PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

3.5 Study Report of DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic

Lead beneficiary: RDDC

Delivery date: 06/04/2017

Revision: 5.0

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CSA project: 653371
Start date: 01/05/2015
Duration: 33 months
### Revision history

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<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>15/10/2016</td>
<td>RDDC, T. Mandrup</td>
<td>First early draft</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>01/12/2017</td>
<td>RDDC, T. Mandrup</td>
<td>Amendments and formatting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>28/10/2016</td>
<td>RDDC, T. Mandrup</td>
<td>Paper amended and sent to experts for peer review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>31/10/2016</td>
<td>WP 3</td>
<td>Expert input received at WP round table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>17/02/2017</td>
<td>RDDC, T. Mandrup</td>
<td>Final study submitted to EDunni</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>28/02/2017</td>
<td>RDDC, T. Mandrup</td>
<td>Submission of final version to Project Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>08/02/2017</td>
<td>RDDC, T. Mandrup</td>
<td>Final editorial corrections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>06/04/2017</td>
<td>LAU, K. Hytinen</td>
<td>Review and Final version to be submitted</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This deliverable contains the field study reports from the African selected IECEU case study regions; DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya. It assesses the contributions of the EU CSDP missions in the four states, their effectiveness, and the roles these missions played in the creation of stability, and to what extent they constructively contributed to the overall security of the states. In all four cases this has been done by including and drawing upon a significant number of semi-structured qualitative interviews, literature reviews, which means that the studies presented include perspectives of mission personnel, representatives of host governments, NGOs and other IOs. Applying the methodology of the IECEU project, in particular DL 1.4. and DL 1.5, the success of the missions have been examined by describing the main capabilities deployed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the mission have been analysed by looking at the attainment of both internal and external goals and their appropriateness. This combines both the findings of the field trip and the conducted interviews, as well as comprehensive desktop research. The findings were tested and refined at an expert round table held in Copenhagen on 31 October 2016 with relevant experts. It is difficult to directly compared the finding in the four cases, since they are very different in both time, objective, context, resources, political priority, etc., some general trends can be found and extracted from the different studies.

In the DRC case study the first case is Operation Artemis from 2003, then looking at the 2006 EUFOR RDC intervention, followed by a more in-depth study of the EUPOL mission, and the study ends with the closure of EUSEC in July 2016. All EU missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been part of EU support for the transition and implementation of the 2002 Peace Agreement in the country. A key challenge was that the sheer size of the DRC, the lack of infrastructure and the non-permissive environment made it a very difficult and complex undertaking. The Congolese partner has been resistant to reform, and the EU has found it difficult to undertake its SSR (security-sector reform) initiatives successfully. Some informants even called the EU project generally a failure, whilst other key informants argued that sometimes it is better to do something than nothing.

The South Sudan Field Trip report, is an in-depth study of the contribution by the EU CSDP mission EUAVSEC to the overall security of the state of South Sudan by in particular taking into consideration the perspective of mission personnel, representatives of the GoSS, NGOs and other IOs. EUAVSEC South Sudan was launched in July 2012 following the South Sudan’s request for EU support to strengthening security at Juba International Airport, as part of the international community’s overall assistance to the country. A key challenge for South Sudan after independence was to establish a fully operational transport hub for commercial and passenger purposes. Improving airport security will not only contribute to the fight against crime and international terrorism, but also enable the increased flow of people and goods, thus helping to boost trade and promote regional integration. In the EUAVSEC mission the EU was faced with a number of same challenges that the union faces in several of the other missions, for instance a discrepancy between mission objectives and the resources available, a lack access to and efficient use of lessons
learned and lessons identified, and finally a lack of training and insufficient preparation of the personnel deployed.

The case study focusing on EUBAM in Libya was based on interviews done outside Libya, since the fieldtrip to Libya was cancelled because of the security situation. However, since the EUBAM mission had already been evacuated to Tunis in July 2014, and was put on a standstill, the cancellation did not prevent the information gathering amongst the former mission members. However, this initially prevented interviews of any of the Libyans, who had interacted with the mission. After many attempts three interviews were conducted with Libyan nationals who had had contact and dealings with the mission, or who in other ways were familiar with the situation in Libya and had field experience from Libya from the time of the deployment of EUBAM Libya. These additional interviews did not dramatically change the conclusions of this report, but they did give it more strength. One of the key findings, which can also be found in some of the other case studies is that virtually all of the international organisations were competing against each other and that especially the race for who gets to manage the border management reform was fierce.

The case study on the EUFOR intervention into CAR came as an response to the violent conflict that erupted 2013. EU unanimously decided to deploy the military operation to contribute to safe and secure environment and provision of humanitarian aid to affected population. The chapter argues that EU’s political creditability was a major reason behind the establishment of the operation. However, in the end the will to contribute troops was limited, and the force ended up, like Operation Artemis in the DRC, being dominated by few member states, and troops from non-EU member states. As a result, EUFOR RCA was given a limited mandate in terms of tasks, area of operation, and time. In that regard EUFOR RCA case study has similarities to the relatively successful two military operations in the DRC, that also were short, and narrowly defined.
Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

3.5 The DR Congo Field Report

Lead beneficiary: RDDC

Delivery date: 28/02/2017

Revision: 4.0

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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of this IECEU project deliverable 3.5, The DR Congo Field Trip report, assesses the contributions of the EU CSDP missions Operation Artemis, EUFOR RDC, EUPOL and EUSEC to the overall security of the state of the DR Congo, in particular by taking into consideration the perspectives of mission personnel, representatives of the Congolese authorities, NGOs and other IOs. EU involvement started with the deployment of Artemis in 2003, and the study ends with the closure of EUSEC in July 2016. All EU missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been part of EU support for the transition and implementation of the 2002 Peace Agreement in the country. A key challenge was that the sheer size of the DRC, the lack of infrastructure and the non-permissive environment made it a very difficult and complex undertaking. The Congolese partner has been resistant to reform, and the EU has found it difficult to undertake its SSR (security-sector reform) initiatives successfully. Some informants even called the EU project generally a failure.

Applying the methodology of the IECEU project, in particular DL 1.4. and DL 1.5, the success of the mission will be examined by describing the main capabilities deployed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the mission will be analysed by looking at the attainment of both internal and external goals and their appropriateness. This combines both the findings of the field trip and the conducted interviews, as well as comprehensive desktop research. The findings were tested and refined at an expert round table held in Copenhagen on 31 October 2016 with relevant experts.
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Re-integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHoM</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Mission / Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</td>
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<td>FD</td>
<td>Former Detainees</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAIA</td>
<td>All-Inclusive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<th>International Criminal Court</th>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (formerly IGADD, Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification)</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Congo</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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THE AUTHOR

Thomas Mandrup

Thomas Mandrup is an Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College, Denmark, and an external lecturer at the Centre for African Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Recently, he has been appointed an Extraordinary Associate Professor at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He has published articles and book chapters and co-edited several books on issues related to African security governance and South African foreign policy. His three latest co-edited books were Towards good order at sea: African experiences, published by Sun Media in February 2015; The Brics and coexistence: an alternative vision of world order, published by Routledge in October 2014; and On military culture: theory, practice and African armed forces, published by Cape Town University Press on 1st October 2013. His latest book chapter, 'Denmark: how not if to outsource military services' was published in Commercialising Security in Europe, edited by Anna Leander, Routledge/PRIO, March 2013. Currently he is co-editing a book on the African standby forces and finalizing a monograph on the South African National Defence Force.

Thomas Mandrup received his PhD in International Relations (2007) from the University Copenhagen, Denmark, for a dissertation entitled: Africa: salvation or despair? A study of the post-apartheid South African government’s use of the military tool in its foreign policy conduct from 1994 to 2006. As a doctoral candidate, Dr Mandrup was attached to the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS). He has previously worked as a consultant on South African foreign policy for Chatham House in London as part of a FCO/MOD-commissioned project on South Africa. Currently his is an member of the Editorial Advisory Board of Scientia Militaria, the South African Journal of Military Studies. He has extensive fieldwork experience from, for instance, the DR Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Sudan. Currently he is heading the African section of a larger EU-funded project (Horizon 2020) on EU conflict management.
1 INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the grant agreement, the objective of DL 3.5 is to analyse the findings from the field trips organized by the RDDC to the DR Congo in order to scrutinize the nature, impact and effectiveness of the four key EU ESDP Missions in the DR Congo from 2003-2016: the so-called Operation Artemis in 2003, the EUFOR deployment in 2006, EUPOL 2004-2014, and finally the EUSEC program from 2005-2016. The emphasis is more on the EUSEC and EUPOL missions than on the two military interventions, which are now more historical. The data used for this study are based on both a literature review and data collected during fieldwork conducted in the DR Congo in 2004, 2009, 2010, 2016 and finally January 2017. The earlier periods of fieldwork had a different objective, but data from these will be used when relevant to the study, as well as for purposes of comparison with the more recent data, since they constitute in-time raw data. The security situation in relation to the postponed national elections of late 2016 in the DRC did restrict carrying out the last period of fieldwork, since many actors were less accessible due to the security situation. The volatility of the situation was illustrated by two events that occurred during the last period of fieldwork in the DRC, when the death of long-term opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi created fears of renewed demonstrations and violence in urban areas, whilst in Goma rumours of the infiltration and re-emerging of the M23 rebels led to pressure on the airport, as people wanted to get out of the city. In the DRC the fear of an eruption of violence is a constant factor.

The DRC case study is structured as follows. The following section focuses on the EU’s strategic thinking and actions in the DRC. This is followed by a general case study of the SSR program in the DRC, with a specific focus on the police. Then follow two sections focusing on the two military interventions in the DRC, and then finally two sections on the EUPOL and EUSEC missions respectively. The last section of the study assesses the effectiveness and success of the EU in the DRC. All the sections relating to the background and nature of the wars and conflict in the DRC can be found in the DRC review study.

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1 In the report the two EUPOL missions, the initial EUPOL-Kinshasa and the subsequent EUPOL mission, are analysed as one.
2 THE EUROPEAN UNION’S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

2.1 General introduction

Acting through the two pillars (Community Action and the Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP), from 2001 until the closure of the EUSEC mission in July 2016 the EU was active in the DRC and ran four ESDP missions. As Hoebke argues, the involvement in the DRC provided the EU with an opportunity to use a whole range of the tools at its disposal (Hoebke, The EU and "Conflict Peacebuilding" in the DRC, 2007, p. 47). The EU has functioned as a mediator, conflict pre-emptor and preventer, crisis manager and military intervener. The DRC did initially in 2003 provide the EU with an opportunity to test its new ESDP capabilities and carve out a more dominant role for itself in the international system. However, as this deliverable will show, in its turn this has also provided the Union with a number of lessons learned and lessons identified, as well as leaving some question-marks in relation to the roles and capacities of the EU in to undertaking these kinds of missions. Nevertheless, the important role of the EU in the DRC was recognised by the very fact that the EU, together with bilateral EU member states, became the largest donor in the DRC, which led the UNSC call for an even more dominant role in the SSR program in the DRC in 2007. This came after the EU in 2006 had announced that it would be willing to undertake a more dominant and coordinating role in the SSR program, a role the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC, had so-far undertaken (Hoebke, The EU and "Conflict Peacebuilding" in the DRC, 2007, pp. 53-54). Even though that the EUPOL mission managed to include some non-EU members in its staff, for instance, Angola, it did not manage to position itself in this dominant coordinating role. The strategy formation generally creates tension within the donor community, which did not necessarily have the same mandates, budget cycles, interests or objectives.

The EU is currently involved via its EDF-financed PROGRESS project, to which a number of EUSEC projects were transferred at the time the program closed in July 2016. This has created the challenge that the whole train and equip part of the EUSEC mission cannot be financed under the EDF PROGRESS project because of its EDF status. This has created tensions with the Congolese beneficiaries, and the EU mission itself presents it as a challenge (1, 2017) (6, 2017).

2.2 The background to the EU involvement in the DRC

The EU suspended its aid cooperation with the DRC/Zaire from 1992-2002, when humanitarian was provided and continued via the ECHO\(^2\) system. EU–Congolese cooperation officially restarted with the signing of the National Indicative Plan (NIP) in January 2002, which released 120 million Euros from the 8th

\(^2\) The humanitarian aid department of the EU.
European Development Fund (EDF). In 2003 a new NIP was signed within the framework of the 9th EDF to the amount of 205 million Euros, which in 2004 was raised to 270 million Euros on the condition that progress in the transition could be detected (Hoebek, Carette, & Vlasserenoot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007, p. 5). Its actions have covered a wide range of projects: humanitarian and development aid, diplomatic and technical support, and two military operations, ARTEMIS in 2003 and EUFOR RDC in 2006. Since 2003, the central element in the EU’s efforts to support the DRC was the backing of the transitional institutions to meet the requirements for the elections in 2006, since Joseph Kabila’s governments have attempted to (re-) introduce a formal state presence in the DRC. This involved financial and logistical support to the electoral process, support to create the necessary security conditions (with two Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions: EUPOL and EUSEC), support to the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) (EUFOR RDC), and an important election observation mission. The EU’s involvement in the DRC was also part of and influenced by the idea of the ‘security-development nexus’, which basically claims the existence of a causal relationship between ‘development’ and ‘security’, i.e. as one cannot grow without the other, a ‘whole of government approach’ is called for (Buur, Steputat, & Jensen, 2007). The EU’s involvement in the DRC has also been influenced by the Contonou Agreement, which stresses the importance of assistance, cooperation and political dialogue between the EU and the group of so-called APC3 countries, of which the DRC is a part. This privileged partnership, combined with the ESDP and CSDP projects and interventions, was part of the combined EU engagement. The EU’s presence in the DRC is furthermore also a clear demonstration of the increased coordination between the EU and the UN in crisis management. The four European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions in the DRC are the most visible of the wide degree of CFSP involvement in the country and the wider region (Hoebek, Carette, & Vlasserenoot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007).

After the signing of NIP 2002, the EU became increasingly involved in the DRC. This happened in line with the efforts and priorities of a number of its member states. The development of the EU as an actor in world affairs has been mirrored by the widening scope of EU interventions, from the ‘classic’ development cooperation and humanitarian relief to innovative ESDP operations such as Operation Artemis in the summer of 2003 and a dedicated security sector reform (SSR) mission, EUSEC. In several respects the EU’s involvement in the DRC became a test case for a number of the later engagements. The general framework for this evolution was the support to the transitional process, which included the elections. The EU, together with its individual member states, was by far the largest donor in support of this process, and through its deployment of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 it also assumed an important role in the measures to secure the first electoral process in the DRC since 1965. However, it has not operated alone but in conjunction with other donors, in particular the combined UN involvement in the DRC, which is in line with what Javier Solana in 2007 argued was the preferred strategy for the EU’s ESDP missions. These could operate independently, but it was preferred that they did so in partnership with others, such as the UN, AU or NATO (UN, 2007). As

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3 Africa, Caribbean and Pacific.
the Channel evaluation of 2011 showed, the initial DDR program involved more than forty national and international partners spending an average of US$ 1.5 billion a year on development aid in the DRC (Channel Research, 2011, p. 61). The deployment and interventions in the DRC should be seen as a result of and part of what can be considered ‘effective multilateralism’ (Hoebekke, Carette, & Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007). Whereas there is a large degree of convergence in strategic vision and objectives between the different strategic objectives and priorities in Brussels related to involvement in the DRC, this convergence has at times been more difficult to find in the missions in the DRC itself. While coordination mechanisms have existed in Brussels, in theatre it has often been left to ad hoc measures and individuals to coordinate the efforts.

The EUSEC and EUPOL capacity-building missions in the DRC were not established as a consequence of a renewed outbreak of violence but as an attempt to assist in implementing a complex peace agreement and thereby aid state (re-)building efforts in the DRC. The two missions were also established as part of a broad international effort in which many actors were active and in play at the same time. Within the area of SSR, the EU representative had to coordinate and plan their efforts first of all with a complex group of local actors, secondly with a myriad of international organisations and actors, and finally with bilateral EU member states, which were in the DRC both as part of the joint EU effort and by virtue of running their own bilateral projects with the DRC government. This, the coordination and handling of so many interests, has turned out to be one of the key challenges for the EU engagement in the DRC, one that also makes it difficult to assess the role and impact of the EU initiative. Dealing with the SSR of the Congolese army, the question is where EUSEC training start and stop, and whether it can be meaningfully separated from the training conducted by MONUSCO/MONUC\(^4\) or bilateral actors. A related problem to this is found in the assessment of the impact of the EU-initiated programs, where the reporting of the activities is seemingly most often focused on quantity, not impact. In 2014 Rayroux and Wilén even went so far as to say that the EU’s peacebuilding in the DRC has been characterised by a paralysis and a dysfunctional SSR program. This is due to a conceptual discrepancy between the idea of local ownership and the de-facto externally defined, financed and executed SSR program, which leads to distancing from and local resistance to the program and reform in general (Rayroux & Wilén, 2014). The relevance of the assessment must be on the impact, i.e. to what extent have the EUSEC and EUPOL missions managed to reach their stated objectives, and why have they done so? Which endeavours have been successful and especially which have not? Due to the long period of the engagement of the EU in post-conflict reconstruction and reforms in the DRC, its involvement has also been influenced by international changes in the approach to peace-building, though the concept of local ownership has remained at the centre of the engagements (Rayroux & Wilén, 2014). Already in 2011 Channel Research produced an evaluation that documented a clear cleavage between local and donor perceptions of the challenges facing the partnerships in the DRC (Channel Research, 2011, p. 63). These cleavages still exist in 2017, where the donors are seen as being unwilling to consult effectively with local

\(^4\) MONUC was transformed into MONUSCO in 2010 to signal that the mission was entering into a new phase.
partner, whilst the donor side describes the Congolese partner as having limited capacity and often being plagued by corruption (5, 2017) (6, 2017).

The EU’s engagement in the DRC should be seen as an integral part of the EU’s whole of government approach, with initiatives being initiated in several sectors of the state. As mentioned above, EUSEC and EUPOL both formed part of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) program in the DRC. Both missions ran simultaneously with the short-term deployment of the EU force (EUFOR) which helped secure the 2006 elections, but they followed the pre-emptive deployment of Operation Artemis in 2003. This mission helped to stabilise an unravelling security crisis situation with potential ethnic-based violence in Ituri province in the north-eastern corner of the DRC, and it was replaced by UN forces after it had stabilised the situation. Since 2010 the DRC has been an important partner and beneficiary of the Cotonou Agreement, and at times it has enjoyed high growth rates.

The objective of the EU projects related to the SSR program has changed over time. After the official start of the two-year transitional period in June 2003, the EU and the international donor community were heavily involved in assisting the transitional institutions (Hoebek, Carette, & Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007). Consequently EU involvement started out as project to assist in preparing the Congolese security institutions to handle security related to the 2006 elections, later moving to the medium to long-term strategic objectives of creating sustainable frameworks for the future security institutions in the DRC, which included training, strengthening the judicial framework and increasing institutional capabilities. The changing objectives in the DRC were to a large extent also tied to the general security situation in the country, since the programs had to be conducted in a non-permissive environment, with high levels of instability and insecurity, and where local actors often paid lip-service at best to the implementation of reform proposals. All in all this was a very difficult environment to operate in, one where calculated risks, especially the risks of failure, were part of operational reality.

2.3 EU’s Political and Strategic planning and thinking in relation to the DRC

‘In order to increase the consistency of the EU’s activities in the DRC, the closest possible coordination between the various EU players should be ensured in Kinshasa as well as in Brussels, through appropriate arrangements. The European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the African Great Lakes Region will have an important role to play in this respect, taking account of his mandate.’ (COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2007/406/CFSP on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), 2007)

The EU has been involved in mediation attempts and peace negotiations in the DRC since the start of the conflict in the country. The EU General Council has paid considerable attention to the process and supported it through diplomatic initiatives. A clear sign of the priority given to the DRC and the Great Lakes region was the appointment on 25 March 1996 of the seasoned diplomat Aldo Ajello as EU Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region. In 2007 he was replaced by Roeland van de Geer, whose mandate ended in 2011, along with the EUSR function in the region. His mission and mandate were related to the entire
African Great Lakes region conflict system, and focused on creating the necessary frameworks and conditions to solve the crisis that has plagued large sections of the Central African region. The EUSR has given support to and coordinated with the UN and the African Union (AU) and has kept in close contact with regional governments and actors. The function and role of the EUSR is also to report and inform the European Council on ongoing regional developments and to formulate and provide policy recommendations.

With the increased EU and bilateral European involvement in the DRC, especially after 2002, and the deployment of the two capacity-building operations within the ESDP framework, the role of the EUSR was enhanced and came to include being a regional focal point between the office of the EU SG/HR and the then EUPOL and EUSEC Heads of Mission. The EUSR function was also to provide political advice and ensure that coordination with other EU actors present took place, as well as creating and maintaining contact and relations with local governments and authorities. The impact of this was that it increased the visibility of the CFSP on the ground, as well as helping ensure the coherence and complementarity of the different ESDP actions in the DRC.

The appointment of a seasoned diplomat like Amb. Ajello meant that he managed to use his extensive international network to acquire access and ensure increased dialogue. This allowed him to help mediate and provide a framework for the resolution of tensions between the different actors involved in the DRC crisis, as well as partake effectively in facilitating international initiatives and negotiations. At the same time Amb. Ajello had solid contacts within the EU delegation, which were needed in order to coordinate the combined EU involvement in the DRC. The mandate of the EUSR ended on 31 August 2011 as part of the general scaling down of the EU’s engagement in the DRC (Hoebek Be, Carette, & Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007)

The Delegation of the European Commission in Kinshasa was reopened as part of the NIP in 2002. Since then it has played an important role in coordinating the EU’s efforts and actions in the field. The Delegation has been responsible for following up all the initiatives, projects and actions financed by the EC. Based on its presence in the field and its regular contacts with both Congolese and international actors, the Delegation has performed a key role in the development and definition of projects, actions, support to elections and EU policies, including its involvement in SSR. Within the coordination institution, CIAT, the Head of Delegation represented the EC and shared the EU presence with the representative of the local EU Presidency (Hoebek Be, Carette, & Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007). Early on the EU’s focus was to secure ‘local ownership’ of the projects, something that sounds good, but is often difficult to implement. As Willén et al. argue, the EU’s engagements have often been hit by a kind of paralysis, which was not necessarily the fault of the EU itself, but could be a consequence of the lack of buy-in by the local actors (Rayroux & Wilén, 2014).
2.4 Background: Security Sector Reform Programmes and the Demobilisation, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) programs in the DR Congo

According to Wolf the term SSR implies:

‘….the transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibility and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus accountable security force reduce the risk of conflict, provide security for citizens and create a safe environment that is conducive to development.’ (Wulf 2004)

As rightly pointed out by Bjørn Møller back in 2010, the SSR concept has become an international buzzword when dealing with international security and post-conflict reconstruction. It should be seen as part of the neoliberal consensus, where the hegemonic ‘West’ attempts to reform and transform the rest of the world in its own image (Møller 2010). SSR programmes were initiated to create functional and effective state structures that have, or are close to having, Weber’s ideal of a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Jackson et al. go even further and argue that SSR often amounts to liberal state-building, with a mission to transform a much wider set of institutions and structures than simple security institutions. The liberal epistemological underpinnings of the SSR concept have led to a focus on much more than classical state and national security issues (Albrecht & Jackson, 2014, pp. 84-85). Consequently, the term ‘SSR’ is used in this field report as an abbreviation for the reform of the much broader security system, basically dealing with an attempt to (re-)create state control with the institutions in society that have the actual right to support the rights of other actors and to use violence on behalf of the state authorities. This is very much in line with the OECD’s DAC guidelines, which state:

‘The OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance agreed by ministers in 2004 define the security system as including: core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia).’ (Albrecht & Jackson, 2014, p. 92)

This is a great responsibility in democratic society, which requires tight civilian oversight and control. As Wulf argues, accountable and effective security institutions do reduce the risk of conflict and provide security for the citizens of the state. The reform must, therefore, be part of a comprehensive strategic attempt to reform and/or create new security actors by making them capable of realising this reform. However, it is not just reform of the security system that is important, but also, and particularly, the creation and reform of the legal framework in which it has to function. Therefore, SSR must focus initially on the framework for the reform and put some effort into this. Furthermore, the SSR program should be characterised by firm civilian oversight and especially by local ownership. The latter aspect, as Autesserre, for instance, argues, is often
highlighted as a key issue, but is difficult to secure in reality (Autesserre, 2014). In the case of the DRC this has turned out to be a challenge, since the SSR program was initiated in a non-permissive environment where the state and its institutions were coming out of war, and it is still faced with significant security challenges, with limited or no capacity to secure civilian control and oversight, nor even the ability to deliver on its parts of the SSR project plans (5, 2017). Apart from the more conceptual thinking related to the role of SSR, it is also a practical box of tools that can be applied in different ways and adapted to the specific circumstances on the ground. This requires an in-depth knowledge of and network within the country in question, which often constitutes a key challenge. International experts are therefore often sent in to wind up programs as in the previous project, not taking the local context into account. This is also one of the reasons why SSR programs often only have limited success, because they are designed and superimposed on non-permissive local context (Jackson, 2015).

One of the structural challenges often facing SSR is that the strategies are often focused on the national level, while, for instance, police forces normally conduct their operations at the local level. This creates the challenge of connecting the two levels and encouraging them to merge and not act against each other. This is again something that can look like a minor issue on paper, but it is often highly problematic when it comes to practical implementation on the ground, where the SSR tools need to be flexible and tailored to the local situation. This becomes even more the case in a vast territory like the DRC, with its large regional differences and limited infrastructure. Another challenge for SSR are the special issues that may face the program in a non-permissive environment like that in the DRC. Here the focus would normally be on stabilisation, and therefore the rapid reform of the armed forces, and not the other security institutions. This priority is informed by the immediate security challenges that face states in conflict or in the early stages of a stabilisation phase.

In addition to these challenges, donor involvement and donor dependence is often problematic and marked by a degree of selfishness, because the ‘West’ wants to create security structures that can assist in dealing with its own security concerns, e.g. the war on terror, more than being focused on what is the best for the state in question (Møller 2010). Some commentators compare donor support on SSR with a Trojan Horse, because one never knows what it carries in its belly once it has been invited within the perimeter of the state (Møller 2010). Foreign involvement is extra-sensitive when it is trying to deal with reforms and obtain access to the security sector, traditionally considered the state’s most national and sensitive sector, the intelligence service being a case of point. Foreign involvement is often part of both creating international visibility and creating goodwill with local government, which can provide market access, but also be part of an intelligence access strategy.

The coordination between the individual donors, as well as between donors and the recipient state, has also for various reasons turned out to be difficult and not to function well in many SSR programmes. For instance, is the individual donor merely playing a monitoring and advisory role, or is it taking a leading role in running the process? Examples of both types of donor role can be found. The British, for instance, took a leading role in the SSR programme in Sierra Leone, where British personnel assumed leading roles in the national security institutions and then transferred authority to the local authorities when they were deemed to be
ready (Sierra Leone 2009). The evaluation of this process was initially very positive, but it requires compromises to be made in relation to local ownership. Several years later this program attracted criticism for being too reductionist in its approach by focusing on the institutions of state and building a security system that is unaffordable within the Sierra Leonean budgetary framework (Albrecht & Jackson, 2014, pp. 96-97). The British approach to partnership in SSR, as well as capacity-building in, for instance, East Africa, has been to produce a strategy and then persuade the partner states to adopt the British-produced plan. This leads directly to one of the other challenges when dealing with SSR, which is the issue of donor coordination. Donors have national agendas which make it difficult for them to coordinate their efforts effectively. Individually they need visibility and quick and tangible results to be able to persuade domestic opinion that the donated funding is being well spent. This often militates against the objective of the SSR programme, which needs well-coordinated efforts and long-term funding. However, the problem of coordination is a problem not merely in the relationship between the donors, but also in that between the latter and the recipient state. It has turned out to be relatively effective if one wishes to slow down a reform process, and maybe to secure some funding in one's own interest, as well as to reach bilateral agreements with individual donors, as compared to a whole group of donors. The risk is that the SSR programme may well end up being a patchwork of bilateral agreements where coordination is lacking or only limited, without any comprehensive long-term objectives, and lacking the required focus on the specific needs of the recipient. This will often lead to a lack of ownership and even resentment on the part of the local parties.

2.4.1 THE SSR PROGRAM IN THE DRC

‘The transfer of political ownership to national authorities is always a challenge, and in the DRC is proving exceptionally difficult. This is especially the case with SSR, a policy domain involving crucial sovereignty and security sensitivities. A second complication for the DRC is the continued fighting in the eastern provinces. [...] Conducting SSR in these conditions may be compared to attempting to repair a car travelling at full speed.’ (Hoebeke, Boshoff and Vlassenroot 2008)

The OSCE handbook on Security Sector Reform (SSR) stipulates that there is both a practical and a qualitative difference in initiating and implementing SSR in permissive compared to non-permissive environments. The SSR program needs to be tailored to the actual context, taking local circumstances societal structure and history into consideration (OECD, 2007, p. 30). Prof. Paul Jackson argues that SSR should not be seen as a fixed program, but more as a sort of menu of different tools that need to be selected and evaluated in each case (Jackson, 2015). The SSR programme in the DRC in the early years of the EU and UN mission faced huge challenges in relation to the above since the programme had to be implemented in a very hostile environment, leaving only a short time for transformation and reform because of immediate security needs. In 2016, after the transition of the UN mission into a stabilization mission in 2010 and the termination of the EUSEC (2016) and the EUPOL (2014) missions, only limited progress could be detected, especially on the side of the Congolese army (FARDC), but also in the national police (PNC). The slow progress of SSR in the DRC is one of the key reasons for the limited progress in creating stability and peace. The legitimacy of the central government is questionable, despite the relatively successful elections in 2006,
and less so in 2011/2012. The postponement of the 2016 national election illustrates that the political system in the DRC has become increasingly authoritarian since the elections of 2006. One of the problems for the Congolese government has been that, due to its own weakness, including of course its institutional weakness, it has had to reach a number of compromises when negotiating conditions for peace agreements with militia leaders. One of the consequences has been that individuals responsible for war crimes have been promised amnesty and a high-level position in the security institutions in return for accepting SSR and integration. The principle of the non-acceptance of war-criminals has consequently been dropped in an attempt to reach an agreement with these elements.

The renewed fighting in Northern Kivu in late 2008 and the continued violence in eastern Congo in general, even after the deployment of the UN/SADC Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2013 as a robust addition to the deployed UN force, show that the Kinshasa government has been unable thus far, and even unwilling, to exercise state control over its sovereign territory, in particular the eastern parts of the country. As Boshoff rightly pointed out early on, one of the key problems facing the peace process, and thus the SSR, was the difficulties in achieving progress in the DDR and especially in making the DDR(RR) process effective (Boshoff 2008 p. 2). In 2016 the situation improved somewhat, as especially the DDR(RR) program with Rwanda seems to be working relatively well, but the domestic DDR program\(^5\) has faced challenges, especially because the Congolese government either deliberately, or due to lack of state capacity, has failed to deliver the agreed frameworks for returnees. This has created a basis for the re-recruitment of former combatants (Vogel & Musamba, 2016). Does this then mean that the DDR program has been a failure? Yes and no. If a narrow focus is taken it has been a failure in the sense that it has failed to integrate former combatants effectively into society. However, whether the recruitment is the due to the failure of the DDR program or has more to do with a whole range of other factors in DRC society and the continued conflict is of course another matter. The question that remains to be answered in that context is to what extent the EU, its partners and the competing donor community in the DRC have been too focused on implementing and executing programs, and not enough on the impact of these programs?

### 2.4.2 THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

In the reports to the UNSC it was expected that the election of a democratic government in 2006 would increase stability and make it possible to reduce the UN’s military presence in the DRC. However, the inauguration of the first elected government in February 2007 did not provide the expected progress in the SSR programmes, nor for stability more generally. The DDR process came to a near standstill due to corruption, a lack of capacity within DRC institutions and direct opposition to the reform. Compromises such as the ‘mixage’ principle had to be made, and became an integral part of the SSR in the DRC. The ‘mixage’

\(^5\) The DDR program in the DRC in reality consists of three subsequent programs that have faced numerous challenges. For an in-depth study of the DDR program pls. see for instance Vogel & Musamba, Recycling Rebels? Demobilization in the Congo, Rift Valley Brief, 2016.
principle was the result of a compromise negotiated between the then dissident General Laurent Nkunda and
the Rwandan and the Congolese governments in 2007 represented by General Numbi, whereby the rebel
force was allowed to be integrated into the army and mixed with government forces without going through
retraining, integration or any kind of vetting. The result was that whole rebel units were kept intact within the
national army or FARDC, which created loyalty problems and command and control issues. The EUSEC
early on called this strategy a failure (10, 2009A). The UN SSR office argued at the time that the lack of
qualified officers was a problem for both the PNC and the FARDC, but that for political reasons it was
necessary to let time change these problems, which were a consequence of the compromises made during
the transition (23, 2009). However, interestingly enough the ‘mixage’ document was drafted by EUSEC, but
the eventual implementation and the compromises made were the consequences of Congolese negotiations
(12, 2016). Over time it must be added that the problems caused by this reform, such as the lack of
command and control and issues concerning loyalty, are less visible in the contemporary force (12, 2016).
The problems related to the compromises made to the integration process were illustrated in late 2006 when
a large number of FARDC elements deserted and re-joined the rebel forces, especially the CNDP. In early
2009 the CNDP split, its leader General Nkunda was put under house arrest in Rwanda, and the bulk of its
forces were reintegrated as whole units into the FARDC in the so-called AMANI-Leo structures, being used
in the Rwandan-led offensive against the FDLR. This was a renewed attempt to integrate the CNDP into the
peace process, and a lot of compromises had to be struck to make it happen, including the fast-tracking of
the integration of whole units and addressing the immediate security needs facing the FARDC and DRC
government in the eastern DRC. By fast-tracking integration, the AMANI-Leo units could be used directly in
the fight against the FDLR, without having to go through the slower retraining and sensitisation process.
Interestingly enough the EUSEC advisers warned the DRC authorities on the dangers in this model, but it
was implemented anyway, basically for the above reasons (10, Anonymous, 2009). In March 2012 some of
the same elements deserted yet again and created the M23 rebel group. In 2016 the conclusion among UN
SSR officers was that these early integrated units have limited military capabilities, being plagued by serious
command and control challenges (7, 2016) (4, 2016). The question concerning the ‘mixage’ strategy was
and is, of course, whether the Congolese government at the time had any alternative options, given its own
weak position. According to a former EUSEC employee, this was the only option available to the
government, given that it was faced with a direct security threat and instability, especially in the eastern part
of the country (12, 2016).

The international community and the government in Kinshasa were also affected by the fact that the focus at
that time was on creating stability, highlighting the role of the army while downplaying the role and
importance of the police. However, although conflicting ambitions between the donors and the Congolese
authorities have been the reality, since the FARDC was the key focus of reform due to the immediate
security situation, the international donor community found it easier to work on the reform of the PNC than of
the FARDC. This also meant that the dialogue between the donors and the Congolese authorities was much
better on the side of the PNC than the FARDC, where dialogue with the Ministry of Defence was often
problematic, if it existed at all (4, 2016).
However, despite this, and despite the fact that a lot of progress could be detected in formulating the framework for the new police, including the new police law, limited progress in the reform of the PNC can be detected. In 2010 a new vision was created for the Congolese National Police (PNC), according to which the PNC should be public, civilian, apolitical, republican and professional, accessible, have an open and close contact to the civilian population it serves, be under civilian control, respect international legal principles and basic human rights, be transparent and adhere to the principles of good governance (UNPOL 2010b). The reality six years afterwards in 2016 was that the PNC was very far removed from this vision and remains a much feared and corrupt institution.

2.4.5 THE ORGANISATION OF THE SSR AND DDR(RR) PROGRAMME IN THE DR CONGO

'A key lesson from SSR programmes is that each country context is different and approaches have to be tailored to address the local environment.' (OECD, 2007, p. 30)

The initiation of the SSR program in the DRC followed the signing of first the Lusaka agreement in 1999, which was never really implemented and only received some momentum after the assassination of President Laurent Kabila in 2001, and later the ‘The Global and All-inclusive’ Peace Agreement signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002. The peace agreement was the result of a South African-dominated international initiative to promote Congolese dialogue between civil-society groups, political parties, military groups and the Kabila government, which led to the so-called Sun City agreement and the subsequent peace agreement. An important part of these agreements, besides providing a blueprint for the transitional power-sharing government, was the disarmament and demobilisation of the armed groups and the reform of the national security institutions, in particular the creation of a new integrated armed force and a national police service. These reform proposals were supposed to create some level of nationwide security before the elections planned for 2006. Since 2008 MONUC’s (MONUSCO from 2010) SSR mandate, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1856, is to be active in three pillars of SSR: defence, the police and justice in the DR Congo, doing so in cooperation with the other dominant donors in the DRC, especially the EU.

When dealing with SSR in the DRC, it is necessary not just to focus on the SSR process itself, but also to scrutinise both the DDR and the DDRRR process that was instigated in 2003. The successful conclusion of the DDR(RR) process has been identified as a necessary foundation for SSR. The two programs were originally organised as a dual-track strategy called ‘tronc commun’, indicating that the personnel could be included in either an integration track or a demobilisation track. However, due to ineffectiveness and mismanagement the DDR(RR) process in DRC has been plagued by problems, including delays, a lack of resources and logistical problems. As a result donor support for the domestic DDR program was suspended in 2006, which led to criticism from MONUC because mismanagement seems to be an unavoidable ingredient in SSR programs in an environment like that in the DRC, and the suspension has had a damaging effect on the wider peace process.
The administration and coordination of the DDR program was primarily a joint responsibility between the transitional government, MONUC and the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) for the duration of the three-year transition period (Onana & Taylor 2008 p. 502). The DDWRR program was a MONUC-driven program and was not faced with these challenges in the same way. The government also established two committees to oversee the identification process of elements belonging to each of the factions that were to be integrated and one committee to oversee the operational side of the integration process. As mentioned above, the primary objective of the DDR(RR) and SSR programs was to help the transitional authorities regain control of the territory and to enable the planned 2006 election. The national DDR program was consequently initiated in December 2003, when President Joseph Kabila signed three decrees creating the institutional framework for it. However, it took the transitional government quite a while to adopt the National DDR program (PNDDR - National Plan for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion). This happened as late as June 2004, and only after tedious preparations and broad assistance from MONUC, UNDP and Belgium (Onana & Taylor 2008 p. 505). The program described the close relationship between the DDR and army integration and emphasised the importance of national ownership of the program.

Another important element was that the program of integration, both in the PNC and FARDC, focused on the technical side of the integration in an attempt to deemphasize the political differences between the former warring parties. The dual ‘tronic commun’ strategy, where all former fighters, including government forces, follow identical processes, regardless of whether they enter the DDR program or join the new army or police institutions, was based on four main elements – regrouping, identification, sensitization, and selection.

Adding to the complexity of the DRC case is the fact that the DRC government and the international community had to deal with both Congolese and foreign armed groups and militias in their DDR/SSR efforts. Congolese armed groups underwent the DDR process, which was coordinated by CONADER (National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion), guided by the PNDDR and financed in its entirety by the World Bank. Foreign armed groups went through the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegretion or resettlement (DDRRR) process, coordinated mainly by MONUC, guided by the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) and spearheaded by the World Bank and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

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For more on the challenges of the demilitarisation process, see e.g. ‘Demilitarising militias in the Kivus’ (Thakur, 2008).

The MDRP is a multi-agency program focusing on demobilisation and reintegration in the Great Lakes area, i.e. the DRC and the surrounding states, targeting reaching more than 400,000 combatants in seven countries. By May 2008 the MDRP had reached two-thirds of this target in general and in the DRC. The program was financed by the World Bank and 13 donors and had by the end of July 2008 spent more than SUS 210 million on its program in the DRC. The MDRP partners met in March 2009 for the last time before the closure of the program in June 2009 and its replacement by individual national programs.
The international donor involvement was coordinated by the MDRP, which was given the lead role (Onana & Taylor 2008 p. 506). An unintended consequence of the MDRP was that the intended linkage between the DDR and SSR programs was difficult to implement, due to the fact that the MDRP funding was earmarked exclusively for DDR and not SSR, i.e. a distinction was maintained between development- and security-related activities. This worked as a disincentive for the military leadership in initiating reforms because the same level of funding was not made available for the SSR (Onana & Taylor 2008 p. 507). At the same time the government failed to make resources available from its budget for both DDR and SSR, despite an agreement made in early 2004 stating the contrary. This illustrates an important point, namely that the success of these types of programs is to a large extent dependent on the cooperation and ownership of the local authorities. This has to large extent been the case in the DRC, and the government has often not delivered on its share of the responsibilities in relation to DDR and SSR, causing the desertion and (re)-recruitment of combatants. As already mentioned, the PNDDR offered the former combatants a choice of either being reintegrated into civil society or joining the new national army (Hoebek 2008 p. 3). The initial estimated number of combatants to be integrated was set at 330,000, which, however, turned out to be an inflated number used to gain influence and positions by the different parties on the basis of their announced strength (11, 2009). This created problems for the DDR process because the individual combatant’s free choice was in reality limited by a quota system set up between the different armed groups in the army. In turn, the inflated numbers resulted in the forced recruitment of some of the combatants (Onana & Taylor 2008 p. 505). The former commanders from the different military groups were, as part of the peace agreement, offered an officer’s rank and a command post in the new national army, without any consideration of their individual competencies as military commanders, i.e. there was no sensitisation of the integrated personnel (Onana & Taylor 2008 p. 503). According to MONUC’s SSR office, among others, this was a necessary national compromise, which can only be corrected over time (23, 2009). In addition, the non-government parties feared that a sensitisation process based on military competence would favour President Kabila and his allies, and they were very concerned that the quotas mentioned in the peace agreements be upheld. This is also why the planned PORGRESS-led program for the re-training and redeployment of older personnel from FARDC is a politically touchy topic (6, 2017). Progress in creating the needed legal and doctrinal frameworks in transitional institutions and in parliament was slow as well. The draft Defence Law (November 2004) did not provide any direction on the size, operations or functioning of the army but instead focused on the organisation and structure of the overall defence apparatus (Boshoff & Wolters, 2006). However, article 191 of the 2006 constitution stresses the future role of the FARDC and the police in the DRC, though it was only by August 2011 that the Defence Law and the Organic Law were implements and provides this guidance (DRC Government, 2011). As a former EU representative to the DRC argued, it was remarkable how much resistance was detected from the local authorities to the formulation and implementation of this law (4, 2016).

Many factors played a role in explaining the slow-moving process. It became obvious during the transition period that several of the main actors were not interested in the real integration of their (former) armed groups (Boshoff & Wolters, Slow military reform and the transition process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2006). This also included the highest level of government. The individuals who opted for
demobilisation were offered a demobilisation package and training, a process managed by the Congolese authorities through a national commission in charge of the managing and coordinating the PNDDR, the so-called CONADER (Boshoff & Wolters, 2006). CONADER was headed by an aide close to President Kabila and was plagued by mismanagement and corruption (11, 2009). One of the main problems was that CONADER and FARDC were responsible for transporting people to the assembly camps, which often did not happen. This problem was increased by the MDRP’s decision to end funding for the program.

2.4.6 THE HISTORY OF THE CONGOLESE POLICE, - ‘LE BRAS TENDUS’

‘The National Congolese police (PNC) faces a double challenge: on the one hand, to fulfil its traditional mission of ensuring the security of the population, on the other hand, to reform and restructure the institution.’ (EU, EU Police Mission for the DRC, 2015)

The Congolese police have historically had a turbulent existence, and they have been transformed on several occasions. During the colonial era the force formed part of the ‘Force Publique’ (FP), which had responsibility for both the external and internal security of the country. The FP was split into two sections, garrison and territorial troops, where the latter had the responsibility for the internal security of the colony in a paramilitary or gendarmerie type function. After independence in 1960 the police were split into three branches, the Gendarmerie, the local police and the chiefs’ police. In 1972 parts of the police, the Gendarmerie, were again integrated into the national army, leaving the local police as the only ‘regular’ police force. In 1984 President Mobutu again felt a need for control over the security sector, and he therefore created the so-called Civil Guard, which was given ordinary police tasks, as well as responsibility for border control. The Gendarmerie continued working in a parallel structure on a more local level (International Crisis Group, 13 February 2006 p. 5). Both forces received preferential training and pay compared to the local police, which became more marginalised. For Mobutu it was, like everything else in Zaire at that time, a system of checks and balances, where the elite around Mobutu created security for themselves by establishing tensions between the different security institutions. However, the result was that neither force was particularly effective, despite large groups of its personnel receiving training in international police academies.

When Laurent Kabila took power in 1997, he introduced a new police structure, the Police National Congolaise (PNC), where the former Gendarmerie and Garde Civil were merged with elements of the rebel army. The PNC should ideally have covered the whole country, but they were not present in several sectors of the DRC. By the time of the Laurent Kabila-led takeover, the security institutions in the DRC had disintegrated from many years of mismanagement from the Mobutists, where the priority had been given to
specific elite units. This decision, which came out of political necessity and compromises at the time, has plagued the PNC ever since. As one central Congolese informant argued, the PNC is no better than the staff within it, and there are few good and well-trained police officers (5, 2017). Another problem with this has been that the force has had no mechanism for retrenching old personnel and replacing them with new recruits, which has aggravated the problems. In addition to this the PNC was too militarised in its manner of operation and needed to be civilianised (3, 2017) (4, 2016) (9, 2017).

<table>
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<th>The Congolese Police – major developments</th>
<th>Pre-independence - 1960</th>
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<td>Force Publique: Police</td>
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<td>Territorials</td>
<td>After independence: Gendarmerie and National Police merged and divided into police and paramilitary units (responsibility transferred to the MoD. 1972: Nationalisation/Zaire: Large number of police officers fired because they were considered not loyal to President Mobutu. From 1984-Civil Guard (Policing and border control; the National Gendarmerie (operated at the local level) and the local police 2002: The PNC was formed primarily from les Polices urbaines, la Gendarmerie, la Garde civile and then integrated elements from the armed groups. The Civil Guard and Gendarmerie merged into the National Police, including a large number of former rebels. The force has been split into three branches: the Specialised Units, the Territorial Police and the Specialised Services.</td>
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Table 1. The Structure of the Congolese Police and Armed Forces.

The Special Presidential Division (DSP) and the Military Operations and Intelligence Service (SARM). This preferential treatment of selected units has continued during the Kabila governments, both Laurent and Joseph, who established the Presidential Guard, which are loyal and controlled by the President. These units receive a better salary, better equipment etc., and consider themselves superior to the regular army. It is also the only military structure that possess heavy weapons like tanks and artillery.
One of the fundamental challenges facing the SSR of the PNC is, as pointed out by ICG, that the security sector in the DRC was created to secure not the people, but initially the colonial elite and later the political elite in the DRC. In this way the security sector resembles that in many other African states, but in the DRC, as with many other issues, things are more extreme. The different police units also had the objective of individual enrichment, i.e. the security institutions were used for political and economic purposes. Although in 2006 the ICG warned that the historical pitfalls should be avoided in the new force, the history of the last couple of years has shown that so far the force has fallen directly into the same hole (ICG 2006 p. 2). In many ways the reform of the PNC has also meant the creation of a new police identity, because historically the police force in whole or in part has been integrated into the army and therefore does not have an institutional identity to build on. This tendency continued when the then Air Force General John Numbi was appointed the new Head of the PNC in 2006. Numbi’s appointment also meant that the relationship with the donor community became more problematic, since he had a more confrontational style in the partnerships (5, 2017). The police continue to have a militarised structure and culture, which also is visible in their daily work. As one UNPOL interviewee commented, the PNC has better access to Kalashnikov assault rifles’ than ordinary police riot equipment and vehicles (24, 2016). The primary focus in the SSR in 2004 for the international partners and the transitional government in the DRC was to prepare the security institutions, including PNC, for the 2006 elections. In 2009 this focus was to a large extent the same as part of preparing the police for the 2011 elections. The strategy put in place targeted the creation of a force consisting of 38,000 police officers divided into three branches. The specialised units department consisted of approximately 9000, constituted by the Rapid Intervention Police (PIR) and the Integrated Police Units (PI). These forces were, in theory, deployed on the provincial level, to be deployed if security emergencies arose. The second branch of the PNC was the Territorial Force (FT), which consisted of a force of 25,000 dispatched all over the country and working on a local basis. The third branch consisted of what were called ‘Specialised Services’, consisting of, for instance, the criminal investigations department (International Crisis Group, 13 February 2006 pp. 6). In total MONUC estimated the PNC to consist of approximately 110,000, a number that MONUC would like to reduce to 80,000 (Saudubray, 2010). In reality no one knows the exact number of police officers in the DRC, since on the one hand the numbers have been inflated by the authorities, while on the other hand the exact numbers of officers in some cases are higher than reported, since police positions in some instances are inherited from generation to generation, without formally being registered. The stated objectives of conducting a census have still to be finalised. The EU claims that this work was finalised in late 2016, but according to the Congolese and the UN this was not the case (1, 2017) (5, 2017) (24, 2016)

The force has historically been an incoherent one, operationally incapable of carrying out its tasks. It has in general, apart from the elite units, been underpaid, ill-trained and greatly feared by the citizens of DRC/Zaire. The relationship between the elite in power and the security apparatus, including the police, has in many ways been one of estrangement because the elite have not dared to trust the police or the security apparatus, whilst at the same time this very elite has been dependent on the security institutions to stay in power. The risk of a coup mainly by the military has always been part of the calculation that the political elite needs to take into account. UNPOL early on suggested that the police be deployed among the civilian
population instead of placing them in police encampments, isolated from the local population. However, later on the DRC government, with the support of donors, decided otherwise, illustrating the difficult relationship between the donors and the then government.

In 2003, after the Pretoria peace agreement had been signed, the then vice-president in the transitional government, Azarias Ruberwa, estimated the number of police to be 74,631, which were to form the basis for the new PNC (Boshoff 2004 pp. 5), a number that was later increased to 110,000.

### 2.4.7 NATIONAL POLICE REFORM

‘The Congo police have never been able to provide basic law and order and have themselves ranked among the top abusers of citizens’ human rights.’ (International Crisis Group 2006 p. 4)

The SSR of the PNC can be divided into two major phases, before and after the 2006 elections. Pre-2006 the reform and training of the PNC was primarily focused on preparing the PNC to contribute constructively to the 2006 elections by having some kind of operational capability. The focus was, therefore, on the training of specific capabilities such as crowd control. Post-2006 the reform and focus were taken to another level with long-term objectives in mind, creating a force that can contribute positively to a modern Congolese state. It was UN Security Council Resolution 1565 of 2004 that initially mandated the UN to become involved in SSR in the DRC. The resolution specifies that MONUC was mandated, within its capacity, to be involved in SSR in the DRC, and it emphasises the importance of training and monitoring the reform of the police, focusing on democratic values, human rights etc. (UNSCSR 1565 2004). In 2010 the number was expanded under Resolution 1925, which mandated the increase in the number of police from the initial 391 civil police to up to 1050 police in formed units (UNSCSR 1925 2010). Resolution 1925 also underlines the fact that the international involvement in the DRC had entered a new phase of an increased emphasis on police and stabilisation and a reduced focus on the military presence, i.e. the operation changed from being a predominantly military operation to a more civilian-dominated operation, apart from the eastern parts of the DRC, which continue to be plagued by conflict and instability. This change in the mandate and focus of the UN is also instructive in explaining some of the challenges of the SSR programme, and in particular the SSR of the PNC, in the DRC. The focus has been on handling the immediate security challenges and reforming the army.

