the

U.S, China and active engagement of the UN Security Council is needed. Furthermore sanctions were issued by both the EU and the US targeting military commanders on both sides responsible for mass brutality, and the violation of human rights. Sanctions were imposed by the US on opposition commander Peter Gadet and the head of the government’s presidential guard, Marial Chanuon. The European Union imposed travel bans and asset freezes on Gadet and a government SPLA commander, Santino Deng.

IGAD however was successful in achieving an agreement of the forming of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU). Having declared the capital of Juba as a demilitarized zone and both the government as well as rebel troops remained at a strength of 1,370 troops 25km outside of Juba, also the return of incoming Vice-President Riek Machar was made possible at the end of April 2016 despite several delays in his return due to missing security guarantees by the government. Taking over his former post without any major security incidents and the formation of a new government at 4 May 2016 are promising signals. However, all actors have to work together in order to develop new approaches to support conflict resolution and maintain long-term peacebuilding in South Sudan. Only by reforms and directing the South Sudanese state to serve its people, instead of its leaders, sustainable peace can be brought to the battle vexed country.

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3. THE CSDP MISSION/OPERATION AND THE CONFLICT

3.1. General approach of the EU to the conflict

The European Union Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) is not the only aspect of EU engagement in South Sudan. The CSDP Mission is part of the EU's Comprehensive Approach, a strategy to assist South Sudan in becoming a viable, stable and prosperous state by covering all aspects of support to the country: political and diplomatic, security and rule of law, stabilization, human rights, development, and trade. The so called EU Single Country Strategy for South Sudan is the response to the 2011 EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions to “follow a comprehensive EU approach to Sudan and South Sudan”\(^{106}\). Therefore, almost all EU-level instruments, except military intervention, have been deployed: an EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan (Rosalind Marsden, 2010-2013), the EUAVSEC Mission, a large humanitarian assistance programme as well as European Development Fund (EDF)-financed programmes.\(^{107}\) The European Union has attempted to develop bottom-up approaches in its policies towards the Republic of South Sudan. Some key EU projects have thus been implemented by non-governmental actors from EU countries with broad knowledge of developments in the country.

The wider political engagement of the European Union in the region dates back to 2005, when the so called Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement was signed. After the United States, the EU is the largest donor to South Sudan, having allocated €285 million in development funds between 2010 and 2013.\(^{108}\) This aid targeted mostly the agriculture sector, health facilities, education and judiciary. Furthermore, the EU cooperates closely with international partners like the United Nations, which are also active in South Sudan since 2011 when UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan) was established. UNMISS’ objective is to consolidate peace


and security in the Republic of South Sudan, help establish conditions for development, with a view to strengthen the capacity of its Government to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with all neighbouring countries. Through EUAVSEC, the European Union collaborated with UNMISS, for example in organizing in September 2013, a three day’s training course for 33 Immigration Officers from the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), in order to improve their work and reach internationally recognized standards. In addition to the EU as such, a number of EU member states (in particular the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands) have also been very active in political processes in South Sudan, working in parallel to collective engagements. The United Kingdom for instance, was heavily involved in the diplomatic process which produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, whilst its Department for International Development (DFID) provides extensive co-funding for the food security programme. The Netherlands - one of the largest donors in South Sudan - have played an important role in the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) – the commission that monitors the implementation of the CPA, and have contributed a considerable amount of development funds to South Sudan, mainly through pooled funds. The Republic of South Sudan is one of the Netherlands’ main development partners and the latter has proven to be a constructive partner during the Interim Period and has a sound relation with the Government in South Sudan.

3.2. State of the conflict at the time of the establishment of the CSDP mission/operation

In the first year after South Sudan became an independent state, tensions with Khartoum did not cease. Unresolved post-secession issues mainly related to the existing interdependences

between the two neighbours that were not entirely solved by implementing the CPA as well as inter-communal fighting in Jonglei state and numerous human rights violations in law enforcement continued to pose a serious problem. Despite its quest for stability, the Government of South Sudan was vulnerable to the demands of the various competing groups for political inclusion and access to state resources, which are being used mainly to build clientelist structures based on ethnic groups. In February 2012 South Sudan shut down its oil production, causing severe economic consequences, and two months later armed clashes with Sudan, at Heglig oil fields, followed.\textsuperscript{113} The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, with the support of the UN Security Council, reacted accordingly with the adoption of a Roadmap for the two conflicting parties, in order to end the hostilities and resume negotiations as soon as possible\textsuperscript{114}, and by the time the EU CSDP Mission in Juba was launched, a few positive results were already visible. Still, the lack of basic infrastructure, the weak development of markets, a serious shortage of security officers at Juba airport due to the severe economic situation in the country and the lasting insecurity caused by the previous decades of civil war formed the reality in post-independence South Sudan.