In November 2004 the Minister for Home Affairs set up the so-called Joint Group of Reflection on the Reorganisation and Reform of the Police (GMRRR). The group was tasked with scrutinising the PNC and coming up with proposals for a reform of the force, including writing up a draft proposal for a new organic law

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9 The GMRRR consisted of Congolese police experts, experts from MONUC, UN CIVPOL, EUPOL and the EC, Angolan, UK, French and South African embassies.
for the police, which was to be the guiding document for the PNC’s daily operations. The conclusion of the GMRRRR was that the PNC was an unprofessional police force that was in an urgent need of restructuring and training to be able to function effectively in support of and in the service of a future democratic state and government in the DRC (UNPOL 2010) (9, 2017). The group highlighted a series of problems which were causing the lack of operational readiness. The police had inherited a military culture in terms of both training and rank structure, which was not suitable for the police work at hand. Furthermore the PNC lacked both the human and physical infrastructure to function as an effective police force. This was especially visible in the absence of functional police stations, detention centres, IT infrastructure, pens and paper, equipment for the police officers etc. Another issue was the fact that the PNC had been created by decree in 2002, without having the needed legal and institutional framework in place. There was no salary system, resulting in missing salaries, no law for the police, no code of conduct for the police, and no police register or statistics (UNPOL 2010). The group produced a long list of recommendation for the reform of the PNC, which were closely related to the findings above. Several of the recommendations were linked to the legal framework surrounding the police, which pointed to the need for the ‘Organic Law’ mentioned above, but also that there was a need for the introduction of civilian control and culture in the police as part of the general demilitarisation of the organisation. This included a change to the constitutional provision for the police linking it with the army and the separation of the police from the military judicial system and the military grade system (UNPOL 2010). A second recommendation was the need for unification of the different branches of the police. Thirdly, the group pointed to the highly critical issue of launching a critical review of the rank structures in the PNC and reclassifying all personnel. This was a controversial point, because the peace agreement stipulated that the integrated personnel would be assigned a certain rank, despite not having the formal qualifications for this position. However, this was part of the negotiated peace agreement, and high rank secured its holder an income and influence. The consequences were very negative for the police because it resulted in a high number of individuals being placed on strategically important positions, without having the necessary formal qualifications. The PNC did not have the capacity or programs in place to train and educate the personnel in question.

In September 2007 the group was replaced by the so-called Follow-Up Committee for Police Reform (CSRP), which was given the task of ‘conceptualizing’ the organic law. However, the Committee only began to meet in 2008 and spent a long time searching for its role. (Davis, 2009, s. p 20). The CSRP was a formalized committee with eight (nine from 2010) sub-working groups and eleven members from the donor side, primarily EUPOL and UNPOL/UN experts (2, 2017). The CSRP had representatives from seven

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10 The nine groups were 1) Legal and Regulatory Framework; 2) Organisation; 3) Training; 4) Logistics and Infrastructures; 5) Human Resources; 6) Budget and Finances; 7) Information and Relations with Civil Society and PNC; and 8) Evaluation. On 24 February 2009, the creation of a 9th group called Human Rights, Child Protection and Sexual Violence was proposed (MONUSCO 2010b).

11 EUPOL’s mandate ran until 2014 and the mission consisted of 59 international experts. The Mission’s members included police experts, criminal justice experts and experts in the cross-cutting aspects of security sector reform (SSR). EUPOL was closed in 2014, and some of the advisory roles undertaken by EUPOL...
ministries,\textsuperscript{12} while civil society is represented by two representatives; the Inspector General for Police also has a seat in the Committee. In an attempt to stress the civilian nature of the PNC it is the Ministry of Interior that heads the Committee. The CSRP is run by the so-called executive secretariat, which has the task of ensuring a constant dialogue between the different Congolese parties and the international donor community. The secretariat also has the responsibility for constantly focusing on adjusting the reform programmes in an attempt to reach the long-term objectives (UNPOL 2010b).

So, despite the attempts that were made to secure local ownership, the reality was also that the dominant position of the international actors and the limited capacity of the local actors meant that the level of local ownership over the process is likely to have been limited. It seems that during the process there was a partial disconnect between the Congolese parties and the then donor community. This could to some extent be related to the lack of local ownership because this process has been driven by the donors. However, as one central Congolese informant argued it was also a consequence of strong personalities, for example, Gen. John Numbi had a key role in the breakdown of relations (5, 2017). The Congolese side has often blocked or delayed the implementation or decision-making process. As one Congolese informant involved in the process argued, from 2012-2016 70 pct. of planned reform tasks in the police had not been implemented, whilst the last 30 pct. was run by donors, including the EU (3, 2017). This leads to the fundamental question of whether an externally driven process, where for instance the training programmes are designed by the external parties, can be successful? Must it, as the OSCE handbook argued, be a nationally owned process to be successful, and what does nationally owned actually mean? What is obvious in the Congolese case is that while training on a practical level may be successful and well executed, if this training functions on an ad hoc basis, without a functional overarching plan, it might well come to be a missed opportunity. However, several parties to the process have argued that, compared for instance to the reform of the army, in the case of the police the Congolese government actually tried to engage and take ownership for the process (4, 2016)

The police reform itself was an ambitious project, given the short-term and long-term objectives described previously. However, priority was given to four areas:

1) The legal framework, the steering and the following up of the reform, whose objective is the adoption of legal instruments, the creation of the steering committee and the following up and evaluation of mechanisms;

2) The census, the formation of a database for PNC staffing, staff recruitment and management systems for

were taken over by a consortium (EUNIDA) of European development agencies and private organizations that ran its so-called PARP II program.

\textsuperscript{12} The Ministries of Defence, Justice, Planning, Finance, Budget, Public Functioning, and Human Rights.
the qualitative and quantitative command of the Congolese Police staffing;

3) The reorganisation, restructuring and equipment of the PNC for a progressive occupation of the entire territory and the improvement of the financial and supply system; and

4) The training and re-training for the consolidation of PNC’s professional skills and capacities.

(Source: MONUSCO 2010b).

The legal framework has turned out to be one of the most challenging priorities in the case of the DR Congo in the sense that the process of shaping the organic law for the police was very slow. However, despite the critical issues, progress has been made. The CSRP produced a long-term, i.e. fifteen-year, strategic plan and also a short term, i.e. three-year, action plan. However, the draft organic law was sent to the National Assembly, in the spring of 2010 being passed by the National Assembly, which means that the PNC now had a judicial foundation. At the same time government passed the action plan for the PNC, i.e. both the short- and long-term plans have been authorised by the government (Relief web 2010; EUPOL 2010). One of the objectives of the action plan is to try to coordinate the many different donor projects. However, the problem is not only to pass the legal framework through Parliament, but also to ensure that these projects are then implemented, which in the Congolese case has turned out to be very difficult (17, 2010). The problem among other things that many stakeholders have an interest in the actual training, depending on the training, but are reluctant to initiate the fundamental reform. However, as a Congolese informant argued this was also due to the fact that the international donors generally, especially the EU and to some extent the UN, had a poor understanding of the political dynamics of the Congolese context, and did not use local interlocutors to obtain the necessary access (9, 2017). Autesserre’s description of how a local Congolese expert only got a job at an international NGO after using a non-Congolese name springs to mind (Autesserre, Peaceland - Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, 2014).

2.4.8 THE INTEGRATION

If possible, the reform of the police in the DRC has in many ways been as problematic as the army integration process. The SSR process was supposed to integrate the different police services, which has turned out to be an immense challenge. While certain elements of the rebel forces were integrated into the specialised paramilitary units, national integration, i.e. at the national level, for the territorial police was initially dropped, and training was decentralised to the regional level (International Crisis Group, 13 February 2006 p. 6). This has to be seen in the context of the history of the police in the Congo/Zaire, which for several decades had not received any, or only limited, training. Six training centres were established to function as regional training facilities. One of the initial problems after the start of the transitional phase in June 2002-2006 was that all the focus was, as mentioned above, placed upon preparing the police for the 2006 elections, and not on the longer term objectives. EU support for the training, equipping and logistics for the thousand-man specialized Unité Police Intégré (UPI), is a case of point. It illustrates the difficult balance
that the parties in the DRC had to strike at all times between the long-term ambitions and objectives and the more immediate security needs at the time. These interests are not always compatible. In 2005 UNPOL initiated what it called the Refresher Minimum Programme (PMR), which focused on five basic training modules agreed with the PNC. The PMR managed to train more than 17,000 regular police and 749 Rapid Reaction Police by preparing them for the 2006 elections. According to the UN this was a major achievement, which moved the PNC from an inoperative entity to something that was operational and helped make the 2006 elections a success (MONUSCO 2010 B). This happened in parallel, and not always in a coordinated manner, with EU support for the UPI. According to UNPOL the focus for the police has been to disentangle it from its (para-) military past and to civilianise the PNC (25, 2010). The reality, however, has been that most of the priorities for police reform mentioned above have not been achieved, and UNPOL personnel even argued that the equipment situation in 2016 was worse than it was in 2006, when the police, for instance, had relatively well functioning radio equipment. In 2016 police officers communicate via private cell phones, and in more remote place they have climb trees to get reception. Most arrests happen by hiring private motorbike drivers as transport because very limited transport is available. Most of the basic equipment that the EU and UN did provide for the PNC in the build-up to the 2006 elections is no longer functional (24, 2016).

In the preparation for the scheduled 2016 elections, the PNC HQ in Kinshasa had no idea about the exact number and location of its police stations in the city, nor knowledge of the number of police officers. Often a police station that was supposed to have thirty police officers would only have less than ten. This was due to lack of a central HR register, but also due to payments, with salaries being paid out to non-existing individuals (24, 2016). In early 2016 UNPOL consequently had a project to map the police presence in Kinshasa.

The necessary reforms, among others the organic law mentioned above, struggled to pass through Parliament, and for the donors it has been difficult to initiate dialogue and coordination with the Ministry of Interior and the existing police structure. To illustrate this point, during a visit in 2009 MONUC’s SSR police office declared one of their ambitions for the coming year to be establishing a dialogue with its Congolese counterparts (MONUCSSR 2009). This happened despite the existence of the GMRRR coordination mechanism, which was under Congolese leadership.

Deploying the PNC countrywide has also turned out to be difficult. The central government’s attempt to introduce formal justice structures and a police presence in the form of the PNC often clashed with the traditional justice systems at the local level. These challenges were exacerbated by the fact that the PNC’s disciplinary record is questionable and that the judicial system in the DRC basically lies in shambles. Among the consequences is the difficulty in bringing a suspect to trial, and often no prison facilities exist for

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13 The Minister of Justice in 2010 announced a plan to hire 2000 magistrates in the two coming years to improve the capacity of the judiciary. In 2016 the situation had slightly improved, but it remains a challenge.
convicted criminals. This implies that it is actually very common for victims of violent crimes, such as rape, which is a widespread crime in the DRC, to meet their attackers on the street the day after he they are arrested. Correctional services are often in a very poor condition, which means that, if there is a prison, it is likely to lack functional facilities, with no resources for feeding the inmates, who either have to work for food or die of hunger. Only one prison in the DRC has received any government funding. Related to this is the fact that it is often difficult to keep inmates in prison, and that no central register of inmates exists in the DRC. Often prisoners are killed for political or other reasons, stressing a culture of impunity in the correctional service in particular, but also in the security sector in general (Alston, 2010, s. 19). There are no official statistics for the number of deaths in prisons in the DRC, but in one prison in Kinshasa 21 deaths were registered in 2009 alone (Alston, 2010, s. 19).

2.4.9 THE EARLY IMPACT OF THE SSR PROGRAM

‘In October 2008, fighting erupted in the North Kivu province in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)… This outbreak of violence is a clear sign that despite the international community’s investment in accompanying the DRC through a strenuous peace process and political transition for over a decade, the Congolese security system remains not just a fragile, but a destructive force. Not only is the current Congolese security system incapable of defending the state and the state’s authority, it also poses a serious threat to the population as a whole, and to women and children in particular. Impunity within the security system allows serious human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, to go unchecked. This culture of impunity within the law enforcement and security services must change to render the security system a protector of Congolese citizens’ rights rather than the principal abusers.’ (Davis, 2009, s. pp. 7)

This culture of impunity is also the consequence of the absence of justice due to the largely absent criminal justice system, which leads to vigilantism and mob justice (Alston, 2010, s. 21). One question that springs to mind when scrutinising the donor-driven, or at least donor-influenced and financed SSR in the DRC, is to what extent it has worked and been a success. And the short answer to that is that there is no simple answer. The eighteen integrated brigades of the early brassage are still intact and operational in 2017, not trained military forces after NATO standards, but at least in operation. Is that then success or failure, or both at the same time. It is easy to establish that the rapid integration in 2009 was not a success, since these units disintegrated and became the core of the M23 rebel forces. However, as described above, that was a Congolese-driven process, where the donors had been side-lined. The widespread perception is that the SSR program in general has been failure. This was stated very clearly by both MONUC/MONUSCO officials and key Congolese stakeholders, like for instance President Laurent Kabila and then Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito (UN Security Council, 2010 a). The former President of the Senate, Léon Kengo wa Dondo, argued that the benchmarks for the SSR had not been met (UN Security Council, 2010 a). This points to the fact that many of the ambitions of the SSR programs and project have proved to be over-ambitious and badly designed and planned, an issue mentioned by several informants, which can explain some of the criticism.
To describe in popular terms, if the project is to build Range Rover, and the result is a ten-year-old Suzuki, then that is a failure. However, it might have been more realistic to plan for the Suzuki in the first place.

The disagreements seem to be over why the SSR program has been less successful than it might have been, who is to blame, and how the SSR is to move forward. During a UNSC visit in May 2010, President Kabila called for an increased and real commitment from the international community and to prepare the security sector to take over from MONUC/MONUSCO (UN Security Council, 2010 a). The international donors for their part argued that the Congolese, for various reasons, have obstructed the process (26, 2010).

In cooperation with the PNC, the international partners have reached the stage where the necessary draft legal framework for the future of the PNC has been put in place. Impact studies were undertaken to prepare for the implementation of both the short-term PNC reform action plan (three years)14 and a longer term strategy for the development of the police (fifteen years)15 (UNPOL, 2010). Since then these plans, the judicial framework and the plans for police reform, have been passed by the National Assembly and the government. One of the reasons why it took such a long time to do this was the struggle between the Ministries of Justice and the Interior concerning the contents of the draft Organic Law, which suggested that the ‘Police Judiciaire’ should be placed under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior and not the Ministry of Justice (Davis, 2009, s. p. 20). However, there is further a structural problem in the relationship between the Ministry of Interior and the PNC in the sense that, because the latter is not in control, the police inspector is (17, 2010).

A number of programmes and plans were presented at a coordination meeting between the donor community and the Congolese in July 2010. EUPOL and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) introduced a program to collect data on PNC personnel, which amongst other things included the introduction of a professional ID card that was planned to take fifteen months to implement. However, this program failed, and no effective biometric system for the PNC has yet been established, despite claims to the opposite made by the EU (1, 2017). This would have been an important step forward in creating a database on the police, which would make training, distribution of salaries etc. much easier (Relief Web 2010) (4, 2016). The PNC payroll is in itself a symbol of the weakness of the Congolese state in the sense that the figures are inflated in the form of so-called ghost policemen as a way of providing an additional income for the senior officers, a symbol of the lack of statistical material. On the other hand, it is also often the case that in the rural district local police operate without being registered and receiving a salary, which means that they have to generate an income locally and that the number is higher than figures states.

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14 According to the UN the objective of the Quick Impact Projects is being ‘implemented in order to give the accurate answer to the current and urgent needs of the Congolese National Police (Trainings, Buildings, Deployments)’ (UNPOL 2010).
15 The UN stated the objective of the long-term strategy as: ‘Long Term efforts in an Integrated Strategy in compliance with the 3-year PNC reform action plan and 15-year strategy in order to reach the final objective of a professional, autonomous, republican and sustainable security force able to take care of its populations, DRC wide’.
However, another problem related to the payroll is that of widows and orphans inheriting a deceased officer’s position and salary. This is a social problem indicating that no scheme to secure an income or a pension for the relatives of a deceased policeman exists in the DRC. Therefore, the PNC, in the absence of social support system, has a social responsibility for these individuals (Davis, 2009, s. p. 20). Consequently there is a need for a government reform to address this issue and to secure some welfare provisions for PNC officers and their dependents. However, taking the general situation of the DRC into account, it might take a while before this can be introduced in view of the government’s general inability to deliver on its promises.

This will also form part of the basis of the future plans to create a force that operates effectively along the lines listed above, e.g. in the service of the state and its citizens, in accordance with human rights etc. As Davis argues, there is an urgent need to conduct a vetting of the existing force by getting rid of the worst human right perpetrators (Davis, 2009, s. pp. 7). The UN initially tried to run the names of the highest ranking officers through a database to make sure that the worst human rights offenders were excluded from the force. In the event, the UN initially failed to come up with an effective system, and the US government started to run the names of Congolese officials through its databases. However, by June 2016 the so-called ‘red-tape’ office of MONUSCO was checking the Congolese units prior to joint operations for their previous human records. This creates tensions within the MONUSCO operations, since blacklisting some units and commanders makes joint operations with the Congolese difficult. Nevertheless, the PNC is a result of a political compromise, and the vetting of its personnel, or more particularly the lack thereof, is a result of this compromise (17, 2010) (5, 2017).

As mentioned above, the security sector has been plagued by a culture of impunity, with a strong negative effect on the PNC’s relationship with the local population. The trust that needs to exist between the citizens and the police is lacking, and it will take many years to build because it has never been there and the PNC is currently continuing to act in accordance with its old cultural pattern.16 In this connection the culture of sexual abuse has been particularly widespread in DRC, especially within the FARDC, as has been documented by Baaz et al. (Baaz & Stern, 2009). High numbers of cases of rape can be found all over the DRC, even outside the conflict zone.17 The problem seems to be that the issue of rape has been ‘normalized’ in large sections of Congolese society, and especially in the security sector. As Alston showed in a report, the higher ranking officers often deny that a problem of sexual abuse exists. According to his findings rape was often seen as being imaginary and a result of infidelity on the part of the women (Alston, 2010, p. 16).

It is therefore considered ‘normal’ that men who do not have money buy to sexual services will rape to satisfy their needs. Baaz et al. call this ‘normal’ rape, as opposed to rape used as a weapon to humiliate the enemy

16 A small personal experience is, for instance, getting through border crossings in the DRC, where the border police always ask for a gift to be able to do their job. The worst example was once when an older police officer had a group of trainees with him, when he asked the author for a gift for everybody and which of course made sure that this institutional culture was carried on to the next generation of officers.
17 According to the UN there were 13,404 incidents registered cases of rape in 2006, 13,247 in 2007 and 14,245 in 2008 (Alston, 2010, s. 16)
This raises a number of issues. One is related to salaries, and especially the lack thereof. If the reasoning in the security sector, despite its highly problematic starting point, is that men rape by nature if they do not have their sexual needs satisfied, this means that another level is added to the problem with salaries that are not being paid to the personnel, i.e. if the PNC personnel, and the army for that matter, received a decent and regular salary, they would not have to rape. A PNC officer receives $US 60 per month. That should at least remove some of the arguments used to ‘normalize’ rape. However, the problem lays in the general cultural acceptance of rape and sexual violence, which makes reform of the PNC even more difficult.

2.4.10 FORMAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE AND SETTLEMENTS – (IN)JUSTICE AND THE IMPACT ON SSR

An important part of the SSR program in the DRC has been the reform of the justice sector, which, as previously mentioned, has proved highly problematic and has functioned badly. Informal justice, and even private justice based on force, has been, and still is, widespread in the DRC.

An additional problem is the relationship between formal and traditional law, where the latter often turns out to be more attractive for the parties involved because it operates more swiftly and its verdicts normally end up in some kind of economic settlement, rather than in a prison sentence as in the formal system. However, the traditional judicial system constitutes a significant challenge for the effective establishment of the formal state because the traditional chief possesses a dual role by virtue of representing different branches of the state. The traditional chiefs have been provided with a formal role in relation to the formal state, being the state's local representative, while at the same time continuing to function as judges according to traditional justice systems. This duality has proved to constitute a serious challenge for the formal state. However, traditional justice is also attractive to local populations because it incorporates traditional belief systems, like for instance accusations of witchcraft, which are widespread in the DRC. Traditional justice often functions as a hybrid between formal and informal systems of power, and organisation of the local community.

Furthermore, approximately four hundred magistrates have been appointed and, therefore, receive payment, but yet refuse to be deployed to the locations where they are supposed to be working (17, 2010). This, of course, adds to the problems facing the formal state in extending its control over the DRC. In general the judiciary is in a poor state, and improvements are not visible (17, 2010). The Congolese government has acknowledged that the justice system is dysfunctional and is not providing the sense of justice its citizens require. Political interference is ubiquitous, and the result is that it is often possible to buy certain judgements.

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18 This is just a line of thought and should not in any way be seen as a support for prostitution etc.
19 The salary for a magistrate in the DRC in 2010 was $US 600-700 per month. By Congolese standards this is a high salary, and it was suggested that an amnesty for corruption could be a way to solve part of the corruption problem.
(Alston, 2010, s. 21). This relates back to the hybrid nature of the sentencing and provision of justice, where formal state structures are often used to intimidate one side in a dispute.

The weakness of the formal Congolese state is visible because in several instances it has chosen not to deploy its representative to areas controlled by customary chiefs, who themselves refuse to recognize or accept any formal state presence (27, 2010). It is also difficult to prepare the PNC and the judiciary for encounters with traditional chiefs and justice because they take many forms in the DRC (27, 2010). The consequence of this for the provision of justice, rule of law and the SSR program should not be underestimated. The international strategy was therefore also focused on judicial reform as a foundation for the creation of sound and sustainable reforms of the security sector in general.

### 2.4.11 THE STRUCTURAL ISSUES FACING THE PNC

One of the initial problems facing the transitional government after the 2002 peace agreement was who was going be part of the new police force and how large the force was to be. However, there was only a very limited focus on police reform, because the signatories to the agreement and the international community prioritised reform of the army. A large number of police officers were not registered, which meant that they were not on the payroll and not part of the official statistics of the national police. This was especially true further away from Kinshasa, which meant that in certain police stations up to a third of the officers were not registered and did not receive a salary from the government (ICG, 2006, p. 5). The result was that the officers had to secure an income elsewhere. In reality it is often true the other way around as well, namely that police stations do not have the official number of police officers since their pay goes directly to the station commander.

As a result of the faulty integration process and the compromises made in the current force, there is no connection between rank and the intended function of the individual police officer. According to the peace accord, a third of the PNC officers in the new force were to be given the rank of officers, even though they did not have formal qualifications or the training appropriate to the rank. This, of course, has major implications for the performance of the day-to-day operations of the police force. Another consequence of the peace agreement was that the different parties had to fill their quotas in both the army and the police, which turned out be difficult for some of the rebel factions especially. The result was that the non-statutory forces struggled to find the allocated number of personnel to be put into the structure, while the formal police had to demobilize trained police officers. The short-term plan has been divided into six main points, which are to be reached within three years. The estimated budget for this purpose was $US 291 million. The long term strategy has been put in the form of nineteen strategic objectives to be reached within fifteen years with an estimated budget of $US 1,3 billion (UNPOL 2010). To add to the difficulties, the influence of trainers from a range of different countries, such Angola, France and China, each coming with its own training manual, produces a very heterogeneous result.

Several of the problems faced by the PNC are similar to those of the FARDC. The payment of salaries constitutes a problem, both in terms of making the actual payments, and also in relation to the size of the
salaries, which are too small for officers to live and feed their dependents on. This explains the notion of the *bras tendus*, because the direct ‘taxing’ of, for instance, motorists becomes a necessary survival strategy for the individual policeman, while it is also part of a structured system channelling resources up into the police structures for the higher echelons of the PNC (Baaz & Olsson, 2011). The failure of implementation of the biometric payment system and the absence of a functioning salary system in the DRC makes actual money transactions more problematic, and the system is vulnerable to abuse. Payment to fictive policemen is, as in the army, a real problem, partly explaining why a plan to start a vetting procedure and registration of PNC officers, which should have started in November 2010, has been delayed (25, 2010) (4, 2016).

Many police officers are therefore forced to find other sources of income. One effect, for instance, is illegal taxing, collusion with armed groups and criminals, and extortion. These minor transgressions occur on such a scale throughout the country that is very damaging for any attempt to improve the image of the force among the public, which in general must be said to be rather negative. Vetting of PNC staff is almost non-existent, and alternative options for surplus PNC staff are few. The PNC, in fact, exhibits many of the characteristics of a paramilitary force, and the detrimental state of the judicial system in the DRC means that it is difficult to prosecute ‘rogue’ elements in the PNC. Attempts to start transferring cases from the police to the military justice system have been blocked for a long time, but they have been accepted in recent years. The result is progress in the attempt to counter the sense of impunity for violations committed by individuals and groups in the security sector in general and the police in particular.

### 2.4.12 THE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE PNC

As mentioned previously, the PNC consists of three different units: the LENI or Legion nationale d’intervention,20 the police mobile and the territorial police. There is, however, a big difference between the nature of the police in the different sections of the DRC. In Kinshasa the reform has been more advanced because of the absence of military conflict in this part of the country, while the reform process in the east has been problematic. Another operational problem for the PNC in general has been that the coordination between the PNC and the army is insufficient, which creates operational problems (25, 2010). In support of the stabilization plan for the east, the so-called UNSSS,21 in February 2009 the PNC started to deploy north of Goma along two axes towards Rutshuru-Ishasa and Saké-Masisi in North Kivu to support the army’s effort (UNPOL, 2009). However, the problem was that the PNC has turned out not to be very robust, often withdrawing when faced with armed opposition. Often the PNC has been asked to perform tasks and handle

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20 This unit has had several names: *Police Rapide Integre* (PRI), later the riot police, and now the intervention police.

21 Later replaced by STAREC and ISSSS.
security challenges that it has not been trained or equipped for as part of a process of a militarization of policing in the DRC, especially in the east of the country.

![Map of DRC](http://files.ctctcdn.com)

Source: http://files.ctctcdn.com

However, during the elections in both 2006 and 2011 the PNC did play a crucial role in securing the electoral process. Despite the limited capacity of the force, attempts were made, especially in relation to the riot police, to ensure that some capacity existed to handle the threat of public disturbances. However, the election in 2011 also showed that the PNC is increasingly being used as a means repression of political opposition. The violence in 2016 has confirmed this and has once again placed the PNC at the centre of providing security for the regime, with big differences between its situation and role in Kinshasa and in the regions.

### 2.4.13 LENI OR LEGION NATIONALE D'INTERVENTION

The LENI LEGION is located with one unit in each sector of the country. In theory it has a rapid response-type role in the DRC, and in principle, despite the fact that it is tied to a specific district of the country, can be deployed wherever it is needed. This is, of course, in theory only because the force lacks enablers making it deployable.

This means that the LENI LEGION should be deployed as the first units after the army has swept an area. In principle the LENI LEGION will then be deployed as the first units to be brought in to secure an area, making the deployment of ordinary police and other symbols of the official state possible. The LENI LEGION has received direct support from France, who has seconded an officer to it. It is the LENI LEGION, which was supposed to play a central role in the SSR strategy as the first unit to be inserted, that has been accorded the most prestige. Furthermore, because so much focus has been on securing the elections, as the riot police the LENI LEGION received preferential treatment and better equipment than the PNC, which continues to be a defunct force.
In November 2009 the LENI LEGION was deployed to Equateur Province to quell a local conflict between two ethnic groups, which had led to large number of refugees fleeing across the Congo River to the Republic of the Congo. This operation was in many ways to be seen as test of the force’s capacity to deal effectively with a local security issue. However, the operation turned out to a disaster for the LENI LEGION when local militia killed 45 of its personnel and it had to be reinforced by FARDC and MONUC to quell the violence. The operation showed that the LENI LEGION, despite being represented as an elite unit, has only limited capacity and has yet to acquire the necessary capabilities to make it a reliable force. The problems faced in Equateur are not unique, as evidenced by the August 2010 violent attacks of local militias on the civilian population in Walikale in North Kivu. This area had been cleared by the Congolese army, but it never became known why the PIR failed to deploy and secure the area (MONUSCO HR Office, 2010). This stresses the previously mentioned point that coordination within the security sector is not effective and even non-existent.

2.4.15 THE TERRITORIAL POLICE (TP): A CASE STUDY FROM KASANGULU

The TP is the local police force, which is supposed to have the day-to-day responsibility for security in the local community. The TP is yet to be deployed in many districts of the DRC, and there is no central record of the number of police officers in the TP, which, of course, poses a highly problematic situation. The TP has received many training courses from the donor community, which were often not well-coordinated. In 2009 plans were made for the force to be vetted, which was scheduled to take fifteen months, another plan that never really materialized. One of the problems for the TP is that because the central registers do not exist, it is also difficult to keep a register of who has received what training. This partly explains the previously mentioned problem of the lack of coordination regarding which units have received what training.

The Kasangulu training camp in Bas-Congo

The training camp in Kasangulu, a two-hour drive from the capital, Kinshasa, is the regional PNC training centre for the Bas-Congo province. The camp itself is relatively modern and has been newly renovated, with classroom facilities and living quarters for the students and the teaching staff. The training is done by a mixture of Congolese and UNPOL trainers, everything being financed by the Japanese aid agency, JICA. The training is conducted in accordance with training manuals provided by UNPOL and seems well organized and executed.

22 The standard in Kasangulu was much higher than in the army’s training camp in Luberizi in South Kivu, which the author visited in February 2009.
Lecture hall in Kasangulu, DRC January 2010

In Kasangulu approximately five hundred officers can be trained at a time, however, many of the students never show up. One of the reasons for this is the lack of access to transport, which makes it difficult for PNC personnel to get there. Several of the students had to hitch a ride or even walk long distances to reach the training centre. As with so many other matters in the DRC, the government is unable to deliver on its part of the responsibility in the partnership with the donors. This includes the provision of transport, some of the food supply etc. It is also the individual commanders who decide who is to be nominated for training, which is often treated as a kind of bonus (28, 2010). One of the problems, seen from the donor side and with the long-term objectives of the police reform in mind, is that the training is not done by whole units at a time, but by selected individuals from different units. The problem with this approach is that it is difficult to target bad practices, such as, for instance, the culture of petty corruption, if only individuals receive training and are then send back to their old units (29, 2010)

Another illustrative problem for the SSR of the PNC is that the Kasangulu training facility, which has been modernized by JICA, is not owned by the PNC but by the Department for Roadworks, which is lending the facility to the PNC and can reclaim it at any stage. An additional problem for UNPOL is that it is dependent on receiving JICA financing to continue its operation, but JICA, like most donors, operate on short budget cycles, which makes long-term planning difficult.
2.4.16 CREATING A ‘FUTURE DIFFERENT FROM THE PAST’ – WHAT ARE THE ‘ELEPHANTS’ IN THE ROOM?

‘The fragility of the Congolese State is the common denominator of past and continuing instability in the DRC. Its weakness, and in many cases, absence from people’s lives, has left a vacuum, allowing military economic actors to flourish illegally and violently in pursuit of private interests.’ (MONUC SSR Office, 2010)

This statement by the SSR office of the UN mission is in many ways a traditional way of understanding the dynamics of the conflict in the DRC. However, while the idea that the state is absent from the lives of its citizens might be correct in some parts of the DRC, in large areas it is the other way around in the sense that the state is too much present, and in the wrong manner.

The DRC has many challenges after nearly fifteen years of conflict. Despite the continued presence of a large UN military force of more than 19,000, security and state control remain the key problems. There are continued instability and attacks in the eastern DRC, and the civilian population continues to be the victims of this chronic instability. However, the security threat has been reduced to a level, and changed in nature, to an extent that it no longer constitutes a direct threat to the Kabila government. The conflicts in the DRC have change in nature, becoming generally more political. The state continues to be ineffective or even absent in areas of the state, where the civilian population is left to its own destiny. The UN has created a number of benchmarks for success, i.e. reducing the effectiveness illegal armed groups, properly manned border postings, significant reductions of human rights violations, enhancement of the national security forces, and the creation of a strong legal framework (MONUC SSR Office, 2010). The problem, of course, the facility that the government has been largely unable to deliver on these benchmarks areas thus far. The UN’s new strategic framework argues that to secure peace it is necessary for the army to be replaced rapidly in a newly liberated area by the PNC (MONUC SSR Office, 2010). This is seen as a precondition for obtaining long-term stability. During a visit to villages north of Goma, and even some of the suburbs of Goma, I found this to be still very much the case (Mandrup, 2016). Consequently there is an urgent need for initiation of the reform of the PNC and a move away from the narrow instrumental focus that has characterized the effort until now.

The title used above in heading 1.3.4 “is reforming the bras tendus”, i.e. the out-stretched arms. This continues to be highly relevant in relation to the PNC because corruption remains a problem. The culture of impunity and corruption seems to be perpetuating itself within the force, without serious steps being taken to address the problem. However, there are signs giving some hope that the state has started to clamp down on high-ranking corrupt police officers, as, for instance, was seen in the arrest of the police commander for the Tanganika province in 2009, which ended in a shootout. It was the provincial auditor who demanded that the police commissioner be arrested. However, this shows that improvements are mostly happening outside the PNC, and not necessarily within it (17, 2010). Furthermore, in the DRC it is often difficult to establish to what extent these decisions are due to a change of practice and a clampdown on corruption, or as part of a political power play. However, the improved capacity of the military justice system, under which the PNC falls, will help in the long run. Several attempts have been made to try to establish and map out the dynamics of the corruption in the PNC and to determine what can be done to alter this type of behaviour.
There is a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, which often means that when the LENI LEGION, or the police in general, are deployed, it happens without it being coordinated beforehand between the two different institutions. Secondly, capacity and equipment are in such a state that the legion is incapable of performing its proper function when deployed in the east, assuming it can even deploy at all. This means that often the traditional police are deployed into an area as the first police units, without having either the necessary equipment or training. This means that they often are unable to perform police functions in the recently liberated zones since they do not have the required capabilities. Often they are unable to hold an area effectively and thereby perform the supporting role to that of the army. Another problem is that often there are no facilities such as police stations, which makes traditional policing difficult. Also the PNC is often intimidated by the FARDC and finds it difficult to operate without the support of the army. The UN SSR strategy is based on Congolese security institutions be able, over time, to take over responsibility for the provision of security from MONUC/MONUSCO. However, despite the fact that the UN mandate renamed the mission a stabilisation mission, it is doubtful whether the DRC is ready for a downsizing, however limited it might be (United Nation Security Council, 2009). That MONUC in 2016 was still deployed at its full force shows that the concerns raised in 2009 were very valid. There is continued instability in the eastern DRC, and the PNC currently seems incapable of taking the important role that police forces often play in the stabilization phase, for instance, taking control and holding an area taken by the army. The Congolese government has therefore also had to retract its previously stated wish that the MONUSCO forces should be withdrawn, because it cannot handle the security by itself (Vinter, 2010).

The PNC has a documented record of the excessive use of force and violence, and even of being responsible for arbitrary executions (Davis, 2009, p. 12). This, combined with the culture of impunity, means that the PNC in its current configuration is a highly unreliable force. One well-documented incident was a clash in the Bas-Congo province between the PNC and followers of the Bundu Dia Kongo movement, which led to more than a hundred deaths (Davis, 2009, s. 12) (Alston, 2010, s. 18). The UN investigation in Bas-Congo showed that the Congolese government detains persons without proper cause and even kills its political opponents, and that the police play an important role in making this possible for the government (Alston, 2010, s. 18). The local government representative even tried to block the UN from investigating the incidents in Bas-Congo. However, this is also illustrative of another point, namely that there is a major difference between the role of the police in the west of the country, which has not been hit by conflict to the same extent, than the eastern, which is still plagued by war.

MONUC has on several occasions documented the excessive use force by the security forces in the DRC and proved that the security forces are responsible for the majority of reported sexual offences. The PNC was responsible for 43 percent of the cases of sexual violence documented by the UN Human Rights Office
in 2007.\(^{23}\) These figures are, however, distorted, since private cases in the local community are often not reported but settled locally. Despite the unreliability of such statistics in the DRC, they are important in the sense that they demonstrate that the PNC is a source of insecurity and abuse for the local population. Another element to this is, of course, that the PNC and the FARDC are equally threats to the local population. The Congolese state is only in control of parts of the territory, and when its security institutions enter new areas, they live off the land and are thus seen as a source of insecurity for the local population. One of the central problems here is that the PNC in its current state is unable to be a competent replacement for the army in areas previously controlled by militias, not being trained or disciplined enough, and lacking the most basic equipment. This means that this task often is left to the army, which is overburdened and ill-suited to it. This is a vicious circle, because without a functioning PNC it is very difficult to introduce civilian rule and formal law. An illustrative example of this was the four hundred magistrates who remained in Kinshasa and refused to leave for their assigned postings because of a lack of government control and basic facilities in their allocated areas.

2.4.17 CHALLENGES TO THE EU AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY IN GENERAL

‘If local ownership is taken seriously, it changes the means and manner of engagement in SSR; as such, SSR assistance should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than determining that path and leading them down it.’ (OECD, 2007, p. 30)

The EU has not been operating on its own in the DRC, but in close cooperation with a number of international and bilateral partners. EUSEC often created partnerships with bilateral partner like Angola, who then undertook the actual training (14, 2009). This was the case with the training of FARDC and the police, and again in 2016, when the EU hired Moroccan and Tunisian instructors to train the PNC database operators (5, 2017).

A whole range of different donors are involved in the reform of the Police in the DRC, but the UN, the EU (through EUPOL), the World Bank, the UK, Angola and South Africa have so far been the largest actors. However, the SSR of the PNC has in many ways been frustrating for the donor community in the sense that progress has been slow and has met with much resistance from the Congolese side. Furthermore, that assistance has so far been focused primarily on the technical aspects of the SSR, e.g. the training of specific units. Only limited work has been done on the nature of the PNC, its role in a future democratic state and especially how it should support the population (Davis, 2009, s. p. 27). These fundamental reform issues remain merely a theoretical subject in many ways, which, of course, is highly problematic for the long-term

\(^{23}\) The FARDC was responsible for 54 percent, and the various militia groups for 3 percent. However, these figures have to be used with some caution, because of the lack of access to militia-controlled areas etc.
objectives of the force. In 2008 the United Kingdom donated £70 million over five years in support of the police reform and of accountability in the security sector in general. The focus was to strengthen security-sector governance and improve security and access to justice (DFID DRC, 2008), but interestingly DFID opted to run its programmes bilaterally, and not as integrated into broader international efforts (4, 2016).

UNPOL’s visit to Kasangulu 2010

As mentioned previously, donor coordination often constitutes a real challenge in a post-conflict situation like that in the DRC. Donors often have national political agendas, they often work on short-term budgets, they need to show quick results to their domestic audience, and they often base their engagement on their own national structures and experiences etc. All these elements generally make donor coordination difficult. In the case of the DRC there is often a complete lack of coordination, if it is present at all, and at times competition between donors has been the result. This has resulted in the Congolese government playing the different donors off against each other. The donors try to obtain some influence by getting their hands on a project of their own (Risch 2009 p. 6). The donors have a coordination committee, but their relations with

24 The so-called Common Assistance Framework was drawn up by a group of donors representing 85 percent of overseas development to the DRC as an attempt to coordinate their efforts (DFID DRC, 2008).
the Congolese have often been on a bilateral basis, in other words, existing between the individual donors and the Congolese side, without much coordination between donors. The result has been, in some extreme cases, that the same police units are being trained in the same issues, for instance, crowd control, by the different donors without any coordination (UNPOL 2010 C). However, there has also been internal criticism between different UN institutions. The HR offices, for instance, argued that the UNPOL training missions were too focused on the actual reform, and not on the reform of the PNC, and it was therefore difficult to see why there was a need for such a high number of UN police trainers (17, 2010). This stresses the discrepancy within the donor community between the governance and ideological approach to police reform and the instrumental or technical approach, where the governance side argues that the instrumental short-term approach is undermining the long-term ambitions for reform (17, 2010). The donor community has been trying to hand over the responsibility for security in the DRC to local authorities, but a lack of progress and a reduced interest in the SSR program makes it difficult to discern a concerted effort to transfer this responsibility. This has been seen in the withdrawal of military forces mentioned above and the renaming of the UN mission as a stabilization mission. Importantly the concept of stabilization is here used as an indicator of a new and less robust involvement as part of a disengagement strategy. This type of stabilization is therefore very different from the stabilization missions we have seen in, for instance, Afghanistan and Somalia. However, the reality of the MONUSCO force has also been very different, which the decision to deploy the FIB is a clear indication of. Nonetheless this change was also seen in the mandate of the operation, where the training is focused on the principle of training the trainer (25, 2010).

Another example often used regarding the lack of coordination between donors is the absence of joint training manuals, which means that the different police units have a very different approach to police work, depending on whether they were trained by, for instance, the Angolan or the French police. The South African, Angolan and Belgian trainers have, for instance, used three different training manuals (ICG 2010 pp. 15). The new FARDC recruited units are being trained by South Africa, China and Belgium, but are operating with different sets of training manuals based on different doctrines. The lack of coordination and/or the perception of the lack of coordination are not new in the sense that a 2006 ICG report quoted an Angolan official complaining about this (International Crisis Group, 13 February 2006 p. 9; ICG 2010 p. 15). However, the striking feature about the lack of coordination is that this was still the case in 2010 and again in 2017. The result has been a plethora of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agreements between the donors and the Congolese government, which had severe negative consequences for the effectiveness of the SSR programme, which has turned out to be complicated, with several parallel programmes. To further complicate the field new bilateral donors, such as the USA and China, are entering the DRC and introducing new concepts of training.

Another important issue related to donor involvement in SSR in the DRC is the level of local ownership. In the DRC local ownership of the SSR has been at best limited, being mainly focused on the material side of the reforms. The Congolese did not have any interest in the reforms, which would have meant altering the basic structures of power in the DRC and thereby access to resources (Risch 2009 p. 6). Nevertheless, the donors often have their own national agendas and lack the will to listen to the needs of the PNC. At the
French-financed judicial officers’ school, the school’s Congolese management stated that this was a problem.

The Judicial Officers Training School, Kinshasa, 2010

The French seconded a French police officer to the school, and the curriculum used came from the French judicial system, which differs a great deal from the Congolese system. This created some tensions because the French police officer had no judicial background, as opposed to the Congolese staff, who were trained lawyers. This stresses one of the central points in dealing with local ownership and the need for initiatives to be tailored to the local circumstances (27, 2010). The problem is often the international templates used, which do not necessarily fit the national situation (17, 2010). The judicial training school was also interesting in the sense that there was no contact with, for instance, UNPOL, and that several bilateral approaches to the school showed that coordination between donors was often lacking (27, 2010).

However, another problem in the relationship between the donors and the Congolese has been that priorities are not the same in the sense that the Congolese focus has been on the immediate and short-term needs, such as fighting the militia groups in the east. Their focus was therefore on training that facilitated a fighting capability and on receiving new military equipment. This has often been in contrast to the donors, who have focused on army reform, e.g. numbers and the affordable size of the future army and military conduct, e.g. human rights, which were not seen as that important to the Congolese fighting a war (ICG 2010 p. 15). However, at the same time the International Crisis Group argued that there is an urgent need for the donors and the government to agree on some initial priorities for the SSR programme and to move away from the current traditional military focus on equipping and training (ICG 2010 p. 22). This focus could be on the rule of law, fighting corruption, civilian control or supervision, all issues that are listed in the long-term
priority list for the PNC, though this also raises the question of ownership. It is interesting to observe the struggle between donors over who should handle coordination. The ICG suggests that the ambassadors’ forum should handle coordination (ICG 2010 p. 22), while in January 2010 MONUC argued that they were the main actors in SSR in the DRC and should do so (30, 2010). The attitude from the UN side was that they were the principal actor in SSR and that the other actors needed to adjust their programmes to that of the UN, otherwise the UN would do it themselves (30, 2010) (MONUC SSR Office, 2010). The SSR office based its approach on UNSC Resolution 1906, which emphasised the focus on SSR (United Nation Security Council, 2009). Some of the other international donors were taken by surprise by this UN approach, given EUPOL’s long involvement in the DRC (26, 2010). However, the UN strategic framework is very much focused on the army and its reform, and the PNC is only mentioned in passing in relation to payment reforms. Apart from the UN trying to use ‘bullying’ tactics to force the other donors to follow its lead, it is striking that the reform of the PNC is not one of its concerns. In a long list of benchmarks on security and stability for 2010-12, the only one mentioning the PNC directly has the objective that by 2011-12 the PNC should be sufficiently deployed in Kivu and Orientale provinces that the army’s presence can be reduced by fifty percent (MONUC SSR Office, 2010 b).

The new beast created by the SSR office in Kinshasa in early 2010 was a stabilization plan, called ‘STAREC’ and focusing on the eastern DRC. The problem with this plan, seen from the PNC side, was that the focus continued to be on the army and that the PNC is not directly included in the operational set up. The military planners cannot see the relevance of an increased focus on the PNC at this stage (30, 2010).

The SSR concepts that have been used, and are described above, are foreign to the Congolese context and are consequently difficult to implement. This is, of course, not something that is unique to the Congolese situation, as it can be found in several other post-conflict situations. One of the problems seems to be that, despite the stated focus on ‘partnership’ and ‘local ownership’, this is only apparently the case. Whether a real partnership is possible between two or more unequal partners is, of course, the thousand-dollar question that remains to be answered. In the Congolese case, SSR was imposed from the outside and has been met with resistance from the Congolese side.

2.4.17 THE SSR PROGRAM IN THE DRC: CONCLUDING INITIAL REMARKS

It is easy to be critical of the SSR program for police reform and the international efforts in the DRC. The number of success stories is limited, and the government security forces are repeatedly involved in violent attacks and human rights abuses against the civilian population, as was documented by the UN in August 2010. ‘Failure’ is a word that comes to mind when thinking about the reform of security institutions in the DRC. The process has to a large extent been donor-driven, with local ownership being limited in the sense that the reforms were met with only limited support, and sometimes even with obstruction, from the national Congolese stakeholders. There are numerous reasons for this, a few of which were an unwillingness to relinquish the control that the existing structure provides, the fact that the present systems contain many opportunities for corruption, and finally the circumstance that the political settlement was created with a
delicate balance in mind, reforming which may create openings for instability. The security sector is in general one of the most national, and by opening itself up to foreign donors, the Congolese state is also opening itself up to external access. There is furthermore much relevance in the quote by Boshoff et al. which argues that SSR in the DRC resembles repairing a car while driving it at high speed. The focus on SSR in the DRC has been on creating security and some sort of stability more than on the larger-scale security system reforms. In that respect the needs and reforms of the police had secondary importance until 2010 because the reform of the army has hitherto been the main focus due to the security situation. Since 2010 and the transfer to a stabilization mission, there has been an increased focus on police reform, though actual implementation has been difficult. SSR of the PNC has entered a new phase in the DRC because the government and the international partners are trying to move the operations on from stabilization into a phase of transformation, where the role of the police is evidently going to become more important.

The DRC case illustrates that SSR is also a politically delicate issue, often the result of political compromises. Consequently there is a sizeable discrepancy between the ideal reform process and that which is actually implemented, or between theory and practice, as one informant argued (3, 2017). The rank structure and the fast tracking of personnel are examples of the latter. This has negative effects on the ability of the PNC to function as an effective force. Reform plans have been put forward, but they would have severe political implications. And as mentioned previously, in the DRC there is a long distance from idea to decision, and even longer from decision to implementation. The consequence is that although the organic law might finally have passed in Parliament, it might take a while before actual implementation is visible on the ground. An illustrative example of the problems facing the police reform in the DRC is the fact that the PNC has yet to produce an overview of the number of police officers and that salary payments continues to be a problem.

This section has shown that the PNC is likely to continue to constitute a source of threats and abuse to the civilian population in the foreseeable future. As a Kinshasa taxi-driver exclaimed after a PNC officer had tried to get a bribe and forcibly open the taxi with the author in the back of the car, “the PNC are thieves in uniform’.
3 OPERATION ARTEMIS

In October 2002 the DRC and Ugandan governments signed a bilateral agreement allowing for the withdrawal of the Ugandan Defence Forces (UDF) forces deployed in, among other places, Ituri province. This agreement followed the collapsed Lusaka agreement of 1999, which the actors had failed to implement. Ituri province had been plagued by sporadic fighting and instability since 1999, and the 2002 agreement, and the decision in December 2002 to form a government of national unity, paved the way for the withdrawal of foreign military forces and the deployment of the UN force, MONUC/MONUSCO. However, the fast withdrawal of the UDF and the limited MONUC force of seven hundred Uruguayan peacekeepers at the airport of the provincial capital of Bunia in April 2003 created a security vacuum which was exploited by local actors. Fighting between a primarily ethnic Lendu militia supported by the DRC government and an ethnic Hema militia led to 500,000 internally displaced people and the deaths of an estimated 60,000 in Ituri itself. Another aggravating element was the brutality the militia groupings used, which led to international fears of a new 1994 Rwanda scenario. The killing of two UN military observers helped further the calls for an international military response to stabilize an escalating security situation. It was the killing of the UN military observers that triggered UNSG Kofi Annan to call for the rapid deployment of a robust military force to take control of key installations in Bunia and protect the civilian population. In Resolution 1484 the UNSC mandated the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for a short period of initially three months. The force was deployed in parallel to the MONUC force, but operated in close coordination with it. This model of deploying a robust parallel force is something that came to be a model for future deployments in both the DRC and beyond.

3.1 The political and strategic considerations

The deployment of Operation Artemis has been of central importance in the shaping and setting up of the EU’s military dimension to shape the ESDP. It was the first time that the EU had launched a robust military force, with the specific objective of preventing a potential genocide from happening and using force and the threat of force to stabilize a volatile security situation. It was therefore very different from the existing UN mission, MONUC, which at the time had a clear peacekeeping mandate. The Artemis force therefore had the objective of creating a security situation in which the MONUC force could be deployed and to prop up the small Uruguayan MONUC contingent that had already deployed. The decision to launch the operation also happened at a stage in EU cooperation where the US-led initiative to invade Iraq had created a significant split among EU and NATO members, making it difficult to find a common platform for handling of global peace and security issues (Duke, 2009, s. 396). The decision therefore came as an important tool with which member states could seek a common normative position on important international security challenges at a time where the union was split. The decision to deploy Artemis followed the St. Malo decision that the EU should play ‘its full role in the world’, including in the area of crisis management (Duke, 2009). This followed the organization’s inability to act with military means during the Balkan wars, which left the impression of an EU that lacked both the political will and the institutional structures to act, even within Europe itself. The decision to deploy was therefore done with reference to the normative values set out in the Treaty of the EU.
(TEU), which stresses the commitment to the principles of the UN Charter (Duke, 2009, s. 397). There was consequently a strong normative commitment at the time to try to address the security and humanitarian challenges facing the international community. The decision to deploy Artemis was furthermore taken at a time when the EU member states had drafted, but not yet passed, the EU Security Strategy (ESS), which also informed the decision to intervene with military means. The EU had made it a priority to equip the UN to be able to fulfil its role as the global manager of peace and security. Building a robust EU military capability was part of this thinking, and Operation Artemis became the first mission, apart from the missions in the Balkans, where this was implemented. In practical terms the new-found UK-French partnership, which was cemented in St. Malo and later at their bilateral meeting in Le Touquet in 2003, stressed the political commitment behind the normative framework presented in the TEU and ESS. As Duke emphasised, this also created an expectation within the UN system that at least two of the dominant states in the EU were ready to play a new and constructive dominant role in assisting the UN in creating peace and stability (Duke, 2009). The deployment of Artemis also underscored the autonomous position of the EU in crisis management and conflict prevention. However, the decision on the deployment of Artemis was also part of an attempt by a strong alliance within the EU to move away from the EU’s dependency on NATO assets in its deployments. The mission in the Balkans had been a matter of Berlin plus deployments, whilst Operation Artemis was seen as an independent EU operation. This was due to the political crisis that the US-led invasion of Iraq had caused for NATO unity, which made strong EU member states like Germany and France search for European solutions to conflict management.

The EU decision to deploy Artemis was also dominated by the national interests of a number of EU member states, in particular France. France had lost significant influence in central Africa after its problematic role in during the Rwandan genocide, in particular Operation Turquoise, and later the retreat from the CAR. This had left France without a significant foothold in central Africa, and the dominant role it played in Artemis reopened the possibilities for France to regain some of its lost influence. With the deployment of the French force in CAR in 2013, this dominant position was recreated, and France regained its strategic regional influence. The decision to deploy Artemis therefore also came against the backdrop of strong lobbying in the African Office in the French president’s office at the L’Elysée Palace. As Duke, Grignon and others convincingly argue, the deployment of Artemis offered the French government a chance to focus French policy effectively and implement it at three levels. At the level of national interest, it offers the potential to recreate the influence and pride that France lost in the 1990s in central Africa and beyond. Secondly it offered a possibility to situate and increase the interests and capabilities of the ESDP, which had suffered due to the EU’s incapacity to act in the Balkan during the 1990s. Thirdly, in partnership with UNSG, it offered Kofi Annan a chance to increase the capacity and importance of the UN as a counterweight to the tendency to circumvent the UNSC, as was the case in during what was perceived to be the illegal invasion of Iraq. However, France was very careful to frame its drive and initiative as a multilateral operation and endeavour, thus countering the claims that France was seeking its own interests. Very important was also the role played by the former colonial master, Belgium, which had committed a minor non-combat contribution and made intelligence assets available to the Artemis force, but diplomatically played a significant role as a member of the International Committee overseeing the DRC transition (CIAT). The limited Belgian role on
the ground was due to its previous colonial history, which had prompted the Senate in Belgium to legislate against the use of Belgian troops in its former colonies.

### 3.2 The Artemis Operation

On 30 May 2003, through Resolution 1484, the UN Security Council mandated the EU to deploy an intervention force into the town of Bunia, the provincial capital of the Oriental Province in the DRC. The EU Council’s Joint Action plan plus was passed on 5 June 2003 authorising Operation Artemis, which had two narrow objectives: to stabilize the security situation, and to improve a critical humanitarian situation by allowing humanitarian access in the town of Bunia. The force was only to be deployed for three months, and it was withdrawn by 1 September 2003. The decision to deploy the force was also due to the fact that the EU, through its Special Representative to the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello, had been involved in the DRC peace process since 1996 and consequently was heavily involved in the attempts to secure peace in the DRC. The deployment of Artemis should consequently also be understood within this context.

The mission was a French-led initiative, with more than 900 of the 1800 troops coming from France. However, France was insistent that the force should have an EU label and not be seen as a French endeavour. This was among other things due to the experience of its widely criticized role in Rwanda around the 1994 genocide, and especially its launch of Operation Turquoise, which created a corridor for refugees to escape into the DRC after the genocide had taken place. This allowed the groups and individuals that had been responsible for the genocide to escape from the advancing Rwanda’s Peoples Front (RPF) forces. The DRC is still, more than twenty years later, faced with the negative consequences of that decision, with a Rwandan actual and proxy war being undertaken on DRC soil.

When the security situation on the ground in Ituri deteriorated to such a degree that ethnic Hema and Lendu were pitted against one another, the situation began to be compared to what had been found in Rwanda just before the genocide. France was weary of being involved, since it feared being accused of supporting one side in the conflict. Deploying as an EU force therefore came to be a way of creating legitimacy for the French-dominated force and initiative. It was furthermore a way to implement the St. Malo principles, according to which the EU was going to transform itself into an effective conflict management tool. The deployment also happened at time in history when NATO was in crisis due to the disagreements amongst its members related to the invasion of Iraq. The crisis in UN operations in the wake of the problems and the lack of aptitude faced by this institution in the 1990s in, for instance, Sierra Leone, Somalia and in the Balkans left a void for the EU to fill, especially in the area of more robust peacekeeping. The new role that the EU carved out for itself also followed the recommendations of the so-called Brahimi report of 2000, namely to attempt to modernize the UN’s peace operations and shape its strategic partnerships with regional organisations like EU. However, the EU focus at the time was on the Balkans and on the events in Iraq. Javier Solana early on stressed that the DRC was not a priority area for the EU. It was therefore a French initiative that drove the decision to deploy, and the French army command called for a sufficient and realistically robust Chapter VII mandate, limited in scope to Bunia town and with a time limit of three months. It was furthermore made a condition that the national DRC government and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda supported, or at
least accepted, the deployment (Duke, 2009, s. 402). The decision to deploy was taken on 5 June 2003, and already one day later the first hundred French soldiers had arrived at the airport of Bunia, the full force having been deployed by 7 September 2003. Half the force was deployed in Bunia, while the rest was stationed in Entebbe in Uganda. Interestingly enough, even though the force was dominated by France, the Artemis mission had participation from a whole range of different nations, including non-EU members, namely South Africa, Canada and Brazil. This model of a supported EU-dominated force was also visible in later EU military intervention missions in, for instance, the Central African Republic, Mali and Chad. The Artemis deployment also revealed a number of other issues. In Artemis it was only France, the UK and Sweden that contributed combat troops, whilst the remaining contributors, Germany and Belgium as the biggest TCC’s, contributed with non-combat troops and staff officers. That a dominant EU member state like Germany opted for a non-combat role is based on its national history and its post-WWII pacifist stance, preventing robust military engagements. Operation Artemis revealed the problems and challenges faced by EU missions due to national caveats, which had significantly negative impact on the operational capabilities of the deployed forces. However, the problem of national caveats was not limited to the EU, as NATO, for instance, and especially UN missions suffer from the same kinds of challenges.

Artemis also played an important role in changing the pacifist paradigm in Germany because this type of peace-making operations was something normatively close what Germany wanted to contribute to the post-Cold War community of states. This change was already visible in 2006, when Germany took a lead role and contributed combat troops to the EUFORCA deployment in Kinshasa.

Artemis was deployed to stabilize and put a lid on an escalating local conflict in the town of Bunia. It was a French-dominated mission, but with a clear EU and UN mandate, and it was supported by non-EU states, for instance, South Africa with two Oryx helicopter platforms, Canada with strategic and tactical airlift capacity, and Cyprus. The inclusion of a small British contingent helped create access to Entebbe airport, since France’s role in central Africa remained a contentious issue due to its role during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The operational area was logistically close to Entebbe Airport, which is a regional logistical hub and only three hundred kilometres from the operational zone in Bunia. Strategic lift was identified as a weakness in the mission, which was furthermore seen as a French mission in an EU framework. Another challenge was that budgetary problems meant that EU had to reduce its original force target. France functioned as the framework nation, and a budget of seven million Euros was made available for common costs, while the remaining costs were covered by the contributing states. However, Artemis was exceptional in the sense that France covered many of the costs of the operation, on which it spent 46 million Euros.

Its area of operation was limited to the town of Bunia, and it managed to stabilize the situation and hand over the UN mission on 1 September 2003. Being the first independent military operation launched by the EU, the operation became a milestone in the development of the ESDP, one that came to shape future operations. The deployment of Artemis was characterized by strong French geostrategic interests, but was also a consequence of the split created in the NATO alliance by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Artemis was also interesting in the sense that it was a robust military deployment of 1800 deployed forces with superior capabilities, including significant Swedish special forces capabilities. France provided 900 of the combat
troops, whilst Germany’s 350 contribution was of a non-combat nature. On top of that France had over a 1000 troops in reserve in Gabon and Chad.

3.3 Conclusion

Operation Artemis was politically an important step in the development of the EU as a global conflict manager. It was launched at a time when the international community was split over the US-led decision to invade Iraq. The EU member states were divided between the group that had joined the invasion and those that opposed it on the basis of its supposed illegality. However, the real tension was mostly played out in the NATO alliance, which created a space for the EU to step up its role as a conflict manager. That the French-led Artemis force had a significant British contingent should also be seen as an attempt to create rapprochement between the EU members through what was seen as an European mission. The decision to invade Iraq had also undermined the UN, and especially the UNSC, as the key global actor for peace and security management. The Artemis operation was also an example of the UN, with UNSG Kofi Annan at the forefront, seeking alternative alliances and actors in its role of managing international peace and security. The two institutions therefore both found themselves in a place in time and history when they needed partners to strengthen their relative importance.

The operation was also an illustration of the important role played by national interests in deciding where and how the EU should intervene. Had France not driven the process of creating support for the operation, it is very unlikely that it would have taken place. France had, as shown in this section, a direct historical and strategic interest at stake, and the deployment of Artemis created an opportunity for France to repair its damaged image and influence in central Africa, as well as in the world in general. France showed the world that it was living up to the normative values expressed in the UN Charter and that it was willing, together with its EU partners, to deploy into high-risk zones of conflict to help the UN strengthen its role as the global conflict manager. The normative element therefore played a significant role in legitimizing the deployment, and it was presented as being in stark contrast to the allegedly illegal US-led invasion of Iraq.

3.4 Lessons from the Operation

The first question that needs answering is to what extent the operation managed to reach its objectives. The aim was contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, and to prevent what was described as a potential ‘genocide’ from happening. Among France’s allies there was some scepticism about whether there was a genocide, but it was recognized that they were facing a ‘serious’ humanitarian crisis and that war crimes were being committed by the actors in the conflict. However, the French military planners managed to get a mandate that was realistic, with the tools they needed, including approval of the use of force, and with a short deployment time. The Artemis mission therefore avoided the mission creep that so many UN and later NATO missions have experienced, and it had only a very narrow objective. The deployment of Artemis meant that the parties to the conflict knew that the force could and would use force if need be, and it managed to create a security situation where refugees could start to return to the town of Bunia. The Artemis force therefore served as a much-
needed bridge for the deployment of a larger UN force in the area, but it did not manage to solve the underlying causes of conflict. However, that was not the objective of the deployment, the EU force instead providing robust assistance to a weaker and more lightly armed and mandated UN force.

Operationally the EU force reduced the risk by keeping half of its force in Uganda and by having Entebbe airport so close to the zone of deployment. Entebbe has two runways, which means that it is possible to reinforce or evacuate the deployed force at short notice. The airport had and still has a high loading and reloading capacity, which made it a good logistical rear base. The mission was self-sustainable in the sense that it brought in its own logistical supplies, with international partners like South Africa and Canada providing the necessary lift capability. In budgetary terms this mission was, like the 2006 EUFOR RDC, covered financially by the Athena mechanism, while the national contributions was covered by the deploying nations themselves.
4 EUFOR RD CONGO

‘The request of the United Nations, almost a year ago, for military support came at a crucial point in time: the transition period in DRC was entering its final phase and it was essential to create the necessary conditions and security environment to ensure a successful outcome. The European Union had worked very hard for a number of years to facilitate a democratic transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Elections were key to final success. We could not fail and we answered positively to the UN request to put soldiers on the ground.’ (EU, Presentation by Javier Solana, 2007)

On 12th June 2006 the European Council decided to deploy a robust military contingent in support of the MONUC force for a period of four months to help secure the presidential and national elections in the DRC (EU Council decision on the launching of the EUFOR RD Congo, 2006). The decision was among other things prompted by the fact that the initial integration and training of the local Congolese forces had been difficult, and not enough local forces had been trained to secure the elections. Of the planned eighteen integrated brigades only fourteen had been formed, and the tense political situation in Kinshasa was considered to have the potential for conflict (Hoebbeke, The EU and "Conflict Peacebuilding" in the DRC, 2007, p. 49). The difference between EUFOR RDC and Artemis was basically that the former was deployed as a deterrence force, while the Artemis mission was sent in to stabilize and stop a potentially escalating crisis from taking place and to relieve the pressure on the small MONUC force deployed in Bunia (Hoebbeke, The EU and "Conflict Peacebuilding" in the DRC, 2007, p. 49).

The operation was under German command and was run from the operational centre in Potsdam, Germany. The decision to deploy was based on an official request from the UNSC calling for the EU to deploy in support of and prop up the existing UN mission in the DRC during the elections. UNSCR 1671 of 25th April 2006 authorized the EU to deploy a military force, and the interim Congolese authorities expressed support for the deployment. For the EU the mission was a success because it was deployed without activating the Berlin+ agreement with NATO, using EU assets. Though it was a German- and French-dominated mission, twenty-one EU member states and Turkey contributed to the mission. However, as Pohl documents, the dominant German role was the result of significant French pressure for Germany to play the role of lead nation (Pohl, 2013, p. 201)

The EUFOR deployment was intended to be in support of MONUC as part of securing the first elections in the post-Congolese war era, and it was named Operation EUFOR RD Congo (hereafter EUFOR). On 25 April 2006, through Resolution 1671 (2006), the UNSC mandated the temporary deployment of an EU force for the duration of the national and presidential elections, and the mission was completed on 30th November 2006. All parties to the conflict agreed to the deployment, and clear lines of communication and coordination were established to ensure the mission’s effectiveness.

The EU framework for the operation was the ESDP, which provided guidance to support what the EU sees as its ‘comprehensive’ approach to its engagement with the DRC. The EU deployment should therefore be
seen as part of an overarching strategy of (re-) building the Congolese state after the years of war and conflict.

The EUFOR mission consisted of three structures, namely the operational command centre located in Potsdam, Germany, the forces deployed in Kinshasa and the ‘deterrence’ and reserve force deployed to Gabon. On top of that Germany and France had a second reserve force ready in Europe, which could be deployed if needed. The idea was to have a relatively light military footprint in the DRC, but having a deterrence force on immediate call that could deployed in the entire DRC in support of MONUC. In his report to the UNSC, Javier Solana stressed that the reason for dividing the force was to avoid a heavy military presence in DRC itself, while at the same time stressing to the actors in the DRC that EUFOR had the military capability and will to use force to enforce its mandate.

In the same briefing, Solana concluded that EUFOR had been a success on several levels, including in terms of both the conduct of the deployed forces and of the mission itself, as well as through it achieving its stated goals of securing the elections and help secure the transition to peace and stability (EU, Presentation by Javier Solana, 2007). The greatest success was the deterrent effect of the force on the local actors, limiting the number of incidents. Elements of the force in Gabon were brought in as a show of force on several occasions, both in Kinshasa and other geographical locations of the DRC (UN, 2007). While it would be fair to say that EUFOR did help stabilize the security situation in Kinshasa, it did not, as Solana claimed, play a significant role in the overall achievement of peace and security in DRC. This was also to be expected and was basically not the objective of EUFOR, since the physical presence of the force was too limited terms of its mandate, time set aside for deployment and soldiers on the ground to have a long-lasting impact.

According to Solana the EU had drawn a number of lessons learned that would be useful in future military operations. At the UNSC he highlighted that the bases of EUFOR’s success were:

- ‘the definition of a clear mandate, in both scope and timeframe;
- highly professional troops, to whom I wish to pay tribute;
- a very high degree of interaction with MONUC;
- an active communication policy, both towards the Congolese population and to key actors in the electoral process;
- in a wider context, transparency and information-sharing with African partners, with the AU, and other African regional organizations invited to deploy liaison officers, has also facilitated this process.’ (EU, Presentation by Javier Solana, 2007)

As it was the case with Operation Artemis, the limited four-month time for deployment and the narrowly defined operational objectives helped make the operation manageable and achievable. The success was also due to the nature and training of the forces deployed, a well-equipped and highly trained force, which had the necessary military resources to fulfill its operational mandates. That said, the operation also showed that the number of challenges facing the operation were limited, being primarily the 21 August 2006 attack on the residence of opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, where EUFOR contingents had to be deployed, and then a street-mob attack on a local radio station.
4.1 Operational planning

This was an ESDP mission in which Germany and France played a dominant role, both in terms of the level of troop contribution and in providing headquarters facilities, writing up the operational plan etc. The shared leadership between Germany and France also reflected the important role that the two countries played in this operation. However, it was also a case of France putting a lot of pressure on Germany to take on this leading role, at a time when Germany and the United Kingdom were both heavily involved in the military operations in Afghanistan. After the mission questions were raised whether it had been the right decision for Germany to deploy, because these assets could have been used better in Afghanistan at the time.

The mission was different from Operation Artemis on several levels. It was a mission in which 21 EU member states were involved, and it was run as an EU operation, without making use of Berlin+ assets. It was also a force that, when deployed, was not dependent to the same extent on French interests, but was part of the combined EU involvement in the DRC. The mission was also conducted with the acceptance of the local actors and the international presence already in the DRC. It was supposed to be deployed in support of the MONUC force, and not as independent force.

The military planners conducted several recce missions and identified several possible deployment areas in the DRC if the force was to be activated and deployed. Despite the fact that the mission was widely supported by the EU member states, it was more difficult to get members to deploy troops in theatre, and when they did so it was often with national caveats and limitations on their use. As highlighted above, and which was also one of the reasons for the inclusion of Turkey in the operation, the force lacked the necessary air assets in terms of both tactical and strategic support and lift, and also in relation to combat air support. It was lucky for the mission that this never became an issue, since these assets were only employed on a limited scale and did not have to reinforce the forces in theatre. The force was therefore never tested regarding the extent to which it would have been able to deploy in time and with the necessary effect. As mentioned in the previous sections, the EUFOR RCD force was a robust military deployment, which included significant military assets that could be deployed.

The deployment of the EUFOR operation on 30 July 2006 and its withdrawal on 30 November 2006 was based on certain experiences from Artemis. The difference was, however, that the bulk of the forces were only deployed as a rapid reaction capability in neighbouring Gabon that could be deployed in hotspots all over the DRC. The force was under German command, and had contributions from 21 EU member states and Turkey. The objective of the force was fourfold: supporting and providing security to MONUC installations and personnel; contributing to airport protection in Kinshasa; protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and evacuation operations in case of emergency if needed. The force was therefore basically sent in to prop up the MONUC force already in operation, with which it operated in close cooperation. Again this operation had a clear UN mandate, and there was local consent regarding the deployment. However, this mission also showed some of the weaknesses that EU military operations face. When the resolve of the force was tested when government forces attacked the oppositional presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba, it was only the Spanish contingent that did not have national caveats
preventing them from intervening. Furthermore, had the Congolese government fortified the international airport, it might have been difficult to bring in the reserve force stationed in Gabon without it at least being delayed. So while the EUFOR mission managed to fulfil its mandate to a large extent, the operation also showed some of its limitations. In terms of pooling and sharing, both missions managed to engage in close cooperation with the MONUC operation, and in the case of Artemis managed to bring in non-EU partners to provide logistical support to the mission. However, the EUFOR deployment showed that if intelligence is not shared and accessible and the national contingents do have national caveats that prevent them from operating effectively, it can endanger the missions and its objectives. The EUFOR RD Congo illustrated again that the contributing countries were reluctant to deploy troops in theatre and that the strategic and tactical lift capabilities needed to be effective were not available. As was the case in Artemis, France contributed 1090 troops, whilst Germany deployed 780 soldiers and was by far the biggest troop contributor. EUFOR RD Congo was, however, significant in the sense that it constituted a chance to show the EU flag, and the Berlin+ agreement with NATO was not activated on this mission.

4.2 Financing

In terms of financing, the force was based on the same model as Artemis, where joint costs were covered for by the Athena mechanism, while national costs were covered by the contributing state. The budget for the four-month deployment was 16.7 million Euros to cover the joint costs for the 2500 troops deployed in the DRC and Gabon. The estimated total cost of the mission was a hundred million Euros. EUFOR RD Congo had approximately a thousand troops deployed in Kinshasa, while the bulk of the force was either in Gabon or, as an additional reserve, in Germany and France.

4.3 Decision-making: command and control STRUCTURES

The strategic operational headquarters were located in Potsdam, Germany, and headed by Lt. Gen. Karlheinz Viereck, the commander of EUFOR RD Congo. It was also from this centre that the political strategic level in Brussels was coordinated. In Kinshasa the deputy head of the mission, French Maj. Gen. Christian Damay, ran the operational and tactical level from the EUFOR RDC Force HQ located at N’Dolo airport.

4.4 Conclusions

The EU and Solana presented EUFOR as a success. As was the case with Artemis it had been deployed for a short time, four months, and had a clear mandate. It had the agreement of all the actors involved in the conflict, but the GR had prepared to block reinforcements arriving through the airport in the event of a military confrontation. EUFOR was therefore vulnerable if reinforcements had to be brought in, which could at least have delayed the deployment. However, this is speculation, since it never came to the feared confrontation. EUFOR managed to help the election take place in a relatively orderly manner. The EU managed to deploy an EU-run and sustained force, in cooperation with the UN MONUC force on the ground. It thus had strategic similarities to Operation Artemis, which was also an attempt to implement the
ESDP’s policies and priorities, and to do so in close cooperation with the UN. It was also a success in the sense that it managed to get contributions from 21 EU member states under German lead and therefore had less of a French footprint than was the case with Artemis.

However, the mission also showed that national caveats made the operation difficult to run and that in that sense the EU looked like most other international missions. The operation also highlighted the clash of priorities that exists between NATO and EU contributions, where, for instance, strong voices in Germany and the UK argued that the assets should have been used in Afghanistan instead. This criticism may have informed some of the later deployment in, for instance, the Central African Republic, where once again the force was a French-dominated deployment.
‘European Union police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo providing assistance, mentoring, support and advice to the Congolese authorities for security sector reform (SSR) in the fields of policing and its interaction with the justice system.’

The EU’s initial engagement with the SSR of the police fell into three phases, the last being the establishment of what was initially known as EUPOL Kinshasa, an ESDP training and capacity-building mission. In 2007 this mission was transformed into a nationwide EUPOL mission with a longer-term objective, a program that was closely interlinked with the attempts to build capacity in the judicial sector.

The EU’s initial involvement was focused on the implementation and support for the transitional phase starting in June 2002 and leading up to the elections in 2006. In 2003 the EU Commission provided funding for the establishment of the Unité de Police Intégrée (UPI). The first two phases were financed by the EDF to the tune of six million Euros, while individual member states donated equipment and cash worth 2.3 million Euros. The two first stages were focused on providing basic equipment and training, rehabilitation of the training centres, operational support, and assistance in the implementation of mandates (Hoebke, Carette, & Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007, p. 10). The two first stages ended in 30 April 2005, at which point the EU had trained 1050 officers and 40 local trainers, while also modernizing the UPI operational base at the cost of a little more than 1 million Euros. This was financed by the EU’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), which allows the Union to respond quickly to immediate threats to security, as caused by the lack of housing. In the third stage the engagement became an ESDP mission with the establishment of EUPOL Kinshasa in 2005. Initially the mission had 29 international staff from predominantly France, Belgium, Sweden, Netherland, Portugal and Italy, and had the task of monitoring the performance of the UPI forces trained by the EU.

A considerable part of the EC’s support to the DRC has directly or indirectly benefited the electoral process and the reform of the security sector (SSR), such as the initial phases in the establishment of the UPI. With an amount of 20 million Euros, the EU is one of the key contributors to the World Bank MDRP, which targets former Congolese and foreign combatants and recipient communities after disarmament. The DRC is the largest recipient of the Commission’s emergency aid through ECHO (45 million Euros in 2004 and 38 million Euros in 2005) (Hoebke, Carette, & Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007, p. 5)

25 The RRM was created in 2001 to have a facility to respond rapidly and flexible to immediate threats.
26 The staff were temporarily expanded in the run-up and holding of the 2006 elections: on top of the deployment of an additional 29 staff, thirteen came from Angola and two from Mali. The mission also received an additional budget of 35 million Euros on top of the 4.4 million Euros already committed to the EUPOL Kinshasa mission.
As part of the EU’s engagement to support the transition period in the DRC, the EU allocated 149 million Euros to help implement and hold the national elections in 2006. 24 million Euros of these funds were earmarked for security measures, which basically translated into training and equipping the Rapid Intervention Police (PIR) (Hoebek, Carette, & Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007, p. 6) In the latter part of the EUPOL mission the deployment focus was on the creation of the judicial frameworks for the PNC, but also on judicial reform and the education and training of magistrates. The EUPOL section did play a key role in the formulation of the reform program for the justice sector and in general had a focus on issues and training of gender awareness and human rights (EUPOL RDC, 2010b).

4.1.1 Intra-organisational cooperation and coordination

The EUFOR RDC was deployed in support of the existing MONUC force, and there was close cooperation between the EU and UN on several levels. On the political-strategic level there was close coordination in both military and political matters between the UN Secretariat and the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union for the duration of the mission. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, at a briefing in UNSC even argued that this served as a model for future collaboration efforts (UN, 2007). On the operational and tactical level cooperation was equally close, and the UN provided logistical support to the deployed EU forces, which of course reduced the pressure and requirement for EUFOR to be self-sustainable in theatre. One informant argued that that the coordination between the DRC government and the international organizations involved in the reform program had functioned relatively well: for instance, it was agreed that UNPOL would handle the actual training of the PNC, while EUPOL would focus on the frameworks for reform, including legislation and HR (4, 2016)

5.1 Operational planning

One of the problems facing the EUPOL Kinshasa mission was that, after the decision had been made in 2004 to commit and deploy a police training mission to the DRC, it took fifteen months for it to become fully operational. It was basically interdepartmental issues in Brussels on the nature and shape of the mission that delayed the deployment of the mission. The Commission preferred a smaller and longer term mission and engagement, while the Council wanted more short-term crisis management. Later in the process an issue arose over the commission in Brussels not being willing to share the lessons-learned reports with the delegation and mission in the DRC. When the PROGRESS mission was designed, it was done without access to the internal evaluation reports on the previous missions (1, 2017). This was due to the fact that the evaluation reports were classified because several of the EU’s projects were financed by national contributions, and therefore the reports could only be released if the contributing state agreed (1, 2017). The member states and the Commission are very scared of project risks, which means that projects tend to be relatively conservative and secure to avoid risk. Mission designs over the years have been drawn up without any in-depth analysis or project assessments being made (Channel Research, 2011, p. 63). The projects have therefore been too ambitious and unachievable (1, 2017). One of the problems faced by the EU has been the lack of commitment from the local partner. The Congolese authorities have often made promises, but very seldom delivered on them (2, 2017) (Channel Research, 2011, p. 63), this being one of the
criticisms raised against the program: that is, it was a success in theory, but practice and the situation on the ground tell a different story (2, 2017)

5.2 Security Assessments and applications of standards

As mentioned above, one of the criticisms raised against the programs undertaken under EUPOL has been that they have been too risk-focused, which has then in turn damaged the impact of the programs. The latter have been focused on the national, central level, and not so much on the local level where the most police actually work. This has also meant that in some instances the projects initiated have been standardized, off-the-shelf programs. However, the biometric payments system does not fall within that category and was a risk-prone project, which, due to the nature of the DRC conflicts, the size of the country, the absence of functioning infrastructure and the continued instability, was difficult to implement.

5.3 Operational Capability

5.3.1 DECISION-MAKING: COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

As mentioned above, in the case of the EUPOL mission there seems to have been a disconnection between the operational level in theatre and the policy level in Brussels. The planning was difficult both because the ‘lessons-learned’ reports were not available to the project planners and implementers on the ground, and because of the risk awareness involved, which influenced the planning. On the structural level there seem to have been well-defined command and control structures, from the mission to the in-country delegation to Brussels. However, as was mentioned in an early study on EU engagements in the DRC, there were problems with cooperation between the missions, i.e. EUSEC and EUPOL.

5.4 Operation composition and key features

EUPOL was a relatively small mission in terms of the actual numbers of deployed international personnel. The focus was primarily on the national level, and not so much on the local operational level. EUPOL-Kinshasa was different in the sense that its main task was to help prepare the integrated police units, most of whose police officers did not have any formal police training and had been integrated from the former armed groups or recruited rapidly during the rule of Laurent Kabila without any kind of vetting. EUPOL-Kinshasa helped equip and train the police units in the capital Kinshasa. As part of the Working Group on Police Reform and Reorganisation (GMR3) from November 2005, the EU experts played a pivotal role in drafting what was to become the formation of the future Congolese police. Later, in 2007, the GMR3 was transformed into a more permanent structure, Le Comité pour le Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSRP), in which the EU continues to play an important role. However, the difference between the two institutions, and therefore also in the role of EUPOL, was that, while the GMR3 was a mapping exercise of the police that included a number of international actors, the CSRP included the different ministries and local actors, including local NGOs, with an interest in and a role to play in the reform of the police. EUPOL’s role was more in advisory capacity. However, the legal experts helped draft the Organic Law for the police and define
the Congolese version of Community Policing (PdP) and the values attached to it, which were to become the backbone of the police force. In addition the EU provided IT experts who helped set up the police database to provide the Congolese police authorities with information on all its staff in the DRC (1, 2017)

5.5 Budgetary constraints

Budgetary constraints have been a continuous a problem for the mission. The PdP program was something the bilateral donors liked because it included the principles of POC, HR and accountability, all issues that suited them well. As mentioned above, most projects undertaken by EUPOL were partly financed by bilateral contributions to it, which made reporting and evaluation more difficult and insecure. Furthermore the budgetary constraints meant that, for instance, the IT project is located at the national level, while on the local level reporting continues to be manual. The cost of implementing and connecting a national database is too high. There seems generally to have been a discrepancy between the ambitions and goals of the projects and the reality and magnitude of the problem at hand (1, 2017). One local informant argued that the EU had a slow response time, i.e. that from the time a project was decided to the EU actually being able to commit took a long time compared with working with other bilateral donors (5, 2017). This informant went so far as to call the EU a donor ‘that you could not always count on, due to budgetary limitations and normative political considerations, which could lead programs being suspended (5, 2017). Several local informants also complained that the EU principle of partnership in the financing and budgeting of programs was destined to fail since the DRC partner did not have the capacity or resources to be effectively part of such a partnership. Projects financed in this way would often fail, since the EU’s response would be to suspend them whenever the DRC side failed to deliver (4, 2016) (5, 2017)

5.6 Comprehensiveness

5.6.1 EU CONTRIBUTIONS

As mentioned above, EUPOL’s involvement in the DRC has from the outset been part of a wider EU comprehensive approach to the DRC. EUPOL was part of the initiative that focused on implementing the 2002 peace agreement, which the EU had helped facilitate. As one informant mentioned, the progress achieved in reforming the police is due to the EU, in cooperation with the other donors (2, 2017). Another informant argued that many of the failed or only partly successful initiatives were due to the EU’s strict focus on program management and that problems and challenges on the strategic political level have a direct and negative impact on projects on the ground (5, 2017). The problem seems to have been that there was not always the best coordination between the different sectors of the EU’s engagements, and there were apparently significant challenges in relations between Brussels and the missions in the DRC (1, 2017). This was especially the case when it came to program planning and assessment and risk assessment. As one informant argued, the EU did not do a proper analysis of the context it was going to operate in, and the programming was therefore not based on the local circumstances (3, 2017). Furthermore the programming
was often a by-product of the activities of individuals in the missions, rather than an outcome of the comprehensive planning process (5, 2017).

### 5.6.2 INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

One of the successes of the EUPOL missions has been that through their involvement in the GMR3 and the CSRP, they managed to establish close coordination between the donors, as well as between the donors and the Congolese (4, 2016). That said, and as illustrated in the case study, institutional infighting between the donors and national interest-driven approaches did have an negative impact on EUPOL’s work. However, it was not as crucial a problem as was the case with the EUSEC or the relationship between the FARDC and donors. But according to one local informant the donors in the police sector did compete a lot and did not agree, for instance, that all initiatives should be coordinated through the CSRP office in Kinshasa to avoid overlaps and ensure coherence (5, 2017). This means that the Congolese host did not have any overview or control over what kinds of projects were initiated at the local level. Furthermore the donors argue that did this to avoid corruption, but in doing so they undermined the overall objectives of the mission. For the Congolese the argument was that EUPOL was much more difficult to work with compared with, for instance, the Japanese or Chinese (9, 2017). One informant used the example of the building and establishment of a police academy, where, it was argued, the Congolese side had secured its agreed share of funding, while the EU could still not commit itself fully and had presented what the Congolese side saw as intrusive demands regarding the project. For instance, the Congolese architect had been replaced with a German architect without a sufficient explanation being provided (5, 2017). Another local informant with good access argued that this was just the most recent example of the EU not understanding the local dynamics and hiring international experts instead of using the locally available expertise, while at the same time also having a long response time (9, 2017). However, as yet another local informant argued, the only institution that has so far been able to provide any kind of significant progress in reforming the PNC has been the EU, which has to fight against a defunct local institution that is attempting to resist reform (2, 2017). The fragmented views on the role of the donors can be detected with both local and international informants. Whereas several local informants praised the Japanese involvement in the reform of the PNC, one key international informant called the Japanese efforts ‘crap’, citing the uncoordinated attempts to establish an academy for the border police as an example (4, 2016). This kind of sentiment also resonates with the author’s own findings described in the case study.

### 5.6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGIES

As was the case with the EUSEC program, EUPOL did implement a national registration project for the PNC. This meant that in 2016 for the first time the PNC had a database, including personal files of all the personnel it employed (1, 2017). This is an important tool for the police, both in terms of ensuring salary payments and also if any kind of career planning is to take place. The problem with this system is that it is based nationally, while most police officers work at the local level, where there is no connectivity or even IT infrastructure. As one informant argued, this means that everything has to be reported manually through the
chain of command, which makes it extremely vulnerable (1, 2017). Another informant argued that it was not correct for the EU to argue that it had a fully operational database system delivered and working at the PNC, because the staff who were supposed to operate the system had not been trained properly. Basically they would be unable to pull information out of the system if asked to do so (5, 2017). Consequently the system is not being used to its full capacity. One of the problems was the three trainers from Morocco and Tunisia that the EU decided to recruit to train their Congolese counterparts, who did not manage to provide the necessary training to make the local operators capable of operating the system, in stark contrast to the EU arguing that the system is fully operational (1, 2017). One of the interesting aspects of this, of course, is the discrepancy between the two positions, the Congolese arguing that they have been given a system they cannot operate or manage, while the EU seems to believe that their role in this matter is over and done with. The risk, of course, is that the system ends up being yet another good intention, but one that for various reasons did not work in reality.

Another aspect of the technological dimension is the physical infrastructure of the PNC. The force lacks the most basic infrastructure, which, of course, adds to the problems facing the donors in interfacing with the Congolese. If EUPOL had been focused on the national level and not on improving the physical infrastructure of the PNC units that are to implement the proposed reforms such as the PdP, then reform would have been extremely difficult to achieve. Another problem facing EUPOL in relation to the technological aspect was that the mission was willing to provide training, but could not and would not help equip the trained police units due to the arms embargo imposed on the DRC during the first part of the mission. The EU even helped block Congolese attempts to acquire the necessary equipment from elsewhere. As one local informant argued this was nonsense, and it undermined the whole training initiative (5, 2017).

5.6.4 POOLING AND SHARING

As should be evident from the text above, EUPOL's engagement can be seen as a narrative of relative success that did face problems, but managed to deliver on most of the projects it was involved in (2, 2017). The other side of the story is that the EU had some success, but also a lot of failures, which was due to an extreme EU focus on strategic political issues that had very little to do with the actual assistance given (1, 2017) (5, 2017). At the same time in its engagement with the Congolese the EU was often dependent on the national contributions provided to the projects, since the EU seldom had the necessary funds to implement the full program. According to some sources there was on the face of it close cooperation and coordination between the actors, especially via the CSRP (4, 2016) (1, 2017). However, in reality there was competition between several donors, and duplication and inconsistency in the actual implementation was often the day-to-day reality (5, 2017) (1, 2017). So even though certain donor states shared information, many of the non-EU donors have not shared their information or priorities. Internally, between the different EU missions, a criticism was raised early in the process that there was no organized or concerted attempt to coordinate the efforts of especially the EUSEC and EUPOL missions. In addition to this one international informant argued that many of the challenges faced by the reform process were also due to the fact that there was only limited
coordination and interaction between the FARDC and PNC, which made donor involvement more complicated and risked establishing silo projects, with limited interaction (12, 2016). However, this contrasted somewhat to the reality in theatre in the east of the DRC, where one informant reported that during a field visit he and his unit had close operational cooperation with the PNC units in the area and did joint patrols with them (13, 2016). This informant was of course talking about operational realities on the ground, while other informants focused on the strategic level in Kinshasa, making the different issues involved difficult to compare.
The EU defence mission in the DRC was established in June 2005 as part of the EU Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) to assist in conducting SSR of the army, the FARDC, in the country. The mission officially ended in July 2017, when some of the previous EUSEC tasks and projects were transferred to the PROGRESS project, aimed to enable the FARDC to retrain and retire older personnel and replace them with new recruits\(^\text{27}\) (6, 2017). In reality this is very difficult actually to implement, since the job market in the DRC is extremely difficult and because a number of the soldiers earmarked to leave the army are former combatants from the previous rebel groups, which creates a number of potential political challenges (1, 2017). That this is a difficult exercise to undertake can be seen in the fact that this program, which in 2017 was presented as a brand new idea, had already been a priority for EUSEC in 2009 (10, Anonymous, 2009).

This was also an indication of the fact that the EU believed its engagement with the FARDC had changed because the PROGRESS was considered a development program financed via the EDF, and not a military capacity-building initiative like EUSEC (6, 2017). The EUSEC mission had a dual purpose both to assist the DRC government rebuild its army, thus enabling it to secure the state’s territory, institutions and citizens after the signing of the 2002 peace agreement, and to assist in creating a biometric payments and identity-card system for the FARDC. The latter was intended to ensure a separation between payments and the chain of command, which has constituted a serious problem in the DRC, where many soldiers were never paid and large sums of money for salaries have disappeared due to corruption and misuse of funds. Early on it was recognized that EUSEC program was faced with the fundamental problem that it had to implement an SSR program in the midst of war, which meant that a number of compromises had to be undertaken moving it away from what was considered best practice (10, Anonymous, 2009). As another informant stated, that strategy was that sometimes it is better to do something than doing nothing (7, 2016)

\(^\text{27}\) In the FARDC soldiers normally operate on a 7 + 7 contract, meaning that in principle they should leave the force after fourteen years. This is, of course, more complicated to do in practice.
One of the problems facing the EUSEC program and work with the FARDC was also that the salary levels in the latter were too low to allow personnel to sustain the livelihood of even a small family. A soldier earns around $US 70 per month, while an officer’s salary is only around 15 $ more (Baaz & Verweijen, Beetween Intergration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army, 2012). This represents a major increase in salaries compared to 2006, but still illustrates the challenges facing EUSEC reform efforts, which had to work with a military force whose soldiers needed to generate an income from other sources to be able to sustain a livelihood for their families. As one international informant mentioned, EUSEC had been faced with the fact that force numbers had been inflated, while at the same time soldiers in the FARDC travel with their dependents, increasing the complexity of the projects (11, 2009).

The establishment of the EUSEC program also followed the general EU engagement in the DRC to assist in implementing the 2005 peace agreement between the main belligerents in the conflict. This included the World Bank-supported Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program, as well as the integration and retraining of the different armed groups in the DRC. This was an overwhelming task since the security situation was volatile, the sheer number of troops to be sensitized, retrained and integrated was vast, though lower than reported by the parties to the conflict, and the institutional capacity of the DRC state limited or absent. Initially the armed groups and the government forces claimed that there were 343,000 armed personnel, but after the introduction of the database system in 2009 this figure was reduced to 124,907 (6, 2017). This indicated that the figures had been inflated both for political reasons, i.e. to increase their significance during the transitional phase, and more especially to secure economic pay-outs of salaries to so-called ‘ghost soldiers’. This was made a key EU priority to help the newly formed Congolese army get its HR structures in place. It was also an area where the EUSEC could have a visible and useful impact in a sea of other donors providing training and direct military advice. As one informant argued, the donors in the armed sector had learned to coordinate their efforts, though this only applied to the western donors, since most non-western donors did not wish to share and coordinate their activities (1, 2017). Furthermore, no military training doctrine existed, and there was no constitutional provision outlining the role of the FARDC in DRC society until 2006. In the period from its initiation in 2005 to the end of 2008, the EUSEC mission helped train eighteen FARDC battalions at the cost of more than $US 100 million, though the target had been 28 battalions (11, 2009). This led the Channel Research evaluation to conclude that EUSEC, and the EU in general, had been too focused on technical assistance and had not paid enough attention to establishing frameworks for the new armed forces, which local informants criticised, believing the EU/EUSEC to be too focused on the strategic political level (5, 2017). This indicates how difficult it has been for EUSEC to navigate in this environment, especially when the rotation of personnel has generally been relatively frequent, with personnel with limited or no experience and networks in the DRC being brought in. One informant explained that because the EUSEC mission often worked in conjunction with other partners, such as the World Bank and bilateral donors, it has been criticized for suspending activities and funding when it was one of the other donors that had done so. He used the example of the DDR program where the World Bank had suspended its funding on several occasions, making the EUSEC training role more difficult (11, 2009)
However, one of the biggest challenges facing the new armed forces was that they were the product of a political compromise where rebel demands to fast-track the integration of units led to whole units, the so-called mixage principle, being kept more or less intact. This immediately improved the fighting capabilities of the FARDC in its struggle with the remaining rebel forces, often in conjunction with UN forces, though its medium to long-term impact was that loyalties to the Kinshasa government were limited. On many occasions several of these integrated units deserted and created new rebel forces, the CNDP and later the M23 being cases in point. The EUSEC warned against this strategy, but the Congolese decided to make compromises to achieve integration and produce capable and functioning military units as soon as possible (7, 2016).

**6.1 The programs and projects**

The first EUSEC task was to assist in the integration of the armed groups after the signing of the peace agreement. The first EUSEC personnel were deployed as advisors to the administration of the FARDC as experts and technical advisors on issues such as command and control, budgetary and financial management, training, accounting, and finally the handling of contracts and tenders. Another early EUSEC program was to modernize the training centres in Luberizi and Kisangani and to provide support for the families of the FARDC soldiers (Hoebek, The EU and "Conflict Peacebuilding" in the DRC, 2007, p. 55). EUSEC has been involved in a range of smaller training programs and projects often of four months to a year in duration, where international experts have been brought in to conduct specific kinds of training. Earlier studies have shown that, even though these types of project do provide an opportunity to improve specific capabilities in the FARDC, the long-term impact is limited, the recipient institution losing trust in the programs because of their short time commitment (Channel Research, 2011, p. 99). This position was confirmed during the field visits in 2016 and 2017, when several examples were mentioned of international experts having been flown in for short training sessions, the impacts of which were not evaluated. The local beneficiaries stated that often, for instance, twenty local experts were trained, but that no efficient follow-up system was put in place to make sure that the trained capability would continue to be available thereafter. The local perception was that the EU thought that doing the training once would ensure the capability for the future. Due to the general state of the training institutions in the DRC and the FARDC that was not the case, operational know-how and the capacity to sustain these capabilities being absent (9, 2017) (5, 2017). On the EU side this was described as an example of how difficult it is to operate in the DRC context and of the lack of commitment and ownership on the part of the Congolese partner (6, 2017) (7, 2016). Another problem faced by the SSR reform process was that, due to the continued security threats and instability in the eastern DRC, the focus was on rapid training of the fighting capability of the integrated brigades, not on the longer-term objectives of reforming the FARDC and establishing civilian oversight of the armed forces. The immediate security needs led to a focus on short-term objectives instead of building up the long-term reform of the army. That said, it must also be recognised that the SSR was implemented under very difficult circumstances, which of course made the tasks undertaken by the donors, including EUSEC, very challenging. It led one informant to state that sometimes it better to do something than do nothing, even though the impact of the initiatives may be limited. For instance, the operational centre in Kinshasa has lost
its operational capability, and the communications equipment does not function any more, operations often being conducted on open cell-phone lines (7, 2016).

EUSEC has helped rebuild and improve the FARDC’s infrastructure, for instance by building eleven armouries and ammunition depots, and helping draft a legislative framework for the army. However, the priority was initially on HR and personnel management in general, and in the last part of the mission also on training. Generally the reform initiatives within the FARDC have been centralized and are directed by centralized commands focusing on the conflict, which at times have been disconnected from the military reality on the ground (12, 2016). One international informant argued that generally the FARDC soldiers are good soldiers, but they are often left without any or only limited mission support (12, 2016). However, as one local informant argued, the EUSEC mission, and the EU in general in the DRC, have been incapable of using local interlocutors to obtain access to the key people in the system. As a consequence the newly deployed EU staff, especially in the EUSEC system, often did not have the necessary access to the key ministries (9, 2017). One central international informant confirmed that it had taken the informant more than six months to get a reply from FARDC upon taking up the role in the mission (1, 2017). However, a former EUSEC staff member claimed he could recognize that it would be difficult to get access to FARDC, and coordination meetings involving all the parties did not take place. He was a member of the so-called working group, in which donors and the Congolese partner planned and projected future activities and projects (21, 2016). However, as an informant from an influential regional power argued, the leadership of the FARDC is very closed, and it was difficult for most international military advisors to get access to it (22, 2009).

6.2 SINGAMIL and the biometric registration system

One of the cornerstones of EUSEC engagement with the FARDC has been to help establish an effective human resource database, enabling the FARDC to have files on all the soldiers in the force. Coupled with this has been the issuing of identity cards to FARDC personnel and the establishment of the so-called biometric census and bank-based payment system in 2007-09 to ensure that the ordinary soldiers actually receive their salaries (10, Anonymous, 2009). In the EUSEC fact paper of 2009 the ambition with the identity cards is stated to be to ensure that all personnel in the FARDC have an identity card that cannot be falsified (RDC, 2009). This was, as mentioned previously, not achieved, because examples of widespread fraud with the ID cards have been detected. The EUSEC missioned actually managed to establish a system making 81% of the personnel part of the system, which, given the factors of the size and lack of infrastructure in the DRC, is an impressive result (6, 2017). However, the system works better in the western DRC, especially around the capital Kinshasa, while the majority of the FARDC forces are deployed on operations in the east, where access to banking and IT infrastructure is limited. The bank-based payments system was established in an attempt to avoid corruption and fraud, but it has the inherent problem that access to banks in parts of the DRC is limited, that the banking sector is known to be unstable and unreliable, with four recent bankruptcies among banks, and because banks often keep the money for weeks before making it available to the soldiers (1, 2017) (6, 2017) (8, 2017). The goal of PROGRESS and FARDC was to have a fully bank-based system by 2017, but that was made more difficult by the economic collapse.
of several of the national banks. As one informant explained, the entire database system was built from the MOD centre in Kinshasa, which was linked with to the so-called level 2 institutions (for instance the army, navy and air command) and level 3 institutions (regional military commands) via a satellite link system. However, there have not been sufficient resources to connect level 4 or level 5 institutions, where most of the personnel are located (8, 2017). This was simply due to the fact that a satellite-based system is too expensive to establish and operate for the FARDC, and no donors have so far been willing to finance the establishment of a fully integrated system (8, 2017). As one international informant remarked, the result is that the data and records need to done by hand and transferred to the central database system manually, which often means that information and data are lost or otherwise not reported (8, 2017) (1, 2017). One informant even argued that the system had not proved sustainable and was inoperative in several locations of the FARDC’s institutions (7, 2016). Another informant argued that EUSEC, and PROGRESS following it, had managed to run a relatively effective training program, which had enabled the FARDC to run 80 pct. of the training and maintenance of the system in 2017. Another informant argued that although the biometric system does work, severe challenges can be found in relation to the lack of control (12, 2016). However, the other informant acknowledged that, even though the FARDC was better at maintaining the system than the PNC, there was still a challenge in relation to maintenance and HR planning, ensuring that personnel were available when the trained personnel left (8, 2017). This training program had been run in partnership with British development aid money from DFID, which characterizes the EUSEC engagement in general. The PROGRESS program to retrain and retire FARDC personnel will also only happen if other donors and private enterprises become involved, as the EU PROGRESS program only has a limited budget(6, 2017).

6.3 The challenges

As one of the informants stressed, the database project and the identity card system were difficult to sustain because there was no budget or only a limited one. The ID cards provided by the EU were the only type of ID that many of the personnel possessed, and due to the fact that no resources were available to secure the system, therefore fraud had become an issue (8, 2017). One example of this was the more than 10,000 false ID cards that had been discovered before the South Kivu offensive in early 2016, which came as no surprise, though it was an embarrassment to the FARDC. The next problem is that no resources are available to expand the database system to the whole country, creating problems of underreporting and fraudulent behaviour.

6.4 Military training facilities and institutions

When in 2012 EUSEC became involved in the attempts to rebuild the military education system in the DRC, it was due to the realization that its involvement in the DRC had reached another level, which moved the focus away from the short-term political goal of increasing the combat effectiveness of the FARDC so that it could stabilize the security situation to the goal of ensuring the future capacity of the FARDC by reintroducing Congolese-based military training. As can be seen from the chart below, EUSEC was involved in setting up several military facilities, including the Military Academy in Kananga, which provided basic training to military officers. One of the problems faced by the FARDC has been that the last military training
institutions were closed in 1992 (12, 2016). The FARDC is consequently a patchwork of former statutory personnel and officers who had received training from different international military institutions, and some without any or limited military training. In 2012 the EU therefore decided to start rebuilding the military school, thus allowing new recruits to enter the force (21, 2016). At the military academy in Kanaga the EU paid for the modernization of the buildings and the salaries of the lecturers, while Belgium and France provided the actual trainers and instructors (21, 2016). When EUSEC was closed in July 2016 the agreement was that the EU would withdraw support for the military academy, the FARDC supposedly paying for the running of the schools from 2017. France and Belgium would continue to provide trainers for the Academy. The fear from the EU side was that the FARDC would not be able or willing to find the necessary funding to run the academy (12, 2016). An early evaluation of the state of the academy in 2017 showed that funding had gone missing and that the Congolese personnel had been changed since the withdrawal of EUSEC, which explained some of the problems related to the funding (1, 2017). However, the transfer of responsibility to the Congolese partner took place only a short while ago, and it is therefore too early to conclude what impact the project might have had. On the positive side the military academy has been reopened, thereby assisting in creating a functioning future army. However, whether the FARDC has the capacity to run the academy is more doubtful in the sense that the Congolese partner has so far only shown limited capacity to undertake the responsibility for tasks of this nature.

FARDC’s educational institutions (source: MONUSCO SSR 2016)

The Military Academy has been criticized for not training what is needed and for placing too great a focus on normative issues like gender and human rights, instead of making sure that the training and military education are based on what the force actually needs (9, 2017). Another informant argued that it was exactly the pressure from the EU that led the Congolese to focus on these kinds of issues, thereby enabling them to change the problematic culture inside the FARDC.
6.5 Operational planning

The objectives of the EUSEC mission have changed over time. Its initial task was to help the FARDC in the integration process that resulted from the 2002 peace agreement. Furthermore the mission also helped to establish a biometric payments system. Later in the mission the focus was changed and EUSEC prioritized increasing HR capacity and helped set up, together with Belgium and France, a military academy in Kananga for officer training, as well as several other training academies in Kanaga and Kitona. Formal military training had not been undertaken in the DRC since before the first Congo war (6, 2017). However, the implementation of the so-called Singamil IT system, which is a personnel administration tool, has been a cornerstone of EUSEC’s engagement in the DRC.

Several informants argued that the EUSEC program suffered from the high turnover of international staff, which meant that institutional memory was lost and that every time new staff are brought in, the programs and priorities tend to change (1, 2017) (5, 2017). Some informants even argued that EUSEC projects, and the reasons for their limited success, were due to the fact that the project planning phase was not carried out properly, meaning that EUSEC personnel and projects were designed and initiated without a proper understanding of the Congolese context in which they were operating (1, 2017) (3, 2017). Projects were therefore not tailored to the DRC, but tended to be copies of projects carried out in other conflict zones. The EUSEC was also criticised for using international staff without the knowledge of the DRC, while making no attempts to establish contact or make use of the locally based intelligentsia who do possess such knowledge, and especially access to the central actors within the FARDC structures (5, 2017) (3, 2017). For these informants it was striking that the EUSEC and EU delegation did not even attempt to make contact with the local base of local knowledge, but tended to prefer to be briefed by other expats (3, 2017) (5, 2017). It was also argued that it often very much came down to personalities, since one of the early EU delegation heads had been different, and Congolese experts had been used in writing the assessment of the security sector that informed the initiation of the reform program (5, 2017). The EU side admitted that the projects so far had been badly planned, were too ambitious and often failed to obtain their objectives (1, 2017). It was also argued, as was the case with EUPOL, that it made no sense for the EU to train units, but then refuse to equip and arm them, and even blocking the DRC from acquiring military equipment from elsewhere (9, 2017) (5, 2017). It was also argued that the EU’s principles of partnership, i.e. that the Congolese should finance some of the project, was unrealistic, resulting in the collapse of several project. One international informant conceded that this might be true, but argued that the Congolese seemed to be capable of financing institutions and buildings when it was made a priority, the new institute for strategic studies being a case in point (1, 2017) (3, 2017).

That said, one Congolese informant argued that, had it not been for the EU, no reform would ever have started. The progress that had been made was basically down to the EU working with a Congolese partner that often resisted reform (2, 2017). However, an earlier study by Baaz et al. showed that resistance to reform was less common among the lower ranks of the FARDC personnel, who expressed a wish to see conditions within the force improve (Baaz & Verweijen, Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic
Trajectory of the Congolese Army, 2012, p. 33; Pohl, 2013). Former EUSEC staff even argued that the project had been such a great success that it had been logical to start the next phase of retraining and rejuvenating the FARDC (6, 2017).