### 3.3. Establishment of CSDP mission/operation

In July 2011, the European External Action Service (EEAS) elaborated an option paper of how to best support the newly created state of South Sudan. Four options regarding the mandate were presented\textsuperscript{115}: improving aviation security at the airport of Juba, supporting the border management between Sudan and South Sudan, establishment of a river police and customs authority on the Nile and establishment of a criminal police for and of criminal investigation authorities and institutions in South Sudan. The PSC decided to go for the first option, an aviation security mission for the airport of Juba. This decision mainly also reflected the missing support and willingness by the Government of Sudan for any activity in which also Khartoum would have been involved and thus making the border management and Nile police


\textsuperscript{115} Jandl (2012), 495.
impossible. Moreover, member states were at that time unwilling and the necessary political support was lacked for the criminal justice mission which would have meant a greater EU involvement by providing a significant amount of experts for the establishment of such a mission. Therefore, only the aviation security mission remained on the table, although several experts criticized the possible mission as hindering the developments of the EU as a credible actor in crisis management since the mission was little ambitious and would not improve tremendously the security in South Sudan on the ground. Furthermore it was argued that the visibility of the mission would be very limited since almost no locals would use the airport of Juba for travel. So already before the decision on the mission was taken, critics arose due to the lacking political will of EU member states in deploying a more relevant mission for improving the security of South Sudan on the ground. Nonetheless member states followed this little ambitious approach and decided to launch EUAVSEC South Sudan.

EUAVSEC was created in response to South Sudan’s request for EU support, in order to strengthen security at Juba International Airport, since the country has no direct access to the sea and therefore the flow of goods and people depends heavily on air transport. The CSDP Mission was established by the EU Council Decision of 18th June 2012 with a mandate for 19 months. EUAVSEC started in September 2012 and terminated its operations on 17th January 2014. This was the EU’s first engagement in South Sudan under the CSDP and was financed within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The overall budget allocated to the Mission was €12.5 million and the deployed personnel consisted in total of 64 international as well as local staff, with Mr. Lasse Christensen from Denmark and Mr. Desmond Ross seconded from the United Kingdom, as Head of the Mission and Deputy Head of Mission respectively. When deploying the mission, the main problem was to find suitable personnel for the mission, especially in the field of aviation security. Whereas enough

\[\text{116} \text{ Interview with PSC member.}\]
\[\text{117} \text{ See for example Gowan Richards: Europe’s Humanitarian Dilemma}\]
\[\text{http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9585/europes-humanitarian-dilemma}\]
\[\text{quoted 15.4.2016.}\]
\[\text{118} \text{ Jandl (2012), 496.}\]
\[\text{119} \text{ Official Journal of the European Union}\]
\[\text{quoted 22.4.2016.}\]
\[\text{120} \text{ Council of The European Union}\]
\[\text{quoted 22.4.2016.}\]
candidates could be found in areas such as human resources, border management, police and customs, candidates with knowledge and expertise in airport security were very rare. Thus, the EEAS had to change the recruitment system for those experts from seconded to contracted experts.\textsuperscript{121} However, the overall staffing including personnel from 14 different countries proved to be good, especially the seconded staff proved to be well trained and prepared for the mission. Nonetheless, according to mission personnel, the mission was over provided with procurement and administrative positions when we needed more operational positions.\textsuperscript{122}

The main challenges the mission was facing from the beginning was the fact that the IT equipment, personal protection gear and motor vehicles were not suited for the mission. This was a procurement and logistics issue which was badly handled from the beginning in Brussels. The procurement process caused long delays and essential IT equipment only started to arrive about six months into the Mission. Seconded personnel arrived with their own personal protection equipment but contracted staff had none until some nine months into the Mission.\textsuperscript{123}

Looking at the mandate, EUAVSEC South Sudan aimed to contribute to the strengthening of aviation security, border control and law enforcement at Juba International Airport, under public oversight and in accordance with human rights standards. EUAVSEC was a civilian mission with a non-executive mandate. It assisted the Government of South Sudan in raising the security at Juba International Airport to internationally accepted standards, which would lead to an increased flow of people and goods and also boost trade. Going into more detail, the Mission first and foremost aimed to advise and assist the South Sudanese authorities on aviation security as well as to support the coordination of security activities related to aviation. It was, however, not involved in aviation safety, which refers to accident prevention and thus to all technical matters involving flight and airport operations. In July 2013, with the set-up of the Airport Security Committee to include all stakeholders, an important milestone was achieved\textsuperscript{124} EUAVSEC provided assistance to the Committee in developing crisis management plans. Improved capacities in the South Sudanese transport ministry, increasing security awareness through training of approximately 350 security staff, the improvement in screening of