### 6.6 Security Assessments and applications of standards

The EUSEC mission was deployed in close cooperation with the UN forces, which meant that security was provided by the UN, and no independent security provision was introduced.

### 6.7 Budgetary constraints

Apart from an initial budgetary allocation related to the preparations for the 2006 election of 16 million Euros, the budget for EUSEC was between 7-9 million Euros per year (EU Council Joint Action, 2005-2015). This was basically used to bring in international staff and experts working with the Congolese beneficiary. As mentioned above, a number of informants argued that the EUSEC budget was often too small, and as a consequence there was often a disconnect between the ambitions of the projects and the actual budget available to the mission.

### 6.8 Intra-organisational cooperation and coordination

As mentioned previously, most of the EUSEC programs and training were carried out in cooperation with other partners, including the local beneficiaries. However, the EUSEC mission had focused on its priority projects of the Singamill, the biometric and bank based salary payments system, and support for the military educational system. The UN had the lead in cooperating with the FARDC in SSR, and the EUSEC had to work within this framework. However, as several informants mentioned, the different donor-actors did not necessarily have the same priorities and mandates, and cooperation was often difficult. Furthermore national interest often blocked actual cooperation, and the Congolese strategy from 2007 to prioritize bilateral cooperation made coordination more difficult.

### 6.9 Infrastructure and Technologies

The issue of technology was a priority area for the EUSEC mission. A cornerstone of the project was to use modern technology to improve personnel management in the FARDC. This was done by using biometric data registration conduct a census of the force and by issuing ID cards based on the data obtained from the census. On top of that the EUSEC attempted to introduce a personnel database for personnel management by distributing 800 computers to the FARDC and helping provide some connectivity. However, as mentioned above, although the project might have been a good idea, a combination of the sheer geographical size of the DRC, the absence of any IT infrastructure, the Congolese lack of ability to maintain the system, the lack of economic and human resources, and finally a limited project budget ultimately resulted in the inability to roll out the system to all FARDC units. This means that the system is now a hybrid between more ancient filing systems done by hand and modern technologies, which has had a limiting effect on the electronic system. The same can be said in relation to the ID card system, which is very popular among the soldiers,
but where there is no budget to secure the cards, leading to significant cases of false identity cards being produced (6, 2017). Another problem has been that the bank-based salary payments system has only worked properly in the areas around Kinshasa, while fewer soldiers have access to banks in other parts of the country. This points to the fact that the DRC, like many other African states, has only limited access to reliable banking, which could indicate that models like the Mpesa-cellular telephone-based system would be a more workable option.

6.10 Pooling and Sharing

In general the missions in the DRC formed part of a partnership between several international partners and local actors, typically led and coordinates by the UN. As one informant stressed, compared to other donors the EU has the basic challenge that its projects and planning are often heavily influenced by its normative human rights and democratization agenda, which is often difficult to implement in the DRC context. This has made it more difficult for the EU to have effective project planning and execution, because these normative considerations and priorities have led to the suspension of project activities and financing, to the frustration of the Congolese partner (9, 2017). The perception has been that the EU wanted to train and educate personnel in normative issues such as gender and sexual violence and exploitation, while what was really needed was train and equip programmes that could provide security for the vulnerable population in the conflict-ridden sections of the DRC (9, 2017)

The role of the UN mission, MONUC/MONUSCO, has been criticized on several occasions. One international informant argued that the problem with the UN strategy for the training of the FARDC was that had the short-term goal of enabling the FARDC to take over from MONUC/MONUSCO, and not the long-term objective of building an effective and well-functioning Congolese army. Training the FARDC was part of the UN’s exit strategy (10, Anonymous, 2009), thus hampering the role and influence of EUSEC, which had to navigate within this UN-dominated international framework. However, as one seasoned international informant argued, one of the problems faced in maintaining cooperation between the UN and EU has been that the mandates of the missions were different. Furthermore since 2007 local government has not wanted effective donor coordination (12, 2016). During a field visit in 2009 the author observed first-hand how frustration unfolded between EUSEC/EUPOL and MONUC over the future priorities of the SSR projects, the latter having brought in a new head of SSR, who started to reformulate the SSR strategy to the frustration of the EU’s actors, who had not been informed. This illustrates how difficult this type of international cooperation can be, especially when there is a high turnover of personnel and when institutional memory is often partly lost along the way. However, the EUSEC mission would not have been able to operate without close cooperation and logistical support from MONUC/MONUSCO, which provided security for the deployed EUSEC personnel as well. During the EUPOL and EUSEC census projects, the small EU teams were dependant on support from the UN (MONUC, 2009b). This program was highly controversial for the FARDC, since it uncovered the large number of ‘ghost’ soldiers who were receiving a monthly wage, which constituted a major source of income for many FARDC officers (10, Anonymous, 2009). The tensions surrounding these issues are illustrated by the fact that the current head of the program bancaire within the

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
FARDC, a close partner of the EU PROGRESS team, needs a personal protection detachment to stay alive (6, 2017). Another informant argued that the bank-based payments system had improved accountability, though outside the larger urban areas it is difficult to implement. Furthermore, a high percentage of salaries still arrive as cash bonuses which are not controlled by the electronic system, and the acquisition of larger luxury goods, like cars, is still controlled by the president (12, 2016). The powerful Maison Militaire plays a crucial role in this process.

Most international donors recognized early on the importance of local participation in and ownership of the programming of projects (Channel Research, 2011, p. 117). However, as shown by the different case studies, although donors have tended to cooperate and coordinate to a certain extent, they have often also opted to act bilaterally. As shown by the Channel Research evaluation in 2011 and confirmed again in 2017, donors often opted to avoid working with the state authorities, choosing instead NGOs and local authorities and institutions as their preferred partners. This by the very nature of things hampered coordination and cooperation between the various actors involved, since the overview was lost. This also meant that the impacts of the projects and initiatives were limited by a lack of proper project planning and the very plethora of activities. Since 2007 the DRC government prioritized bilateral partnerships in the SSR of the armed forces, which resulted in several parallel military training programs being set up and run (Channel Research, 2011, p. 96). However, as one high-level international informant argued, the strategy of prioritizing bilateral training was not the fault of the donors, but the result of a strategy launched by the Congolese Minister of Defence in 2007 and against the recommendations from, among others, EUSEC (10, Anonymous, 2009). Nevertheless, the result was that the programs and training involved a whole range of different international actors and experts, each arriving with their own national strategies, thus undermining local ownership.

Attempts to implement international strategies, such as the ISSSS, have been less successful since they failed to include all international actors effectively and to integrate them into their national efforts. Furthermore, international strategies need local buy-in and ownership to be implemented effectively, something that has also been less successful (Channel Research, 2011, p. 96). As one international informant mentioned, this was also due to the fact that international donors, both regionally based and international ones, had to balance their national interests with what they saw as the best measures to achieve an effective result and a successful project (1, 2017). The result was often that it was the bilateral and uncoordinated projects that were prioritized. EUSEC projects were similarly characterized by what was politically possible in European capitals, where politics, risk-avoidance and normative considerations had a high priority. This should be combined with the fact that the legislative process in the DRC is and has been slow, meaning that the necessary judicial framework for an SSR program for the army has been absent. An organic law for the FARDC was passed in 2011, which provides the guidelines for the force's future structure.

28 The author experienced this first-hand during a visit to North and South Kivu in 2008, where even the UN-run trainings were dependent on the country delivering the training. The head of the UN SSR program in 2010 remarked that it was possible to see by the marching style of the FARDC units who had trained them.
The law has been revised since 2011, for instance transforming the military districts and regions.

Due to the fact that since 2007 the FARDC and the DRC government have had a strategy of seeking bilateral partnerships with international donors, the training of, for instance, the new Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was conducted by France, South Africa, the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium, while France, Belgium, South Africa and China have been the primary partners in training the new recruits (12, 2016) (23, 2009). The decision to establish the RRF came as part of a 2007 Congolese plan, under which these forces were supposed to replace the deployed UN forces in the DRC (22, 2009). However, as one international informant argued, this strategy of establishing RRF had been a partial failure because the FARDC did not have the capacity and capabilities to led the RRF as a rapid response force (12, 2016).

The plethora of different international partners has constituted a challenge because there is no common doctrine or training manual, and the training is run by the bilateral donors (23, 2009) (12, 2016). Reading the consequence of this was unclear because some international informants argued that in practice this was a minor problem (1, 2017) (12, 2016), while other informants argued that it was major problem because it was difficult to work together (3, 2017) (9, 2017). The argument from the donors’ side was that it was not a problem in the case of the training done by western, often NATO states, though it is an issue with the non-western military training teams, which often do not coordinate their efforts (1, 2017). However, one informant who has worked in the DRC for more than ten years argued that the culture within the FARDC is changing positively, with increased capacity within the force and an increased willingness to assume ownership for its development (12, 2016). An example of this is the better conduct of military operations in the east and the increased domestic financing of the new military strategic academy (1, 2017) (12, 2016). This was also one of the reasons why the EUSEC mission was scaled down and replaced by PROGRESS, which had three main priorities, including to follow up and continue EUSEC projects like the database system and to initiate the planned retraining of older FARDC soldiers. A focus on governance has helped the FARDC manage its budget and ultimately to increase its accountability (12, 2016)
7 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARTEMIS, EUFOR, EUSEC AND EUPOL IN DR CONGO

The EUFOR RCA assessment is based on the IECEU analysis guide, in which effectiveness is defined as the mission or operation achieving its objective in an appropriate manner from the perspective of both the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent.29 From the EU perspective, assessment related to internal goals is aimed at determining to what extent the European military operation met the EU’s politico-strategic goals and operational objectives as described especially in connection with the mandate. Internal appropriateness is examined in terms of whether the operation was implemented in a timely, efficient and cost-effective way. From the conflict perspective, external goal attainment is a matter of the extent to which the four missions prevented further violence and made a meaningful, positive and sustainable contribution to the transformation of the conflict. Finally, the examination of external appropriateness looks at whether the European involvement did more good than harm by respecting the principles of proportionality and necessity. The operations can be framed as a success if all the criteria have been well met, but only a partial success if at least one of the four criteria has not been met.

7.1 SUCCESS FOR THE EU

7.1.1 INTERNAL GOAL ATTAINMENT

1. Politico-Strategic Objectives

It has been argued that Africa is shaped like an pistol, with the Congo being the trigger. This is one of the explanations for why, from early on the in the DRC conflict, the EU has been a central actor in it. The DRC was early considered to be of strategic importance to the EU, though interest in this has faded in the past five years. Even though EU officials argue that the DRC is still of strategic importance to the Union, the focus seems to have moved north, to the areas that are producing streams of refugees or that have active Islamic radical militant movements. The DRC has neither. It can also be argued that the EU’s involvement in the DRC, and in central Africa in general, has been and still is driven by the narrow political interests of specific members of the EU, especially France and partly Belgium. To put it bluntly, the EU is very unlikely to have deployed Operation Artemis and the EUFOR RDC had it not been for France’s national interest in doing so. This can also explain why internally the EU has scaled down its involvement in the DRC, because since the war in Libya, Mali and its heavy involvement in the Central African Republic, France has moved its focus away from central Africa. The EUFOR RDC deployment was interesting in the sense that it was the only operation which included all EU members30 at the time, but also because of a subsequent feeling that Germany had been pressed into conducting and leading the operation by France when it should have been focusing on its engagement in Afghanistan. The later deployment in the Central African Republic is

29 IECEU project D1.4, Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention: Identifying the Success Factors, p. 8.

30 Denmark was excluded due to its opt out from EU military cooperation.
instructive because of the lack of willingness among EU member states to take part in what was considered to be a deployment driven by French interests.

According to Article 42 of the TEU, the main purpose of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) of the European Union is to provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets, which it may use on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. One local informant in the DRC argued that looking back at the four ESDP missions in the DRC they had been a theoretical success, but that the lack of implementation on the ground was a failure (2, 2017). The EU had managed to assist in drafting central legislation and creating the frameworks for the SSR program, including on the police side the establishment of the CRSP with representatives of all the relevant government branches, the EU and MONUSCO. However, the actual implementation of the agreed programs did in not take place more than 70 percent of the cases (2, 2017). This was confirmed by EU staff members, who argued that programs were often insufficiently planned and that the assessment studies prior to writing and designing the actual program had not been carried out professionally enough. The programs had often been too ambitious and unattainable, and the budget available to implement them limited (1, 2017). This informant even went so far as to say that the projects had in general not been designed against the backdrop of the needs of the Congolese, but on what the international experts thought was the best (1, 2017). The result has been that the EU can look back on a number of projects that did not constitute the major change and reform that were intended. One local informant argued that the EU seems to have been more focused on domestic visibility and less on the impact on the ground (9, 2017). A third informant argued that one of the explanations for why the impact of UNPOL had been limited was that it had focused on the national level, not the local level where most PNC officers operate. It was therefore a structural fault in the EU project design that resulted in the limited impact (2, 2017). In addition, the EU had also been faced with the fact that the forces they had to operate with had limited or even no police training, and several informants highlighted this as a major obstacle to the reform effort (2, 2017) (5, 2017) (9, 2017). Also the EU had experienced that it could not count on the local Congolese partner to deliver on its promises, which often left the donor exposed to criticism and required it to finance the whole project so it could run31 (2, 2017). However, as one high-level Congolese informant argued, this was also due to the fact that the EU had the misconception that the Congolese partner, which was just coming out of a war situation and had limited human and economic resources, would be able to deliver in such a jointly financed partnership. That was unrealistic and was an important explanation for why the Congolese partner so often failed to produce the agreed funds for the projects (5, 2017). An illustrative example of this is the biometric payments system, where the system, and the idea behind it, does work, but where in practice it has only a minor impact (1, 2017) (2, 2017). Another example is the centralized focus on legislation, where the laws for the police are fine and would work in a

31 The author has experienced this himself on several occasions in theatre in the DRC, where in both police and military training bases the government did not provide the agreed subsidies for the deployed personnel.
functioning democratic state, but not in the DRC in its current form (2, 2017). A third informant even argued that the EU, like a number of the other donors, did not understand Congolese thinking related to ‘partnership’ and development aid, where the Congolese considered funding to be a ‘gift’ (3, 2017).

One of the objectives of the missions in the DRC has been that, for the projects to be successful, they need to have a high degree of local ownership and buy-in. One local informant argued that in the case of the EU it had been more question of the ‘adaptation’ of the donor plan and that local participation should be considered to be involvement rather than ownership (3, 2017). A central international EU staff member argued that there had been a big difference here between EUPOL and EUSEC in the sense that, in its relations with the PNC, EUPOL had been part of a much more open and coordinated effort together with other donor partners and the local beneficiaries than had been the case with EUSEC. One of the reasons for this was the early drafting of key legislation for the police, which increased local ownership for the reform program (4, 2016).

The missions in the DRC have been important for the EU in the sense that this was the first time that the ESDP was tested, and it provided the EU with an opportunity to test its ambition to become a comprehensive global player, with a tool box that was more diverse and more attractive than, for instance, those of NATO. During its four operations the EU managed to partner with other international organizations, in particular the UN, in providing comprehensive tools in post-conflict situations in the DRC. The challenges for the EU were to be found at several levels. The national interests and normative liberal ambitions of the EU in its engagement with a reluctant Congolese partner meant that projects were suspended due to issues arising at the strategic political level, but the impact was felt on the actual projects on the ground. This led to high levels of frustration and mistrust on the part of the Congolese beneficiary. The next problem was that the EU had too limited a budget and too long a response time, making it a difficult partner to work with. Internally in the EU problems were also visible in the project planning and design phase. The Union’s projects were described as over-ambitious and unrealistic, being driven by changing international seconded personnel, who arrived with their own personal ambitions. This meant that the projects were often designed without a thorough and in-depth understanding of the Congolese context and having made little or no use of Congolese interlocutors and local networks in general. This meant that it was often difficult to get access to the relevant Congolese actors, making projects often unrealistic and leading the EU to fail to achieve its stated objectives for the missions. The EUSEC mission to introduce a biometric salary payment system is a case in point. The system was established, but due to the size and nature of the DRC and the lack of funds, the system is not fully operational. One issue here is an unrealistic expectation and a lack of understanding of what could and can be expected of the Congolese partner. The latter was just coming out of a war situation, and a number of the central actors within the Congolese system had an interest in blocking or at least delaying the project. Another problem related specifically to EUPOL, but also partly to EUSEC, was that the main focus was placed on reforms at the national level in Kinshasa, though in reality most PNC personnel work and operate at the local level.
Internally in the EU there are some structural problems, where, due to the partnership with bilateral donors in the projects, it has often proved impossible or very difficult to get access to the 'lessons learned' reports from the previous projects. This had a significant negative effect on mission planning.

### 7.1.2 INTERNAL APPROPRIATENESS

The original primary goal of the missions was to assist in implementing the 2002 peace agreement and, after the 2006 elections, to assist the DRC to recover from many years of conflict by supporting the SSR program. As mentioned above, and as described in the review study, the DRC is still plagued by conflict and instability fifteen years after the 2002 peace agreement was signed. However, to conclude that the international engagements, including EU involvement, have been complete failures would be a mistake. This entirely depends on the benchmarks that are used to make such an assessment. The problem for the EU has been that it has often been difficult work with a Congolese partner coming out of war, and with the lack of the institutional capacity to be involved in a meaningful partnership. One of the key objectives in the OECD handbook on SSR was the importance of local ownership, which can be difficult to obtain when the partner country lacks either the will or the capacity to assume ownership. However, the EU missions were also generally criticized for not using or tapping into the local knowledge base, the projects being imposed by the external partner instead. Internally EU informants called the projects badly planned and over-ambitious, while another informant argued that the strategy had been that sometimes it is better to do something than do nothing. Another challenge facing the project planners was that they were being asked to implement a SSR program in a non-permissive and conflict-ridden Congolese context. Combined with the vast nature and complexity of the many Congolese conflicts, it proved very difficult to implement and execute the planned activities efficiently. Another issue was that the EU projects were dependent on partnership with the UN mission in the DRC for logistics and security, which at times made running them more difficult. Furthermore, the missions’ partnerships with other donors were made complicated by the fact that the donors’ mandates differed: for instance, the UN was focused on preparing the Congolese to take over responsibility for security from itself, while the EU missions had a longer-term reform ambition.

### 7.2 Operational Objectives

#### 7.2.1 POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE CONFLICT

This section will attempt to assess whether the EU mission and operations have been effective in preventing and reducing conflict in the DRC, i.e. it will assess the general impact of the EU mission on the conflicts in the DRC. It asks whether the mission helped prevent the further continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of the conflict and seeks to answer this by looking at the preventive means at the mission’s
disposal. The question is whether the mission has contributeds in a meaningful way to the further prevention of the conflict and whether the means used were proportionate to the task of prevention. 32

7.2.2 EXTERNAL GOAL ATTAINMENT

Since the start of the first Congo War, the EU has been a dominant actor in the region and has actively supported and helped frame the peace agreements and their implementation. The first EU mission, Operation Artemis, was deployed in the Ituri provincial capital of Bunia in 2003 with the aim of stabilizing a deteriorating security situation. The force was deployed parallel to the existing UN PSO mission in the DRC, and after six months it became part of the international community’s overall assistance to the country. The Artemis mission manage to stabilize and pre-empt an unfolding humanitarian crisis in the Bunia area. The risks of ethnic cleansing and even genocide were avoided, and the civilian population started to return to Bunia. The robust posture of the Artemis forces deterred other armed actors from attempting to escalate the situation. The deployed force also managed to allow the UN force to be deployed. The mission also managed to fulfil the EU objective of partnering with the UN, at a time in international affairs when the US-led intervention in Iraq, without a proper mandate, challenged the multinational international system and the UN’s own legitimacy. The Artemis operation also allowed the EU to test its new ESDP in practice and to situate it as a global international actor in its own right. The Artemis mission has been criticized for not contributing to a general lasting improvement on the security situation in Bunia in particular and in Ituri province in general. After the Artemis force left, the security situation deteriorated again. This is a relevant point that highlights an issue with role and purpose of military deployments. The objective of Artemis was not to secure long-term stability, but to stabilize the immediate situation and allow the UN to deploy and execute its mandate. Although a French-dominated mission, it had a clear EU and UN mandate and was supported by non-EU states, for instance, South Africa with two Oryx helicopter platform, Canada with a strategic and tactical airlift capacity, and Cyprus. The inclusion of a small British contingent helped provide access to Entebbe airport, since France’s role in central Africa remained a contentious issue due to its role during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The operational area was logistically close to Entebbe Airport, which is a regional logistical hub, and only 300 km from the operational zone in Bunia. Strategic lift was identified as a weakness of the mission, which was also seen as a French mission within an EU framework. Another challenge came from budgetary problems, which meant that the EU had to reduce its original force target. France functioned as the framework nation, and a budget of 7 million Euros was made available for joint costs, the reminder of the costs being covered by individual contributing states. However, Artemis was exceptional in the sense that France covered many of the costs of the operation, spending 46 million Euros on this operation.

Its area of operation was limited to the town of Bunia, where it managed to stabilize the situation and hand over to the UN mission on 1 September 2003. Being the first independent military operation launched by the

32 Deliverable 1.4. Identifying the Success Factors (indicators), 13-14.
EU, the operation became a milestone in the development of the ESDP, one that shaped future operations. The deployment of Artemis was characterised by strong French geostrategic interest, but it was also a consequence of the split in the western NATO alliance created by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Artemis was also interesting in that it was a robust military deployment of 1800 military personnel with superior capabilities, including significant Swedish special forces capabilities. France provided 900 of the combat troops, whilst Germany’s 350-troop contribution was of a non-combat nature. On top of that France had over a thousand troops in reserve in Gabon and Chad.

When the EUFOR operation was deployed on 30 July 2006 and withdrawn on 30 November 2006, it was based on some of the experiences of Artemis. The difference was, however, that the bulk of the forces were only deployed as a rapid reaction capability in neighbouring Gabon, which could be deployed in hotspots all over the DRC. The force was under German command and had contributions from 21 EU member states and Turkey. The objective of the force was four-fold: supporting and providing security to MONUC installations and personnel; contributing to airport protection in Kinshasa; the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and evacuation operations in case of emergency if needed. The force was therefore basically send in to prop up the MONUC force that had already been deployed, and it operated in close cooperation with that force. Again this operation had a clear UN mandate, and there was local consent regarding the deployment. However, this mission also showed some of the weaknesses that EU military operations are facing. When the resolve of the force was tested when government forces attacked the opposition presidential candidate, Jean-Pierre Bemba, it was only the Spanish contingent that did not have national caveats barring them from intervening. Furthermore had the Congolese governments force fortified the international airport, it would have been difficult to bring in the reserve force stationed in Gabon without it at least being delayed. So while the EUFOR mission to a large extent managed to fulfil its mandate, the operation also showed some of its limitations. In terms of pooling and sharing, both missions managed to enter into close cooperation with the MONUC operation, and in the case of Artemis managed to bring in non-EU partners to provide logistical support for the mission. However, the EUFOR deployment showed that if intelligence is not shared and accessible, and if national contingents have national caveats that prevent them from operating effectively, this can endanger the missions and its objectives. It can be argued that EUFOR was a success as a deterrent force because it was never really tested, and when it was, it managed to conduct itself in an convincing manor. However, as it was the case with the Artemis force, it did not have a lasting effect on the general security situation in the DRC, which has continued to be a challenge ever since. Nonetheless EUFOR managed to allow the elections to take place, which again permitted EU involvement through EUSEC and EUPOL moving from focusing on transitional security to the actual initiation and implementation of the SSR program.

Financing the force was based on the same model as Artemis, where joint costs were covered by the Athena mechanism, while the national costs were covered by the contributing state. The budget for the four-month deployment was 16.7 million Euros to cover the joint costs for the 2500 troops deployed in the DRC and Gabon. The estimated total cost of the mission was 100 million Euros. EUFOR RD Congo had approximately a thousand troops deployed in Kinshasa, while the bulk of the force was either in Gabon or, as an additional
reserve, in Germany and France. The EUFOR RD Congo showed again that the contributing countries were reluctant to deploy troops in theatre and that the necessary strategic and tactical lift capabilities needed to be effective were not available. As was the case for Artemis, France contributed 1090 troops, while Germany deployed 780 soldiers and was by far the biggest troop contributor. EUFOR RD Congo was, however, significant in the sense that it constituted a chance to show the EU flag, and the Berlin+ agreement with NATO was not activated on this mission.

In terms of the two capacity-building missions, EUPOL and EUSEC, they were both tasked with assisting in implementing the SSR program that followed the 2002 peace agreement. In 2005 the EU launched the EUPOL\textsuperscript{33} and EUSEC missions, which were tasked to assist in the training of the Congolese police and military institutions as part of the SSR and state-building project initiated after the signing of the two peace agreements. The EUPOL project was ended in 2014, EUSEC in 2016. The initial task was to train the interim security forces, both army and police, to provide security for the 2006 elections. After that the missions were involved in reforming, integrating and training the security forces and had a focus on human resource development, including salary payments. In the last part of the EUSEC mission leading to its closure in July 2016, the mission focused on the military training infrastructure. Most of the EU projects have been carried out in partnership, or sometimes in competition, with other donors, including EU member states. Belgium, France and the UK have, for instance, been running large bilateral training programs, parallel to the EU projects. Coordination between donors have often been absent or insufficient, leading to an overlapping of programs and duplications. The problem has been that national donor interests and a reluctant national DRC partner which prefers easily controllable bilateral partnerships have reduced cooperation and had a significant negative effect on the impact of the projects. Generally it can be argued that the two capacity-building missions have been less successful and have not managed to achieve their stated goals. The two military deployments, by contrast, had short, clear and narrowly defined mandates, and their mission objectives were realistic. For the two SSR missions they lasted for more than nine years, had too limited a budget to achieve their complex mandates and had to operate in a vastly complex reality, where they were often dependent on the cooperation and capacity of their partners. This proved to be very difficult, and the stated objectives were not met.

EUSEC was initiated in 2005 and closed in July 2016. During its last mandated year it had a budget of 2.5 million Euros and ten international staff, down from a budget of 11 million Euros and 48 international staff during the 2012-13 financial year. EUSEC managed during its time in operation to build an IT system for the Congolese army, finance the building of eleven armouries, introduce identity cards for army personnel, and focus in its last years in operation on creating capacity in the military education system.

\textsuperscript{33} The EUPOL mission was launched in two phases, with the smaller EUPOL–Kinshasa phase deployed from 2005 to 2007, before being replaced by EUPOL–RD Congo, which ran from 2007 to 2014.
EUPOL was initiated in 2005 as EUPOL-Kinshasa, changing into EUPOL RD Congo in 2007 and ending its mandate in September 2014. In its last year of operation it had 31 international staff, stemming from seven, mostly French-speaking EU member states. The focus has been on helping establish the legal framework for the police and increasing and improving the training and specialized training facilities in the police force, while its attempts to create a biometric payment and ID card system have been less successful. In the last five years of the mission it had a budget of 6-7 million Euros.

The EU has therefore been involved in a wide range of post-conflict state-building initiatives as part of larger efforts to address the vast range of causes of conflict in the DRC. The DRC review focused on the background to the wars and conflicts in the DRC and on how the EU has been involved since primarily 1996. The four missions (five if EUPOL is included as a separate mission) all had different objectives. The two robust military deployments were both deployed for a short time period of less than six months and had a narrow and realistic mandate.

However, due to the fact that the missions lasted for nearly ten years, the tasks and objectives changed over time. The EU has invested large amounts of money and resources in its attempts to assist in implementing the peace agreements. A final problem for the EU has been the excessive focus on numbers and the lesser focus on impact. Several informants argued that the EU missions were not good enough to ensure the sustainability of the implemented programs, which meant that the latter in effect became dysfunctional shortly after the Union left.

7.2.3 EXTERNAL APPROPRIATENESS

The idea of the external appropriateness of conflict prevention denotes the ways in which the mission seeks to achieve its purpose by stressing its relationship to proportionality. The starting point of the external appropriateness criteria is that the intervention must do more good than harm. Proportionality in this framework refers to the fact that the intervention has to be in proportion to the challenge it faces from the conflict. That is, coercive actions violating state sovereignty and local ownership in situations in which it is not called for is externally inappropriate, and vice versa, i.e. if the mission fails to act in accordance with what is needed to have an effect, this is also inappropriate.

The EU has generally been a central and positive force in its attempts to get the DRC to recover from war and conflict. Together with its bilateral donors, it has been the largest donor in the DRC, having been involved since the early peace negotiations. Its involvement has at all times been at the invitation of the host and has formed part of the overall international involvement in the country. In all its efforts the Union has focused on assisting in implementing the peace agreements and the subsequent SSR programs related to them. The EU has therefore been an important player in attempts to bring Congo back from war and conflict. That said, several Congolese informants have claimed that the EU was the most difficult donor to work with, for several reasons. Normatively the EU itself and its member states had so many conditionalities attached to their involvement that the DRC found it difficult to count on the EU. The result was that the EU would often do the softer and less risk-prone projects, but not what was needed. EU informants confirmed that this was a
problem that they could train, but not equip. However, one Congolese informant argued that, had it not been
for the EU, no reform would have taken place. So while it is easy to be critical of the EU’s involvement, this
points to what one EUSEC informant argued, namely that it is sometimes better to do something than to do
nothing. The EU had a positive impact, but not to the level that was hoped for.

### 7.3 Overall success

In assessing the overall success of the EU’s engagement in the DRC, the answer depends on what is
considered to be a reasonable benchmark for assessment. In terms of fulfilling the mandates, Operation
Artemis and EUFOR RDC achieved their goals, while the EUPOL and EUSEC did not do so to the same
extent. The two military operations had narrow, realistic mandates, and lasted only a short time. However,
they did not manage to have greater strategic impacts on the security situation in the DRC in general. The
EUPOL and EUSEC missions were given unrealistic objectives, which they partly failed to achieve. However,
if the benchmark is moved, these two missions had a positive impact on first the security sector’s ability to
handle security in the 2006 elections, and subsequently to start the actual SSR program and to draft the
framework document related to it. The two missions did not manage to create two well-functioning security
institutions, the PNC and the FARDC, which in 2017 can still best be described as a ‘traffic-jam’, to
paraphrase one informant. The relevant question, of course, is to what extent this is the responsibility of the
EU missions, or whether this also has to do with the fact that the Congolese partner has been unable or
even unwilling to implement the needed reforms. The paralysis of the EU’s engagement is not always the
fault of the Union, and this leaves the question the extent to which it would have been better not to engage in
the DRC as long as the local beneficiary was non-permissive. However, knowledge of this would only have
become available if proper, in-depth studies of the situation had been conducted and if institutional memory
had been maintained and distributed within the EU system. Another major challenge was that, despite the
fact that the international donors interacted with one another and coordinated their efforts, the differences in
national interests, norms and mandates often resulted in bilateral engagement and donor competition. This
was also due, however, to the fact that the Congolese prefer bilateral partnerships because they are easier
for them to control. The DRC has turned out to be a complex and difficult environment for the EU to operate
in, and its missions have found themselves caught between a reluctant partner and a domestic political
reality that made it difficult for them to operate. One important lesson from the DRC has been that it is not
possible to engage effectively in the country when the normative political ties are too narrow and when
bureaucratic system has too long a response time. The EU should also become better at using and engaging
with the local knowledge base, which has often been remarkably absent in the DRC.
LIST OF INTERVIEWS

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3.5 Study Report: South Sudan

Lead beneficiary: AIES
Delivery date: 10/02/2017
Revision: 3.0

Revision history

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<td>30/06/2016</td>
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<td>Amendments and formatting</td>
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<td>31/10/2016</td>
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<td>12/02/2017</td>
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration</td>
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<td>DHoM</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organisation</td>
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<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This IECEU project deliverable 3.5, The South Sudan Field Trip report, assesses the contribution by the EU CSDP mission EUAVSEC to the overall security of the state of South Sudan by in particular taking into consideration the perspective of mission personnel, representatives of the GoSS, NGOs and other IOs. EUAVSEC South Sudan was launched in July 2012 following the South Sudan’s request for EU support to strengthening security at Juba International Airport, as part of the international community’s overall assistance to the country. A key challenge for South Sudan after independence was to establish a fully operational transport hub for commercial and passenger purposes. Improving airport security will not only contribute to the fight against crime and international terrorism, but also enable the increased flow of people and goods, thus helping to boost trade and promote regional integration.

Applying the methodology of the IECEU project, in particular DL 1.4. and DL 1.5 the success of the mission will be examined by describing the main capabilities deployed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the mission will be analyzed by looking into internal/external goal attainment and internal/external appropriateness. It combines both the finding of the field trip as well as the conducted interviews as well as comprehensive desktop research. The findings were tested and re-fined during an expert roundtable held in Copenhagen on 31 October 2016 with relevant experts.

Finally the conclusion will be drawn on the overall performance of the EU with regard to the conflict in South Sudan as well as by providing concrete recommendations not only for further CSDP engagement in South Sudan in particular, but also for CSDP engagement in Africa in general.
1. ANALYSIS OF EUAVSEC SOUTH SUDAN – FIELD REPORT

In accordance with the Grant agreement, the main objective of DL 3.5 is to analyse the findings from the field trip organized by the AIRES to South Sudan in order to detect the impact and effectiveness of the EU Aviation Security Mission which was deployed to Juba International Airport between October 2012 and January 2014. Due to the unstable security situation in South Sudan as a consequence of the civil war that started in late 2013, the field trip was organized in April 2016 for a very short period of time in order to best guarantee the security of the IECEU researchers as at the same time of the field trip, the return of the Vice-President in opposition, Riek Machar, was foreseen.

Methodologically this deliverable is very much based on the interview material. In total, 23 interviews were conducted in Juba, Brussels and EU member states. Interviewees included actual and former members of government and senior government officials from South Sudan, senior staff of EUAVSEC South Sudan, the EU Delegation in Juba, representatives from EU member states in charge of CSDP, university professors and students from Juba University and the Catholic University Juba as well as representatives of the NGO sector and the South Sudanese diaspora in Europe. Furthermore also two interviews with Sudanese officials and academics have been added. The interviews are complemented by a specific desktop research of the issues to be addressed in this report. The field trip reports complements and adds to the deliverable 3.2. The South Sudan review and thus does not duplicate the findings there, such as the independence process of South Sudan, the outbreak of the internal conflict in South Sudan and the role of other international actors and world politics.

The field report focuses and relies strongly on the interview material that is used in this deliverable to analyse the more operational functions of EUAVSEC and how the problems perceivable through the research material were faced on operational level as well as on the personal perception of the author stemming from the field trip. In accordance with the Grant Agreement, the whole methodological framework for field WPs (WP2, WP3, WP4) rests on the theoretical considerations done within several deliverables of WP1, most importantly D1.4 (Identifying the Success Factors - Indicators) and D1.5 (Conceptual Framework and Methodology).

As this mission was of a very specific technical nature, it is very difficult to compare it with all other CSDP missions and operations to date and to assess its success. In order to keep a coherence within the WP and considering those limitations, this deliverable nonetheless applies the logic of the IECEU project and although some patterns of the methodology might not entirely apply for EUAVSEC South Sudan, the added value in the overall comparison lies in the fact that many of the difficulties and shortcomings CSDP missions and operations are confronted with, have also applied to this very specific technical assistance mission and thus underline the need for re-thinking planning and operational capability as well as competences and comprehensiveness of CSDP missions.
1.1 EUROPEAN UNION PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

South Sudan gained its independence after decades of civil war and ethnic violence in the former common territory of Sudan which used to be the biggest country on African soil. The two civil wars in between 1955-1972 and 1983-2005 did not allow the South for effectively building-up state-like structures and the SPLA had turned into the SPLM and thereby underwent the change from a liberation army to a liberation movement that had to take over the future of the country. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 set the provisions for a government of national unity, especially the governance and institutions of South Sudan needed to be set up and to overcome the tensions between those that were already collaborating in the government of national unity in Khartoum and those who fought for freedom and independence. Sudan, for a long time, had based its hope on Vice-President John Garang who had never been in favor of a split of Sudan but for gaining special autonomy for the South. After the death of Garang, the later South Sudanese President Salva Kiir was considered in Khartoum as a weak, uncharismatic and unreliable partner. Nonetheless it was President Bashir’s own conviction that the referendum foreseen in the CPA had to take place and that he would be the first to accept not only the outcome, but also the separation and independence of South Sudan. President Kiir thus focused his role as until the referendum in securing and sustaining his power and did not pay too much attention on paving the way for setting up the structures for a viable new state. He also lacked a real vision for the new-born state after independence and based his hopes on the support of the international community.

Furthermore, as a consequence of the strong role of the tribes in South Sudan, the country never had an effective central government, and it has struggled with recurrent insurgencies and ethnic violence. Despite the in international fora widely-spread assumption that most of the tensions would exist between the two separate nations Sudan and South Sudan, it turned out that shortly after the independence of South Sudan, the clashes within the tribal structures would lead to turmoil and weaken the stability of the country. However, despite the efforts of UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan) to provide for stability, the majority of the other international actors, including the EU focused stronger on state and institution-building and thus neglected partly the developments within the country. Sudan was still internationally considered as a rogue state and as the source of all evil that would affect South Sudan. The border disputes starting in 2012 especially concerning the region of Abyei as well as the Nuba mountains did also further contribute to this perception.

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34 See DL 3.2. The South Sudan Review, 14.
35 Interviews no. 22 and 23.
36 Interview no. 22.
37 Interview no. 23.
38 Interview no. 8.
39 Interviews no. 22 and 23.
1.1.1 The European Union Comprehensive Approach and South Sudan

Immediately after South Sudan became an independent country on 9 July 2011, all major international actors including the EU pledged their support for the development of the new-born country to help it achieve its national motto of justice, liberty and prosperity. Indirectly, the EU hoped by supporting South Sudan to avoid the risk of a regional conflict (with Sudan) and a state failure as doubts where raised whether the country could sustain itself from the very beginning.

In preparation for South Sudan’s independence, the EU upgraded its representation to a full delegation in May 2011 and inaugurated the European Union compound in Juba. In addition to the EU delegation, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark and Spain have representations in the compound, while Sweden has an office in another part of town. At the independence celebration of 9 July 2011, the then HR/VP of the EU, Lady Baroness Ashton, declared that “[W]e will be your partner in achieving this, not just now, but for the long term. This partnership will be focused on helping the people of South Sudan, through working together with their government.”

Already before the independence celebrations took place, the Council agreed on 20 June 2011 to follow a comprehensive approach to Sudan and South Sudan with, inter alia, the aim of assisting South Sudan to become a viable, stable, and prosperous state.

The Comprehensive Approach set out, as a short-term option, the possible deployment of a civilian common security and defence policy (CSDP) mission to strengthen airport security and, as a medium-term option, the contribution to broader border management in South Sudan. The EU’s engagement with South Sudan is based on the EU single-country strategy, which is aligned with the country’s 2011-2013 National Development Plan. The document identifies the principal sectors for EU and member state engagement as rule of law, health, education, infrastructure (mainly water and sanitation) and agriculture/food security. Several EU member states and ECHO are also committed to humanitarian assistance in South Sudan. All of the EU-level instruments, except military intervention, have been deployed in the country: an EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan, the EUAVSEC CSDP mission at Juba international airport, Instrument-for-Stability financed initiatives, a large humanitarian assistance programme and European Development Fund (EDF)-financed programmes and projects.

The Single EU Country Strategy for South Sudan is the development response to the EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of 2011 to “follow a comprehensive EU approach to Sudan and South Sudan.” As the Strategy says, the comprehensive approach “covers all aspects of the EU’s policy towards an independent South Sudan including political/diplomatic, security/rule of law, stabilization, development, human rights, humanitarian and trade. It also highlights the increasing role of EU development assistance in South Sudan

40 Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the South Sudan’s Independence Day celebration, 9 July 2011, Brussels, 9 July 2011 A 273/11.
42 Paragraph 8, 3101st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels: Council of the European Union.
and mandates the EU to take forward joint programming of development assistance in: justice/rule of law; education; health; water management and rural economic development in coordination with GRSS and in response to the SSDP.\textsuperscript{43} The overall comprehensive approach foresaw a sum of € 830 million to be spend within the period 2011-2013.\textsuperscript{44}

1.1.2 Good governance, Institution and Capacity Building

Besides other areas, such as rule of law, education, health or infrastructure, also governance and institution and capacity rank highly in the EU’s comprehensive approach to Sudan and South Sudan. The South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) of 2011 states as a target “[T]o build a democratic, transparent, and accountable Government, managed by a professional and committed public service, with an effective balance of power among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.”\textsuperscript{45} Historically, government in Sudan has been perceived to be authoritarian, unjust, non-inclusive, and non-accountable and, therefore, a driver of the conflict between the North and South. The central government in Khartoum treated the Southerners as people of second class and thereby limiting their rights, although a huge diaspora of Southerners still continues to live in North Sudan. The civil war between Sudan and South Sudan was therefore fought on the ideals of political inclusion and equitable service delivery\textsuperscript{46} as it was also the vision of late John Garang.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, the SSDP strongly highlighted the need for building up good governance structures to be supported by effective institution and capacity building and relying on international support. The key challenges in the development of good governance, institution and capacity building were identified regarding inclusion, access to financial resources, fiscal discipline, legal authority for oversight and the recruitment of trained personnel. Especially the later proved to be difficult. According to UNICEF reports, the adult literacy rate stands at a mere 27 per cent, and 70 per cent of children aged 6–17 years have never set foot in a classroom. The completion rate in primary schools is less than 10 per cent, one of the lowest in the world. Gender equality is another challenge, with only 33 per cent of girls in schools.\textsuperscript{48} Therefore one of the key elements of EUAVSEC South Sudan that were not originally foreseen as such were to provide basic forms of education and training.

1.1.3 Infrastructure and Civil Aviation

After the separation of Sudan, South Sudan became a land-locked country lacking the basic infrastructure especially regarding road, rail and water transport routes. Whereas infrastructure in general needed to be developed, in particular civil aviation became a relevant issue for South Sudan and the sector was

\textsuperscript{43} Single EU Country Strategy 2011, 4.
\textsuperscript{44} Single EU Country Strategy 2011, 18.
\textsuperscript{45} South Sudan Development Plan 2011, xvi.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{47} See DL 3.2. The South Sudan Review, 14.
\textsuperscript{48} See UNICEF on South Sudan: https://www.unicef.org/southsudan/education.html [30.01.2017].
considered to be vital to internal stability and economic development.\textsuperscript{49} A key challenge for South Sudan after its independence was therefore to establish a fully operational transport hub for commercial and passenger purposes and thus boosting the weak economy of the country. South Sudan became a member state of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in November 2011 and thus opening the way for implementing ICAO standards at its national airports. In order to attract foreign airlines to include destinations in South Sudan in their itineraries, it was necessary to develop minimum international standards since all the existing airports in South Sudan, mainly Juba International Airport as well as the airports of Wau and Malakal did not conform to ICAO standards.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, one of the key priorities of the Single EU Country Strategy was to develop and strengthen civil aviation in South Sudan.

First measures included resurfacing airstrips, lighting and other essential infrastructure. Also the EU member states themselves were very active in supporting the development of the civil aviation sector. Already before the official independence of South Sudan, France had invested in upgrading air traffic control equipment and supported provision of air traffic controllers (including for the 9th July 2011 independence ceremony)\textsuperscript{51}. Luxembourg provided capacity building to the Civil Aviation Authority including on safe transport of hazardous materials and security management systems.

Those measures were deemed necessary in order to provide support to air traffic control which itself is a basis for institution building and development of a long-term strategic plan. This is also strongly linked to the EU support to upgrading security at Juba International Airport\textsuperscript{52} by deploying a civilian mission in the context of CSDP.

### 1.2. PLANNING CAPABILITY

This chapter will analyse the planning capabilities of EUAVSEC South Sudan and its effectiveness in achieving the desired results and impact. Planning capability will be more closely examined from the perspectives of political-strategic planning, operational planning as well as, security assessments and standards.

#### 1.2.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

As described in the previous section, EUAVSEC South Sudan was not the immediate consequence of an outbreak of violence or conflict but more related to supporting and building capacity in a new-born but in its history war torn country. The mission formed part of the EU’s comprehensive approach regarding South

\textsuperscript{49} Single EU Country Strategy 2011, 12.
\textsuperscript{50} South Sudan Development Plan 2011, 75.
\textsuperscript{51} Together with ASECNA (Agency for Air Navigation Security for Africa).
\textsuperscript{52} Single EU Country Strategy 2011, 12.
Sudan and did not have an executive mandate. The mission was also not tasked to participate in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) of South Sudan as well as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives and can therefore best be considered as a technical advisory mission in a very narrow spectrum of civil aviation. Therefore it is hard to compare and assess the impact of the mission compared to almost all other missions and operations in the context of CSDP as its aim was not to end a conflict or to contribute to peaceful elections, but to allow for a proper functioning of civil aviation at Juba International Airport. It was to date the only mission in the context of CSDP that had the focus purely on (civilian) aviation security.

1.2.2 POLITICAL-STRATEGIC PLANNING

It has already been stated in this deliverable that from the very beginning, the EU committed itself to support South Sudan in the institution and capacity building in the framework of its comprehensive approach. Already at the independence celebration on 9 July 2011 in Juba, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), Lady Baroness Ashton promised support to the Government of South Sudan and indicated that a mission in the context of the EU’s CSDP could be launched in South Sudan.

On 19 July 2011, on behalf of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), the South Sudanese Minister for Transport and Roads, Agnes Poni Lokudu, addressed a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) welcoming the Union’s proposal to contribute to the strengthening of the security at Juba International Airport (JIA) in order to raise it to internationally accepted standards, through the deployment of a CSDP mission.\(^{53}\) The Foreign Ministers of the European Union approved the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) on 23 January 2012 and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) on 27 April 2012. The Operation Plan (OPLAN) was agreed within the COREPER on 24 January 2013.

The strategic objective of EUAVSEC-South Sudan was to contribute to the sustainable and effective functioning of Juba International Airport (JIA), by achieving acceptable security capacity under local ownership, in line with international standards and applicable best practice. In particular, EUAVSEC South Sudan should contribute to strengthening aviation security, border control and law enforcement at JIA, under public oversight and in accordance with human rights standards.

The tasks of the original mandate, dating to 18 June 2012 were to:\(^{54}\)


\(^{54}\) COUNCIL DECISION 2012/312/CFSP of 18 June 2012 on the European Union Aviation Security CSDP Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC-South Sudan).
(a) assist and advise the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and other relevant South Sudanese services to establish the aviation security organisation at the Ministry of Transport and at JIA;
(b) assist and advise the GoSS and other relevant South Sudanese services to develop, adopt and implement:
— aviation security programmes and plans by the civil aviation authority of South Sudan,
— aviation security programmes, plans and relevant standard operating procedures at JIA;
(c) improve the performance of officials involved in aviation security operations, according to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended procedures, through training, mentoring, monitoring, advice, assistance and coordination;
(d) support sustainability and long-term viability of South Sudan’s achievements by working with other Union and international stake-holders;
(e) support the promotion of security awareness amongst the commercial and private entities operating at JIA.

**Difficulties encountered**

EUAVSEC South Sudan followed the usual EU patterns in launching a mission. The mission was preceded by a fact finding mission, the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) that was deployed to South Sudan immediately after the approval of the CMC. However, due to the conflict dynamics in South Sudan the situation on the ground quickly changed leading to the situation that the mission that was deployed six month after the TAM was deployed to a different environment as foreseen by the fact finding mission. No proper follow-up to the TAM had been taken into consideration.

Although the mandate was considered as being well drafted leaving enough room for interpretation and being flexible enough for adjustments, the initial TAM, the CONOPS and the OPLAN were built on the assumption that a new passenger terminal would be completed close to the start of the mission. The Government of South Sudan assured that this would be done by the end of 2012, however, the Government failed in sticking to its promise and till the end of the mandate there has been very little progress. This hindered the execution of the tasks of EUAVSEC tremendously as especially Brussels based institutions, such as the EEAS, PSC and CivCom as well as the member states perceived the new terminal as an essential element of the success of EUAVSEC. However, the new terminal was considered by EUAVSEC personnel as not essential for the creation of a secure transport system, as it would have facilitated the processing of passenger more than the actual security at the airport. This view was not entirely shared by EUAVSEC personnel as some considered the fact that no proper training facilities could be found as a

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55 Interviews no. 12 and 15.
56 Interviews no. 5, 8.
57 Interviews no. 14, 21.
58 Interview no. 12.
consequence of the lack of the new terminal which led to the situation that not the full training could be deployed to the South Sudanese airport authorities. 59

The planning was also made difficult by the fact that various EU member states had mixed feelings about the operation. 60 There was a group of member states strongly supporting the mission already from the beginning, another just supporting or to better say not blocking it and some member states proved to be reluctant in supporting the mission. This was very much due to the fact that in general member states had little knowledge about the situation in South Sudan and questioned the need of the EU to engage. 61 However, once the mission was deployed, there was good support in general by EU member states.

Already the Council Decision made it clear that EUAVSEC South Sudan would not have an executive capacity62 which limited the impact of the mission once the ethnic tensions started. The biggest challenges, however, in both the planning and execution were the difficulty to achieve a real ownership by the South Sudanese counterparts.

1.2.3 OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The Operational Plan (OLAN) was drafted by the Deputy Head of Mission and the Head of Planning. As part of OPLAN, a provisional Statement of Requirements (SOR) was produced - an overview of the means and resources that are needed in order to be able to fulfil the mission. The challenge that often lays at the heart of this parallel process is that the planning done in Brussels is conducted with limited knowledge about the resources that will be forthcoming for completing the operation as will be illustrated in the following sections on procurement and equipment. According to the interviews there were also mismatches between the original version drafted by EUAVSEC personnel and the structures in Brussels. The latter obliged several changes which the mission personnel did not agree with in terms of their local experience and knowledge. 63

1.2.4 SECURITY ASSESSMENTS AND APPLICATIONS OF STANDARDS

As stated several times, the EUAVSEC mission was in particular of technical nature and had about 12 security experts in house. Like other missions, it was subject to the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) security assessment from Brussels. Mission personnel criticized that the SIAC requirements were quite impractical and unnecessary compared with the application of practical security measures by other organization on the ground, such as the UN, the EU Delegation and other member states as well as NGOs. As a concrete example the need of having the personal set of body armor was mentioned which was considered a must, however, the body armor and helmets were delivered about seven months after the

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59 Interview no. 15.
60 Interview no. 14.
61 Interviews no. 12 and 15.
62 Interview no. 14.
63 Interview no. 12.
mission had already been deployed. Seconded officers arrived with their own personal protection equipment (PPE) in hand but the contracted officers had to wait until the equipment arrived.64

1.3 OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

EUAVSEC South Sudan was the first aviation security mission deployed by the European Union in the context of its CSDP. It was unique by its character and mandate. Although civilian missions follow standardised procedures there are a number of variables which impact on the operation’s capability to implement the planned activities on the ground. The following section analyses the Operational Capability of EUAVSEC South Sudan, focusing on decision-making and command and control structures, operation composition, and budgetary constraints.

1.3.1 Decision-Making – Command and Control Structures

Being a mission of civilian nature, EUAVSEC South Sudan also followed the standardized procedures regarding decision-making as well as command and control (C2) structures. As in all other EU missions and operations, the political- strategic level control was conducted in Brussels by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) meeting on a weekly basis. The tasks of the PSC are to exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative (HR), political control over the crisis management operation, provide it with strategic direction and take the relevant decisions in that regard. PSC embodies the multinational political authority that directs and oversees the work of the relevant EU bodies and the staff personnel running the headquarters of actual operations.

The strategic command and control was carried out by the Director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPSS) who functioned as Civilian Operation commander (CivOpsCdr). As the mandate in its Article 5 states: “With regard to the conduct of operations, [he shall ensure] proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions as well as the PSC’s decisions, including by issuing instructions at the strategic level as required to the Head of Mission and providing him with advice and technical support.”65 All seconded staff shall remain under the full command of the national authorities of the seconding State or Union institution concerned. National authorities shall transfer Operational Control (OPCON) of their personnel, teams and units to the Civilian Operation Commander.66 In order to ensure a higher degree of coherence, the CivOpsCdr, the EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan as well as the Head of the EU Delegation should consult each other on a regular basis.

64 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
At the operational level, the command and control were carried out by the Head of Mission (HoM) and the Deputy Head of Mission/Chief of Staff (DHoM). On 10 August 2012, the PSC appointed Mr. Lasse Christensen from Denmark as Head of Mission who assumed his responsibilities by 1 September 2012. Mr. Christensen had a background as an officer of the Danish National Police being deployed in various international missions. As his Deputy Head of Mission/Chief of Staff Mr. Desmond Ross, seconded by the United Kingdom, was appointed having a strong background in aviation security. The HoM was in charge of exercising command and control of, EUAVSEC-South Sudan at theatre level and was directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander. Further tasks according to Article 6 of the mandate included inter alia the command and control over personnel, teams and units from contributing States as assigned by the Civilian Operation Commander together with administrative and logistic responsibility including over assets, resources and information placed at the disposal of EUAVSEC South Sudan. He was also tasked with the coordination with other Union actors on the ground. Irrespective of the chain of the command, the Head of Mission should also have received local political guidance from the EUSR, in close coordination with the Head of Union Delegation in South Sudan.

1.3.2 Operation Composition and Key Features

The mission consisted of 34 international staff and 15 local staff members, but never reached the original number of 64 staff members. This was the consequence of the very technical character of the mission that was primarily looking for aviation security experts and only secondly for border management and rule of law experts. From its very beginning, only seven EU member states – Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Spain, Sweden and the UK seconded personnel. Although it would have been provided for by the mandate, there were no third countries participating in EUAVSEC South Sudan. In retrospective, the countries deploying personnel to the mission amounted 14. The strength of the mission was adjusted to the South Sudanese absorption capacity through non-recruitment up to the full strength of aviation security personnel. In fact 43 aviation security people were recruited instead of the originally planned 300-400 personnel.

1.3.3 Budgetary Constrains

Civilian operations are financed directly by the EU budget. In general, the financial references are included in the Council decision establishing the mission and are revised following recommendations on expanding the

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68 Interview no. 12.
69 Interview no. 11.
70 Ibid.
mission. The available funds are combined in the ‘EU as global player’ section of the budget.\textsuperscript{71} For EUAVSEC South Sudan, the Council decision foresaw financial reference amounting to €12.5 million.\textsuperscript{72}

From the perspective of the mission personnel, the budget was over restrictive. Very few items could be acquired locally as there was no provision within the budget specifications for variation of technical specifications. According to the opinion of senior staff member of EUAVSEC, the specifications should have been more generic and less constraining taking into account that the mission was deployed in an underdeveloped nation where a higher degree of flexibility would have been needed.\textsuperscript{73}

As it will be demonstrated in a subsequent chapter, however, due to the fact the mission did not establish its headquarters within the UN compound at Juba International Airport, resources could be saved by simply renting a hotel for the use as mission HQ. In that particular respect, the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) was considered as a very flexible and adaptive instrument. The FPI contributed strongly to the mission’s ability to adapt to changes in the conditions on the ground and to act in a flexible and speedy manner.

1.4 COMPETENCES

EUAVSEC South Sudan was a special technical mission in a volatile environment embedded in a broader range of peacekeeping activities by other international actors. Therefore, a proper mixed of personnel had to be found in order to be best suited for deployment. This section thus analyses the expertise, skills and competences of the personnel deployed.

1.4.1. Personnel Expertise and Professional Background

In general, regarding HR, the mission underwent the same process like every new CSDP mission.\textsuperscript{74} However, EUAVSEC South Sudan was the first CSDP mission in the context of aviation security. This unique character made it difficult to recruit people having aviation skills and also being familiar with aviation security in general whereas experts in the field of border management and police could be found quite easily as in general member states were willing to second personnel.

As only some but not a sufficient number of qualified candidates with aviation skills could be found, the procedure had to change from seconded to contracted via the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) and DG

\textsuperscript{71} See EU Institute for Security Studies: Yearbook of European Security 2013, 276.
\textsuperscript{72} Art. 13 of COUNCIL DECISION 2012/312/CFSP of 18 June 2012 on the European Union Aviation Security CSDP Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC-South Sudan).
\textsuperscript{73} Interview no. 12.
\textsuperscript{74} Interview no. 11.
Relex. This was requested by the Head of Mission and granted by the Commission. Overall, there was a ration between seconded and contracted personnel of 2:1.\(^76\)

As in other missions, also EUAVSEC South Sudan was over provided with procurement and administrative positions when more operational positions would have been needed. Especially an earlier deployment of the head of Mission Support was recommended. The staffing of Mission Support was fully achieved whereas finding candidates for operational roles proved to be more difficult and as a staff member pointed out was only of second importance in Brussels.\(^76\) Nonetheless, the mission was short staffed at critical times when people would have been needed to achieve the tasks as set out in the mandate.

### 1.4.2. Skills and Competences

In general, the personnel was committed and well qualified, except three to four cases. However, as one interviewee stated, seconded staff were better trained and prepared both in terms of knowledge and also better equipped. Seconded personnel undergo a comprehensive medical review prior to their deployment whereas contracted personnel are only required to produce a certificate of fitness from their chosen medical practitioner. It was concluded that medical requirements should be standardized for all personnel.\(^77\)

One particular concern raised within the interviews was that the recruitment process did not sufficiently emphasis the need for regional experience. Sensitivity and understanding of the local culture and working practices within Africa are critical to gaining support from local counterparts and the success of any mission and people need to be sensitive to these issues. Several instances of insensitivity were protocolled during the mission.\(^78\)

### 1.4.3 Training

Currently, the Member States are responsible for organizing pre-deployment trainings to their own nationals. Nevertheless, in absence of common standards or curricula, vary the training greatly. The EEAS organized an one week pre-deployment ENTRi training in September 2012 that according to the interviewed personnel was interesting, but it would have been much more valuable if it had dealt more with the specific mission needs and on geographical, historical and cultural information on South Sudan. The training was thus perceived as too generic. It would have been worth to also tackle the historic and cultural background of the

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75 Interview no. 15.
76 Interview no. 12. This opinion was opposed and rejected by Interview no. 11.
77 Interview no. 12.
78 Interview no. 15.
country as the majority of mission members had only limited knowledge and understanding of the country of deployment.  

1.5 COMPREHENSIVENESS

From its very beginning, EUAVSEC South Sudan was seen as an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to Sudan and South Sudan that was decided in June 2011 and further elaborated in the EU Single Country Strategy for South Sudan 2011-2013.

1.5.1 EU Contributions

Due to its positioning within the EU comprehensive approach, EUAVSEC South Sudan as such lacked visibility and was not perceived as a single diplomatic mission providing training and advice to the Government of South Sudan. There was no clear communication strategy visible and also when talking to informed South Sudanese in Juba, EUAVSEC was not perceived. In that regard, the EU delegation was stronger perceived which might also be a consequence of having an own EU compound in Juba known to the general public and of providing Commission money within the EU Single Country Strategy in other areas more visible to the general public.

Furthermore, the fact that the mandate of the mission was very much limited to technical issues and training purposes did not generate a commonly spread perception of the mission among the population. The lack of local ownership also further contributed in that regard, although South Sudanese officials being familiar with the mission very much stressed the importance of EUAVSEC in capacity building.

1.5.2 Intra-organisational Cooperation and Coordination

The comprehensiveness that was discussed amongst the people interviewed was mostly comprehensiveness of relations between the EU delegation and the mission. On European level, there were weekly meetings organized where the major European stakeholders, such as the EU delegation, the respective Embassies and EUAVSEC in order to ensure a proper information flow and coherence of EU’s

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79 Interview no. 12.
80 Interviews no. 9, 17, 18, 19.
81 Interviews no. 1, 5, 8, 17.
action. Also the current staff of the EU delegation was emphasizing the importance of ensuring coherence in the context of the comprehensive approach regarding South Sudan.82

One particular issue in terms of EU comprehensiveness and coherence was stressed several times in the interviews. This was the crucial moment when EUAVSEC had to be evacuated to Nairobi due to the deterioration of the security situation on the ground. There were various narratives reported by the interviewees. There was a different approach between CPCC and the HoM as well as also initially between the HoM and the DHoM of how to evacuate personnel and staff. The decision had been made to bring EUAVSEC under the control of the EU Delegation for the purposes of arranging evacuation and air transport. This decision was heavily criticized by the mission personnel.83 In their opinion, EUAVSEC was better equipped with operational personnel, had its own Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), vehicles, equipment and evacuation plans than the EU delegation. Furthermore, EUAVSEC operated as a separate diplomatic mission, liaising with the EU Delegation. The derogation of responsibility should not have been order by CPCC or accepted by the HoM.84 The evacuation was ordered on the morning of 18 December 2013 by the CivOpsCdr under instructions from the EU High Representative.85 This was contrary to the advice of the HoM and senior management of the mission which recommended a small team should remain.86 In general, the cooperation with the CPCC was considered as unproblematic. Nonetheless a lack of involvement in key decisions, such as the possible extension of the mission as well as its evacuation were criticized by senior mission personnel. It was recommended to have a standardized set of plans, SOPs and a better defined C2 relationship between CPCC and the mission itself.

All interviewees agreed that coordinated evacuation plans and lines of command should have been decided in a more proper way before deploying the mission.87

1.6. INTEROPERABILITY

The people interviewed strongly underlined that the cooperation between EUAVSEC and other international organizations was excellent in Juba.88 EUAVSEC tried to ensure coordination and cooperation with regular meetings and training sessions. Relations with the Embassies and NGOs, such as the International Red Cross were considered as particularly good.89

82 Interviews no. 2,3.
83 Interviews no. 12, 13, 15,16.
84 Interview no. 12.
85 Interview no. 12.
86 Interview no. 15.
87 Interviews no. 12, 13, 15.
88 Interviews no. 8, 10, 12, 15.
89 Interviews no. 12, 15
Both, EUAVSEC and UNMISS stressed that they had a very good cooperation on the ground\textsuperscript{90}, however, the mission personnel underlined that the relationship between EU institutions in Brussels and the UN Headquarter was not properly working and the UN in New York was not at all willing to assist the mission in setting up the headquarter close to Juba International Airport, where one of the two big headquarters of UNMISS are located. The proposal to build the headquarters of EUAVSEC within the UN compound did not work out, in fact, EUAVSEC had to rent a hotel but thus saved money allowing an extra year for the mission to be deployed.\textsuperscript{91} Nonetheless, leading EUAVSEC officials stated that on the ground, both mission staffs worked together against the short-sightedness and bureaucracies of their respective headquarters.\textsuperscript{92} There was logistical support by UNMISS regarding fueling and joint common advise to relevant GoSS ministries. Furthermore UNMISS also provided when necessary its aircrafts for air-shuttling. Representatives of UNMISS are now hoping for the EU to return with an even stronger presence as will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this deliverable.\textsuperscript{93} With both, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) as well as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was very close and good.

The cooperation with local authorities was as good as it could be in a dysfunctional government.\textsuperscript{94} The Ministry of Transport was at the time of the deployment of the mission not well established and thus the personnel to be trained could not take the advices which led to the situation that the institution-building had to start from a much lower level than anticipated by EUAVSEC. Therefore, the institution building capability was not considered as the strongest part of the mission.\textsuperscript{95} In general, beneficiaries were good and cooperative and after some time needed to convince them about the added value of doing the trainings, they were eager to learn more, also in areas that were primarily not foreseen within the mandate of the mission. As there were several request and due to the fact that the new terminal was never terminated, also courses and trainings in areas such as public administration and management were offered which were partially financed by some member states, in particular Denmark, and attended even by senior government officials of South Sudan.\textsuperscript{96} The South Sudanese police authorities were very cooperative as they also saw the mission as part of contributing to enhancing overall security in Juba.\textsuperscript{97} The only segment being very reluctant in the training activities were customs and immigration officials who were described as rather obstructive and to be acting in a way which was not appropriate for a diplomatic mission.\textsuperscript{98} The interviewees thus could not

\textsuperscript{90} interviews no. 10, 12.
\textsuperscript{91} Interview no 15.
\textsuperscript{92} Interview no. 10, 15.
\textsuperscript{93} Interview no. 10.
\textsuperscript{94} Interview no. 12.
\textsuperscript{95} Interview no. 15.
\textsuperscript{96} Interview no. 15.
\textsuperscript{97} Interview no. 6.
\textsuperscript{98} Interview no. 12.
agree about the degree of ownership of the project and the future of the trained personnel which to some of the interviewees could have been greater.99

1.7 TECHNOLOGIES

This section addresses the need for proper technical equipment in order to best cope with the mission mandate in a difficult environment and to also look into the potential for applying pooling and sharing in the context of a CSDP mission.

1.7.1 South Sudan Infrastructure and Technologies

When South Sudan became an independent state, it lacked almost all basic infrastructure. In certain areas, the Government of South Sudan had to start from zero. Already the South Sudanese Development Plan of 2011 underlined the need for building up the necessary infrastructure in the country and stated that “[T]he provision, maintenance, rehabilitation and operation of good quality infrastructure will play a vital role in enabling diversified and sustainable economic growth and development, thus enhancing livelihoods and reducing poverty. Good infrastructure is needed to connect markets and people, and for delivery of services. This should help reduce the cost of doing business in South Sudan and enhance growth and competitiveness. Water control infrastructure, such as hydropower and water storage dams, will enable economic activities. Exploring all sources of energy will ensure a reliable power supply, vital for economic development.”100

Thus, it was of no surprise that none of the South Sudanese Airports did fully comply with standards set by the International Organisation of Civil Aviation (ICAO). Juba International Airport was very small and the number of passengers using the Terminal exceeded the capacity of the building. By the time of the independence celebrations in Juba, the area of the Airport was even not fenced and easy to access.101 Therefore, technological capabilities turned out to be one of the critical issues related to EUAVSEC as basically everything was needed on the ground to run the mission properly. The IT equipment, personal protection gear and motor vehicles were generally perceived as a disaster. There was a lack of radios, satellite phones, etc. In the opinion of leading mission staff, this was a procurement and logistics issues which was handled from the beginning in Brussels. The procurement process caused long delays and essential IT equipment only started to arrive about six months into the mission.102

99 Interview no. 12, with a diverging view no. 15.
100 South Sudan Development Plan 2011, 76.
101 Based on the personal perception of the author participating in the independence celebrations of South Sudan.
102 Interview no. 16.
Seconded personnel arrived with their own personal protection equipment but contracted staff had none until some nine months into the mission. This was not acceptable in the view of the mission leadership.\footnote{Interviews no. 12, 15.}

Especially transport vehicles turned out to be problematic as the advices from the mission were largely ignored. The mission had to operate in an undeveloped equatorial area of Africa and the mission personnel was mainly deployed in the open air in extreme heat and weather conditions. The few existing paved roads as well as road and route system in South Sudan are in extremely bad condition, or non-existent, even in large parts of the capital Juba itself. Therefore, the supply of suitable vehicles that could also be maintained and supplied with parts in South Sudan would have facilitated the mission operation on the ground enormously. Instead of providing the mission with Toyota vehicles – although there was a dealership in Juba with a good workshop and parts support, vehicles were sent from storage in Kosovo because they were surplus to the needs there. This procurement however did not take into consideration that there was no support for VW or Skoda vehicles in entire South Sudan as for African purposes Toyota vehicles are the most often used. The EUAVSEC personnel had the feeling that “we were given the VW and Skoda cars simply because it was convenient for the supply system”.\footnote{Interview no. 12.} Moreover, they arrived five to six months after the deployment, were fitted with winter tires and with sets of snow chains in the boot. Also the air conditioning was reported as absolutely inadequate for the hot African climate. As a result, more than a third of the cars were unserviceable within months and with little chance of being fitted in the country. Some were used as warehouses to restore other cars and improvising became the key skill within the mission.

Also the mission uniforms were unsuitable for the African climate with short sleeved Polo-shirts and baseball caps.\footnote{Interviews no. 12, 13, 16.}

The mission staff was also very concerned about the way vital equipment was shipped. The procurement of supposedly vital equipment, including shredders and secure safes was delayed by the fact that the EU mission support was trying to consolidate the shipments in one container. Thus, vital security equipment was delayed whilst other less necessary equipment was added to the shipment inventory.\footnote{Interview no. 12.}

Also necessary IT equipment arrived a year later after the mission was deployed and the same happened with equipment for hearing protection, eye protection or high visibility clothing for staff members working at the airport did not arrive until the very late in the mission. Several items needed to be bought directly by mission staff, such as specific safety lights to be fitted to the vehicles which were substituted by flashing lights acquired from local stores in Juba.\footnote{Interview no. 16.}

The importance of having a central warehouse was strongly underlined as the vital equipment needed to fulfill the tasks of the mission did not arrive on time and was rather inappropriate. Also from a financial

\begin{center}
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\item \textit{103} Interviews no. 12, 15.
\item \textit{104} Interview no. 12.
\item \textit{105} Interviews no. 12, 13, 16.
\item \textit{106} Interview no. 12.
\item \textit{107} Interview no. 16.
\end{itemize}
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perspective it was argued that too many resources were spent in the wrong issues in advance. By following the recommendations and advices from the ground, many resources could have been saved or better used in other vital equipment areas.108

1.7.2 Pooling and Sharing

Since one specific part of the IECEU project is focusing on the potential of pooling and sharing in CSDP missions and operations, the issues was addressed in the interviews. The concept of pooling and sharing was defined in the IECEU project as “institutionalised cooperation between states or other institutions, where capabilities/assets are shared, either in a bilateral, multinational and supranational context”.109

The knowledge about pooling and sharing was very limited. Reference had been made to the fact that this concept is stronger related to CSDP military operations. Besides the fact that member states financed specific training courses for senior government staff of South Sudan and thus pooled resources with EUAVSEC, the only minor pooling and sharing component could be detected in the procurement sector when vehicles that were on surplus in Kosovo were deployed for EUAVSEC. However, the full potential of pooling and sharing could not be reached.

108 Interview no. 15.
109 DL 6.1 Standardisation review: Comparing the analysis.
2 EFFECTIVENESS OF EUAVSEC SOUTH SUDAN

The question of how to best analyse the effectiveness of EUAVSEC South Sudan is very much in based on the guiding principle documents of the IECEU project. In the context of this project, effectiveness is defined as a mission/operation achieving its purpose in an appropriate manner from the perspective of both the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent.\textsuperscript{110} From the EU perspective, assessment related to internal goals is aimed at determining to what extent the met the EU’s politico-strategic goals and operational objectives as they are described especially in connection with the mandate. Internal appropriateness is examined in terms of whether the implemented was implemented in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective way. Zooming in from the conflict perspective, external goal attainment assesses the extent to which EUAVSEC South Sudan prevented further deterioration of the security situation and provided a meaningful, positive, and sustainable contribution to conflict transformation. Lastly, the examination of external appropriateness looks at whether the European deployment did more good than harm by respecting the proportionality and necessity principles. A success can be identified when all criteria are met well, while it can be considered a partial success if at least one of the four criteria has failed to be met.

2.1 SUCCESS FOR THE EU

2.1.1 Internal Goal Attainment

1 Political-Strategic Objectives

According to Article 42 TEU, the main purpose of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) of the European Union is to provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets, which it may use on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The developments in South Sudan have always been of concern to the EU, as not only a regional conflict involving Sudan or other neighbors was perceived as a possible scenario but also that South Sudan from its very beginning would turn into a failed state. Therefore the overall EU approach was to help stabilizing the country by applying its comprehensive approach and especially focusing on capacity and institution-building. It was not foreseen that a conflict would break out within South Sudan and that the EU would overtake peace-building tasks. Looking at the present situation and also the fact that its own mission had to be evacuated due to the deterioration of the security situation on the ground, it has to be said that the EU – together with the international community – has failed in providing sufficient support for establishing a functioning state

\textsuperscript{110} Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention: Identifying the Success Factors, p. 8.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
structure. Looking at the Fragile State Index of the Fund for Peace, South Sudan ranks at the very end together with Somalia\textsuperscript{111} and can be considered a failed state. The latest developments within the South Sudanese government are also not indicating a shift in a more prosperous future of the country. The EU will have to ask itself if the comprehensive approach should have concentrated more on security related issues instead of focusing on technical assistance as without security there is no development possible and security first of all requires stability in the country which is far from being achieved concerning South Sudan. Therefore, EUAVSEC did not fulfill the political-strategic objectives since security and policing management capability could not be fully owned and consolidated by GoSS and thus external support beyond the CSDP mandate would have been necessary.

2. Operational Objectives

Looking back at the objectives of the mission, it is to assess whether EUAVSEC South Sudan contributed to the sustainable and effective functioning of Juba International Airport (JIA), by achieving acceptable security capacity under local ownership, in line with international standards and applicable best practice and whether it contributed to strengthening aviation security, border control and law enforcement at JIA, under public oversight and in accordance with human rights standards.

As already stated before, the mission was very much based on the assumption that a new terminal would be built in order to better handle the passenger flows and providing a higher degree of aviation security. Regardless of the fact that this new terminal was never finished, the overall functioning of Juba International Airport is very much dependant on the overall security situation in the country. Due to the deterioration of the security situation during the deployment of the mission and especially since the end of 2013 onwards, the functioning of Juba International Airport can only be tested by the fact that a big regional carrier, namely Ethiopian, is carrying out flights on a regular basis to Juba. The idea of Turkish Airlines to also fly to Juba was postponed as a matter of the outbreak of violence. On a more personal note, the author of this deliverable could see the changes at JIA between July 2011 and April 2016, however, the old existing terminal still lacks international standards.

Nonetheless the key achievement of EUAVSEC is undoubtedly the fact that Juba International Airport continues to be an international airport. This was in question several times during the deployment of

EUAVSEC, but the mission helped in fulfilling ICAO standards and contributed to a proper capacity building during the time of deployment.\textsuperscript{112}

Talking to mission personnel, the question of ownership is hard to assess. Although South Sudanese officials were very reluctant in taking over the ownership, it could be witnessed that the border controls and law enforcement became stricter at JIA not only for the general public but also for VIPs who – against their will and their habits – have to undergo screening and security controls.\textsuperscript{113} At the Ministry of Transport and the Civil Aviation Authority, an organisational plan regarding AVSEC has been developed and training for the personnel was provided. The aviation security department is nonetheless still understaffed and it remains unclear how far the potential of the trained staff is still used. The overall security at JIA is still disputable and strongly dependent on who currently has the control over the territory close to the airport.

In total, the mission issued more than 600 training certificates not only in areas foreseen by the mandate but also in other areas such as public administration. Approximately 180 individuals received a basic AVSEC training, 16 JIA AVSEC staff participated in intermediate AVSEC trainings and around 70 AVSEC officials were trained in specialised courses, such as screening of individuals and vehicles. This could be achieved despite the fact that around 75% of the South Sudanese security staff were illiterate at the time of the mission. Although steps towards sustainability were taken, the number of adequately trained personnel remains limited.

EUAVSEC South Sudan witnessed itself the lack of proper security standards when the mission had to be evacuated via JIA leading to a de facto situation that the mission could not terminate its mandate on the ground. Furthermore, in international comparison a time-frame of at least five years would have been necessary to bring countries such as South Sudan without a functioning aviation security system to internationally accepted standards.

All those issues lead to the conclusion that despite all the difficulties and wrong expectations encountered the internal goals could be partly achieved by EUAVSEC. Taking into consideration the environment in which the mission had to operate, the fact that so many trainings could be carried out needs to be assessed as a positive step into the right direction whose sustainability is to be question by the renewed outbreak of violence.

\textsuperscript{112} Interview no. 15.
\textsuperscript{113} Interview no. 15. Also confirmed by the personal experience of the author.
2.1.2 Internal Appropriateness

The original goal of EUAVSEC was to having an impact by improving the structures and capacities of civilian aviation in South Sudan. This goal could not be reached due to the lack of security on the ground as illustrated before, but the question whether the best possible actions were taken to reach it is left unanswered. Like in other areas where CSDP missions where deployed, a big part of the problems that the mission faced was because of the absence of security in South Sudan and in terms of making any progress, also the non-existence of an overall governance, which prevented any sustainable effectiveness. Due to the rapidly changing environment it was almost impossible to establish lasting relations with the South Sudanese counterparts and they were also more concerned about their own security situation than doing training for aviation security.

It seems that the EU approach and assumptions were overly optimistic regarding the situation on the ground and thus overseeing the real need for first of all assisting the UN peace-keeping force in areas such as DDR and SSR before going into a very technical area such as aviation security. Furthermore, the EU took the South Sudanese promise of building the new terminal for granted and the mission thus found itself in a situation to do proper training without the proper premises and structures. Furthermore, especially at the start of the mission, the mission was confronted with a lack of willingness by the South Sudanese counterparts to even take an advice and to participate in the respective trainings.

This relates to the question of timeliness. Was the mission the right tool deployed at the respective time and was the time effectively utilized? As the analysis has shown, EUAVSEC South Sudan was in the right place but at the wrong time as the security situation did not provide for a proper conduct of the mission and EUAVSEC lacked the respective back-up and conditions for properly letting the mission work. The mission planning as well as the operational and political-strategic objectives were based on false assumptions and although the mission personnel managed to apply the mandate in a flexible manner, the goals were not reachable and as such the mission doomed to fail from the start. However, due to the personal engagement of the mission personnel, the trainings and capacity building elements could be conducted. The mission also lacked the necessary resources and equipment and thus especially the first phase of the mission was rather ineffective and costly as the necessary equipment needed to be acquired locally.

Furthermore, the cooperation between Brussels and the field did also not work properly. Especially the cooperation between the EU Delegation and the mission was inadequate.¹¹⁴ As a study by Clingendael Institute has pointed out “Specifically in the African context, there is also a lack of expertise in the security-development nexus, which makes it hard to implement the comprehensive approach. This could be improved considerably by increasing and enhancing cooperation with the EU Special Representatives and Brussels,

and in particular with DG DEVCO, but such cooperation remains difficult.\textsuperscript{115} The issue became obvious when the mission had to be evacuated and when no proper mechanisms and guidelines of how to best handle the evacuation were in place. Moreover, there was a lack of coordination of intelligence between the EU delegation and the mission and no proper consultation of the mission. In the words of a EUAVSEC official: "What is right in Brussels has often no relevance in South Sudan. I understand that politics involved in gaining approval for such missions via PSC and other committees right up to Council level, but I felt that some of the CPCC people making their presentations to PSC, etc. did not have the knowledge they needed to convince the committees of the need."\textsuperscript{116}

Before the outbreak of the conflict in fall 2013, the mission was on a good track for extending the mandate, however, EU member states seemed to have lost their interest in the country and especially two member states were opposing an extension of the mandate. The extension of the mission would not have solved the internal fightings in South Sudan, but it would have contributed to more sustainability and a higher degree of the objectives achieved by the mission. As such, the impact remains a very limited one.

2.2 SUCCESS FOR THE CONFLICT

The external perspective assess whether the EU mission/operation is effective overall in preventing the worsening of the conflict. It asks whether the mission helped in preventing the further continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of the conflict and seeks to answer this by looking at the preventive means at the disposal of the mission. The question is whether the mission contributes in a meaningful way to the further prevention of the conflict and whether the means used are proportionate measures to prevention.\textsuperscript{117}

2.2.1 External Goal Attainment

EUAVSEC South Sudan was launched at a time when there were still high hopes that South Sudan would develop into a new, stable and slowly growing prosperous country after the independence. It was still at a time when the international community payed lot of attention to the developments and strongly committed itself in assisting South Sudan. It was commonly perceived that the main threat to the new-born state would come from Sudan\textsuperscript{118} and evidently the issue of unresolved border questions between Sudan and South Sudan in the areas of Abyei and South Kordofan proved to be the main security challenges for the world’s youngest nation.\textsuperscript{119} Those tensions reached their peak shortly before EUAVSEC South Sudan was deployed.

\textsuperscript{115} See Dick Zandee ‘The EU as a security actor in Africa’, Clingendael Monitor 2016, 38.
\textsuperscript{116} Interview no. 12.
\textsuperscript{117} Deliverable 1.4. Identifying the Success Factors (indicators), 13-14.
\textsuperscript{118} Interview no. 23.
\textsuperscript{119} See for instance Katrina Manson “Cross-border violence threatens Sudan deal” in Washington Post, 27 March 2012.
when a conflict over the Heglig oil fields broke out leading to half a year of fighting resulting in a victory of Sudan and a withdrawal of the South Sudanese troops.

As soon as the tensions between Sudan and South Sudan ceased to exist, the inner tension between the leading players in South Sudan broke out. As described in DL 3.2., the start of the conflict is dated back to the aforementioned dismissal of the cabinet and Vice-president Machar by President Kiir in July 2013. The conflict turned into a civil war by the escalation of violence in late December 2013 after an infiltrated SPLM leadership meeting. Fighting broke out between the forces loyal to President Kiir and forces loyal to former Vice-President Machar after Kiir accused Machar of plotting to overthrow him. The violence quickly spread to Juba and to Unity and Jonglei States. The Dinka members of the Presidential Guard attacked the Nuer, whereby the White Army of Nuer responded by targeting their enemy.\(^{120}\)

The conflict is marked by significant brutality leaving ten thousands dead. Rebel factions attacked several regional towns and forced many civilians to flee the country. In January 2014 a ceasefire was signed but broken subsequently. The further talks in February did not end the violence, moreover caused the displacement of more than a million people by April. Former Vice-President Machar fled the country and was as follows charged with treason. April was marked by grave killing, which was conducted by the Machar forces near the town of Bentiu and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. By the end of May 2014 the conflict displaced more than a million people and brought five million people in need of humanitarian aid. In fact, in July 2014 the UN Security Council described the food crisis in South Sudan as the worst the world has ever seen. August 2014 was marked by peace talks in Addis Ababa held after months of fighting. Finally, in August 2015 a peace accord could be signed leading to a Transitional Government of National Unity upon the auspices of IGAD that took up the work in April 2016. However, the situation again deteriorated in July 2016 when ethnic violence again erupted. Vice-President Machar again fled the country and was then replaced by the Chief Negotiator for the IGAD peace negotiations Taban Deng Gai. There is now again hope that finally peace will be restored, however, the odds are not very promising.

The role of the European Union was like in the months after the outbreak of the tensions limited to sanctions. Already in 2015, the EU agreed on an embargo on arms and related materiel as well as the freezing of funds and economic resources.\(^{121}\)

Thus, it entirely failed to actively contribute to the settlement of the conflict which already hold true for the time, EUAVSEC South Sudan was deployed to Juba. However, it needs to be reminded that the level of ambition of the EU was very limited and was not focused on a possible conflict within the country as such. Therefore it is somehow unfair to judge EUAVSEC South Sudan with regard to its performance in the


outbreaking conflict and moreover the general methodology of the IECEU project in how to defining success of a CSDP mission might not be properly applicable in this context.

### 2.2.2 External Appropriateness

This section refers to the ways in which the mission seeks to achieve its purpose stressing its relation to proportionality. The assessment starts by analyzing whether the EU mission and thus the foreign intervention did more good than harm. Proportionality in this framework refers to the way in which the intervention has to be in proportion to the challenge that it is facing from the conflict. That is, coercive, state sovereignty violating and local ownership stamping intervention in situation in which it is not called for is externally inappropriate and vice versa, when mission is taking actions below the necessity to have an effect, is also inappropriate.

In the context of EUAVSEC South Sudan it is clearly to see that the mission provided more positive outcomes than harm as both, the mandate and the actions on the ground were primarily related to technical issues, such as capacity-building and thus not directly linked to an involvement in national politics and the various security challenges. As it was illustrated both in this deliverable as well as in the DL 3.2. the mission was quite unknown to a broader public and it had no impact on the overall security situation in South Sudan.

This is exactly the point where it becomes obvious that the mission did fail regarding its external appropriateness as the level of engagement did not allow for creating a sustainable impact. Although the security situation at Juba International Airport improved partially (as long as the relative peace period in South Sudan lasted) and Juba International Airport continues to be an airport under ICAO standards as well as capacity-building could be achieved, the mission did not go further as stated in the mandate to help calming the ethnic tensions leading to the outbreak of violence in December 2013. It also becomes rather clear that the overall aim of applying a comprehensive approach to South Sudan based on a National Action Plan could not be achieved and thus it comes by no surprise that some were questioning the need for a CSDP mission in order to contribute to aviation security and whether – as the European Parliament in its Report on the implementation of CSDP of October 2012 – the results could have been better achieved by the Commission using its Instrument of Stability.\(^{122}\) This, however, would have required a different mindset and political will stemming from EU capitals.

2.3 OVERALL SUCCESS

As the previous analysis has shown, EUAVSEC South Sudan was confronted with a variety of challenges in its internal as well as external structures. Embedded in the EU’s comprehensive approach to South Sudan, the mission had to work in a very narrow margin of the whole spectrum of the approach, thus leaving not much room for actively contributing to enhancing the security situation in South Sudan. By also taking a closer look to the level of ambition set out in the mandate and the structure of the mission it is evident that a mission that never reached its full operational capacity of only 64 personnel – which was largely due to the South Sudanese absorption capacity – would have a strong impact on the situation in the country. This low level of ambition paired with hesitance of EU member states and institutions to deploy a more robust mission to South Sudan which security wise could have had a stronger impact than EUAVSEC South Sudan, leads to the conclusion that the overall success of the mission was on the one hand the fact that Juba International Airport continues to be an international airport and is very limited to the fulfillment of the training requirements as laid out in the mandate of the mission. Unfortunately for the sake of the country and its people, the mission did not contribute to the mellioration of the conflict situation which however was also not in the mandate of the mission.

Furthermore, aside of the trained personnel, no real visibility and even not a strong ownership could be achieved although in general, public opinion in South Sudan was very favorable of a stronger EU engagement.\(^\text{123}\) It was surprising how little knowledge about the mission could be detected during the field trip especially related to acting senior government officials. The mission seemed to have been a drop into the ocean of all the problems the country of South Sudan was and still is confronted with. However, the mission also did not damage the image of the EU, the EU is still perceived positively and is expected to contribute more actively to resolve the conflict and to contribute to capacity building in the country.

\(^{123}\) Interviews no. 7, 9, 20.
3 CONCLUSION

The European Union favours to attribute itself to the role of a global actor in international crisis management. In the case of South Sudan, the impact and visibility of the European Union in dealing with the crisis is nonetheless limited. This perception did not change with the deployment of an EU Aviation Security Mission to help improving the international safety standards at Juba International Airport as the restricted mandate strongly focused on technical cooperation and development rather than the bigger picture of crisis management and post-conflict stabilization.

Therefore, EUAVSEC South Sudan had to operate within a limit spectrum of engagement in the overall comprehensive strategy of the EU towards South Sudan. Against the backdrop of various shortfalls in planning, logistics, procurement and overall strategy, the mission staff had succeeded to train an impressive number of South Sudanese officials in issues such as civil aviation, airport security, border management and overall public administration.\textsuperscript{124} The impact therefore on improving the security at Juba International Airport can mainly be seen regarding human resources. Furthermore, Juba International Airport is still open applying ICAO standards which is of high importance as South Sudan is still heavily dependent on air transport in order to trigger its economic potential. Therefore, as a senior EUAVSEC official has stated: “We have not finished our job and we should think of a relaunch.”\textsuperscript{125}

Already from its start, the mission was deployed in a mood of general South Sudan euphoria dominating the international community in 2011 and 2012 and thus it comes without surprise that also the EU fall into this trap and designed an overambitious mission regardless of the situation on the ground. This was even triggered further by the report of the pre-deployment mission which led to completely wrong assumptions about the situation on the ground, as the gap between the fact finding mission and the political decision was almost half a year and the situation in Juba entirely changed. Negatively for the mission to be deployed, nobody was aware of the changes.\textsuperscript{126} As a consequence, the mission personnel had to adapt to the situation and to carry out the mandate in a very flexible way.

The mission fitted perfectly into the overall international presence in South Sudan and the cooperation on the ground among those international stakeholders as well as the NGO community was very good. However, it needs to be addressed that the cooperation on headquarters level between Brussels and New York should be improved.

\textsuperscript{124} Interview no. 12.
\textsuperscript{125} Interview no. 15.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
South Sudan was very grateful to the European Union for deploying the mission. Nonetheless it needs to be questioned whether the South Sudanese were really aware of the limited impact the mission would have on security in the country. If so, a different type of mission might have been requested and it would have been interesting to see whether the EU and its member states would have been willing to take over a heavier burden. Furthermore, the personnel to be trained was below the expected level and basic issues needed to be commonly developed and trained.

The European Union is still perceived positively by the local population as well as the Government in South Sudan and the field trip has shown that expectations are pretty high that the EU will engage in a stronger manner in the future. Possible areas of future engagement of the EU would include DDR as well as SSR initiatives, the training of police and border personnel and some of the respondents were even asking for a peace-keeping operation by the European Union.127 Also the UNMISS was strongly in favour of the EU deploying a new mission, mainly in the sector of SSR.128

EUAVSEC South Sudan has shown the difficulties for the European Union to put its comprehensive approach in place on the ground. A variety of actors and overambitious objectives and strategies led to a complex situation on the ground hampering the effectiveness of the overall EU approach to crisis management and conflict prevention. It has furthermore shown that the EU needs to be better prepared to launch a mission in a hostile environment such as South Sudan where EUAVSEC was not a bridging mission or operation, not replacing a former mission and were knowhow of the situation on the ground as well as good contact with the local communities were desperately needed.

Finally, the analysis of the mission should also be reflected in the overall question of the level of ambition the EU and its member states are willing to commit themselves in crisis management. The case of EUAVSEC South Sudan has clearly shown that the euphoria at the launching of the mission had quickly disappeared and the interest in the mission decreased. This can then lead to dangerous situations like the one of fall 2013 when the mission needed to be evacuated and no proper mechanisms were in place.

Aside of the training outcomes achieved, a positive factor of EUAVSEC South Sudan was the fact that despite the security deteriorations, no casualties had to be reported. This was – as one interviewee mentioned – not that much a consequence of proper planning, but of luck and right intuitions.129

South Sudan is a perfect example that comprehensiveness in theory needs to be properly related to comprehensiveness on the ground. As long as intra-institutional rivalries exist, as long as there is no real

127 Interviews no. 18, 19.
128 Interview no. 10.
129 Interview no. 15.
encompassing European strategy, the missions can only be of limited access. Despite all its weaknesses and shortfalls, the EU is still perceived positively as a donor not only of resources but also a real contributor to international peace, security and stability. Therefore, it cannot shy away from new requests calling for stronger European engagement especially on the African continent. If the lessons learnt out of all its CSDP missions and operations would be properly implemented, the EU could definitely better contribute to becoming a formidable force for the good in the world.130

The following conclusions and recommendation should be taken into consideration for future lessons learnt not only in South Sudan, but in for crisis management missions and operations in Africa in general

- The EU should start learning from its own mistakes and take the lessons learnt processes more serious.131 Also EUAVSEC encountered similar difficulties that were encountered in earlier missions.
- The pre-mission planning needs to be of higher quality and firmer agreements with the host country need to be negotiated.
- There should be more emphasis and focus in the pre-deployment training on country specific information as well as intercultural competences.
- The objectives of the mission should be more realistic and taking better into consideration the situation in the theatre.
- All stakeholders should better understand the mission objectives and be more realistic in their expectations.
- The achievement of the mandate must have priority over mission support needs and there need to be clear priorities for security designated equipment.
- Such a technical mission requires a longer term engagement in order to create sustainability and impact on the ground.
- The time between the fact finding mission and the actual political decision and deployment needs to be shortened in order to provide a realistic picture of the situation on the ground. It would have been wise to keep a core team with accurate equipment on the spot in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly.
- Such a core team on the ground would also help in avoiding an inaccurate picture of the situation on the ground at the point of departure.
- The selection process of the personnel should be improved. Same standards should apply for both, contracted and seconded personnel regarding training, background briefing and medical standards.

131 This was reported unanimously by all the mission staff interviewed who had also partly been deployed in other CSDP missions/operations before.
• Ensure that the supply chain is shortened to enable delivery of necessary equipment to the mission in time for it to be used. Make also sure that the equipment fits the purposes and conditions of the host country, i.e. that there is potential for support on the ground.
• Creation of a central warehouse from which the vital equipment is directly sent to the mission and not that the missions get the surpluses from other missions or operations.
• Security requirements must be practical and not overburdening with bureaucratic measures.
• Budgets must be realistic and applicable in underdeveloped countries.
• There should be a stronger integration of senior mission personnel in decision-shaping in Brussels since mission personnel has better situational awareness than the bodies in Brussels.
• The communication equipment and channels especially in remote and underdeveloped countries such as South Sudan should be improved.
• Coordinated evacuation plans and lines of command should be decided before the mission is deployed.
• EUAVSEC South Sudan has shown the need for stock piling of food and supplies for events such as the evacuation of the mission.
• EUAVSEC South Sudan benefited in general from good co-operation and co-ordination with international organisations and NGOs on the spot.
• Although the mission was deployed under the comprehensive approach of the EU, the evacuation of the mission showed the lack of coordination of intelligence among the different EU bodies in the field.
• There needs to be an overall country strategy including the level of ambition of the EU and its member states in order to increase the sustainability and visibility of EU engagement.
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS


Government of South Sudan: South Sudan Development Plan, Juba, August 2011.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS


Interview no. 3 (2016). Interview with Official of EU Delegation, Juba, 11 April 2016

Interview no. 4 (2016). Interview with Civil Society NGO Representative, Juba, 11 April 2016

Interview no. 5 (2016). Interview with Government Official of South Sudan, Juba, 11 April 2016

Interview no. 6 (2016). Interview with Senior Police Official, Juba, 11 April 2016

Interview no. 7 (2016). Interview with University Professor, University of Juba, Juba, 12 April 2016

Interview no. 8 (2016). Interview with University Professor and Former Government Official of South Sudan, Juba, 12 April 2016
Interview no. 9 (2016). Interview with Student Representative of Catholic University of Juba, Juba, 12 April 2016

Interview no. 10 (2016). Interview with Senior Official UNMISS, Juba, 12 April 2016

Interview no. 11 (2016). Interview with EEAS Senior Official, Brussels, 2 May 2016

Interview no. 12 (2016). Skype Interview with Senior EUAVSEC Official, 5 May 2016

Interview no. 13 (2016). Skype Interview with Senior EUAVSEC Official, 6 May 2016


Interview no. 15 (2016). Telephone Interview with Senior EUAVSEC Official, 6 June 2016

Interview no. 16 (2016). Telephone Interview with Senior EUAVSEC Official, 7 June 2016

Interview no. 17 (2016). Telephone Interview with South Sudanese Researcher, Sudd Institute, 7 June 2016

Interview no. 18 (2016). Interview with South Sudanese Local Community Representative, Vienna, 10 June 2016

Interview no. 19 (2016). Interview with South Sudanese NGO/Diaspora in Austria, Vienna, 10 June 2016

Interview no. 20 (2016). Telephone Interview with South Sudanese Researcher/Journalist, 13 June 2016


Interview no. 22 (2017). Telephone Interview with Sudanese Senior Government Official, 20 January 2017

Interview no. 23 (2017). Telephone Interview with Sudanese Researcher, 20 January 2017
3.5 Study Report: Libya

Lead beneficiary: CMC Finland

Delivery date: 10/02/2017

Revision: 2.0
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This section analyzing the effectiveness of EUBAM Libya is based on 18 interviews conducted between January 2016 and February 2017. Eleven of them were conducted face to face in Brussels, Belgium and in Finland four interviews were conducted via Skype and three via telephone. The originally planned field trip to Libya, mentioned in the grant agreement, was cancelled because of the security situation in Libya during the time of the interviews. As the mission as a whole had already been evacuated to Tunis at this point (from July 2014 on) and it was in a stand still -state, the cancellation did not prevent the information gathering concerning the former mission members, but it did had a negative impact in preventing the interviews of any Libyans, who had interacted with the mission. Even after several attempts, Libyan local who had been in contact with the mission were not located. After using several different channels of government, EU and NGO’s, three additional interviews were made in January and February 2017 to bridge the gap between the mission member interviews and the local perspective. These interviews were of Libyans who had had contact with the mission, or who in other ways were familiar with the situation in Libya and had field experience from Libya from the time of the deployment of EUBAM Libya. These additional interviews did not dramatically change the conclusions of this report, but they did give it more strength.

The interviews present the methodological basis for this deliverable, which is based on primary material. It connects to the previous deliverable of this Work Package, The Libya Report\textsuperscript{132}, which can be consulted, if necessary, for the contextualization of this work.

\textsuperscript{132} Jyrki Ruohomäki (2016) The Libya Review. IECEU.
1 ANALYSIS OF EUBAM LIBYA

1.1 PLANNING CAPACITY

1.1.1 Strategic planning

According to the EEAS list of civilian CSDP mission tasks, "planning is a process and a method, the purpose of which is to translate intent into actions, striving to keep a clear view of the objective from the outset and to stay faithful to ensure its final success". As the intent of the EU, in the case of Libya, was to prevent the collapse of a very important neighboring country, the planning process of EUBAM Libya is therefore connected to the power political situation from 2011 on. In that context, the EU was given the main responsibility in improving the management of the borders of Libya. As one interviewee, who was involved in the mission planning process notes, there was a huge optimism amongst the member states accompanied by a rush to get things done and to "get to Tripoli".

The first plan of the EU was to launch a military CSDP mission, EUFOR Libya, which would have aided in the delivery of the humanitarian aid, but according to an interviewee from the mission planning, EUFOR Libya was doomed from the start, as it, although having the political backing of the member states, had no chance of getting the invitation or buy in from the Libyans, who were adamant of having no "boots on the ground". Therefore it became evident that the EU would send a civilian mission to Libya. The reluctance of the Libyan beneficiaries towards foreign boots on the ground was reflected later in the security arrangements of EUBAM Libya, which had to be organized so, that there were no member state or other military forces involved in the mission. That is that the security arrangements were covered by a private company, which later was realized as problematic. One interviewee pointed out that EUFOR Libya's shadow had an impact in the way EUBAM Libya was planned, in a sense that the planners started constructing it on the basis of a military mission, but another interviewee argued that the groundwork done for EUFOR Libya did not have any effect in the shape of EUBAM Libya.

One important factor that internationally preceded and effected the planning process of EUBAM Libya and tied the hands of the planners was the "Friends of Libya" meeting in Paris in September 2011, where, among other things, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were named as the ones assessing the needs of Libya in terms of economic recovery. This international framework worked together to share the load of activities to help and develop Libya, both in short term needs, such as

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133 Council of the European Union, "Draft list of generic civilian CSDP tasks" EEAS (2015) 854
134 Interviewee P14.
135 The operation was never deployed but it was discussed after the downfall of Qadhafi in 2011.
136 Interviewee P13.
137 Interviewee P 2.
138 Interviewee P14.
139 "Friends of Libya" was a network of international agents, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, together with the EU, the Arab Leagu, Nato and states, such as the US, UK, France and Italy. Ralitsa Kovacheva "Friends of Libya are meeting in Paris, EUinside 1 September 2011, http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/friends-of-libya-are-meeting-in-parts
reconstruction, and in the long term with state-building, institutional strengthening and rule of law. In terms of the state-building process the United Nations Special Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was central. UNSMIL was grounded on the UN Security Council Resolution 2009, dating to September 2011, establishing the mission and giving it the role of supporting Libya's transitional authorities. UNSMIL’s role was to further state-building in Libya, as well as to support DDR\textsuperscript{140} and SSR\textsuperscript{141}.

Whereas the UN took the lead in the state building, in the above described international framework, the role of the EU was subsequently to focus on border management, which was an area in which the Libyans wanted assistance. But border management as a concept already opened two huge areas, land- and maritime borders, which eventually made the mission very eclectic. It was the general feeling among the people interviewed that EUBAM Libya became a mission that strangely tried to do everything, but who were also at the same time limiting themselves to the management of borders\textsuperscript{142}

On the other hand, the Libyan interviewees stressed that it did not look appropriate that the EU launched a mission that was talking about democracy, when the need of the Libyan was to get security\textsuperscript{143}. The hints that there was a problem in communicating the comprehensiveness of the international intervention to the Libyan counterparts. This resulted in the Libyans seein EU as doing things in the "wrong order\textsuperscript{144}.

The fact that EUFOR Libya never got off the ground, is illustrative of the problems that were ultimately hampering the road of EUBAM Libya as well. EUFOR Libya, a military CSDP mission to help in delivering the humanitarian aid in the post Qaddafi situation of humanitarian crisis, was according to interviews in Brussels a purely political idea, meaning that it had no realistic chances of survival in the context in which the Libyans were very adamant in declining any foreign military element, which the EUFOR Libya would have included. EUBAM Libya’s strategic focus was on borders, and it relied on the UN and on the EU Delegation on a more strategic level. But the autonomy of the European Union to plan a mission was compromised from the start, as, according to one interviewee, the "Paris conference [The Friends of Libya meeting, September 1, 2011] rubber stamped" what had already been agreed in Doha earlier (April 13, 2011) in a prior meeting in which the EU was not represented, so the EU was left to follow the blueprint from Doha, without having a influenced in it. In addition, the problem with the mission mandate being so focused on borders, was that the EU had to compete against very strong players to "get the border project". Especially the United States was, according to a local interviewee much more invested in getting the Libyan to agree on developing their border management on the basis of the American homeland security model. Eventually this model was to prevail. When the EU lost the "border project" to the US, the whole ratio of the mission suffered a clear

\[^{140}\text{Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.}\]
\[^{141}\text{Security Sector Reform.}\]
\[^{142}\text{Interviewee P17}\]
\[^{143}\text{Interviewee P16; Interviewee P17}\]
\[^{144}\text{Interviewee P16}\]
setback and can be seen in the way the new EUBAM Libya mandate is formulated to go beyond the border management reform.\textsuperscript{146}

The loss of autonomy, due having to follow the decisions made elsewhere, effected the mission planning. Based on the interviews, the Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept\textsuperscript{146} was something that none of the member states originally wanted, but ended up having to live with, because of the above mentioned decisions of the international community. The desires of the member states, to do SSR and DDR, instead of IBM, was not met. The IBM focused mission then grew into various directions, partly mirroring the original wishes of the member states. In addition, the EU neighborhood policy, which defined the EU's goals towards Libya, had a role in the planning, but had not been updated in regards to the migration situation, which was developing towards critical\textsuperscript{147}. The fact that the mission followed the desire of the Libyan's to get help for border management did, according to interviewed, show in the acceptance by the Libyans of the EU's leading role\textsuperscript{148}. On the other hand, the member state involvement in the planning process was seen by one senior level mission member as making the planning "rigid and slow"\textsuperscript{149}. Against this background it is interesting that the reasons behind the mission seems not to have fully reached the mission members, who listed many different reasons for the mission, such as the danger facing the uranium mines in Libya, or the specific threats of Boko Haram or Al-Qaida, some of them clearly different than what the mission planners in Brussels said and different from what was achievable with the manpower at use. This might hint towards the mission members being at least somewhat unaware of why the mission was there, which can be seen to increase problems in terms of task emphasis and also call for better information sharing.

2.1.2 Needs assessment

EUBAM Libya followed the EU protocol in launching a mission. This means that the mission was preceded by a needs assessment in 2012 which produced a "thick report"\textsuperscript{150}, which kick started the planning. However, according to the interviewees, the needs assessment team managed to cover only "six or seven percentages" of the needs that Libya had\textsuperscript{151}. The same problem of not having enough intelligence information is repeated in all the interviews of the people involved in planning. This was perceived as a big problem\textsuperscript{152}. In order to get better information it was suggested by the interviewees that the needs assessment should take more time especially in theatre, which in the case of Libya is outside Tripoli\textsuperscript{153}. Although the needs assessment in this case took twelve weeks, the team never spent even nearly that time

\textsuperscript{145} Interviewee P16
\textsuperscript{146} Based on the Justice and Home Affairs Council conclusion from 2006, IBM consists of Border control, Detection and investigation of cross-border crime in coordination with other authorities, inter-agency cooperation for border management and international cooperation and Coordination and coherence of the activities of Member States and Institutions. Essentially this type of interagency cooperation was the model that the EUBAM Libya was also mandated to develop for Libya with the Libyans.
\textsuperscript{147} See Ch. 4.2. in "The Libya Review" (Deliverable 3.4)
\textsuperscript{148} e.g. Interviewees P13 and P15.
\textsuperscript{149} Interviewee P6.
\textsuperscript{150} Interviewee P2.
\textsuperscript{151} Interviewee P14.
\textsuperscript{152} E.g. interviewees P13 & P14.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
in Libya\textsuperscript{154}. According to interviews of the strategic planners, this hampered their work considerably, as the information that was accessible was mainly coming from tiny area in Libya, such as Tripoli particular border crossing points, such as Rash Adir or Gadames\textsuperscript{155}. One mission member stated that "The initial assessment needs to be done in a proper way. We need to make sure that the opportunities are there and that the counterparts are there. There is no future if there is no organized counterparts\textsuperscript{156}.