\textsuperscript{121} Interview with HR responsible within the EEAS.
\textsuperscript{122} Interview with former EUAVSEC mission personnel.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
passengers and luggage through training and putting into operation a number of x-ray machines, as well as the enabling of mobile airport perimeter control through training and donation of patrol vehicles, were other significant achievements of the mission.\textsuperscript{125}

Before the outbreak of violence in South Sudan in December 2013, debate within the PSC started of extending the mission. However, this debate stopped on the one hand due to the start of the civil war and on the other hand due to the fact that the new airport terminal was not finished and therefore political decision-makers argued that there were not the necessary facilities on the ground for continuing the mission. Overall, although highly appreciated by the South Sudanese authorities, the mission lacked ownership and it was hard for the mission personnel to change the mindset of the trained personnel making them aware of the necessity that the airport of Juba was more less the only connection to the outside world for South Sudanese economy. The beneficiaries of the mission were good and cooperative. However, Customs and Immigration were obstructive and acted in a way which was not appropriate for a Diplomatic Mission.\textsuperscript{126}

As a consequence of the outbreak of the civil war, the mission needed to be evacuated on 19 December 2013 by light aircraft flight to Nairobi. At that point, there was disagreement between the HoM and DHoM of how to best evacuate the staff and equipment. The final decision was to make the EU Delegation in Juba in charge of the evacuation, although EUAVSEC considered itself a parallel mission, although in practice coordination took place on a weekly basis. The mission officially terminated on 17 January 2014. Overall, the mission was succeeding in local training of South Sudanese Government officials and police officers to undertake the needed duties to comply with international standards. Since the GoSS failed to complete the new airport terminal building, EUAVSEC could not train personnel in proper airport security and border control procedures limiting the impact of the mission in this essential area.

\textsuperscript{126} Interviews with EUAVSEC mission personnel.
EUAVSEC South Sudan was the first CSDP mission to be deployed in the context of South Sudan. Already from the beginning the mission faced the difficulty and lack of political will by EU member states to deploy a more ambitious mission which would have had a larger impact and visibility on the ground. Also the procurement procedure, especially in the case of IT equipment and vehicles, was far from being perfect. For the South Sudanese government nonetheless any help and support was highly welcomed immediately after gaining independence and thus no political pressure was exerted for a stronger mission.\textsuperscript{127} The CONOPS and OPLAN were generally based on the (wrong) assumption that the new airport terminal would have been constructed. However, the GoSS failed in taking real ownership of the project, since the outbreak of the internal conflict hindered the completion of the new airport terminal and thus limiting the training impact of EUAVSEC South Sudan.

In general, mission personnel was well-trained and prepared although there was a common perception that the pre-deployment ENTRI training would have been much more valuable if it had dealt more with the specific Mission needs and on geographical, historical and cultural information on South Sudan. The same applied for contracted staff not undergoing the same medical tests like seconded staff which especially in a remote and critical area such as South Sudan would have been useful.

However, against all odds and taking into consideration the volatile circumstances on the ground, the mission did its best in properly implementing the mandate and training local personnel. The sustainability of the mission, especially due to the fact that the terminal has still not been constructed, remains questionable.

The expectations with regard to a new CSDP mission in South Sudan are high, not only within the TGoNU, but also among other actors such as UNMISS.\textsuperscript{128} Such a new mission – which would definitely need to be more ambitious – could be deployed in areas such as DDR and SSR as well as police and rule of law enforcement. The EU in any case needs to overcome the general notion also by the South Sudanese public to be not only a donor with regard to development aid but to especially also contribute in establishing and strengthening the security

\textsuperscript{127} Interview with GoSS official.
\textsuperscript{128} Respective interviews with GoSS officials, UNMISS officials during the study trip in April 2016.
D3.2 The South Sudan review

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sector of South Sudan. As the new TGoNU at the time of writing this deliverable seemed to be willing to work together, the time would be ripe for the EU and its member states to carefully examine further engagements in a country and region where an active EU role is desperately needed. This, however, requires more proper knowledge about the country specifics as well a better overall understanding of the developments on the ground, especially in the decision-making bodies in Brussels.
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D3.2 The South Sudan review