The planning was made difficult by the various desires that the member states had for the mission to do and to accomplish, these were desired towards particular geographic areas the mission should focus or different opinions of what kind of strategic substance should the mission have have, in terms of whether the mission should focus on maritime or land borders. The strategic IBM concept and the desire to get also tangible results lead the mission into being a two phased, or a tandem, which had both the tactical and strategic element, the latter being prominent first, but the fading out towards the end of the mission as there was no clear progress. The tasks of the original mandate, dating to 22. May 2013 were:

(a) through training and mentoring, to support Libyan authorities in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices;  
(b) to advice the Libyan authorities on the development of a Libyan national IBM strategy;  
(c) to support the Libyan authorities in strengthening their institutional operational capabilities.

According to interviews, there was a discussion on whether the mission should have an executive capacity or not, that is whether it could perform functions in substitution to the recipient state\textsuperscript{157}. The biggest challenges, however, in both the planning and execution were the difficulties to get the regional agents on board in agreeing on joint strategy. The cooperation of the Libyan interlocutors was similarly lacking. According to mission planners, this is where the EU really "got lost". Libya was considered like any other country, even though it had no central structure, or administration that would have been needed to secure any effectiveness and especially sustainability. Interviewees emphasized that this is still (June 2016) the situation, one calling it "an Alice in Wonderland" situation where there are four different governments, clinging to power with whom to talk with\textsuperscript{158}. To succeed in this context, one would need a much better coordination between the particular branches of the Libyan border management and the sensitivity not to

\textsuperscript{154} Interviewee P14  
\textsuperscript{155} E.g. interviewees P13 & P14.  
\textsuperscript{156} Interviewee P3  
\textsuperscript{157} Interviewee P14.  
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
swamp the Libyan absorption capacity at the same time. Quite interestingly the mission still insisted on communication with the rotating heads of departments and ministries instead of bypassing them and addressing, for instance, the tribal areas of southern Libya directly. According to the Libyan interviewees, this might have resulted in more effectiveness.

The EU's decision to deploy a border assistance mission was not without the desire of the Libyans themselves. But the wish to have assistance in border affairs did catch the member states by surprise, as, for example, the IBM concept was something that most were unfamiliar with. Other caveats mentioned by virtually everyone interviewed were the Libyan geography, lack of capacity of the EU to function in an environment like Libya, and the sensitivity of the Libyans towards any foreign element. The latter was manifested especially on the strategic level, but many on the operational level noted that the Libyans were very welcoming towards the mission, meaning that, for instance, the training given was received well.

The mission planning, however, stalled as in Libya there was no sovereign, or a single government which could have given a needed invitation for the mission. These problems were visible for example in the inability to get the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA). The inability to successfully close the negotiations regarding SOMA was problematic on the operational perspective as it took away the standard legal umbrella that is common practice with the CSDP operations, but it also demonstrated the fragmented nature of the Libyan state and its problems in reaching agreements to enter treaties. Ultimately the reason of not getting the SOMA was that it was impossible for any Libyan government to get a legitimacy for such an act, so great was the suspicion towards foreign influence and forces. The lack of SOMA created multiple problems that manifested themselves both on the operational and on the strategic level. The SOMA is normally used indirectly also to commit the counterpart (beneficiary) of the mission, the lack of this commitment fed into the overall problematics that the mission had with the committedness of the Libyan counterpart. On the operational level, the absence of SOMA forced the mission to work under the legal umbrella of the EU delegation, which made some things more difficult, according to the interviews, but one can think that this might have also brought the Delegation and the Mission closer together, as the great majority of the persons interviewed saw the relationship between the delegation and the Mission even exceptionally good.

The mission was preceded by the so called comprehensive assessment, which is required to take place before a mission is established. In this process the EU personnel evaluate the host country’s present capacities in terms of border management needs, -risks, and -vulnerabilities as well as wide social and political matters. The strategic planning that then followed was slow at first, because there was no formal

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159 Ibid.
160 Interviewee P18
161 SOMAs are bilateral or multilateral treaties that define the legal position of civilian personnel deployed by the EU in the territory of another state with the consent of the receiving state. Typically SOMA's include privileges and immunities for the personnel of the mission and also define other legal aspects between the mission and the host state. Aurel Sari "Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements under the ESDP: The EU's evolving practice", The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19 (2008), no. 1., 67-100, 68.
162 Interviewee P 9.
163 Especially interviewee P9 and P10.
164 The Council of the European Union “Revised Draft EU Concept on CSDP Support to Integrated Border Management”. Doc. no. 16044/2/13
invitation coming from Libya. When the invitation finally came, in the spring of 2013, the planning process was sped up, which might have been problematic as some of the political aspects, like the deteriorating situation in Libyan politics, that had changed since the original plan, could not have been considered\textsuperscript{165}. For example, one interviewee remarks that after seeing the assessment done by the needs assessment team, he had the impression that it had updated the administrative structure of the Libyan counterpart to reflect the changed situation, but that the updated assessment had not considered the overall political situation and the challenges that it inevitably produced.

It was problematic, according to one interviewee, that the EU considered in its strategic and tactical (operational) planning "Libya like any other country. We thought that we can trust a word of a minister, but we didn't realize that he was only talking for himself\textsuperscript{166}. The same problem arose in multiple interviews. The mission staff as well as the personnel in Brussels told in the interviews that the state of Libya was nonexistent, that there was not a reciprocal bureaucratic structure of a modern state, which would have worked as a counterpart for the mission, but in practice "any colonel could block a minister, if he wasn't consulted\textsuperscript{167}. The Libyan administration was basically an atomized collection of individual and tribal interests, that should have, in hindsight, been considered already during the mission planning\textsuperscript{168}. If this would have been known, the member states could have been briefed to lower their expectations, was the opinion of one person involved in the planning process\textsuperscript{169}. Now the expectations were inflated, although it started to become obvious soon that the absorption capacity of the Libyans was very limited. In hindsight, keeping the focus more on tactical (operational) side and less on the strategic, such as development of the IBM concept, side from the start would have increased the effectiveness of the mission as a whole. One solution for this problem would have been, according to one mission interviewee, to identify and commit key figures from the Libyan government already from the beginning\textsuperscript{170}. The perspective of the Libyan interviewees was, however, that the mission should have engaged the tribes and local power centres directly, instead of keep trying to make progress through the central governance\textsuperscript{171}

1.1.3 Operational planning

Operational planning was made more difficult by the fact (1) that the mission was not able to recruit enough people with a background in strategic planning\textsuperscript{172}. This added to the problems of the working group for the strategic development of the Libyan border management, which tried to implement the IBM concept. The mission was unable to overcome this shortfall, as it did not have the human resources (people with strategic planning background), in addition the Libyan capability to absorb the strategic advices was not there (2)\textsuperscript{173}.  

\textsuperscript{165} Interviewee P2.
\textsuperscript{166} Interviewee P13.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} The statelessness of Libya is analyzed in extent in the previous deliverable 3.4., The Libya Review.
\textsuperscript{169} Interviewee P13.
\textsuperscript{170} Interviewee P9.
\textsuperscript{171} Interviewee P16.
\textsuperscript{172} Interviewee P6.
\textsuperscript{173} Interviewee P7.
The latter was partly due to the fact that the Libyans were not convinced of the qualifications of the mission personnel to give strategic advice. Changes in the political and security context in Libya were continuous, but the interviewees felt that changing the strategic focus and redirecting the operational functions cannot be done every time something happens. Refocusing would have required time to properly assess things, which was prevented by intelligence information being "very, very limited". This view by an official in Brussels was repeated on operational level, where one mission member stated that there should have been an ability to have a "recess" to assess the mission and its possibilities to continue, instead of just trying to carry on.

Third issue that made the operational planning more difficult was the lack of SOMA (3), which made operational functionality more difficult and taking this into account also took away some resource of the operational planning. The operational planning was further complicated by the changing political and the security situation (4). The security situation started worsening in May 2013 after the signing of the Political Isolation Law, which caused a serious division within the Libyan administration by barring people who were very loosely interpreted as supporters of the old regime. This lead to the steady escalation of the conflict, splintering of the political map of Libya and to the eventual evacuation of EUBAM Libya to Tunis in July 2014.

At the start of the mission the focus was supposed to be the southwest corner, but it was unreachable, due that it was beyond the operating powers of the Libyan government. Then the mission planning tried to come up with alternatives. One of those was the western border at Ghadamis, where there was success. The mission also tried to operate towards Misrate and further, but by that time the political things started to have a bigger effect, because of different coalitions. Later in Tunis it was very clear how limited the mission operations were, which was again reflected in planning. "We had to think who to train from the perspective that some might have links to extremists." One thing that was interestingly excluded from the operational planning was the matter of irregular immigration, which is considered by some mission members as a mistake. "Everyone knows from where the immigration flows start from, but nothing is done about that. The control of immigration was kind of a shadow agenda however, but it was purposefully kept out of political level liturgy." One senior level interviewee also pointed out the problem being the disconnection between CPCC and CMPD, in which the latter plans everything, but after that does not have sufficient connection with the mission.

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174 Interviewee P6.
175 Interviewee P14.
176 Interviewee P3.
177 For the security situation, see "2.2.8 Security" in this document.
178 Interviewees P6 and P14.
179 Interviewee P6.
180 Ibid.
2.1.4 Budget

"I felt like whatever we wanted, we could easily get it. It was not about the funding or the budget."\(^{181}\)

As the EUBAM Libya was never operating at full capacity, peaking at 57 personnel, whereas the authorized ceiling was 111, its deployment was from the start troubled by the security situation of Libya, it was never able to reach even close to its budgetary power and, for example, the EEAS estimated in the Spring of 2015 that the budgetary year spending for EUBAM Libya would be a maximum of 30% of its means. The budget did not limit the operational possibilities of the mission, and one could argue that the importance to fund well a new mission was noted in the case of EUBAM Libya, although the sufficient budgetary power was in this case mostly because there was no possibility to spend more.

However, there were clearly different opinions among the people involved with the mission about whether to use the train & equip -concept, which means that the trainers would have also provided equipment for the trainees to use in the line of work. The general policy of the mission was that the Libyans would not be given any equipment, but only training and advice in terms of procurement, advising how the Libyans could best purchase the devices and equipment needed. In general, this did not happen though, and the ability of the Libyans to procure, or even their financial capacity to do so has been questioned, by the International Crisis Group, for example, on the basis that the Libyan authorities in effect did not have the means to purchase the necessary equipment\(^{182}\). Some mission members see that Libya was miscategorized as a rich country, whereas in reality it was not\(^ {183}\). This view came strongly also from the Libyan interviewees, who emphasized that the economic wealth of Libya was only an illusion when the "money in the American banks" and not on the field\(^ {184}\). Few mission members also raised up the fact that the mission did not have equipments to train the Libyans and the equipment that the mission had, fake passports, for example, were provided by mission members who took them with them from their home country, instead of the EU\(^ {185}\). The mission was therefore not sufficiently resourced from that respect. On the other hand, one mission member told that the Libyan Coast Guard was given small equipments like life wests and magnifying classes, but also small items for the use of force, so on the operational level there was flexibility\(^ {186}\). According to one interviewee "The mission staff found out that they could have been more effective, if they could have provided the trainees some equipment that they used for training"\(^ {187}\), while another stated that "They [the Libyans] understood that we tried to help them. We didn't have a budget for giving devices, but the Libyans didn't care about that"\(^ {188}\).

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\(^{181}\) Interviewee P3.

\(^{182}\) International Crisis Group (ICG) "Testimony by Claudia Gazzini for the hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs on "Libya: The Path Forward" 3.3.2016., p. 2.; http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20AfricaLibya/gazzini-testimony-us-senate.ashx

\(^{183}\) E.g. Interviewee P13.

\(^{184}\) Interviewee P16

\(^{185}\) Interviewee P8.

\(^{186}\) Interviewee P4.

\(^{187}\) Interviewee P2.

\(^{188}\) Interviewee P10.
The view in Brussels amongst the officials interviewed was that the EU cannot start providing equipment or systems, but it must restrict itself to training, mentoring and advising in a mission like EUBAM Libya. "The point was to better the procurement system and good government, not to give them all the equipment\(^\text{199}\)."

One official in Brussels also argued that the Libyans did not suffer from the lack of equipment, but that at least some of the border crossing points that were piloted in the EUBAM Libya did have a very advanced technology, which, however, might have been completely disconnected from the network and therefore rendered useless\(^\text{190}\). To have an effect on this, you do not need more financial or technological resources, but cultural awareness, in this case knowledge of the Arab culture, and the ability to use that knowledge to change things and practices. But doing this requires different set of qualifications than simply knowing the substance or a particular business model.

### 2.1.5 Lessons learned reports / interim reports

Lessons learned process and devising a system of learning has been\(^\text{191}\) the focus of the CSDP as its importance, especially through military operations has been increasingly acknowledged, shown for example by the report commissioned from the Dutch, Clingendael Institute in 2012. The first guideline for the lessons learned was established in 2008. In brief, the lessons learned -process means that lessons are first identified and then analyzed, endorsed, implemented and disseminated. It is obvious that in the case of EUBAM Libya, there simply was not a time to even engage with this kind of a formal cycle and the learning process was more constructing itself in the daily life of the mission. This is why the feedback system and its role might have increased. Obviously, the formal lessons learned process was still in existence, but the interviews did not reveal the role of the Best Practice officers, for example, or how the lessons learned process was structured inside the mission. In these questions the interviewees referred to the short life span of the mission and due to its incapability to engage with a proper lessons learned -cycle of learning, especially so when considering that the lessons has to be translated into changes in practice and policies before they can be considered learned\(^\text{192}\).

As EUBAM Libya was so short lived, there was not a possibility to study lessons learned reports from the perspective of this mission, as there really was not enough timespan to learn from\(^\text{193}\). Also the constantly changing nature of the mission, its uniqueness and the need for a very fluid form also probably effected negatively in the possibility to study lessons from similar missions. Several interviewees did refer in this point to the strategic assessment done by the EEAS\(^\text{194}\). The said assessment was criticized, for example by one senior mission member, on the basis that it is only an opinion of a one person and that opinion can be

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\(^{199}\) Interviewee P13.

\(^{190}\) Interviewee P14.


\(^{192}\) Ibid., 24.

\(^{193}\) Interviewee P7.

\(^{194}\) E.g. interviewees P6 and P14.
effected, for instance, by the background of the one writing the assessment\(^{195}\). Another senior staff member argued differently, that the interim report was not critical enough, as it should not have allowed a window for the continuation of the mission, as he felt that fulfilling the mandate was impossible and that "It was clear from the day one, that Libya was not ready for this kind of a mission"\(^{196}\). The mission members or the people interviewed in Brussels did not bring up the role of the internal critique in the workings of the mission. They did bring up the unreasonable expectations of the general public, or some members the European Parliament, in which, famously, the Rapporteur on Libya, Ana Gomes MEP, stated that the mission was “far too little, too late”\(^{197}\).

Both the officials in Brussels and the mission members, however, had similar opinions regarding the problems of assessing the mission. Two things were highlighted: That the EU has to have means to assess what it is doing, but also to critically view the in advert effects of what it is doing. In the case of EUBAM Libya, one Brussels official gave an example that the assessment has to take into consideration that improving the capability of the Libyan border management, might also lead to more human casualties, as the migrants crossing the Mediterranean would be forced to more desperate measures. Overall the "yardsticks" for the assessment has to be beyond numerical. "We have to be able to observe what the people that we are training are doing in their profession, instead of just looking at the numbers of how many people we have trained"\(^{198}\).

### 2.1.6 Situational awareness

The context, especially the security context in which the mission was operating was changing all the time and quite soon the situation that the planning documents had described, did not exist anymore. The mission members seem to have been well aware of this, "Country was not in a state that making progress on everything would have been possible\(^{199}\)." However, the working group on IBM did continue a long time without making any progress. According to one interviewee, it became evident after months of work that the Libyans did not actually want a European style IBM system, because they felt the American model that is based on "Homeland security"-type single agency more suitable\(^{200}\). According to one local interviewee, this did not happen just because the Libyans felt that the American model was better, but because the American operators did better work in winning the "project" on border reform, which was heavily competed of and not only between the EU and the US\(^{201}\). This did not become clear before the mission advisers distanced themselves from their original perspective of advising on IBM and engaged more with the Libyan counterpart. In this case therefore, there seems to be a lapse in awareness, first between the situational awareness by the planners, present in the planning process, which was then transferred upon the mission.

\(^{195}\) Interviewee P6.
\(^{196}\) Interviewee P12.
\(^{197}\) Ana Gomes 2013, 3
\(^{198}\) Interviewee P14.
\(^{199}\) Interviewee P3.
\(^{200}\) Interviewee P4.
\(^{201}\) Interviewee P17
members on site, who accepted the planning assumptions. It is difficult to say, how these kinds of lapses could be eliminated or made shorter. Based on interviews of the mission members, the situation was fairly clear, "The organization for border management was not there, it was more like meeting individuals who were keen on meeting people coming from Europe"202 and conclusions perhaps should have been drawn faster. Again, the possibility of bypassing this problem by contacting the local power centres directly, as suggested by the local interviewees, did not come up.

Most of the mission member interviewees did not discuss the situational awareness directly, because that was ingrained in the particularities of the security situation, which was essentially determining what the mission could at a given time do. For instance, when the security situation did allow the advisors to travel somewhere to give training or engage in other ways with the Libyans, the planned activity was simply postponed. What "situational awareness" effectively came to mean for EUBAM Libya, was knowledge of the daily (security) circumstances, which with varying degrees prevented the mission to operate. Therefore this "awareness" was a forced, reactionary awareness in nature. On the other hand, some interviewed did state that the mission was able to adapt to its surroundings: "Libya is not a country, but different regions with their own sheriffs and you have to negotiate with each sheriff separately"203. This was an understanding that many of the mission members in Libya repeated, making clear that the situation awareness did effect on the way the mission was carried out and the mission had the capability to adapt to a situation that was different from that described in the documents drafted before the deployment.

The issue that did come up in the interviews was the discrepancy that the operational members of the mission in Libya felt existing between them and the people in "Brussels", "The Brussels end did not understand the severity of the matter when things started to go bad. Matters were not dealt with then. There were political encouragements to stay put when the security situation had already worsened"204. Another interviewee from the operational part of the mission noted that "It was hard to understand Brussels in the situation when we were expecting information about the continuance of the mission"205. Another matter that was raised up in terms of improving the awareness capability was that with the short contracted CRT team the mission loses a lot of expertise and capability in reading a rapidly changing situation, such as was taking place in Libya.

2.2 OPERATIONAL CAPACITY (OC)

2.2.1 Introduction

As noted above, a challenge for the operational activities was the discrepancy between the expectations laid out in the mandate and the operational reality that the mission was facing. This was manifested in the way that the mission started to carry out tasks that were somewhat distanced from the original mandate. After

202 Interviewee P3.
203 Interviewee P7.
204 Interviewee P6.
205 Interviewee P5.
also the EEAS interim reviews suggested continuation of a more tactical approach, trainings and workshops became more manifest and the more strategic objectives, mainly the IBM, were left on the background. In this sense the mission operations did follow two lines of operations that were inscribed in the mandate, but so that the initial strategic emphasis was switched to a tactical one.

It is unclear, and this manifested itself also in the interviews, where different people had very different opinions of how much the tendency to move towards a more tactical, low-key trainings was because the mission followed a planned two phased approach\(^\text{206}\), or how much behind it was the desire to accomplish something simply for the existence of the mission, instead of admitting that the mandate was not accomplishable\(^\text{207}\). Should there have been an end to the mission already before the forced evacuation to Tunis, as at that point the mission effectively had lost its ability to fulfill the mandate?

2.2.2 Management and leadership

Overall the people interviewed felt that management and leadership of the mission worked well. "Everybody could bring up issues and feedback was working well\(^\text{208}\). Directives by the management were considered clear, they came out fast when the situation required them and everyone got the information without delays. There, however, were some power struggles in the management level that the interviewees did see as typical for every mission. Some cases of the Head of Mission being away and some members of the senior management starting then to guide the mission to different directions were reported. The interviewees though repeated that this happens on every mission. One interviewee did recall that the Head of Mission had a really “tough” management team, reflecting the desires of the member states to control the mission via their citizens in the leadership. The same interviewee continued by saying that the mission management “sucked” in this respect, that is, in its effort to retain power in relation to the member states\(^\text{209}\). The management was also affected by the lack of stability throughout the mission. Even though the management structures were flexible, so that the mission was, according to mission members, capable of adjusting itself, the lack of stability had a negative effect on the organization, as, for example, the understanding of the IBM concept varied somewhat among the high level mission members\(^\text{210}\).

Multiple interviewees both from the mission staff and from Brussels talked of unofficial communications between certain individuals in the mission and Brussels, which was considered very negative in terms of the cohesion of the mission. "There were some people with connections to CPCC in Brussels, who, apparently, very regularly, several times a week, would call and complain, which is something that should never

\(^\text{208}\) E.g. interviewee P13.
\(^\text{207}\) E.g. interviewee P12.
\(^\text{209}\) Interviewee P3.
\(^\text{210}\) Interviewee P6.
happen”\textsuperscript{211}. Also the people on the Brussels end were complaining about this taking place. According to one mission member, this happened due to the core team having used to direct communication with Brussels before the mission deployment and then carried out this correspondence even after the mission management had stepped in\textsuperscript{212}. The culture of not following the chain of command was in this way carried on to the mission. Although majority of the interviewees had a positive impression of the mission leadership and the management overall, there were also few more critical views and one of the persons interviewed, who belonged to the senior staff, said that "In a difficult mission you need a strong leadership and in this particular case the mission lacked a leadership and management capabilities. This seemed to be the general opinion of the mission”\textsuperscript{213}. The same person interviewed also had the impression that, as the mission lacked a level of leadership required the EU delegation effectively took the lead of the more strategic tasks that were given to the mission. As stated, this did not, however, represent the general opinion of the mission staff interviewed, but nevertheless indicates that leadership and management aroused mixed feelings.

\subsection*{2.2.3 Feedback system}

The feedback system was generally experienced in a positive way. "There were regular meetings and all worked well on all levels”\textsuperscript{214}. The feedback was seen to work well because the mission was such a "small team” and it was easy to organize open discussion when needed, sometimes several times a day. People also stated that they felt that the Head of Mission was easily approachable when anyone needed something or had something he/she wanted to discuss about. On the other hand there was a shared understanding that the feedback between the mission and Brussels in terms of information flow was not working properly. "The management of the mission was never happy with the feedback from Brussels. Brussels overlook the reports from the mission”\textsuperscript{215}. One person interviewed also felt that the external pressure coming from Brussels or the member states affected the decision making of the mission "Sometimes decision was taken and changed the next day because of pressure”\textsuperscript{216}.

Inside the mission, there seems to have been some problems in receiving less than perfect evaluations. Some of the management level staff members were either serving in wrong positions, considering their capabilities, or their capabilities were not such that the mission at the time required. This led to negative internal reviews of the work effort of those involved, which created some discontent. Senior staff member regretted that these people were extremely difficult to change or to explain their subpar performance to the member states that had seconded them. Based on the interviews, it seems that at least some mission

\begin{footnotes}
\item[211] Interviewee P2.
\item[212] Interviewee P2.
\item[213] Interviewee P12.
\item[214] Interviewee P6.
\item[215] Interviewee P12.
\item[216] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
members expected the internal evaluation to always be positive and when this was not the case, people got upset.\textsuperscript{217}

2.2.4 Human resources, expertise

The nature of EUBAM Libya as a high risk operation in an escalating conflict was manifested also in terms of the human resources, on one hand in the high quality of those resources and in its ability to recruit, but also in the problems of the mission to follow the rapidly changing situation with its personnel structure. The mission never had the full manpower, as stated when the mission was established, at its disposal. Right from the start the mission had to work with limited staff because of the security restrictions. Later, the mission staff had to be rotated between Malta and Libya, because the private security company that was in responsible of the security was only able to guarantee it to a smaller number of people that was the original plan. In addition, the inability to move outside the mission compound made it unnecessary to keep all the personnel in theatre. Although human resources were not a problem in quantity, there existed a definite tapering of enthusiasm from the part of the member states to send recruits when the situation started worsening. Also the mission had clear difficulties in recruiting senior level IBM experts.

When the security situation worsened to the point that many of the mission members had to stay in Malta, it became evident that their commitment to the mission was not optimal. According to interviews some staff members who should not have been on a mission with a critical security status, in the first place, effectively stayed in Malta and never rotated back to Libya. One interviewee stated that those on Malta did the absolute minimum, which was "breakfast, lunch and dinner".\textsuperscript{218} Another interviewee told that the contracts of many should have been terminated, as the work that the people outside Libya were doing was essentially useless.\textsuperscript{219}

Although, by the numbers, there were no problems with human resources, the allocation of those resources raised more diverse opinions amongst the people interviewed. The biggest problem that especially the mission members on the operational side raised up, was their belief that the mission had too much support staff in relation to operational mission members, meaning that there should have been more (also in relative terms) of those who planned and executed the operations. One interviewee also stated that the mission had "too many chiefs, who didn't focus on building the mission and not enough operational people".\textsuperscript{220} Another interviewee from the mission management said that some of the positions in the senior management, which were given by the organizational coming from Brussels, were completely unnecessary and only made the management more difficult.\textsuperscript{221} Apparently at least one member of the senior level left on one's own will as it

\textsuperscript{217} That the evaluations were expected to be positive was especially the view of the interviewee P6.

\textsuperscript{218} Interviewee P3.

\textsuperscript{219} Interviewee P4.

\textsuperscript{220} Interviewee P7.

\textsuperscript{221} Interviewee P6.
became evident that the position did not include any meaningful tasks and after the personal relationship with other mission members started to become difficult. Based on the interviews, also “Brussels” started to “get tired”\(^\text{222}\) of some in the senior management of the mission. Despite these systemic problems, the people interviewed spoke highly of their colleagues, some stating that they were the best part of that mission. Certain activities of the mission were earmarked for certain nationalities, especially Italy and Malta, but this was not considered negative, as the mission members unanimously felt that the expertise and local knowledge that the Maltese and the Italians brought to the mission was very valuable.

However, the balance between the support and operational staff came up repeatedly in the interviews and many from the operational side questioned the allocation of human resources, also from the point of capabilities and effectiveness of the mission: “The relation should be 2/3 of operational personnel, no matter what the circumstances are. Operational personnel would have opened more doors”. The same interviewee suggested that a custom he had experienced on another mission, where local officials are hired for the mission to help open up communication channels, should have been applied with EUBAM Libya also. He felt that such practice would have especially helped EUBAM Libya in its difficulties to contact the right people in the Libyan administration\(^\text{223}\). Operational mission members also felt that they should have been deployed on the field more from the early on, meaning more possibilities of meetings and interactions with the Libyans. This would have resulted in better and faster communication with the Libyans\(^\text{224}\). Especially in the early part of the mission, at least some of the senior management met their Libyan counterparts only very rarely. This made it impossible for the mission to take full advantage of the window that opened in the spring of 2014, during which time the mission was at its highest strength with 57 personnel in terms of manpower, and security situation had not started its ultimate collapse. However, it is debatable in hindsight to say how much sustainable changes the mission could have accomplished at that time, even if the channels for communication towards the Libyans would have been better, because of the eventual full collapse of the Libyan state.

The personnel that were critical towards the allocation of HR did acknowledge that this was due to the EU regulations, concerning the number of the support personnel and also of the number of personnel that could be kept secure based on the capabilities of the private security company providing the mission security. However, they felt that these regulations should be relaxed and at least the practice of building the support element near to full capability before deploying the most of the operational personnel should be reconsidered. There were also reported problems with the balance in human resources in terms of how people with different tasks and capabilities were available inside the operational part of the mission staff. According to one person interviewed the mission had long time the situation in which most of the departments were without the head of the unit. For example there was no head of human resources\(^\text{225}\), or

\(^{222}\) Ibid.
\(^{223}\) Interviewee P4.
\(^{224}\) Ibid.
\(^{225}\) Interviewee P11.
finance and logistics. Another interviewee pointed out the thinness of the legal advisors, which meant extra workload as some of the contracts that the mission had made were too vague and open to interpretations. The lack of certain management positions created a problem in the case of a disputes, as the personnel did not have anyone to work as a filter between them and the more senior management of the mission.

Because the focus of the mission changed according to the security situation, the mission ended up needing more staff for the customs and coast guard units, although the original plan had been to focus the operations on cooperation with the Libyan Border Guard. This became difficult, partly because the Libyan border guard was a military organization and the EUBAM Libya's mandate restricted it from giving military aid or training. In addition to that, multiple mission members told that the leader of the Libyan border guard was a very uncooperative person, who refused any kinds of discussions with the mission. The mission reacted by adjusting its focus more towards customs and coast guard, both of which became clear successes of the mission. On the other hand one interviewee also stated that cooperation with the border guards worked best, because they were a military organization. Most likely this refers to differences between different levels of operational and strategic cooperation.

Although the mission members mostly agreed on the mission staff being experts on their field, some raised up the point that this was not enough, as one needed also the capabilities to work with the beneficiary. This seems to have been a problem especially in the border guard unit, where, according to some mission members, the senior management had problems accomplishing anything with the Libyans. Also some senior mission members seemed, according to statements in the interviews, to have a different concept of the Integrated Border Management that the mission was tried to convey to the beneficiary. This led into problems as the Libyan beneficiary was given conflicting information, which was not further elaborated by the person interviewed. The Libyan's interviewed did not raise up any concerns with the expertise of the mission members, but they did unanimously say that the connections to the local people could have been better.

2.2.5 Mission infrastructure

The one obstacle that kept coming up in the interviews was the compound of the mission. This is also a concrete example in how the mission planning and mission reality clashed. In the original planning the mission staff was to be accommodated in a "village" of small, personal huts. It soon became evident that this would not be possible as the security situation kept getting worse. Because of this, the mission had to move, first to Corinthia hotel, from which later the Prime Minister Zidan was kidnapped and then to the "Peacock compound" that was constructed according to the security standards that the EU required for a mission that held the "critical" security status. According to interviewees representing the senior management of the mission, the need for a compound should have been better taken into consideration in the strategic planning.

226 Interviewee P 8.
227 Interviewee P 6.
228 Eg. Interviewee P 17
What happened was that the mission was effectively demobilized as it did not have a base of operation after the Corinthia option became unbearable.

The procurement of the compound and its re-enforcing took a lot of time and at that point the mission would have needed a civilian engineer. However, getting one seemed to have taken a long time. Some of the interviewees also referred to the logistics of the UN stating that with a similar structure at dispose the compound would have been built within weeks. Many raised up the point that the compound issue was the most clear indication of failure in terms logistics, and generally the logistical support of the mission did not function effectively, according to many. In this respect the people interviewed unanimously thought that the EU should have been better prepared with better planning, for the possibility that was realized, that the mission had to move into a more secure location. As the compound was finalized, the mission staff seems to have been generally pleased with it, although living in a constricted space was also felt as unpleasant. Some suggested that the compound concept might be something that could be copied to future CSDP missions, in order to shorten the planning time required in the future. At the same time though, the same people wondered that the security arrangements of the compound might be such that are not effectively required at least in most of the CSDP missions. However, in terms of the quality of the compound there were also mixed opinions, as EU personnel in Brussels criticized the selected location on the grounds that it was effectively non-defensible and that military expertise should have been used in its selection. The downside of the compound was that moving outside it became very difficult and the Libyan beneficiaries had to start coming to the compound instead the other way around, which mission staff felt weakening the effectiveness of the mission. Moving from one place to another had an effect on the mission members and the physical surrounding also affected the way in which the mission could interact with the Libyans. Behind the wall of a fortified compound it was much more difficult.

As stated above, many mission members felt that the logistics of the mission did not function in the best possible way, as the interaction with the Libyans was left limited. The same can be said about the procurement. Especially the mission members who were part of the mission right from the start felt that the procurement had clearly failed:

"EU should provide electricity to start with. At least we would need the basic tools to start with."  

“When I arrived the mission had no computers. Everyone was working from his own computers. No servers. People were storing documents on DropBox. Finally we managed to

229 Interviewee P14.  
230 Interviewee P8.  
231 Ibid.  
232 Interviewee P7.
get computers from the warehouse and by that time they were already outdated and they
came without software.233

“One year on and there were still mission members without computers”234

Others interviewed were not quite as critical, but there was a clear dissatisfaction throughout the mission
staff, concerning the procurement process. In addition to computers the rigidity of the concept was
mentioned in relation to smart phones, which had to be of certain brand, which some mission members felt
as a constraint. Personal radios reportedly only arrived when the mission was already operational. More
senior mission members, who were part of that process, criticized the warehouse concept which the EU
uses, in which the hardware, for example computers, are ordered from, as very rigid. Senior management
argued that the warehouse concept produces outdated equipment and it takes too long to get them
delivered. In terms of equipment like computers, it was suggested that it would make much more sense, if
they could just be bought locally, as these are equipment that are available virtually everywhere235. The
warehouse concept did receive some understanding in principle, but the mission staff felt that its catalogue
should be rethought. For example, the armored cars that the mission would have required were not available
easily enough. Also the location of the warehouse (in Germany) raised critique on the basis that the
warehouse should be located closer to the areas in which the CSDP operations take place236.

2.2.7 Operating in mission

The mission objective, as stated by the European Commission at the time of the mission launch was to
“support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air
borders in the short term and to develop a broader IBM strategy in the longer term”237. The tasks of the
mission were to “through training and mentoring, to support Libyan authorities in strengthening the border
services in accordance with international standards and best practices, to advice the Libyan authorities on
the development of Libyan national IBM strategy, and to support Libyan authorities in strengthening their
institutional operational capabilities”238. The strategy was to impact positively on state-consolidation and
economic development, and to fight against organized crime. The mission was to achieve its objectives by
transferring know-how instead of financing the Libya's capacity building directly239. Basically this is the
framework one has to judge the effectiveness of the mission against to, but in the case of EUBAM Libya, one

233 In addition, the software had to go through bidding contest, which further delayed the process.
234 Interviewee P11.
235 E.g. Interviewee P6.
236 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.
needs to consider also the impact of the changing context and the, albeit unofficial, tasks and operations the mission took and weight those in.

It became obvious for the mission members right from the start that the mandate was not achievable, which prompted adjustments and putting emphasis on the more tactical tasks of the mission, such as training. "Mandate itself was ok, but the timing was wrong. The country wasn’t ready for an intervention, as we [the mission staff] understood it"\textsuperscript{240}. "Without the need to evacuate [fulfilling the mandate] would have been slow, because of the absorption capacity of the Libyan counterpart, but the mission would have been accomplishable, with the changes that were done" (emphasis added)\textsuperscript{241}. According to the Libyan interviewees, the mandate, which was "only about the borders" was not the best possible, especially when considering that the "border project" was very competed of and especially the US focused heavily in winning it\textsuperscript{242}. In Libya, border control is based on clans and soldiers, which is the army in practice. The EU strategy, however, called for something else to control the borders. "It’s understandable that if you are used in organizing the border control this way and you think that it’s a good way, and then someone comes in telling you that you have to change, that is not the best way to be effective"\textsuperscript{243}. However, contacting those clans would have been a viable option to try to overcome the problems that the weak central government presented\textsuperscript{244}. All in all, the problems with the ill-suited mandate and the Concept of Operations of the mission did present a difficult conundrum for the mission and its effectiveness: How to follow the unfollowable mandate, or at least be effective in some way? One thing that one Libyan interviewee raised up, was that the mission did not put enough pressure on the Libyan government, according to him the mission and the EU presence overall, including the delegation, was too soft on the government, which hindered the possibility to get things done\textsuperscript{245}.

2.2.7 Adjusting the mandate

When the mission management, the Head of Mission in particular\textsuperscript{246} decided, based on assessment of the situation, that the original mission concept to assist on a strategic level was unrealistic, and decided together with the mission planners in Brussels, to emphasize the tactical side of the mission, this ran into new problems. The mission was built for strategic effectiveness, meaning the development of the strategic IBM concept, not so much on building grassroots capabilities. "Big challenge in terms of effectiveness was the lack of equipment for practical training. You cannot train just a concept, you need also devices. We weren’t

\textsuperscript{240} Interviewee P3.
\textsuperscript{241} Interviewee P2.
\textsuperscript{242} Interviewee P17
\textsuperscript{243} Interviewee P5.
\textsuperscript{244} Interviewee P16
\textsuperscript{245} Interviewee P17
\textsuperscript{246} Interviewee P4.
able to do anything like this. EU needs to be more vigorous with train & equip247. The leadership still
decided to focus on the tactical side, as they saw that "it was better to do something, so we started training
and very low level instruction giving"248. The effectiveness also collided with the absorption capacity of the
Libyan counterpart, which manifested in the lack of central government and the bureaucratic structures
needed for sustainable impact. These aspects are discussed more thoroughly above and in 3.4 The Libya
Review of this Work Package. Nevertheless, the mission staff interviewed, who had taken part and
organized the trainings with the Libyans, were very pleased of the reception that they had. The mission
members felt that the Libyans receiving the very practical training, for example on the maintenance of
equipment, were welcoming, understood why the mission was there and were keen in developing their
capabilities in border management. This grass roots level enthusiasm did not reach the higher levels of the
Libyan administration, which remained very difficult in receiving the mission. On a more strategic level, some
steps were taken to move towards the model of integrated border management. For example, there was
success in getting the different Libyan regions to connect and share information, something that they had
virtually never done before. This can be seen as a clear merit, especially considering the stateless nature of
Libya and the very high autonomy between the different regions249.

Operational training took off from the very basics in all the teams that were taking part in the training. At the
Tripoli airport, the mission members gave training to develop the capabilities of the Libyan counterparts in
passport inspections. In this case some mission members had brought fake passports from their home
countries to help in the training. The passport inspection training was participated by women also, which was
considered remarkable by the mission members interviewed, because, according to them, women had not
participated in such activities prior250. However, as the airport was destroyed and its political ownership
changed after the trainings, it is unlikely that any lasting benefits were gained. A Brussels official also told in
interview that the Libyan capability in passport inspection above the very basic level was difficult to improve
because of some cultural differences, which are exemplified in the fact that the person had witnessed high
level fingerprint sensor on the airport security, which were not connected to the network and thus rendered
useless251. However, those engaged in "train the trainers" -activities, where experienced mission members
train the less experienced (either in quality or quantity terms) beneficiaries, who work as instructors, felt that
these activities were useful, but, again, the sustainability of any effect is impossible to verify because of the
conflict escalation since.

247 Interviewee P6.
248 Interviewee P4.
249 Interviewee P6.
250 E.g. Interviewees P4 and P5.
251 Interviewee P14.
The mission also arranged training visits to other countries to take the Libyan border officials on the study visits. These were considered good, but at the same time the mission members felt that they would have been more useful if the destination would have been a neighboring country, or another Arab country, taking the Libyans to Finland, for example, provided a perspective, but not necessarily something that could have been easily adopted for their own context, because the geographic, political and cultural contexts are so different, according to the mission members who had a background in border management.

The mission did succeed in having some small scale success, even though the sustainability of that success is difficult to estimate, because of the subsequent collapse of the Libyan state. The question, however, is how far the activities of the mission were from the original mandate. In these terms the training activities by the mission seem distant to the objectives of the mandate. One person interviewed stated, that in his opinion the mission prioritized its own existence over trying to follow the mandate or, admitting that the mandate was unfollowable252. It seems that the de facto mandate was to leave a footprint and be present, nevertheless how difficult the surroundings became. Indeed this spirit is reflected in the very late evacuation of the mission, which many of the mission members considered a delayed decision on political grounds253. Judging the mission by that “de facto mandate” gives a much more positive picture.

The one single thing that prevented the trainings and other grassroots-level activities of the mission from being more effective, were the problems with security and housing, accommodation and compound. These, in different ways and in different stages, prevented the mission from reaching its potential. Also called for in the interviews was that the EU should have some kind of a common and standardized structure for a mission. This "start up kit" would include all the necessities that a particular type of mission requires, including competences, such as civil engineering or equipment, like armored cars or certain number of laptops. One person interviewed also said that this standardized “package” should include the supporting part of the mission staff and then make it faster for the operational part to deploy254. In the case of EUBAM Libya the lack of these resources (physical and hr) partly contributed to the ineffectiveness of the mission and prevented it from taking advantage of the windows of opportunity that were occasionally open.

2.2.8 Security

The biggest factor in limiting the effectiveness of EUBAM Libya was the internal conflict, which through escalation forced the mission first to fortify itself to a new compound and severely limit its operations, and finally evacuate to Tunis. The latter effectively ended the mission in a sense of it being a contributing agent in the post-Qaddafi Libya. There was not anything that the mission could have done to prevent the conflict from escalating, so small was the strategic capability, with the personnel cap at 111 mission members in a

252 Interviewee P11.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
situation in which Libya was plagued by a numerous different factions and clans jockeying for power. Nevertheless, there were also severe problems in the way that the mission security was handled, namely the problems with private security companies that were hired for the mission security. This arrangement was needed as there was no EU or any other international military force in Libya, which could have worked at least as a backup option for the mission. The general feeling of the people interviewed was that the security should have been handled by a member state or another international force, but at the same time everyone agreed that this was probably impossible, given the reluctance of the Libyans to tolerate a foreign military presence. The situation was further complicated when the weapons of the new security company taking care of the mission security, were lost, presumably stolen, at the Tripoli airport. It is difficult to say whether these problems are such that could have been prevented, but many of the people interviewed were disappointed and angry in the careless way that the security companies had "held the EU as hostage"\textsuperscript{255}. Still, some mission members felt that if the weapons would not have been lost the mission could have been more effective in the small window of opportunities that was open before the conflict started to escalate rapidly in the early summer of 2014\textsuperscript{256}. Some also pointed out that given the reluctance of the Libyans to have a foreign military element there, having one might have also done things much more difficult and lowered the welcomingness that the mission did receive from the Libyans that took part in the trainings, for instance\textsuperscript{257}.

The main problem with the security, in terms of the effectiveness of the mission, was the inability of the mission to work autonomously. The difficult security situation prevented the mission from taking advantage of the short windows of opportunity that opened when the political climate of Libya settled and the escalation of the conflict took a brief pause in the Spring and early summer of 2014. The mission would still have required the services of the security company, which was now handicapped, decreasing the ability of the mission to carry out its activities or to be flexible in terms of meeting people or arrange trainings. Instead, the mission had to trust greatly on external help, both from the private security company and from the security provided by the Libyan officials. The time that it took to arrange even a meeting with the Libyan beneficiary severely reduced the number of contact time that the mission managed to have to fulfill its tasks\textsuperscript{258}. As part of the mission members were rotated to Malta, also the communication within the mission became more difficult, as the staff was geographically divided. The reality of the security situation was conveyed to Brussels very well and all interviewed in Brussels, as well as the mission members on the field, felt that the information flow in terms of security issues was without problems. Nevertheless, the mission members that were in Libya felt that the order to evacuate came very late and they felt that the mission was kept in Libya too long for political reasons, although its ability to carry out the mandate had already passed\textsuperscript{259}. On the other hand, the mission members also felt that before the evacuation, Brussels made things more difficult by stressing the rules and

\textsuperscript{255} Interviewee P13.
\textsuperscript{256} Interviewee P9.
\textsuperscript{257} Interviewee P8.
\textsuperscript{258} Interviewee P10.
\textsuperscript{259} Interviewee P12.
regulations related to the critical security status the mission had. One mission member said that during those occasions the staff wondered “why do we have a mission leadership, if all the decisions are made in Brussels”. The mission member asked rhetorically whether Brussels was so well up to date of the matters on the ground that it was able to dictate the parameters of the mission. The “critical” security status was also questioned at times, because the mission members felt that especially at the early stages of the mission the security arrangements were too heavy, even though the security situation was not as difficult as in Afghanistan, for example. Interviewees acknowledged that in theory a military component would have helped a lot with the security, as it would have provided a heavy support, which was not available from the private security companies. At the same time, all of the interviewees also acknowledged, that this would have been impossible in the Libyan context, as the local resentment towards a foreign military force was so clear. Most of the interviewees were critical towards the fact that the security was handled by a private company, but they did acknowledge that in the end the security arrangement worked well within the limits that was possible. At the same time, it is clear that the loss of the security company's weapons, in transit, was a significant setback to the mission and reduced its operating possibilities for an extended period of time, at the time when the mission could actually have accomplished a positive effect.

### 4.3 COMPETENCES

EUBAM Libya was a mission with a critical security status and with a highly demanding operational context due to the volatility of the Libyan context and the absence of an international, peace keeping or other, military force. Because of these realities, the mission members of EUBAM Libya were highly skilled professionals, with extensive experience from similar tasks. However, this does not mean that the competences were such that best served the mission. Some interviewees did point out that some competences were indeed misplaced, but the same interviewees did stress that the problem was mostly the lack of physical resources, such as armored cars or other equipment, or security concerns.

Although the mission members were experts on their field, their pre-deployment training varied a lot. Everyone should have had the HEAT-training, but according to a mission member from the security staff, this was probably not the case. The competences of the personnel in terms of working in a difficult security situation varied a lot. Some people were operational without supervision, whereas some people needed more assistance, and, as one mission member said, some of the staff members should not have been on the

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260 Interviewee P8.
261 Interviewee P4.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 E.g. interviewees P8 and P13.
265 Hostile Environment Awareness Training
266 Interviewee P3.
mission, because they were not in a best possible physical shape, which created potential risks, and who "were not on the ball"\textsuperscript{267}. Others did not have the flexibility to operate in high risk environment\textsuperscript{268}.

One HR issue that was raised up was the fact that the mission kicked off as a strategic IBM development mission and this reflected in the recruitment, which focused on the competences, which would have been helpful in strategic level cooperation. However, as quite many of the mission members ended up being equipped with training capabilities, the mission managed to re-focus on training, when the strategic emphasis was found very difficult. One person from the mission management raised up the fact that the CSDP missions are "continuous human resources coordination machines", and a continuous lack of competences is something to be expected. The challenge then is to navigate between the member state expectations, which are high from day one, and the realities of what the mission can accomplish. In this context the mission has to apply the given competences to the tasks that you are planning\textsuperscript{269}. In the case of EUBAM Libya, this meant that the mission had difficulties in getting enough IBM experts, considering the original strategic focus of the mission. The difficulties were because the mission had to compete of the limited pool of experts with, for example, Frontex and individual countries, which were able to offer less dangerous working conditions. These limitations were overcome by "working like crazy"\textsuperscript{270}, or through internal arrangements, such as re-positioning individuals where needed\textsuperscript{271}. Interviewees also stated that at the start of the mission they would have required more HR personnel, which might have bettered the insufficiency of some key positions, such as strategic level experts. There were also lack of some very key competences, such as the position of operational legal adviser. Such a person would probably have been helpful in opening contacts and mapping out the legislative needs that needed to be implemented. The lack of these competences were shown in the less-professional way in which, for example, the lease for the compound were drafted\textsuperscript{272}.

4.5 Comprehensiveness

Comprehensiveness in terms of visibility of communications, and especially external communication was very little raised up in the interviews. The people interviewed did not see problems in this sector when asked and gave a generic answer of communications being ok. This is most likely because of the extraordinary circumstances concerning EUBAM Libya. The mission did not have the possibility to fulfill a communications strategy in a situation where its core activities were under great challenges. The comprehensiveness that was discussed amongst the people interviewed was mostly comprehensiveness of relations between the EU delegation and the mission. Those comments varied surprisingly lot. Some mission members said that the cooperation between the delegation and the mission had been exceptionally good. This was also framed as

\textsuperscript{267} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{268} Interviewee P10.
\textsuperscript{269} Interviewee P7.
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{271} Interviewee P9.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
somewhat vital, as the mission lacked its SOMA and had to function under the umbrella of the delegation. The more critical voices said that the mission and the delegation should have been in better working connection, so that the mission could have connected with the programs that the delegation was running. This would have opened the possibility of the mission to provide its expertise in the programs that the delegation was running. It was especially noted that also generally the people responsible for the development programs under the delegation are not interested in talking to CSDP mission members, as they are seen as "security-types", so the lack in comprehensiveness was due to the factors external to the mission and to the above mentioned differences between development work and CSDP missions. The Libyans interviewed did raise up their view that the international agents overall in Libya did not seem to have a very coordinated approach, but rather that they were competing against each other.

4.5 Interoperability

Like in terms of comprehensiveness, also the interoperability divided opinions amongst the people interviewed. In terms of cooperation processes there was an idea and a plan that the mission would serve as a facilitator and a coordinator amongst different donors in Libya, especially in related to border affairs, in effect meaning that the mission would take its role as a leader in terms of developing Libyan border security. This was planned in a meeting held with the other international operators in September 2013 and was participated by representatives, for example, from the UN, UK and the United States. The second meeting of the same group was in June 2014 and between those meeting there does not seem to be too much coordinated cooperation or interoperability, but the status of the mission in terms of border issues was reflected in the US willingness to give monetary support to the mission. The mission also kept close connections with the EU ambassadors (weekly), Interpol, IOM and Frontex were also met and consulted regularly. However, again, no particular interoperabilities were reported by the people interviewed.

Mission members told the problem being that not all operators in the area wanted to share information and/or resources with the mission. This applied to the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, who were described as such big players that they did not need the help of the mission and were unwilling to share their information. But some of these problems were seen as solvable, if the mission "had paid more attention to coordination". The contacts to Arab countries and to the member state embassies in Libya were reportedly working well. But others said that the embassies did live a "life of their own" and were mostly used as information channels without much joint operational capabilities. Naturally the contacts were most prominent with the EU member states of the Mediterranean: They "were keen on knowing, what we were

273 Interviewee P3.
274 Interviewee P7.
275 Interviewees P16 and P17
276 Interviewee P10.
277 Interviewee P7.
278 Interviewee P6.
doing and how they could help\textsuperscript{279}. The mission was said to be the first organization who was trying to get the Libyans responsible for different aspects of border management to the same table and the Head of Mission was reported by mission members to have done a good job in being able to coordinate with some of the numerous bilateral projects that the Italians had in Libya. Also the connections with the United Nations were reportedly working well, and joint training trips with the UN were planned\textsuperscript{280}. All and all the cooperation with other organizations seemed mostly to be information sharing, planning of joint projects and cooperation, but not much concrete was established and no real signs of interoperations are to be seen in the interviews. Again, this is at least partly a reflection of the operational context of the mission. The Libyans reported that the overall coordination between the EU countries were poor and that the EU countries as their own separate states were going one directions, whereas the EU as a whole was going to another direction. This all accumulated to a view in which the Libyans saw the EU as not doing enough, or "trying to empty a sea with a bucket"\textsuperscript{281}

### 4.6 TECHNOLOGIES

As stated above, the recollections of the mission members related to the technological capabilities within the mission varied depending on the time a particular interviewee was interviewed. Those who came to the mission late, stated that everything was fine, even stressing that they had worked on missions that did not provide personal computers for the mission members and that this was not the case with EUBAM Libya\textsuperscript{282}. However, mission members who were deployed right from the start of the mission, told that being without a computer was precisely the reality of EUBAM Libya at first, and that this carried on for quite a while\textsuperscript{283}. The problems with getting computers and when getting them, getting them without software is documented in 3.2. However, there were technological limitations of the competences of the mission personnel that affected the mission. The mission was not able to deliver to the beneficiary in terms of the more technological tasks, argues one of the mission members interviewed\textsuperscript{284}. This was because the mission did not have an expertise like that, that could have advised the Libyans of what kind of technology they needed. In essence, this was a procurement problem and goes to the foundation of the mission thinking. As stated above, the EU did not want to give the Libyans the kind of a technology that they wanted and needed, but wanted to develop an IBM concept with the Libyans and then provide assistance in the procurement. However, other operators, like US and UK worked the other way around and offered systems of technology first and had personnel who were trained in helping with those technologies. This is why the EU was sidetracked and the mission had no effectiveness on the technological level. This may have been prevented with the application of the train & equip -model, which was called for the mission members in Libya, but not by the Brussels officials. On the

\textsuperscript{279} Interviewee P3.

\textsuperscript{280} Interviewee P8.

\textsuperscript{281} Interviewee P17.

\textsuperscript{282} Interviewee P9.

\textsuperscript{283} Interviewee P11.

\textsuperscript{284} Interviewee P7.
other hand, selling was not the focus of the mission in the first place and one Brussels official stated that the Libyans had real difficulties in adopting high-tech without actually having the IBM system built around it\textsuperscript{285}. However, the mission coped by starting to coordinate the work of the organizations that were providing material assistance, although one mission member stated that this was only a second best alternative to being able to directly assist materially and to provide the training to use the technology provided. According to the person interviewed, this would have established a better relation to the Libyan beneficiaries, which would have increased the effectiveness of the mission\textsuperscript{286}.

In terms of technology for the disposal of the mission, the people interviewed seemed generally disappointed in the working of the warehouse concept, according which the technology needed is ordered from an EU warehouse. The warehouse was seen as too rigid, handing out already outdated devices. The logic of stockpiling items that are outdated rapidly, like computers, was questioned by many. As was the fact that the warehouse did not have the items that the mission would have required badly, such as armored cars. Also, the location of the warehouse was criticized. On the other hand, IT-support was also said to have worked very well and the availability of the satellite images, when needed, was good, although one person interviewed questioned the rationality of paying for the as they were provided by the EU for an EU CSDP mission. In terms of e-learning, the people interviewed felt widely that the Libyan absorption capability is not good enough for those kinds of applications, although they were considered the future.

\textsuperscript{285} Interviewee P14.
\textsuperscript{286} Interviewee P2.
5 EFFECTIVENESS OF EUBAM LIBYA

5.1 SUCCESS FOR THE EU

5.1.1 Internal goal attainment

It is clear, based on the analysis of the previous deliverable 3.4, The Libya Review and from this field study report at hand, that the EU considers Libya and the southern Mediterranean as a key neighborhood, a status which is only highlighted due to the flow of migrants from Africa and beyond to Europe, many of who use the shores of Libya as stepping stones towards Europe. From this perspective it is easy to see the eagerness of EU to take a leading role following the downfall of Qadhafi in 2011, especially as it was considered a much, much easier task than the reality came to show. The problems, however, started already before EUBAM Libya was on the drawing board. Although some member states were keen on having a CSDP mission focused on SSR and DDR, assistance in border management was to become the responsibility of the EU in the division of tasks between the (mainly) western powers and organisations, such as UN, World Bank, IOM. After the shortly lived military mission EUFOR Libya, it was decided that the EU should plan a CSDP mission to assist Libya in strategic border management development, advising especially on the IBM concept and together with this approach to provide capacity building training in select pilot programs on border crossing point and airport(s). The goal of the mission can therefore be considered strategic, although strategic impact is not necessarily the role of every CSDP mission. In short the politico-strategic goals of the EU was to stabilize Libya, democratize and modernize it, and generally to prevent a power vacuum and a war zone from been established just south of its shore. These goals were not reached, but in all honesty they were never reachable

Operational objectives that were planned for the strategic impact were mainly the development and modernization of Libyan border management agencies, with the ultimate goal of creating a modern multi-agency border management system following the IBM concept. As illustrated above and in the deliverable 3.4, the strategic emphasis of the mission ran into problems very soon, and the mission was forced to refocus on a more tactical level capability building. This line of operations ran into troubles as well. The problems that the mission faced were largely due to the implosion of the Libyan state and the security situation that kept worsening to the point that the mission had to evacuate, following other international operators and actually out-staying in the collapsed state of Libya many others. Based on the interviews and on the overall estimation on the Libyan conflict, based on research literature and described in more detail in the deliverable 3.4 of this project, it is beyond doubt that the ultimate evacuation was appropriate, the only question being should it have happened earlier.

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The seeming failure of the mission to accomplish any of its tasks\textsuperscript{288}, however, is not the complete picture, as it can be noted from this the field study report. There were conflicting views on how effective the training that was given was and essentially could this training have been made more effective by providing also some equipment for the Libyans, therefore following the so called train & equip procedure. However, as especially the mission planners in Brussels tell in this deliverable, Libya was categorized as a rich country that could well purchase the equipment it needed itself. This line of thought rested on the idea that crisis management cannot be about buying things. In terms of operational objectives the issue of equipping therefore constitutes a clear disagreement between the strategic planners and the personnel in Libya. The local Libyans interviewed all sided with the EUBAM Libya personnel in saying that categorization of Libya as a rich country was a mistake, as all of the Libyan wealth was in "American banks"\textsuperscript{289} But it is impossible to say whether equipping would have made any real difference, as in the end the escalation of the conflict and the vast deterioration of the security situation forced the mission to evacuate first partly to Malta and later fully to Tunis, when its operational capability was effectively slashed to zero. In sum, the mission obviously did not fulfill its internal goals on politico-strategic nor operational level. It came closer having some effect on operational level, but on politico strategic level it seems that either EUBAM Libya was an exercise of doing too little too late, or then it was heavily under resourced for the huge tasks that the member states assigned for it. It must be stressed that based on interviews and on the research literature, it is highly unlikely that even a heavily supported military mission could have accomplished any politico-strategic goals of the EU in the volatile state that Libya was in. Reaching any improvement will require multifaceted effort from the whole international community and will most likely take years. These realities should be considered more than they were in the planning and operations of EUBAM Libya.

5.1.2 Internal appropriateness

The original primary goal of the mission was to have a strategic impact via improving the structures of the Libyan border management. Finally, as we know, this goal was not reached, but the question whether the best possible actions were taken to reach it is left unanswered. Again, a great deal of the problems that the mission faced was because of the security situation of Libya and in terms of making any progress, also the stateless nature of Libya, which prevented any sustainable effectiveness. The latter was present in the interviews, when the mission members and the officials in Brussels all recalled how difficult it was to have any kind of lasting contact with the Libyan counterparts. Libya lacked, and lacks, a modern bureaucratic state, a form that is essentially necessary in making sure that the agreements that are made and the plans that are being drawn are made between two institutions and not between two persons. The Libyan reality

\textsuperscript{288} (a) through training and mentoring, to support Libyan authorities in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices;
(b) to advice the Libyan authorities on the development of a Libyan national IBM strategy;
(c) to support the Libyan authorities in strengthening their institutional operational capabilities.

\textsuperscript{289} Interviewee P16
was the latter and therefore the mission had to start over again when the person in charge from the Libyan side changed, or be frustrated if the person in particular had no desire to cooperate. But could these problems have been overcome? Probably not, but then again the interviewees told that months were wasted sitting in the working groups which went nowhere. As one person interviewed suggested, this might have been because the form of the cooperation was wrong. Instead of trying to find a common tune in workshops, the mission should have focused on higher lever steering groups for which they could have gotten ministerial attendance\textsuperscript{290}. Then again, another interviewee told that his understanding was that the Libyans did not want a multi-agency IBM concept at all, and the only way of being more effective would have been to realize this fact sooner\textsuperscript{291}.

This brings the question to timeliness. Was time effectively utilized and was the timing of the mission and its activities appropriate? As noted in the above it is questionable whether the mission wasted time in seeking a goal that was simply not reachable. However, ultimately this is not the fault of the mission but of the mission planning and beyond that, the fault of the badly placed strategico-political goals and operational objectives for reaching those goals. These both were out of sync with the political reality in and of Libya. Within this misplaced framework there really is not that much that the mission could have done more effectively, as, to aggravate only slightly, it was doomed from reaching any lasting impact because of its vastly outnumbered resources in relation to the huge task that the modernisation and re-organisation of Libyan border management would have required. In the conceptual framework that timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness form for the internal appropriateness of the mission, timeliness is essentially the deciding factor. As several interviewees stated, EUBAM Libya was in a right place at the wrong time. At the time of its deployment the operational context was simply too demanding. Yet, in terms of efficiency it seems that some improvement in the operational functions of the mission could have improved its short term efficiency. It did focus too long for improving the strategic level of border management with no hope of success, during which time it could have had more effect in practical training. However, for training purposes the mission was not optimally staffed and it lacked equipment to be used in training. But the parameters for efficiency were set in the mission mandate that mandated the mission to seek unrealistic goals, through this the responsibility of the failure of the mission ultimately rests on the member states, who, as can be seen from the interviews did place unreasonable expectations for the mission. The question of cost-effectiveness was did not come up much in the interviews, even when asked. From the perspective of the functions of the mission, it seems that it was well funded and the mission basically got everything it wanted, albeit within the rigid procurement system that the EU uses and which was criticized by many interviewed. From the perspective of the EU tax payer, one can of course pose the question whether the mission was a complete waste, as it arguably did not have much lasting effects. Based on the interviews this is too harshly put, as interviewees both in Brussels and those who represent the mission saw the EU footprint in Libya as essential that the option of doing nothing as impossible. However, it does seem plausible that the EU's failure in the case of EUBAM

\textsuperscript{290} Interviewee P15.
\textsuperscript{291} Interviewee P4.
Libya was to fail in reacting to the change of the situation with inadequate and outdated intelligence information and to cling to the mode of operation that was doomed from the day of deployment.

5.2 SUCCESS FOR THE CONFLICT

The external perspective assess whether the EU mission/operation is effective overall in preventing the worsening of the conflict. It asks whether the mission helped in preventing the further continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of the conflict and seeks to answer this by looking at the preventive means at the disposal of the mission. The question is whether the mission contributes in a meaningful way to the further prevention of the conflict and whether the means used are proportionate measures to prevention.292

5.2.1 External goal attainment

In May 2013 when the EUBAM mission launched, the dissolution and disintegration of the Libyan security sector was ongoing and the core question of integrating the hard core revolutionaries into the new security architecture remained unanswered293 294 However, the serious integration of the Libyan politics and security sector had started much earlier.

By the time the mission deployed, there was no monopoly on the legitimate use of force in Libya295 and in essence Libya was saturated with different armed actors corresponding with divisions in almost every division and cleavage present in Libya's internal politics296. The amnesty International had noted already in February 2012 that the Libyan militia was "largely out of control"297 and the situation since that had not gotten better, as the fragmentation first evident in the militia had slowly moved into the political system. Overall, based on literature298, it is evident that the planning and implementation capability of the Libyan state was severely hampered at the time the mission was established. In addition, it was becoming clear that the Political Isolation Law, barring a major part of the key figures in administration from office, was going to be accepted in the National Congress, rapidly increasing the already present destabilization of the country.

The dominant conflicting actors in Libya were and are the multiple and diverse local interest groups, while the key fault line was between the revolutionaries who had risen against Qadhafi and the other political forces in the society, which had either taken up arms later, or had backed the old administration.299 Since 2013 the conflict became more and more a clash between the two largest military coalitions, those associated with Zintan and Misrata300. The conflict started to escalate sharply in May 2014 when renegade

292 Deliverable 1.4. Identifying the Success Factors (indicators), 13-14.
294 Ibid., 26-30
295 Smits et al., "Revolution and its discontents: State factions and violence in the new Libya", 40
296 Ibid., 44
298 Lacher "Fault Lines of the Revolution: Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya"
299 Ibid.
military forces from Zintan, led by General Khalifa Haftar, clashed with Islamist groups in Benghazi in an event called Operation Dignity. The operation led the revolutionary, Islamist and jihadi groups to unite against the Zintanis. A subsequent offensive, named Libya Dawn, by the Misratan led coalition against the Zintanis, took place in July, when Zintani positions in Tripoli and its airport were attacked. This effectively ended the effectiveness of EUBAM Libya and led to its evacuation in the same month. The Libya dawn offensive consolidated the control of the Misrati-led alliance of the greater Tripoli, after which the country was effectively divided into two camps. The country was further divided into two institutional settings, led by the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk - with competing claims of state institutions, like the Central Bank of Libya and the National Oil Company. The Tobruk Government became increasingly isolated and it became open to influences from the Gulf area and Russia.

In this picture, the external intervention, especially as small scale as EUBAM Libya had a minimal possibility to have an effect in further preventing the worsening of the conflict. This fact was also noted in the interviews in which every interviewee estimated that the mission had no effect on the conflict trajectory overall. EUBAM Libya mission was constantly handicapped by the politicization of the individual units or branches of the security sector, which manifested in the absence of any cohesive administrative structures, as reported also in the interviews. This is why research had already in 2013 recommended that a possible external security sector assistance should focus in creating structures and forums addressing the conflicting parties within Libya, instead of trying to build systems for external threats, based on the illusion of Libyan state cohesion. From this perspective it can be critically argued that EUBAM Libya was trying to pursue goals that were not only impossible, but also wrong in terms of considering the overall security and conflict situation in Libya. The country simply was not yet ripe for SSR or even border management reform. The mission failed in its task of operational conflict prevention to prevent further violent conflict, but it is wrong to accuse the mission of the failure, as the possibility for even a limited success was realistically never present. In order to have success, the mission should have been a totally different entity, with a different focus, and even in that case its success would have been questionable, as one can reason based on the difficulties that the UN UNSMIL mission faced, when focusing on exactly on those forum and structure building efforts that were called for.

However, even though the country was not ripe for a SSR or DDR reform, as one can observe from the difficulties of the UNSMIL mission, the expectations of the Libyan were definitely different than the EU was delivering. The local Libyans were perplexed of the EU's perceived emphasis of democracy and human

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202 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
rights in the situation in which they, according to their own words, were expecting action to reduce the number of militias and to improve the overall security306. This was seen as doing things in wrong order307.

5.2.2 External appropriateness

External appropriateness of conflict prevention denotes to the ways in which the mission seeks to achieve its purpose stressing its relation to proportionality. The starting point of the external appropriateness criteria is that the intervention must do more good than harm. Proportionality in this framework refers to the way in which the intervention has to be in proportion to the challenge that it is facing from the conflict. That is, coercive, state sovereignty violating and local ownership stamping intervention in situation in which it is not called for is externally inappropriate and vice versa, when mission is taking actions below the necessity to have an effect, is also inappropriate.

It is safe to say that EUBAM Libya did more good than harm. Nothing from the analysis, both in this deliverable and in its predecessor hint that its actions and operations carried any negative effects, although this is impossible to argue conclusively, because the security situation in Libya prevented a field work there that could have posed this question to the Libyan beneficiaries. However, it is safe to assume so. It is also safe to argue that the measures that the mission took were not externally appropriate in a sense that they fell far below what would have been necessary to have a sustainable impact. This is especially true, when we consider the mission's line of operations focusing on developing the IBM concept with the Libyans, but it is also true when considering the more tactical focus on training and capability development. Much more would have needed to have an appropriate effect, but, again, one must refer to the political realities of the conflict. Not much more was realistically achievable. A simple introduction of more resources for training, or even for strategic advising would have made no difference. It can be heard from the interviews that resources, human, technological, or financial, were never the biggest obstacles for the mission to achieve its tasks in fulfilling the mandate. The biggest obstacle was the deterioration of the conflict and the security situation, which prevented the mission from operating and utilizing even the small resources, in terms of manpower, that it had. The security was also the obstacle that proved to be impossible to overcome. It seems evident that there were serious problems with the services of the private security companies that the mission used. Certainly that is an area where improvements could have been made. But ultimately only a military contingent by a member state or an international military force could have in theory succeeded in providing the autonomy of operation for the mission, which would have improved the chances of the mission members too move outside the compound. However, as virtually all the interviewees reported, having such in a situation where the Libyans were adamant in having no foreign boots on the ground was impossible.

306 Interviewee P16
307 Ibid.
Through this analysis we, again, face the question of whether the mission was a waste of time and money, as its effectiveness is, based on the applied criteria, left small. In answering, one has to return to the situation at the launch of the mission. Already at that point the problems ahead were clearly visible and the ambitious and hopeful sentiment that carried EUBAM Libya seems now misplaced. However, the alternative of doing nothing in the situation simply was not an option, from a political standpoint, which was the consensus opinion of the people interviewed as well. EU had to act. The political pressure to do so ultimately comes from the UN’s decision to act on Responsibility to Protect -clause to topple Qaddafi and staying passive in the turmoil that followed was not politically realistic. Unfortunately for the EU, its hands, considering the form and indeed appropriateness of that action were tied through its commitments with the international community. Based on these facts, the critical evaluation of EUBAM Libya must stress the politico-strategic level and the problems concerning the planning of a mission, which was not appropriate for the tasks ahead. These are the key points for any lessons to be learned from EUBAM Libya.

5.3 Overall success

In the assessing the overall success of the EUBAM Libya, the answer depends on what is considered as a reasonable yardstick. In terms of mandate fulfillment the EUBAM Libya clearly failed. It did not reach success in the tasks that were given to it, nor did it succeed in its primary task of developing an IBM system for Libya. However, this was mainly due to the difficult situation in which the mission was forced to operate. It was not given a chance to be successful and the people interviewed for this work were very honest and straightforward in concluding that the mission accomplishments were very limited.

The mission accomplished to establish EU presence in Libya and it did succeed in carrying out some level of activities, but using the conceptual framework of this project its level of success is left modest. The mandate of EUBAM Libya was very broad (internal goal attainment) and therefore very difficult to fulfill even partly. The same goes with the external goal attainment, requiring the mission to have an impact on the overall conflict trajectory. For the EUBAM Libya this was impossible.

One of the main problems that was raised up by the Libyans interviewed was that virtually all of the international organisations were competing against each other and that especially the race for who gets to manage the border management reform was fierce. Therefore in the evaluation of the overall success of the mission, one has to remember that the whole of the international intervention had serious problems, which EUBAM Libya could not have overcome solely by its own conduct and activities.

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308 Interviewees P16 and P17
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### INTERVIEWS

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PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (ICE) in EU Conflict Prevention

D3.5 The EUFOR RCA

Lead beneficiary: Finnish Defence Forces

Delivery date: 31/7/2016

Version: 2.1

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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
### Revision history

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### Executive Summary

Prepared by: [Author] | [Date]
---|---

This report provides an overview of [topic] and highlights the key findings and recommendations for [specific purpose].

#### Key Points

- [Point 1]
- [Point 2]
- [Point 3]

The report is structured as follows:

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Annex 1. Internal and external effectiveness at political-strategic level

Annex 2. Internal and external effectiveness at field level

Annex 3. Network of French bases

Annex 4. EUFOR RCA area of operations

Annex 5. Annex 5. IDPs’ stated reasons for not returning home

Annex 6. Interview guide
Executive Summary

The Central African Republic (hereafter referred as CAR) has suffered from poor governance and underdeveloped security institutions throughout its independent history. The CAR has never had an effective central government, and it has struggled with recurrent insurgencies and military coups. Changes in power have merely been followed by violent conflict, leading to a replacement of one ruling elite with another. In this sparsely populated country that is unable to protect its citizens, there is little government accountability, and the weak security sector has been partially the source of the violent conflicts over the years. After the increased international presence in the country as a result of the conflict that erupted in the 2013, efforts have been focused on stabilization and rehabilitation of the country.

To respond to the violent conflict in CAR, the European Union (EU) unanimously decided to deploy a military operation (EUFOR RCA) to contribute to safe and secure environment and provision of humanitarian aid to affected population. EUFOR RCA’s deployment had a strong symbolic value for the EU’s global actorness, and the question of the EU’s political creditability can be seen to be the major reason behind the establishment of the operation. Despite the will to intervene, the EU member states were reluctant to contribute troops to such an operation, which reflected in its planning. As a result, EUFOR RCA was given a limited mandate in terms of tasks, area of operation, and time. The Figure 1. summarizes the facts and figures of EUFOR RCA.

FIGURE 1. EUFOR RCA - Facts and Figures

<table>
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<th>Name of the operation</th>
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<td>Established</td>
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<td>The UN Security Council resolution 2134 (2014)</td>
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<td>Type of operation</td>
<td>Chapter 7; military operation</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>OHQ Larissa, Greece; FHQ Bangui, Central African Republic</td>
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<td>Duration of the operation</td>
<td>30.4.2014 – 15.3.2015</td>
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<td>Budget</td>
<td>28,9 million € (ATHENA mechanism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation strength</td>
<td>Planned 1100 persons, final contribution 945 (750 combat troops)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing state</td>
<td>18 EU member states, and Georgia and Montenegro</td>
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<td>Combat units</td>
<td>FR, GE, EE, FI, ES, LT, IT, PT, PO</td>
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<td>Mandated tasks</td>
<td>1) To contribute to the provision of a safe and secure environment in the Bangui (airport, distric: 3 and 5);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) To create the conditions required for provision of humanitarian aid to those needing;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) To prepare the transfer of authority (for UN or AU operation);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) To support the activities of the other international operations in the area.</td>
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Despite its rocky beginning the achievements of EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic are numerous when measured against its restricted mandate. Firstly, security conditions improved extensively in the districts (‘arrondissements’) that were under European forces’ responsibility. While NGOs’ access to the third and fifth district was difficult or impossible prior to EUFOR, humanitarian workers could operate safely after European troops were deployed. The Bangui airport protection ensured by the European Union allowed air traffic to proceed without any serious incidents. Also, EUFOR succeeded in restoring basic freedom of movement for the citizens even if risks of attacks persisted because of rampant criminality. Furthermore, EUFOR securing action contributed to the return of some IDPs who had taken shelter in the M’Poko camp, and even some refugees benefited from the reduction in tensions that European troops fostered and were able to go back to their residences. In addition, as EUFOR RCA took over from Sangaris, some French troops were freed for re-deployment to the provinces and therefore could cover more territory.

Ultimately, since the EUFOR action was a bridging operation, it succeeded in giving the MINUSCA enough time to deploy and for organising a smooth take-over with UN troops, which took place in March 2015. It must be stressed that EUFOR met all of these objectives without any casualties – this is particularly significant since Bangui was the most dangerous area of operations where an EU operation has ever been deployed. Whilst EUFOR was put to the test on several occasions, it has always responded in line with its robust mandate and with respect for the proportionality principle. Furthermore, the discrimination between combatants and non-combatants has never been infringed.

One of the most important achievements of EUFOR RCA lies in the excellent relationship that troops had with local citizens. By all accounts, the European force was respected and appreciated because it succeeded in building a relationship of trust with the Bangui population. Night and day patrols played a significant role in that success since EUFOR’s ubiquitous presence not only reassured many of the citizens but also allowed daily dialogue with the latter. With this structure, EUFOR was able to build a wide network of contacts that proved particularly useful for gathering of information and intelligence but also in reducing tensions and defusing potential violent crisis (e.g., in preventing riots). Another achievement that merits a special note is the solid co-operation and relationship between EUFOR and the humanitarian community. Information was regularly shared between military and civilian personnel, and EUFOR succeeded in securing tension-free access for aid workers to the various districts, since no escort action or confusion as to roles took place. Such a relationship is especially noteworthy in light of the mutual incomprehension and enmity that traditionally impair the effectiveness of collaboration between NGOs and peacekeepers.

The following conclusions can be offered on the basis of the foregoing discussion;

- France was the Framework nation and led the conception and implementation of the EUFOR RCA. It provided also the bulk of the force.
- EUFOR RCA was a success in terms of internal goal attainment: it met most of its politico-strategic and operational objectives. Security improved extensively in its area of operation; the MINUSCA took
over successfully from EUFOR; basic freedom of movement resumed; the operation created the security conditions required for provision of humanitarian aid and for implementation of development projects; EUFOR RCA contributed to IDPs’ and refugees’ return to districts under European responsibility; and it took over from Sangaris, enabling re-deployment of the latter’s personnel in the provinces to protect civilians.

- The area of operation (M’Poko airport, district 3 and 5) was strategically selected.
- From a timeliness perspective, EUFOR was a failure in view of the significant delay in deployment and the refusal to use Battlegroups. However, EUFOR can be considered efficient and cost-effective.
- The European force made a significant contribution to conflict transformation and to prevention of violence within its area of operation. However, its impact at the national level was much more limited. Consequently, the operation must be deemed only a partial success in terms of reaching external goals.
- EUFOR RCA was regularly put to the test by local armed groups, but the response always respected the proportionality principle and maintained discrimination between non-combatants and combatants. It did more good than harm and therefore was a success from an external appropriateness perspective.
- The operation’s limited objectives made it easier to reach the internal goals but prevented EUFOR from making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and transformation at the national level.
- The European force succeeded in building a good relationship with local citizens, because of which EUFOR was appreciated and respected, especially when compared with the MINUSCA or Sangaris.
- Night and day foot patrols played a significant role in EUFOR’s success, because troops could, on one hand, reassure the population by means of their continuous presence and, on the other, engage in regular dialogue with the citizens and create a close-proximity relationship.
- One of EUFOR’s main lines of operation involved the force’s acceptability by the Bangui population. Therefore, it took a ‘counterinsurgency approach’ and oriented its actions largely towards locals in order to get their support and to prevent them from being indoctrinated by militia-leaders.
- EUFOR accomplished engagement in successful dialogue with Bangui local authorities and civil society, including most notably the mayor, neighbourhood chiefs, religious leaders, and local associations. Hence, the force was able to build an important contact network that was useful for collection of information and intelligence and for increasing the force’s acceptance.
- The force’s multinational composition played a significant role in the operation’s acceptance among Bangui citizens: the EU couldn’t be accused of having a colonial past.
- EUFOR employed a comprehensive approach based on narrowly focused co-operation and co-ordination with the European Commission tools and, to a lesser extent, the CIMIC unit. The RESEJEP programme is a good illustration of this approach.
- EUFOR benefited in general from good co-operation and co-ordination with international organisations and NGOs.

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Operation composition was well-suited for the operational environment; EUFOR had Special Forces, military, gendarmerie, CIMIC, and military engineering components that were a useful and complementary mix as part of the operation context.

- The gendarmerie and the CIMIC unit played an important role in terms of dialogue and trust-building with citizens, which contributed to the force’s popularity.
- EUFOR faced the challenges related to multinational force; national caveats, language barriers, and doctrinal differences.
- EUFOR faced several hindrances. Most notably, deficiencies could be observed in intelligence capabilities, troops, equipment, language skills, information- or intelligence-sharing within the force, funds for the CIMIC component training, and leadership.
- EU soldiers reported numerous cases of misconduct toward locals, with some of the actions involved even being illegal. Such misconduct, sometimes involving officers, was not always punished and had a negative impact on the troops’ morale.
- Cash-for-work programmes made a significant contribution to violence reduction and EUFOR’s popularity.
- Though there were numerous wounded, EUFOR did not suffer any casualties.
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil–military co-operation</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
</tr>
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<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration</td>
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<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>The Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office)</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EUFOR RCA</td>
<td>European Forces Republic of Central Africa</td>
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<td>Central African Armed Forces</td>
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<td>FHQ</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full operating capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission</td>
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<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>Initial operating capability</td>
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<td>The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
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<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
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1 APPROACH TO CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC- ANALYSIS OF EUFOR RCA

In this chapter the European Union overall engagement in the Central African Republic, namely in Security Sector Reform (SSR) and specifically in Defence Sector Reform (DSR) will be shortly discussed. This is to provide an overall understanding of the EU’s activities in the country, and the role of CSDP operations and missions as parts of EU’s comprehensive approach. This is followed by in-depth analysis of the European Union Force in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), which will be analysed through the lens of six capabilities established in ‘WP1.5 IECEU conceptual framework’: Planning Capability, Operational Capability, Interoperability, Competences, Comprehensiveness, and Technology. The methodological approach, described in detail in the Introduction of this deliverable, is founded on two methods: (1) analysis of the 34 interviews conducted with representatives of the government actors of various European Union member states; current and former CSDP mission personnel and operation staff; representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the African Union, the United Nations (UN), international development agencies, and humanitarian organisations working in the CAR; actors in civil society and nationals of the CAR and neighbouring countries, and (2) analysis of primary and secondary sources.

1.1 European Union Primary responsibilities and Defence Reform

1.1.1 ELECTIONS

On 20 January 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza, the mayor of Bangui, was elected as the interim president for Transitional Government, with an aim to prepare country for national elections. The European Union and United Nations (UN) together with several regional and bi-lateral partners have supported the country’s political process, while also contributing to the safety and security of the civilians. Indeed, strengthening government’s accountability towards country’s citizens has been perceived as a priority for rehabilitation of CAR by the international community. Some progress in this regard has been witnessed, as the CAR achieved significant milestones in its political transition, most notably the peaceful and successful holding of a constitutional referendum on 13 December 2015 and legislative and presidential elections in December 2015, February and March 2016. As a result, the former Prime Minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra of the Union for Central African Renewal was declared the winner with 63% of the votes.309 This new government is expected to lead the conflict-stricken country towards a new era of hope where security, reconciliation, justice, the fight against impunity, good governance and economic development are now positioned as the major priorities for the CAR. The expectations toward this democratically elected new government are high. As concluded by a governmental official from the CAR, ‘we cannot afford to lose this momentum, since this is our unique opportunity to establish trust towards the government’310, the elections

310 Interview no 33.
have a significant symbolic value for the people of the Central African Republic. However, unable to shoulder the burden of conflict on its own, the CAR will require sustained international support for years to come. The EU is committed to support the development and stability of the country in the spirit of its comprehensive approach.

1.1.2 European Union approach to the Central African Republic

Relations between EU and the CAR are based on a regular political dialogue under the Cotonou Agreement311. The EU is the key partner of the CAR and is the country's main donor. Today the EU promotes its comprehensive approach as a strategy to tackle the complex development and security challenges in the CAR. Currently, EU priorities in the Central African Republic can be divided into five categories: (1) Security, (2) Humanitarian assistance312, (3) Stabilization, (4) Resilience and sustainable recovery, and (5) Regional Impact of the crisis.313

The EU's approach to the Central African conflict is, above all, based on security, which is perceived as a fundamental condition for every peace process. Since 2008 EU has deployed two military missions and two operations in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); (1) European Union Force in Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), (2) European Union Force (EUFOR RCA) in 04/2014 - 03/2015, (3) European Union Military Advising Mission (EUMAM), which mandate expired on 16 July, 2016, and ongoing (4) EU's Military Training Mission (EUTM RCA), working towards a modernized, effective, inclusive and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA). Characteristic for the CSDP, in the CAR the instrument is used as a short-term intervention seeking to complement the EU's broader stabilization efforts, as well as the efforts of its international and bi-lateral partners in the country. EUTM will provide education and training to the country's military and strategic advice to CAR's Ministry of Defence and general staff, thereby contributing to the defense sector reform (DSR) within an overall locally owned SSR process coordinated by MINUSCA. This is believed to contribute to the comprehensive recovery from the crisis and help strengthening the Rule of Law Principles and the State authority.314

Although, the EU has defined a clear end-date for all its military interventions in CAR it has not defined an end-state for its engagement. Ideally, the engagement would be adjusted over time to the particular conditions and needs of the country and its people. In the case of CAR there would be no quick fix and

311 The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, was concluded for a 20-year period from 2000 to 2020. It is the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU. The Cotonou Agreement was designed to establish a comprehensive partnership with 3 pillars: 1) Development cooperation, 2) Political cooperation and 3) Economic and trade cooperation (for the period 2000-2007). For more information: European Commission, 2016, ACP - The Cotonou Agreement, visited: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm_en
312 Since 2013, EC has committed approximately 83.5 million €. The contributions comprises of financial and human resources for affected population, several humanitarian and development projects such as protection, access to sanitation, health care, and nutrition assistance. Contributions are also made to support the emergency response capabilities of the UN and NGOs. See: European Commission, 2016, Central African Republic, accesses, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/sub-saharan-africa/central-african-republic_en
314 Interview no. 4.
responding to the multidimensional crisis requires comprehensive response as well as time and resources. Progress in any one area would not be sustainable without significant and simultaneous engagement in other areas. In order to be successful, conflict resolution and prevention should incorporate elements of traditional security provision combined with conflict prevention, humanitarian relief, institution-building and development tasks ranging from education to economic development\textsuperscript{315}. Thus, the overall aim of the EU’s is to support long-term socio-economic recovery, in the framework a comprehensive state- and peacebuilding agenda, and to help build a more stable country, supporting the transition process and helping put the country on track towards a sustainable recovery. Furthermore, the EU supports the transition authorities in their efforts to find a political solution to the crisis. While doing so, the EU maintains regular dialogue with the CAR authorities, in close coordination with its international partners.

1.1.3 European Union engagement in the defence sector reform
Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR), Repatriation (DDRR), and the implementation of Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programmes have been identified as critical steps for the early stabilization of the Central African Republic.\textsuperscript{316} All these elements are interlinked and thus the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process must be implemented in close cooperation and coordination with these programmes.

The UN is leading the SSR process in CAR, but the EU has supported it namely through its CSDP instruments.\textsuperscript{317} Due to the widely spread insecurity, immediate assistance from the international community is needed to help restore a minimum capability to CAR’s security and defence forces. Since 2014 the European Union’s engagement in SSR in CAR has focused on the Defence Sector Reform (DSR) focusing on reforming and training the armed forces of the Central African Republic (FACA), so that the national forces can provide the first line of defence for the protection of CAR citizens. In close coordination with MINUSCA the EU contributes to develop self-sustainable FACA capabilities necessary to fulfil their respective assignments in the security sector and to allow them a proper progressive development of accountable, credible, and ethnically balanced FACA that is under democratic control.\textsuperscript{318} Reforming FACA is perceived as an essential tool in stabilising the country, since the lack of reliable and effective national defence forces is believed to be one of the root causes for the conflict.\textsuperscript{319} It is also essential for successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of dispersed armed groups. Lack of effective security forces – most of the army being stationed in Bangui - has encouraged communities to develop their own means for


\textsuperscript{316} ‘Immediate Priorities for Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic’, the High-Level Side Event on CAR at the 70th UN General Assembly, October 1, 2015.

\textsuperscript{317} ibid.

\textsuperscript{318} Interview no. 7.

\textsuperscript{319} See for example D3.3 ‘The Review on the Central African Republic’, IECEU-project
Furthermore, poor border security and FACAs inability to protect its citizens from looting and violence of criminal organisations and rebel groups together with FACAs personnel themselves having been regularly accused of looting and of killing CAR citizens, has indeed made FACAs to loose legitimacy among the population. Until the population perceives FACAs accountable and legitimate, the DDR is not likely to be sustainable. Hence, the functioning defence sector is perceived to be a cornerstone in the countrys reconstruction process.

Nevertheless, while CSDP military interventions have primarily focused on the defence reform the EU seeks to continuously liaise and coordinate with MINUSCA regarding all the SSR activities in order to avoid overlap and duplication during the mandated period of EUMAM RCA and EUTM RCA. Hence, alongside developing the defence capabilities reforming CARs other security institutions, such as the gendarmerie and the police, simultaneously are necessary to ensure balance to the defence reform. Rehabilitation of police stations and gendarmerie brigades, rehabilitation of barracks and training centers together with defence reform is believed to help protecting CARs territorial integrity and its civilians, as well as support the restoration of the rule of law and public security. In addition, the national and local justice mechanisms should be strengthened alongside the defence reform to bring an end to the environment of impunity in which soldiers and armed groups operate. Currently, one of the most challenging aspects of the ongoing conflict in CAR is impunity. There is an urgent need to bring to justice perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, to investigate and try serious crimes, including crimes against humanity and war crimes. Hence, an important part in possible conflict resolution is to be found in addressing the impunity and creating social cohesion between the different sides. Consequently, since the very beginning, one of the member states’ main priorities has been the organisation of a political transition the objective of which was legislative and presidential elections. The European Union has been indeed the main financial contributor to the electoral process that is considered a crucial step indispensable for giving state legitimacy for adoption and implementation of the future reforms intended to address CAR conflicts’ causes. All these processes must be planned and implemented in close consultation with the local stakeholders and civil society, ensuring the process to be locally owned.

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320 Poor border security and unpatrolled rural areas, the CAR has been a safe haven for transnational armed groups and criminal networks, a fact that has led to the deployment of multiple foreign armies throughout the country over the past decade. Thus, many rebel groups were first self-defence militias founded in order to protect their communities or their villages from national and foreign criminals such as road-cutters but also from foreign rebels or raiders coming, most notably, from Chad and Sudan. See D3.3 The Review on CAR.
321 Interview no. 5
322 Interview no. 3.
323 Ibid.
324 Interview no. 1; Interview no. 8. and no. 11.
325 Policemen and judges had all fled out of fear of being killed by Sélaka, and FACAs had totally disintegrated in the face of the advancing coalition. There was general anarchy, given that no-one was able to enforce law. Even the prisons had been devastated and couldnt accommodate any inmates. IECEU- Project D 3.3 The Review on the Central African Republic.
1.1.4 Focus on building FACA capabilities

EUFOR RCA’s engagement to reform efforts were modest with its rather robust executive mandate, yet the follow-up mission, EUMAM RCA was mandated to assist the military authorities on the reforms necessary to transform the CAR armed forces into a professional, democratically controlled and ethnically representative army. The follow-up mission, EUTM RCA, will continue contributing to the defence sector reform and overall SSR process.

Although, the EU’s military engagement in SSR has so far been rather modest some progress can already be identified. In relation to military training emphases has been put on improving the FACA’s training infrastructure, including an IT and Informatics training centre, and Medical instruction centre. According to the EUMAM RCA’s website a positive side-effect of the improved facilities is that the FACA soldiers can be trained in its framework to learn a new trade prior to leaving the army, which will enable them to learn new skills and become productive members of the civil society again. In addition, EUMAM RCA delivered several non-operational training courses to FACA to develop their staff skills and operational capabilities. The aim of these efforts is to make Army better capable of managing itself in terms of accountability and governmental oversight and well-prepared for the forthcoming SSR program. The writers of this report did not have access to any statistical information showing the factual impact of the capacity-building efforts.

Building FACA capacity is an expensive and rocky path requiring financial contributions by the international community and long-term commitment. According to an interviewee reforming the armed forces is both; an expensive and political process. FACA is inappropriately equipped and untrained; its current strength is approximately 5,000 troops. Furthermore, the law enforcement in the Central African Republic is virtually non-existent throughout most of the country. The law enforcement agencies, including the police forces, and 2,000 gendarmeries, have been unable to protect the population from the widespread community violence. Thus, along with the foreign troops from other African countries, UN, and France, FACA is tasked with securing the country. Furthermore, poor infrastructure and large geographical area (622,984 km²) has put some real challenges to the defence sector. In addition, there is a political challenge behind the composition of FACA; there is a perception that the armed forces are dominated by Christian soldiers who are biased against the Muslim population, and some FACA members joined the rebel group opposing Séléka during the recent conflict. To diminish this perception, the military structure needs to be ethnically and religiously balanced, and attempts should be made to integrate moderate factions from both the ex-Séléka.

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327 There was no confirmed data available on the size of the CAR’s police unit.
328 The Gendarmerie is a military component with jurisdiction in civil law enforcement. In France and most Francophone nations, like in the Central African Republic, the gendarmerie is the branch of the armed forces responsible for internal security during wartime. In comparison to civilian police forces, gendarmeries may provide a more disciplined force whose military capabilities make them more capable of dealing with armed groups and with all types of violence. Gendarmes play an important role re-establishing law and order in conflict areas, a task which is suited to their purpose, training and capabilities. Hence, the European Union also has its own European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR). In the case of CAR, EUROGENDFOR was specifically tasked to play a key role in stabilizing a particularly volatile area of the capital, Bangui, by deploying a gendarmerie-type Integrated Police Unit, in order to reinforce the rule of law, to maintain public order, and to fight against impunity. EUROGENDFOR mission in the Central African Republic’, last modified 29 August, 2016, at http://www.eurogendfor.org/eurogendfor-missions/eurogendfor-car.
and the Anti-balaka. Thus, one of the main objectives of the EU-led Defence Reform is to tackle this issue by constituting ethnically balanced forces, as well as, restore FACA’s legitimacy and accountability among the local population.329

Despite these efforts, due to the complexity of the root causes of the conflict, there is no quick response to the reconstruction of the country. Hence, the locals’ and the Member States’ expectations towards the implementation of the reform agenda should be managed appropriately.330 There seem to be a desire to find a quick response to reform the country’s security institutions, but there is no short-cut for the development. A major challenge, which has not been appropriately addressed neither by the EU or UN is related to country’s large geographical area, poor education systems, and poor infrastructure namely in rural areas.331 The Area of Operation (AOO) for the EU’s military contribution has been limited to the capital, Bangui area. The country is dispersedly populated, and to promote stability across the country, should the reform be expanded beyond Bangui.332

Long-term SSR, including the reform of FACA, will require the development of an SSR strategy and plan following an inclusive political dialogue that yields a national vision on SSR, including a consensus on the national security architecture. The new government must be closely engaged to the process, and the international rehabilitation efforts must be coordinated in order to avoid overlapping of the activities. However, although security reforms are fundamental to bringing stability to the country by fighting impunity, criminality, and rebellions, DDR and SSR are not a panacea. No peace can prevail without economic development, education, and jobs, which are capital to convince people to stop using violence as a way of living.

1.2 PLANNING CAPABILITY

This section of the report will evaluate planning capabilities of the European Force in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) and its effectiveness in achieving the desired results and impact. Planning capability will be more closely examined from the perspectives of crisis prevention, political-strategic planning, and operational-planning, Force Generation, Budgetary constraints, and lessons process.

1.2.1 Crisis prevention and first response

When assessing the effectiveness of the planning process of EUFOR RCA shall the analysis be extended to cover some discussion on whether the conflict could have been prevented.

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329 Interview no. 14.
330 Since the objective of this study is to analyse the capabilities and the role that EUFOR RCA’s played in the terms of the conflict resolution and prevention in CAR, to analyse the factual implementation of the reform is out of the scope of this study. Nevertheless, for the future research it would be interesting to study from which premises the EU has sought to implement the reform agenda, and how it has been implemented in practice, and what the outcome has been.
331 Interview no. 33; Interview no. 34.
332 Interview no. 20.
The optimal way to prevent crises is to turn them down before they escalate to open hostilities. To do so, the EU follows the security related situation globally through its Early Warning System that seeks to connect relevant actors within the EU in order to be able to respond to conflicts in a proactive and preventive manner. Nevertheless, due to the EU’s limited intelligence capabilities, receiving enough adequate intelligence is highly dependant on its partners and Member States’ capabilities, as well as willingness to share information. Furthermore, with limited capabilities the analyses are focused merely on the EU’s priority regions. In the case of Africa, EU has identified three regional strategies with a view to tackle the instabilities and prevent conflicts in those priority regions in comprehensive manner. Those regional strategies cover Sahel, Gulf of Guinea, and Horn of Africa regions. Nevertheless, CAR is not covered in any of these strategies, which partly also explains the lack of attention European community as a whole had put on the country’s deteriorated security situation.337

However, to France CAR has - at least to some extent- political and strategic value,338 and hence it has followed the development and security situation of the country. Consequently, the role France played in the early stage of the crisis in CAR cannot be undermined. France has been present in the country throughout CAR’s independent history. During Séléka march towards Bangui, France refused to respond to Bozizé’s repeated requests for assistance. Then, when Djotodia took power on March, Paris only reacted by increasing troops strength of the operation Boali officially to ensure safety of French and foreign nationals and protect the airport. Of course, Paris paid great attention to the situation developments, but from a military perspective it only provided support to the AU that decided to deploy the MISCA, that was expected first to

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333 The instrument is further discussed in IECEU-Project D1.1. Review: from short-term stabilization to long-term peacebuilding.


337 Interview no. 3.; Interview no. 22.

338 From a strategic perspective, one has to remind that during Cold War, Central African Republic played a key role in the French strategic chessboard in Africa. Located in the middle of the continent, CAR is a crossroad which was used as a forward position by France in its struggle against the communist camp. The country was indeed a major hub for the French military structure as well as for the intelligence services, and a pivot for Paris intervention in Africa. However, when the Berlin wall fell, CAR lost all of its strategic interests for France which decided to disengage progressively and, in 1999, the last French soldier left the CAR capital even if four years later, French troops deployed again on CAR soil as part of the Boali operation. The country is indeed part of the French military bases network in sub-Saharan Africa, but the operation Boali has never exceeded 300 troops until Sangaris took over and it never brought any particular added value to the French network especially when compared with countries like Djibouti.

339 One may wonder why France, despite Bozizé’s repeated requests, refused to intervene during the Séléka march towards Bangui. After all, several reports reported serious human-rights violations in the months preceding Bangui’s capture. Firstly, it should be noted that France had signed a new defence agreement with the CAR in 2010, according to which, in a break from previous agreements, Paris was not intended to intervene in the event of internal crisis. Therefore, France had no juridical obligation to provide assistance to Bozizé. Seconded, one must stress that the situation in the CAR seriously deteriorated over the course of the year. Probably, France thought at first that the level of violence would decrease after the coup, particularly with African partners’ support, and that it could accommodate another African dictator. Thirdly, according to the International Peace Information Service report already mentioned, Chad played a mediating role to forge the rebel alliance and provided intelligences and military equipment to Séléka. Déby reportedly gave eventually a green light in March 2013 to the Seleka because the rebel coalition was believed to be the best ally to manage the CAR’s northern border. Considering Paris lack of interest in Bozizé’s regime survival and Chadian troops contribution to French intervention in Mali, it is likely that France didn’t want to stand in the way of a precious ally which dispatched more forces than any European partner.

340 Operation Boali, deployed since 2002, was aimed at supporting first FOMUC and then MICOPAX from an administrative, technical, and operational perspective but also at providing training for FACA.
take over from MICOPAX on August 2013. However, during months the CAR descended further and further into violence that MICOPAX couldn’t prevent. Soon the situation reached such gravity that Laurent Fabius himself declared, on 21 November, that the CAR was ‘on the edge of genocide’. Considering this danger, four days later, France had to submit a resolution to the Security Council (SC) in order to provide support to MISCA deployment and explore the possible transformation of the African Force into a UN peacekeeping operation. On 5 December, the Security Council adopted by the unanimity the resolution 2127 authorizing the MISCA and Sangaris operation. This resolution was the result of a strong lobbying led by France for months. Following Resolution 2127 of the United Nations Security Council, Sangaris officially began in the night of the 5 to 6 December, when General Francisco Soriano, commanding the operation, arrived in Bangui. Consequently, it is indeed clear that France played early on a decisive role trying to draw its partner’s attention on the CAR chaos, notably within the Security Council.

Why France did not seek for assistance from the EU before deploying its operation? It seems that France did not seek EU member states’ help because it concluded that France would be able to handle the crisis quickly by itself. Sangaris operation was meant to be a lightning raid, as evidenced by numerous French officials’ declarations. Nevertheless, Sangaris turned out be much more complicated than expected. Given the unforeseen precarious situation, France decided eventually to call on its European partners for assistance, as evidenced by the French proposal to put the CAR crisis before the 16 December Foreign Affairs Council meeting, where Member States confirmed their willingness to consider a CSDP operation in the Central African Republic.

### 1.2.2 EU’s reaction to the violent conflict and establishment of EUFOR RCA

From the escalation of the Central African Republic crisis, in March 2013, the European Union showed its firm condemnation of the violent institutional coup performed by Djotodia. Together with international and regional efforts, the EU worked actively at a diplomatic level in order to stabilize the crisis and to restore a
stronger national government. Nevertheless, after the widespread outbreak, few options were left to find a political solution, and the High Representative Catherin Ashton herself announced that the current situation in CAR was alarming and that ‘the EU member states as well as the international community must work harder and more decisively and do more’. At this point, it had become visible, that the conflict in the CAR required the deployment of military instrument. The United Nations welcomed the deliberations taking place about a possible additional European support. Finally, EU Foreign Affairs Council approved, on January 20, 2014, the crisis management concept (CMC) of military operation EUFOR RCA, which was supposed to be established quickly and was subject to a new Council decision.

The Council established on 10 February 2014 with Decision 2014/73/CFSP an EU military operation to contribute to the provision of a safe and secure environment in its area of operation, as authorized by the UN Security Council in resolution 2134 (2014), with an executive, Chapter VII mandate. This decision created the legal basis for the operation entitled ‘EUFOR RCA’ and was another step towards its rapid deployment. The operation was deployed to Bangui in April 2014, mandated to protect civilians in the Bangui area, including M’Poko International Airport, with a view to handing over to MISCA, the African Union operation, or to a UN peacekeeping mission within 6 months of reaching full operational capability. EUFOR RCA achieved full operational capability in June 15 2014346, which meant that its mandate would expire on 15 December 2014. Security Council Resolution 2181 (21 October 2014) and Council Decision 2014/775/CFSP (7 November 2014) extended the mandate for another 3 months. Maintaining EUFOR’s presence for a further three months aimed to allowing a better handover with MINUSCA including conducting joint patrols and providing backup rapid reaction forces whilst MINUSCA beds in. Due to the fragile nature of the security situation in Bangui, not extending EUFOR for a short period risked harming security gains. This would provide enough time to improve security in the area of operations, improve the stability and freedom of movement for humanitarian actors within the area of operations, and enable enough time for a transfer of authority to MISCA before the end date, thus allowing for a transition period for monitoring and mentoring.

The mission ended its mandate and was closed on the 15 March 2015.

1.2.3 Political- strategic planning

When a crisis occurs, the relevant European External Action Service (EEAS) geographical desk, supported by all services and the respective EU delegation, is in charge of preparing a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA), which proposes a broad range of options available to the EU. However, given the emergency in the CAR, this step was skipped in favour of preparing a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) directly, scheduled for adoption by the Council on 20 January. The CMC required a fact-finding mission

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346 which should be reached 30 days after Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is declared.
organised jointly with the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) in Bangui in late December to ascertain the tasks a European military operation could perform. The EU personnel met representatives of Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs), local authorities, and Sangaris and MISCA personnel with the objective of gathering as much information as possible and proposing concrete actions to the Council.347

After the fact-finding mission, two options348 were presented to High Representative Catherine Ashton349. The first one entailed deploying EUFOR in Bangui to protect the airport and the surrounding area. The second involved deploying troops outside Bangui in the west of the country, for the purpose of securing an important road connecting Bangui to Cameroon that was vital for supplying the capital but also used by the Muslim population to flee the CAR and seek refuge in neighbouring countries. These two options were framed by taking into account a troop strength of approximately 1,100 men since, thanks to informal dialogue among Member States, the EEAS, and the Council, the EUMS and the CMPD already knew, in late December, the size of operation in which the Member States were potentially ready to engage. This informal ‘sounding-out’ was conducted primarily by the Chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC), who approached Member States’ military representatives during EUMC meetings, but also bilaterally by France.

On 15 January, in response to Member States’ desire for a limited mandate, the Political and Security Council (PSC) adopted the first option, aimed at deploying troops only within Bangui, and authorised the planning of the operation, and, five days later, the Council adopted the proposed CMC. Initially, the operation commander hoped for a more ambitious mandate, but consultations indicated quickly that Member States were reticent to arm a force outside Bangui, mainly for security reasons. To convince the most Member States possible, the mission’s ambitions had to be scaled back.350

As mentioned above, given the urgency of the situation, Member States decided for the first time to use the fast-track procedure, which simplifies an operation’s planning by cutting out certain steps in order to deploy at very short notice. In practice, this means that there would not be separate Military Strategic Options (MSO) or a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), because the MSOs are incorporated [in]to the CMC and the CONOPS [in]to the OPLAN.351 All of the EU structures followed the emergency procedure and ‘played the game’ except the Athena Committee, which worked normally. This discrepancy in terms of procedure caused

347 For example Interview no. 9.
350 Interview no. 20.
a delay in the operation’s launch largely because some logistics contracts could not be concluded as quickly as expected.  

France offered to serve as the operation’s framework nation, in order to ensure good co-ordination between EUFOR and Sangaris. Accordingly, on 28 January, France’s Major-General Philippe Pontié was appointed as operation commander by the PSC and began the operational planning of the European operation. The Council decision 2014/73/CFSF formally confirmed Pontié’s appointment as operation commander, while Greece was given the operation headquarters, located at an airbase in Larissa. The Force Headquarter (FHQ) was established in Bangui, at the airport, under the command of the Force Commander, French general Thierry Lion.

As authorized by the UN Security Council in resolution 2134 (2014), with an executive, Chapter VII mandate, EUFOR RCA was mandated on 10 February 2014 to:

(1) Contribute to the provision of a safe and secure environment in the Bangui area- with a handover to the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (AFISM-CAR) within four to six months of Full Operating Capability, in accordance with the mandate set out in UNSC Resolution 2134 (2014).

When considering the appropriateness of the EUFOR RCA’s mandate, it must be remembered that the EU shall not take any action without local consent. In the case of CAR the president of transitional government exclusively asked EU to provide safe and secure environment in Bangui area.

It can be concluded that, early response to the crisis as well as the launch of EUFOR RCA was undoubtedly a result of a French diplomatic offensive aimed at Europeanising the intervention in the Central African Republic. Not only did France behave as a leader, putting great pressure on its European partners for the purpose of stopping massacres in the country, but it also provided the majority of the troops for the mission. Furthermore, the operation commander and the force commander were both French generals. There is considerable doubt as to whether the operation would have ever been launched had France not played such a crucial role, particularly when one considers the painful force-generation process, during which France yet again had to fill the gaps.

Although, the planning of the operation was conducted rather rapidly, according to a representative from the African Union the key partners on the ground, including the United Nation, Operation Sangaris and African

352 Interview no. 20.
355 After the Security Council authorised an EU mission with Resolution 2134, Council decision 2014/73/CFSF officially established the operation on 10 February 2014.
356 Interview no.3.
Union were consulted throughout the planning process. This strategic level planning was perceived crucial for the effectiveness of the operation for two reasons; firstly because good coordination and cooperation was perceived as paramount for greater impact on the ground, and secondly because the EUFOR RCA was a transition operation contributing on protection of civilian before a bigger AU or UN-led mission would be deployed.

1.2.4 Force generation and deployment of the operation

The formal planning process also included the start of force generation for EUFOR RCA. The first satisfactory force-generation conference took place on 13 February 2014, where ten countries offered a contribution. Over the next month, three meetings – which took place on 25 February and 4 and 13 March were unable to secure the assets required to launch the mission. On 14 March, the French Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, issued a joint statement to strongly urge its partners to do more:

‘On 10 February, the European Union pledged to deploy a military operation in support of the international efforts to stabilize the CAR. As things stand today, in spite of the contributions announced by a few European states, we have to face the fact that it does not amount to enough. If no extra effort is made very quickly, it will not be possible to launch this essential operation next week as planned. The European Union must shoulder its international security responsibilities. France strongly urges its partners to give themselves the means to do so’.

Before the fourth meeting, High Representative Ashton sounded the alarm bell in a letter addressed to the Member States in which she stated ‘in the long term the EU risked to lose its credibility’, but, despite her warning, the fourth conference turned out to be as fruitless as the previous ones. These repeated calls to act notwithstanding, the EU had to report the launch of the mission as scheduled to take place on 17 March. The launch remained subject to the establishment of a 100-soldier logistical structure covering at the same

367 Interview no. 1.
368 Interview no. 9; Interview no. 30.
369 France and Georgia offered a company. Estonia offered a platoon with four armoured personnel carriers (APCs), Latvia offered a platoon without APCs, Portugal offered a platoon with FHO officers and transport aircraft, Finland offered either a civil–military cooperative effort or an explosive-ordnance disposal group and four staff officers, Poland offered 150 unspecified personnel, and Hungary offered two officers and Luxembourg one. Romania asserted that it too could contribute a platoon, but the political decision had not been taken yet. (see Niklas I.M. Nováky, ‘From EUFOR to EUMAM’, pp. 102–103).
361 France offered a medical treatment facility and a geospatial unit. Germany offered strategic aero-medical evacuation capacity. While Spain expressed a desire to contribute a special-forces platoon and some staff officers, the political decision was still pending. Poland reduced its contribution from a platoon to a 50–60-strong gendarmerie platoon, and Portugal cancelled its offer of a protection platoon but confirmed its transport-aircraft contribution (see Niklas I.M. Nováky, ‘From EUFOR to EUMAM’, p. 104).
363 During the third conference, no additional contribution was made. On the contrary, Romania withdrew the platoon it had offered earlier (ibid., p. 104).
364 Only two additional staff officers were offered (ibid., p. 105).
time medical, transport, warehouse, and deployment support. The landlocked nature of the country meant that EUFOR was delayed largely because it could not get the strategic transport required to project the force and support it in the long term.

Given the Member States’ reluctance to provide the required assets, the French president himself, on the occasion of the European Council meeting on 21 March, had to remind France’s European partners of the European commitments by stating:

‘[A] European operation has been decided, it has to be implemented. That’s a matter of credibility. Europe can act as a humanitarian actor. It must also prove it is able to act as a military one.

Even the UN Secretary-General called on the Member States to keep their promises. The breakthrough occurred only on 27 March, when, during a fifth force-generation conference, France accepted providing the main assets needed to launch the operation. However, Berlin too played a crucial role, agreeing to finance the use of two Russian Antonovs (through the ‘Salis’ contract) in order to provide the strategic airlift indispensable for bringing material and troops to Bangui.

Thanks to the new contributions, the operation commander could recommend a launch date of 1 April for the operation. However, it must be stressed that the operation was launched even if EUFOR had not yet received all of what was required. A sixth force-generation conference had to be organised later for gathering additional means.

Furthermore, EUFOR faced another problem that prevented the operation from reaching its FOC more quickly. During the planning phase, many Member States pledged to provide augmentation to EUFOR staff resources, but when the operation was actually launched, they took a long time to honour their commitments, so nominal command-and-control capacity was reached with delays; EUFOR RCA reached

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367 Interview no. 20.
370 Itself also offered an infrastructure-engineering platoon, together with 36 vehicles and a few staff officers, while Montenegro offered one staff officer (see Niklas I.M. Novák, ‘From EUFOR to EUMAM’, p. 105).
371 Initially, France aimed to provide 290 men, or 29% of the force, but eventually Paris had to provide additional logistics resources and 326 personnel (see the French National Assembly report cited in Note 162, p. 218); Ibid., p. 215.
373 Interview no. 9.
374 Interview no. 20.
IOC on 30 April and FOC on 15 June. Finally, EUFOR RCA deployed 945 men, including 755 combat troops.376

The run-up to EUFOR RCA has highlighted recurrent problems with EU military operations. Despite a high number of multinational contributions to the operational headquarters – which represents a safe way of getting involved and sending a political signal – only 13 states have supplied personnel on the ground and only a handful have made substantial contributions.377

1.2.5 Operational planning

The first objective of EUFOR RCA was ‘to contribute to the provision of a safe and secure environment’ within its area of operations – the Bangui airport and the third and fifth district– with a view to handing over first to the AU and then to the UN. As described by several interviews this objective of handing over EUFOR RCA to its partners dominated the operational planning.378

Bearing this objective in mind, the most crucial steps in the operation planning is about translating the political - strategic objectives into an Operational Plan (OPLAN). This process was led by the operation commander Major General Ponties. According to an EU official the OPLAN was created in close consultation with EUFOR RCA's main partners; UN, AU and Sangaris379. Due to the operation’s objectives involving the partners throughout the planning process was perceived paramount for the effectiveness of the EUFOR RCA. According to several interviewees this integrated planning manifested as a good cooperation and coordination between these organisations on the ground.380

As a result, according to the EUFOR staff members and EU officials in accordance to its mandate EUFOR RCA operational objectives comprised of the following aspects;

(1) To contribute to the free movement of civilians;
(2) Protect the Bangui airport, along with free aerial movement;
(3) Create the conditions required for provision of humanitarian aid to those needing it;

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376 Combat troops deployed in Bangui came from France, Georgia, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Portugal, Italy, Finland, and Poland. Ibid.
377 The overall budget was 35.8€ excluding the contributions made by individual contributing countries. The main participating states: Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia and Spain. The mission could not have been launched without the support of Georgia, which is the second-biggest troop contributor (150) after France (400). Other troops come from Spain (75), Estonia (55), Poland (50), Italy (40), Finland (24) and Latvia (around 20). The EU's Central African Republic mission, Strategic Comments, 20/3, v-vi.
378 Interview no. 16.
379 Interview no. 9.
380 For example Interview no.1, no.6.
(4) Create security conditions solid enough to trigger dynamics for the return of refugees and displaced people in neighbourhoods under European responsibility.  

(5) Take over from Sangaris so that additional French troops could deploy in the provinces where violence was still fierce.

As part of OPLAN, a provisional Statement of Requirements (SOR) was produced - an overview of the means and resources that are needed in order to be able to fulfil the mission. The challenge that often lies at the heart of this parallel process is that the planning done in Brussels is conducted with limited knowledge about the resources that will be forthcoming for completing the operation. In the case of EUFOR RCA, thanks to informal dialogue among Member States, the EEAS, and the Council, the EUMS and the CMPD already knew, in late December that the size of the operation would be rather modest, with a troop strength of approximately 1,100 person.

Difficulties in Force Generation reflected considerably to the operational planning, as well as the conduct of the operation. As discussed above in the chapter 2.2.4 the strength of the EUFOR RCA was rather modest, and achieving FOC took longer than expected. Consequently, although only less than half of the estimated resources were committed, planning of EUFOR RCA went ahead anyway. This eventually led to the painful realization that France would have to fill in all the remaining gaps when the OPLAN was ready – reinforcing the image of the CSDP as a French-dominated project. Furthermore, it was also stated several times that the planning of the operation was done in a rush, which reflected to the running of the operation.

These shortfalls made it necessary to adjust the operational plans in an ad hoc manner, and especially at the beginning of the operation EUFOR RCA relied heavily on the capabilities of the other international organizations, namely in terms of force protection, logistics, intelligence information, and Medical support.

Furthermore, operational planning was made more difficult by the fact that there were only a limited number of Staff Officers involved in the planning process. The implementation of the mandate at operational- tactical level was challenging as the EEAS had produced an OPLAN that was too extensive for the size of the operation. Furthermore, much of the OPLAN was a copy past from previous operations and exercises, and thus parts of the OPLAN were of the relevance for EUFOR RCA.

‘The EU should have taken additional time to plan the operation, we had a 500 pages OPLAN for a 700 men operation. It was a problem because at the beginning we had Staff of 10 officers and we couldn’t digest such a huge OPLAN.’

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381 The objective was to empty the IDP camp located at the M-Poko airport. Nevertheless, this objective was later considered as unrealistic, due to the difficulties to relocate 80 000 IDPs within short period of time and volatile security situation. Interview n.10.

382 This issue was discussed more extensively in Chapter 2.2.3 ‘Political- strategic planning’

383 Interview no.16.

384 Interview no. 17.

385 Interview no. 27.

386 Ibid.
Another aspect which created challenges for the operational planning of EUFOR RCA was to do with the absence of functioning local government.\textsuperscript{387} Part of the mandate was for EUFOR RCA to bring stability to parts of Bangui. According to a non-EU official, the challenge with the stabilisation process in CAR was that the local actors were rarely involved in the process efficiently. One interviewee mentioned that it must be remembered that the EU works in the country only because it has been requested by the locals.\textsuperscript{388}

Accordingly, leaders and their views must be listened to, and their hopes should be taken into account. The amount of meetings initiated with the local leaders and citizens, as well as the networks established on the ground indicate that the EUFOR RCA put real effort in including the local perspective into the planning and implementation of its operation. However, under the circumstances where EUFOR RCA was established the CAR’s authorities could not be strongly involved in the planning of the operation. Furthermore, when EUFOR RCA was deployed the country’s security institutions were heavily underdeveloped, and thus the support from the local agencies was also very limited. These aspects made it more difficult for EUFOR RCA to ensure that the local perspectives were heard when planning the operations on the ground.

### 1.2.6 Feedback and lessons learned

The lessons learned (LL) process in EUFOR RCA was based on a standard operating procedure (SOP)\textsuperscript{389}. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) conducted strategic review three months after the operation was deployed. In addition, six-months reports and other strategic reviews, were used to inform the Member States of the progress of the operation. Nevertheless, since EUFOR RCA was a short operation, these documents did not have significant impact on the political-strategic planning of the operation.\textsuperscript{390}

In terms of internal lessons process, according to a EUFOR Officer feedback was collected from the units three times during the operation. The first one was done during the operation. Feedback was written down and it was discussed in the unit, but it was not passed forward to the higher levels. The second time was a debriefing in limited scale, but this feedback apparently did not go forward either. The third one was also a debriefing which was held in home country after the individuals had repatriated from the operation. In this debriefing the members of the unit wrote down their feedback anonymously, and this feedback which was passed forward at national and Brussels level.\textsuperscript{391} This internal feedback procedure was perceived ineffective. Experiences from those actually doing the work in the field were not shared or passed forward within the chain of command. As a result, only limited improvements were made to the operational aspects of the operation during the life-cycle of EUFOR RCA.\textsuperscript{392}

\textsuperscript{387} Interview no.4  
\textsuperscript{388} Interview no. 3.  
\textsuperscript{389} SOP included the description of the responsibilities and tasks. It covers the following aspects; Unit strength maintenance; Personnel service support; Discipline, law and order; Local hired personnel; Headquarters management; Protocol and visits to the Headquarters; See, for example, the Council of the European Union and European External Action Service’s ‘Annual 2014 CSDP Lessons Report’ (partially accessible to the public as of 26 May 2015, Annex C: EUMS contribution still limited), 6777/15, of 3 March 2015  
\textsuperscript{390} Interview no. 16.  
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{392} Interview no. 14
Nevertheless, when referring to the EU’s institutional learning it seems that some lessons have been learned and materialized in the planning of the operation. Based on the interviews the following aspects supporting this argument were raised. Firstly, the CSDP engagement has often been criticized for not being part of EU’s wider engagement or strategy over the region, resulting in lack of clear direction and coordination challenges among the different EU actors as well as international counter partners. According to several EU officials the operation planning was done in close consultation with the key actors on the ground and in the spirit of comprehensive approach. Although the CAR is not included in any of EU’s regional strategies, upon planning of the operation CMPD sought to develop approach which would utilize the existing capabilities on the ground, as well as, benefit from ongoing projects and vice versa. Secondly, it seems that EU had learnt some lesson from the experiences of EUFOR Tchad/ RCA, 2008 - 2009. Since the early planning of the EUFOR RCA, commitment from its international partners to deliver their promise in deploying fully operational mission to the ground within the given time frame was insisted.

Finally, although the implementation of the feedback and lessons collected during the EUFOR RCA hardly materialised during the running of the operation, the lessons were considered in the planning and implementation of the EUMAM RCA, which was deployed after EUFOR RCA. Nevertheless, the lessons regarding the financial mechanism has still not been implemented. Inflexible financial mechanism has been identified as one of the main shortfall of the CSDP military engagement in general, yet progress in solving the challenge has not been made.

1.3 OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

EUFOR RCA was the sixth CSDP military operation. Accordingly, from an operational point of view, its code of conduct, structures, and execution follow standardised procedures. Many of those procedures applied to CSDP operations are adopted from the NATO, since most of the EU Member States are also NATO members. The planning process is the key to understanding how an operation works because it provides the conceptual bridge between the political aims and objectives on the one hand and the operational means and resources on the other. Despite the standardised procedures there are a number of variables which impact on the operation’s capability to implement the planned activities on the ground. The chapter 1.3 analyses the

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393 Interview no. 3
394 Interview no. 28.
395 EUFOR Tchad/RCA was planned as a bridging operation to provide the military component for the UN multidimensional mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), until it would be replaced by a UN force. The MINURCAT, on the other hand, was supposed to deploy police trainers to eastern Chad to train local police, who would then provide basic security within the camps. However, the MINURCAT was so slow in its force generation and the training of local police that during most of the deployment of EUFOR there was no parallel police presence. This created a security vacuum within the refugee camps, for which EUFOR had not planned. This lack of police capabilities caused real challenges to EUFOR. Nevertheless, due to UN’s incapability to generate forces and do the military planning in time for the handover, the EU pledged that 2,000 of its troops would remain in the region temporarily to ensure a smooth takeover by the UN force. See: D3.3. The Car Review.
396 Interview no. 9.
Operational Capability of EUFOR RCA, focusing on the following aspects; decision-making and command and control structures, operation composition, and budgetary constraints.

1.3.1 Decision-making – command and control structures

Characteristics for the CSDP operations, EUFOR RCA command and control architecture was multilayered. This means that the Command and Control (C2) arrangements in CSDP operations can be examined from horizontal axis and vertical axis. The horizontal C2 arrangements refer to the unified, multinational feature of the operation, and the vertical axis to the command levels in the structure.

The horizontal C2 arrangements
EUFOR RCA had unified command, meaning that in theory the nations yield control over their armed forces to a single multinational command chain. This is to ensure the most cost-effective employment of scarce resources in function of the realization of mission objectives. Nevertheless, in practice real integration within individual operations is difficult to achieve, since the contributing states often have defined several caveats for the use of the troops. Furthermore, the responsibility over the administrative and penalty matters, namely in terms of human resources, and consequences of individual’s misbehavior during the operation, remain within the national states. Each nation has nominated their national point of contact in the operation who is responsible for the nation related matters during the operation. According to several interviewees in CAR this created some challenges for the effective running of the operation, as the commanders of national forces differed from one another in terms of experience, ethics, and attitude. Especially issues related to information sharing within the operation, and practicing of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were highlighted to be greatly dependable on the National Commanders.

‘Commanders of national forces had great role for the operation’s success. They were information links and if they did not do their job’s properly all members of the peace keeping force on the ground suffered. The situational awareness also suffered, because people did not know what other were doing. Commanders had also important role on passing information forward to their home countries. This led to situations in which these commanders were not willing to pass information about misconducts, because that might have affected themselves.’

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397 Command and Control elements include planning, issuing directives, monitoring, evaluating and ensuring that the necessary corrective measures are implemented in line with political and military objectives
399 Ibid.
400 Interviews no. 14, no.15, no.16, no.17.
401 Interview no. 17.
The issue of misconduct and lack of appropriate measures to deal with them was mentioned several times as a source of ineffectiveness.\(^{402}\) For an example the misbehavior by one nationality could effect to the legitimacy of the whole operation. Thus, it was suggested that in the future it would be paramount to build some sort of channel from the ground, which would bypass the national commanders so that higher levels can be informed about the true situation within the operation as well as in the area of the operation. This would be important also so that misconducts of the commanders could be reported to their superiors.

In addition, the so called ‘unofficial parallel command lines’ were seen to hamper the effectiveness of the multinational command structures. Although armed forces would operate under the banner of a nominally unified command chain they often receive simultaneous instructions via unofficial communication channels from the home country. In the case of EUFOR RCA, altogether 14 nations contributed troops to the operation, France being in the lead of the command. According to several interviewees the challenges related to this multinational nature materialized as reluctance to share intelligence and information among the different nationalities. This became especially evident between the NATO and non-NATO countries\(^{403}\) due to a number of restrictions related to sharing of intelligence to non-NATO countries for example.

**Vertical C2 arrangements**

In terms of vertical C2 arrangements, the EU military Chain of Command comprises of the (1) military-strategic, (2) operational and (3) tactical levels of command each represented by a Commander (Cdr) and his/her Headquarter (HQ). In addition, the fourth (4) and the highest level in the command structure is the political-strategic level, which is exercised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of member states’ ambassadors based in Brussels. The main political and military actors in the EU in the decision-making and implementation process for EUFOR RCA are presented in Figure 1.\(^{404}\)

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\(^{402}\) Interviews no.14 and no.16. 
\(^{403}\) Interview no. 17.
\(^{404}\) The figure is based on the information collected through the interviews.
The political-strategic level control is conducted in Brussels. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is to exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the HR, political control over the crisis management operation, provide it with strategic direction and take the relevant decisions in that regard. PSC embodies the multinational political authority that directs and oversees the work of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the staff personnel running the headquarters of actual operations. PSC sends guidance to, and receives advice from the EU Military Committee (EUMC) which monitors the appropriateness of the EU military operation’s execution. Its chairman acts as the primary point of contact for the operation commander (Op Cdr). The EU OpCdr is a Commander nominated by the Council or the PSC to conduct a defined military operation and authorised to exercise operational command or operational control over assigned forces.

In the case of EUFOR RCA the military-strategic command and control was exercised by the Operation Commander from the OHQ, based in Larissa, Greece. The Operation Commander, Major-General Philippe Pontiès, reported to the PSC through the chairman of the EUMC on all issues of strategic value for the

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405 Figure 1 is based on the information gained during the interviews.
operation. He also attended EUMC and PSC meetings. In addition, the Operation Commander also received local political guidance from the Head of the EU Delegation located in Bangui. The political and strategic guidance given to Operation Commander were then translated into operational objectives which were then implemented by the Force Commander on the ground under the supervision of the Operation Commander.\textsuperscript{406}

Force Commander is the key actor for the military operation at the \textbf{Operational level} in the area of operation. During its lifespan EUFOR RCA had two Force Commanders\textsuperscript{407}, both French, who were responsible for the day-to-day running of the operation from the FORCE HQ, UCATEX, located in Bangui, Central African Republic. This included commanding power over a number of tactical decisions such as increasing number of patrols in area of operations due to changes in security situations. In theory, Force Commander was able to take some decisions that could not wait approval from OHQ or Brussels, or they were so insignificant that they did not require the involvement of OHQ and Brussels. However, all the activities which were considered to be more political in nature such as establishing strategic partnerships, or amendments to the OPLAN, needed to be taken to OHQ and Brussels.\textsuperscript{408}

The research material suggested that the \textbf{Force Commander had a central role for the effectiveness of the operation in CAR}. He had considerable autonomy on the ground, and hence he played a key role in how EUFOR RCA was received in CAR. EUFOR RCA’s first Force Commander, General Lion was complemented by the EU officials and several non-EU actors for succeeding in establishing good cooperation between the operation and other international actors.\textsuperscript{409} The role of the Force Commander’s personality played an important role for the whole operation, since when the Force Commander changed, also the cooperation with the several humanitarian and development actors decreased.\textsuperscript{410}

\textbf{The Tactical level command and control} was exercised by the Component Commanders. They were responsible for running of the individual missions authorized by the Force Commander.

Based on the interviews this multilayered Command and Control structure was perceived too heavy and bureaucratic for the purpose of the operation.\textsuperscript{411} It was mentioned several times that the fragmented structures made the decision-making process slow even at times when rapid decisions should have been made for the sake of the protection of the civilians.\textsuperscript{412} Alongside the bureaucratic decision-making process, also national caveats and national agendas were also seen to hamper effective running of the operation.

1.3.2 Budgetary constrains

\textsuperscript{406} Interview no. 30.
\textsuperscript{407} For the beginning of the operation General Thierry Lion, and for the second period General Jean Marc Bacquet
\textsuperscript{408} For example interview no. 9.
\textsuperscript{409} For example Interviews no. 10, no.11, and no. 25.
\textsuperscript{410} Interview no. 24.
\textsuperscript{411} Interview no. 16.
\textsuperscript{412} For example Interview no.17.
The fundamental reluctance of the member states to become involved in CSDP military operations is partly related to the operation funding. Similar to other CSDP operations, EUFOR RCA could not be financed from the Union budget. Operation contributions were to be paid by Member States, with the main burden falling to those countries participating in the EUFOR RCA. The participating member states needed to pay the costs of their own operational contribution to the operation. Only the limited number of common costs (10 - 15% of the total cost of the operation), such as transportation, infrastructure, medical services, HQ expenses, were financed through ATHENA mechanism. According to Council Decision 2014/73/CFS, the common costs financed under the Athena mechanism amounted to 25.9 million euros. At the end of the operation, the total was 28.9 million euros. However, figures for the entire cost of the operation were not available for the present report, because there is no central accounting system allowing calculation of the cost of CSDP operations. One can only give a very rough estimate of 300 million euros, since, according to the European Union Institute for Security Studies, 'the amounts of money directed through the Athena mechanism usually cover only around ten percent of total operation costs'.

Nevertheless, the inflexibility of the funding the military engagement operation created some considerable challenges. Firstly, as discussed above the contributing states need to finance their own contributions to the operation without any refunds from the EU. Consequently, with scarce financial resources and limited political interest toward CAR among the Member States, contributing troops to such a dangerous operation was not a popular policy option. Secondly, inflexible funding mechanism was perceived to hamper the overall running of the operation, as the ATHENA mechanism could not be used to finance operation related costs, such as equipment, and quick impact projects (QIP).

Funding quick impact projects

During the interviews it was mentioned several times, that one of the key challenges of the running of the operation was related to country’s poor infrastructure. Thus, allocating funds for short reconstructions projects, such as repairing buildings, roads, and networks, would have benefit both the EUFOR RCA’s core activities and the confidence-building towards the local population. Now many of the QIPs had to be financed by the individual contributing states, hence affecting on their scale and implementation. One of the interviewees described this challenge as follows:

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413 This mechanism is separate from the EU budget and is under the authority of Political Security Committee.
414 Interview no. 24.
416 For example, in comparison to CSDP in United Nations’ missions, the troop contributing countries will receive financial compensation from the UN for its participation. For several states this is also a way to generate money for their national armies. Interview 9 June 2016
417 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, low-cost projects that are planned and implemented within a short timeframe. The objective of QIPs is to build confidence in the mission, the mandate or the peace process.
418 Interview no. 9.
‘The problem is that, while millions of euros had been allocated for building large road bridges in a timeframe of 5–10 years – which is good – [EUFOR] lacked money to conduct very short-term and small projects that would have improved the locals’ living conditions immediately.’

In fact, the Finnish troops provided only 40,000 euros for this, though they deployed under NATO doctrine according to which the contingent was meant to provide the budget required for CIMIC affairs. With such a small amount of money, EUFOR could complete a few projects, but the scale was more than limited. Of course, important financial means were provided by the EU for long-term development projects; however, there was a lack of flexibility for short-term projects that needed to be implemented quickly if they were to have an impact on the population’s living conditions:

‘[W]hen we, for example, wanted to fix a broken road, the EU couldn’t contribute, because it should have appealed to the public market, which would have taken several months.’

EUFOR could have resorted directly to EU funds for infrastructure projects of this general nature, but the European Commission is forbidden to give money to a military operation. Consequently, interviewees indicated that the EU must increase its flexibility so that military operations such as EUFOR can access EU funds more easily for its CIMIC projects. One option would be to include CIMIC affairs under the common fund financed by the Athena mechanism. Another would consist of increasing peace operations’ access to the DEVCO budget: even if an operation’s actions are motivated by force acceptability, CIMIC projects are not military ones and contribute to countries’ development. Some kind of common funding is quite logical since CIMIC actions benefit the whole European force and the EU needs procedures that are compatible with short-term operations such as EUFOR RCA.

Thus, especially at the beginning of an operation, a flexible funding mechanism should be in place in order to realise short-term infrastructure and other development projects. Once real shortages are identified, this mechanism would help to achieve quick effects on the ground. Now, overall effectiveness is hampered by issues that could be easily fixed with reasonable funding.

### 1.3.3 Operation composition

The launch of EUFOR RCA took place under difficult circumstances. Deployed in support of the AU mission in a highly unstable environment, it was potentially one of the most dangerous EU operations ever launched. Its mandate was robust with the use of force authorised, under UNSC chapter 7, to protect the civilian population. The mission’s strength was relatively modest (roughly 750 troops), and its mandate was limited in

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419 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
422 Interview no. 23.
423 Interview no. 9.
both space (two districts of Bangui and the airport) and time. During the interviews the main criticism of the EUFOR RCA pertained to the narrow nature of its mandate, mainly in terms of troops, duration, and geographical scope.

EUFOR RCA deployed combat units in an executive operation. Nevertheless, EUFOR RCA’s strength was seen insufficient to truly implement its executive mandate, and to adapt to the needs of such a large country as the CAR. The humanitarians, in particular, would have liked to see EUFOR deployed outside Bangui alongside Sangaris and the MINUSCA in order to face the massive banditry in the countryside that made it difficult for NGOs to reach some regions.\(^{424}\)

Nevertheless, despite its modest strength, and small area of operation the composition of the EUFOR RCA, especially its gendarmerie, CIMIC, Spanish Special Forces, and Italian engineering components, were seen to bring considerably added value for the small operation.

The gendarmerie component\(^{425}\) played a large role in building good relationships with citizens and collecting intelligence, because it has special training that is very useful in urban zones such as Bangui. Gendarmes are interior security experts who possess highly specific knowledge that the militaries do not. While soldiers are trained to make war, the gendarmerie do police work; that is, they have the training and the capabilities required to handle and defuse tensions without harm, to make arrests, to take fingerprints, to talk to people. The gendarmes are trained to conduct patrols within civilian populations and know how to speak with locals.\(^{426}\) They are very useful in terms of maintenance of order since they are trained in, for example, how to handle riots. Since they served complementary functions,\(^{427}\) military and gendarmerie units were mixed within a given patrol\(^{428}\). In this way, EUFOR teams were equipped to face multiple types of threats simultaneously. Consequently, the gendarmerie contributed significantly to EUFOR’s success.\(^{429}\)

Another significant feature of the EUFOR RCA was the Italian Engineering component. Once the operation was deployed, the compound, UCATEX had to be built nearby the Bangui airport. As described by one of the interviewees the Engineering component had a vital role in the securing of the camp that was at the beginning not protected enough. Furthermore, the Italian engineers improved locals’ living conditions and

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\(^{424}\) For example Interview no. 10.

\(^{425}\) The gendarmerie component was armed by Italy, Spain, and France.

\(^{426}\) The added value of gendarmer special training is to operate in violent environment such as in Bangui is rooted to the nature of the troop in comparison to military; whereas soldiers are trained to enforce security by use of force, gendarmer are able to blend law enforcement provisions, including investigative resources and power of arrest, with military tools and tactics. Gendarmes are trained to approach the civil population and tackle the community based violence. The lessons that can be drawn from the joint patrols is that there is a need for different units with different background or training to face different kind of threats. For example in Bangui there was all, community violence, violent demonstration as well as armed groups with heavy weapons.

\(^{427}\) Interview no 28.

\(^{428}\) It is nevertheless important to note that before the EUFOR deployment, Sangaris did not have enough troops for similar patrols, because many soldiers were trying to deal with the violence in the provinces. Furthermore, not only did MISCA not possess the equipment required to conduct night patrols, but its forces were much more static than EUFOR’s. This factor is significant in explaining the differences in terms of positive perceptions between EUFOR, on one hand, and Sangaris and MISCA, on the other.

\(^{429}\) Ibid.
EUFOR’s image by participating in the unity bridge’s construction and leading infrastructure work as part of cash-for-work programmes.\textsuperscript{430}

Furthermore, the CIMIC component was seen as a key enabler for the operation. According to several EUFOR Officers the civil- military cooperation was perceived an essential element for the EUFOR RCA’s effectiveness. Firstly, EUFOR included a CIMIC contingent armed by Finland. Such CIMIC personnel seek to finance micro-projects with the purpose of improving citizens’ living conditions and, in this way, increasing the force acceptance to the population. The goal is not to replace humanitarian actors in humanitarian work but only help the force legitimate its actions.

In the CAR, the most important CIMIC project implemented by EUFOR has been the building of a bridge. Initially, DEVCO had planned to rebuild a broken civilian bridge in order to connect the second and the third district, but, because of delays, EUFOR eventually proposed building a military bridge instead. This initiative may seem trivial, but it must be stressed that the bridge was particularly appreciated by the population.\textsuperscript{431} It reinforced EUFOR’s popularity and acceptability\textsuperscript{432} among the citizens because it helped them improve their daily conditions of living: they didn’t have to make large detours anymore.\textsuperscript{433} It improved people’s freedom of movement, increased communication between districts, and helped merchants in their commercial activities.\textsuperscript{434} Also, EUFOR conducted many reconciliation initiatives at the local level that included football games and dialogue involving neighbourhood chiefs, elders, and citizens, first within communities and later between different communities.

Alongside these successes some shortfalls were also reported related to overall shortage of the troops. As stated by one EUFOR Officer with bigger contributions EUFOR RCA could have made significantly greater impact on the ground.

‘In regards to the mission, I think that since Sangaris was forced to remain in the capital because we hadn’t troops enough, this was really a deception. We should have taken care of the whole city what would have required at least 1500 men. We could have done a great job, in particular because we had problems or difficulties with armed groups when they got out of our districts. We had a good coordination but it would have been easier had we the whole capital responsibility. EU should have been more ambitious, 1500 men, that wasn’t dramatic for the EU.’\textsuperscript{435}

Furthermore, according to an EU officer, some crucial capacities were lacking in the operation. Among these capabilities, were having the camp’s own security unit and having vehicle-drivers mentioned. In

\textsuperscript{430} Ibid. \textsuperscript{431}  Interview no.13. \textsuperscript{432}  Interview no. 14. \textsuperscript{433}  Interview no. 10. \textsuperscript{434}  Pierre Pinto & Bertrand Haeccker, ‘Bangui: la vie quotidienne facilitée par les nouveaux ponts’, RFI, 18 March 2015, at http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150318-reportage-bangui-rca-republique-centrafricaine-vie-quotidienne-ponts. \textsuperscript{435}  Interview no. 28.
consequence, some tasks that were part of the mission implementation plan were not carried out at all in the end, because the personnel planned for these were given new tasks. The challenge with these alterations was that the officers did not necessarily have the right background, training, and equipment to perform the new tasks assigned on the ground. It was suggested that in the future there should be more emphasis on the forces rather than the equipment. After all, all the troops designated by the contributing states bring their own equipment, so the crucial element for effective mission implementation is to have enough forces to complete the planned tasks in the operation.

Despite the Gendarmerie's intelligence collecting capabilities, the interview material suggested that the EUFOR RCA's intelligence gathering assets were nevertheless insufficient for ensuring adequate situational awareness. Furthermore, it must be noted that some national contingents collected intelligence on their own but did not necessarily share it with others, largely because some spoke of intelligence while others talked about information. Therefore, intelligence gathered on the ground did not always reach the higher levels and the other contingents. It was suggested that in the absence of adequate intelligence gathering tools could this capability be strengthened with appropriate in-mission training.

Although EUFOR RCA suffered from lack of forces, thanks to the operation composition EUFOR RCA had real good assets, and advantage in comparison to the other operations. According to several interviewees, with longer mandate, and larger contingents it could have made a considerable impact on the ground. The EUFOR RCA succeeded in building the trust among the local population in Bangui area, and in comparison to other peacekeeping operations, during its short but intensive presence it managed to create an extensive network with the key local actors, thereby preparing the ground for the EUMAM RCA, as well as the UN mission.

**1.3.4 Force’s acceptability as one of the main lines of operation**

In peace operations, maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant audiences—including the conflict parties, local civilians, international NGOs, and foreign governments—is a crucial part of achieving success. One of EUFOR's main lines of operation involved the force acceptance by the Bangui population. Therefore, it oriented its actions largely towards locals in order to get their support and to prevent them from being indoctrinated by militia-leaders. This approach was seen to be an important enabler for the efficiency of the operation. To better understand the importance of such an approach, conceptualisation of the characteristics of the CAR's conflict can provide insight to the issue.

The ongoing conflict in CAR started by the Séléka uprising is an example of a complex conflict where a combination of social, economic, and political factors embedded with several warring fraction, as well as,

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436 Interview no.14.
437 Ibid.
lack of social cohesion, makes it challenging to solve. As discussed in the ‘D3.3. The CAR Review’ the Séléka was an alliance of rebel groups, and part of its military success should be attributed to implementation of insurgency tactics. Hence, in order to understand the implementation of the EUFOR RCA, especially its focus on the force’s acceptability, we perceived that the utilization of the counterinsurgency concept would provide a useful tool.

Before giving an illustration of the counterinsurgency approach in the context of EUFOR RCA, it is to be noted that there is a large debate among the scholars whether peace operations can be considered counterinsurgency. For example, according to Petraeus doctrine a peace operation (PO) cannot be considered counterinsurgency, because of ‘the impartiality with which [it] treats all parties and the nature of its objective’, while in counterinsurgency an enemy is clearly identified. Still, several authors argue that peace operations and counterinsurgency doctrine share many similarities. Counterinsurgency may indeed ‘violates the fundamental principles of classical […] peacekeeping operation’ since it entails the deployment of a neutral interposition force between warring parties who agreed both to a cease-fire and to the deployment of a lightly armed Force authorized to use force only for self defense. However, as Karsten Friis and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg put it, ‘the two concepts are converging on each other’ both ‘in methods and means’ when one compares counterinsurgency and complex peace operations defined as ‘a combination of peacekeeping, peace building or state building and humanitarian action performed by troops capable of enforcing the peace in cooperation with a host of civilian actors during or after intra state conflict.

General Rupert Smith argues in his work ‘The Utility of Force’ that contemporary peace operations follow a war paradigm that he defined as ‘the war within the population’. One of the main characteristics of this paradigm is that force is used be belligerents in order to create conditions under which people needs can be met with the purpose to win their support and thereby win the fight. The defining characteristics of this ‘war amongst the people’ are that conflicts tend to be timeless, more political in nature, and fought between parties that are part of, and in amongst, the civilian population rather than between uniformed armies on a

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438 According to the Petraeus doctrine, ‘insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority’ while counterinsurgency (COIN) is ‘comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Subversion consists, for instance, in fomenting violent civil unrest, violent riots, or strikes but also the use of propaganda or sabotage. The objective is to undermine the legitimacy of the government and other counterinsurgency forces in order to win the population’s backing for rising up against the national and international authorities. The conflict focuses more on the control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population and not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Petraeus Doctrine: The Field Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations (San Diego: ICON Group International, 2010), p. 1.

439 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Petraeus Doctrine, 1-12.


443 Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, 85.

444 Interview no. 2.

battlefield. According to Smith the **real purpose is to gain the will of the population**, unlike in conventional or industrial warfare, which is aimed at breaking the will of the population. Both doctrines centre of gravity is the population that need to be protected and whose basic needs must be met to succeed in getting their support against for instance peace spoilers defined as ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threaten their power, worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’. Therefore, based in Smith’s view there can be seen to be similarities between peace operations and a counterinsurgency approach. However, it is important to note that not only both kind of operations aimed mainly at protecting the civilians, they also **put the emphasis on civilian instead of military solutions**.

**EUFOR RCA** was of course a peace operation, but research showed that to some extent counterinsurgency (COIN) principles can be seen to play a role in the force action on the ground. **First**, as discussed above one of the main characteristics of counterinsurgency paradigm is that force is **used** in order to create conditions under which people needs can be met with the purpose to **win their support and thereby win the fight**. By providing the security and through active dialogue with the Bangui citizens the EUFOR RCA sought to address the security related needs of the population. **Second**, the unity of effort importance guides, at least in theory, both doctrines actions. Indeed, the coherent integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial for any counterinsurgency and peace operations to succeed since military actors cannot win the fight alone. Military actors can only participate to create conditions under which civilian actors can try to face roots of the conflict as part of a comprehensive approach which has become officially the leitmotiv of EU action in the field of peacebuilding. As will be explained below, this coordination between military and civilian tools was a decisive factor in EUFOR RCA success. **Third**, as in COIN, intelligence was a cornerstone of EUFOR RCA action not only to learn about spoilers capabilities and hostile intentions and therefore protect the mandate, but also to get a wider understanding of the cultural terrain and the civilian population since knowledge of local concerns, attitudes and values is of utmost importance ‘when the campaign objective is to affect the political leanings of the population’. **At last**, in accordance with COIN doctrine, EUFOR RCA actions were framed by a **restrictive use of force** since collateral damage can have

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448 Karsten Friis, 50.
449 According to the Petraeus doctrine, ‘insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority’ while counterinsurgency (COIN) is ‘comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Subversion consists, for instance, in fomenting violent civil unrest, violent riots, or strikes but also the use of propaganda or sabotage. The objective is to undermine the legitimacy of the government and other counterinsurgency forces in order to win the population’s backing for rising up against the national and international authorities. The conflict focuses more on the control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population and not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Petraeus Doctrine: The Field Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations (San Diego: ICON Group International, 2010), p. 1.
451 ‘The comprehensive approach is both a general working method and a set of concrete measures and processes to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its wide array of existing tools and instruments, collectively can develop, embed and deliver more coherent and more effective policies, working practices, actions and results. (…) The need for such a comprehensive approach is most acute in crisis and conflict situations and in fragile states’ Council Conclusions on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach, 12.05.2014.
452 Karsten Friis, 55.
counterproductive effects by delegitimizing the peacekeeping force and encouraging citizens to join spoilers to take revenge not only again peacekeepers but also the government and its representatives.

In order to understand how counterinsurgency principles explained above guided EUFOR RCA actions in Bangui, one must first know that during its deployment, EUFOR RCA faced many militias that pretended to be defending their respective community, even if these alleged motivations hid often much more material motivations.453 These quite heterogeneous peace spoilers did not form a coherent organisation. On the contrary, they were rather independent of each other and even sometimes fought each other. Some of the militias were led by hard-liners who resisted not only the transition process but also the international forces’ presence.454 According to General Pontiès, these radical groups were a minority but ‘carried out […] activism against any representation of the international community, of whatever nature’.455 Their objective was to do everything they could to exacerbate tensions and raise the population against the transitional government and the international forces, including EUFOR RCA. As one local NGO representative explained, “the colonels or the rebels wanted EUFOR to leave because it was an obstacle to their daily activities and objectives”.456 Citizens thus were subject to frequent manipulation tentatively fomented by militias’ leaders who “tried to instrumentalize people so that the later denounced EUFOR.457

Citizens thus were subject to frequent manipulation tentatively fomented by militias’ leaders, who used various kinds of tools. For instance, propaganda against peacekeepers was regularly used to incite violent rioting against international forces, especially France, which was an easy target because of its colonial past in the Central African Republic. It must be remembered that the CAR is a ‘country of rumours’ / where ‘Bangui lives on rumours’458 and poorly educated people can readily fall under the influence of leaders who use lies and subversion to reach their ends. Therefore, some militias had great capacity to cause harm, given their ability to exercise negative influence over Bangui citizens. Some of these groups aimed at toppling the transitional authorities with the objective of bringing their own leaders (back) into power. Other militia-leaders’ goal of gaining power, influence, and freedom of action didn’t necessarily extend to overthrowing the government and was limited to gaining power and influence more quickly or extensively than other means would have peacefully allowed.459 As usual in the CAR’s history of rebellion,

453 This issue has been discussed more extensively in D 3.3. The Central African Republic (CAR) Review.
454 Interview no. 2.
456 Interview no. 37.
457 Interview o. 36.
458 Interview no. 20.
459 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Petraeus Doctrine, II-2.
many actually sought merely to cause enough instability in order to surrender only in exchange for compensation of one kind or another. In other words, these groups aimed at selling peace, for instance, by obtaining positions in the administration. Some also strove to cause enough harm and destabilise the national and international authorities enough to be able to keep carrying out their criminal activities.\textsuperscript{460}

Given militias’ dangerous influence over Bangui citizens, the EUFOR RCA action was from the very beginning oriented towards the protection of the population, with the purpose to convincing them not to join militias or use violence by meeting citizens’ aspirations. This was clearly one of the foci for the operation during the planning and the centre of gravity during implementation in Bangui. Different tools were used in order to win the districts citizens’ support by helping to meet, directly or indirectly, their basic needs as far as possible. Among these basic needs were security, food, shelter, health care, jobs, transportation, sanitation, and schools. EUFOR RCA provided mainly security, but EUFOR was only one actor among many other that succeeded, through coordination and cooperation with IOs, NGOs and EU instruments, in winning to some extent Bangui citizens ‘heart and minds’.\textsuperscript{461}

Considering this, one can state that EUFOR RCA utilized counterinsurgency principles,\textsuperscript{462} in that it organised one of its lines of operation around the force’s acceptability\textsuperscript{463}, in order to win Bangui citizens’ support and isolate them from militia-leaders. As in traditional COIN, the population’s will was the real battlefield, where not only military but also civilian tools were used through coordination and cooperation with other EU or non EU (NGOs and International organization) civilian instruments as part of a comprehensive approach\textsuperscript{464}. A high-ranking officer offered a good synopsis of the EUFOR action.

‘We were compelled to put things into perspective as to what concerns the population; what part was she playing, and whose side was she going to join: that of the bad guys or ours? The population was the apple of our eye, on which we had been working tirelessly, and we wanted her to join our side, so that she doesn’t fall under the influence of the wrong men on both sides, especially seeing that, amongst a poor population, with the help of a few well-placed

\textsuperscript{460}Humic, pp. 101–102; Interview no.22.

\textsuperscript{461}Interview no. 34.

\textsuperscript{462}The similitudes described above may be linked to the fact that the Force commander was an Afghanistan veteran.

\textsuperscript{463}Interview no.23.

\textsuperscript{464}Comprehensive approach derives from the recognition that there is an interdependency between security and development since military means alone, although essential, are not sufficient to meet challenges induced by contemporary conflicts and peace operations. Indeed, military actors ‘cannot stabilise a situation for long if the root causes of a conflict or a crisis have not been addressed.’ It assumes that (inter)national crisis are multifaceted and require a consistent multidimensional response based on the integration of ends, the integration of actors, both within and outside the EU (at local, regional and international level) and the integration of means. Coordination and cooperation between military instruments and civilian ones (ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and human rights, as well as justice and migration), within the EU as well as between EU and other national or international actors, is a core principle of the comprehensive approach aimed at maximising synergies and actions guided by a shared analysis of the conflict roots and its solutions. Jean-Philippe Scherer, ‘The EU comprehensive approach’, in (eds) Jochen Rehl and Galia Glume, Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (Vienna: Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2015), Niccoletta Pirozzi, ‘The EU’s comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management’ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2013., Maria Grazia Galantino, ‘On the Comprehensiveness and Legitimacy of CSDP’, in (eds.) Walter Feichtinger, Maria Raquel Freire and Maria Grazia Galantino, ‘EU’s Role in Multilateral Crisis Management. Findings and Conclusions’, Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2013.
banknotes, you could bring her to join either side, and, for her to come join ours, the urge was first to create a bond of trust.465

Therefore, as will elaborated more in details in chapters 1.4 and 1.5, EUFOR aimed at creating a trust relationship with people in order to show them that supporting international and national forces and authorities was in their best interests. All of this is doesn’t mean that peace operation and counterinsurgency concepts are interchangeable. On the contrary, several important differences remain not the least of which is the impartiality with which peacekeepers are supposed to treat belligerents, even if robust mandate under the chapter 7 allow them ‘to threaten with, or resort to the use of force against non-compliant parties’ or spoilers.466 However, counterinsurgency principles can provide valuable lessons prone to foster peace operations success as evidenced by EUFOR RCA.

1.4 COMPETENCES

This section of the report examines the competencies (skills, knowledge, and performance) that affect the planning and execution of the CSDP military operation EUFOR RCA. The analysis focuses on the expertise, skills, and competencies of the personnel in the area of operation.

1.4.1. Personnel expertise and professional background

In the field, the success of missions is impacted by the quality of its personnel, especially the senior leadership. A mission led by ineffectual personnel can decrease the ability of the mission to implement its mandate. A challenge laying at the heart of the military crisis management operations is that they are dependable on the Member States contributions. As discussed in chapter 1.2.4 the participating nations provided personnel, equipment, and resources to EUFOR RCA on a voluntary basis. In the SOR the Operation Commander has defined the resources needed for the operation to be able to achieve its objectives. This includes also requirements for the human resources needed for the operation. The operation is initiated and subsequently planned on the assumption that EU Member States will contribute resources to meet the requirements formally expressed in SOR. Nevertheless, often, the member states deploy inexperienced officers to perform duties that would require strong commanding approach, strict code of conduct and good interpersonal skills. At times, the deployed individuals are unmotivated or they have even criminal track record in their home country, those all reflecting to their actions on the ground. Furthermore, it was mentioned several times during the interviews that the countries did not necessarily send their best staff for posts in this operation, but many EUFOR RCA was their first operation. This was reported as a shortfall, since the demanding operation environment with robust mandate would

have required experienced officers. Especially, inexperienced unit leaders was perceived significantly hamper the effectiveness of the operation. Similar statements were given by several other EUFOR RCA officers. The interview material suggested that the leadership skills of the commanding officers were identified to be the central enabler as well as barrier to utilization of the expertise of the individual officers.

‘About half of my unit was composed of troops, who were in operation for the first time in their life. This would not have been a problem, if the unit had been commanded by skilled leaders, which it was not. The leaders did not know how to use their human resources. We had skilful people from doctors to firefighter to teacher, who had motivation and drive to apply their skills. The motivation died because these people were not allowed to utilize the expertise on the favor of the operation.’

In terms of the culture, military is based on a hierarchical structure with a clear chain of command. The structures, terminology and procedures are more or less the same across the Member States. The officers deployed to EUFOR RCA have often gone through their national military training and, in principle, have knowledge of how to act as part of a multinational military operation. Nevertheless, this multinational aspect of EUFOR RCA caused also some challenges for the effective running of the operation. The lack of French speaking officers was reported as one barrier within the operation, although the official language within the EUFOR RCA was English. The operation was dominated by France, and thus the language barrier also reflected to the information sharing within the operation. For instance, Georgian soldiers charged with the airport’s protection did not speak French and their English was often not sufficient. That sometimes created tensions with citizens, which at one point reached a serious level. At the same time, the Finnish CIMIC officers did not speak French well enough to follow discussions at meetings. It even seems that Finnish officers’ understanding was often the opposite of what had been said. Furthermore, according to one interviewee, the information provided did not circulate well enough within EUFOR;

‘When I spoke to the French, for example, the Spaniards wouldn’t get the information, or the other way round. I didn’t feel like it was a European force but a conglomerate of national forces […]. I sometimes repeated the same thing to five persons, which I shouldn’t have needed to do since I was speaking to one organisation. Those I was in touch with were high-ranking soldiers, colonels, captains, so it was disturbing that they didn’t pass on the information.’

467 Interview no. 18.
468 Interview no. 17.
469 Interview no. 12; Interview no. 13.
470 EUFOR officers sometimes checked afterwards if they heard something strange from the CIMIC.
471 Interview no. 13.
472 Ibid.
1.4.2. Skills and competencies

According to several interviewees the main shortfall in terms of running the operation was due to the lack of adequate human resources. For example, the lack of French speaking officers was considered as a significant barrier to the running of the operation, because the French was one of the official languages in CAR. Especially, the units which were tasked to interact often with the locals, such as CIMIC unit, or Gendarmeries, would have benefitted from better language skills. Furthermore, several interviewees complained of a serious lack of skilled, trained, and experienced leaders among the officers and also about lack of professionalism among the soldiers. For instance, some soldiers were frequently pointed at with loaded guns by accident.

From time to time, there has been the impression that certain nationalities only pursued their own national interests rather than the interests of the operation. Also, cultural differences among the staff were mentioned. For example, responsibilities and procedures were understood and interpreted different ways depending on the organization, country and culture. Thus, it was suggested that more emphases should be put in promoting a common operation culture. The Force Commander and the company commanders play a key role in promoting the common European approach in the operation. The research material suggests that fragmented operation culture may compromise the operation’s effectiveness with respect to the values the EU aims to promote. Consequently, it was also mentioned several times, that the SOPs should be practised more carefully.

1.4.2.1 Emphases on building the trust towards the local population

Despite these internal challenges, the information gathered shows that the challenges were not visible outside the operation and EUFOR RCA was well received by the locals. Indeed, based on the research material, the EU soldiers were rather successful in establishing a trust relationship with the population. This was done first through regular meetings with local authorities and civil society: the mayor, neighborhood leaders, the religious leaders, the leaders of militias, local (youth) associations, in brief everyone with potential influence to a wider community. The purpose of these meetings was to lead awareness campaigns and events focused on the reconciliation process and rebuild social cohesion. The aim was to create space for dialogue, and to promoting harmonious co-existence between the communities. As one association president from the third district explained:

"The objective was to try to make people understand that we are first central Africans and that everyone has the right to choose his own religion. We're all central Africans and we have to live..."

473 Interview no.3.
474 Interview no. 36, 37, 38, 39.
together. Even if we don't like the others, we have to live together, to respect the laws on which
the society is based, there's no question to kill each other because of religion.\textsuperscript{475}"

In other words, EUFOR (with other actors) tried to instill a spirit of dialogue and forgiveness in the population
mind.\textsuperscript{476} Through its CIMIC component, EUFOR also used to organize sanitation campaigns that brought
youth from both districts to work together. It used to promote sportive activities between communities such as
football or basketball match and proceeded to the rehabilitation of some playgrounds.\textsuperscript{477} The idea was again
to encourage communication between people who was not willing to talk to each other anymore. To reinforce
the bond between the people, some EUFOR soldiers also used to participate to these sportive initiatives.
EUFOR support for the free movement of people between the districts was motivated by the same
communication objective.

Due to the foot patrol, EUFOR also used to directly meet and talk with the local population especially about
their problems and needs. The soldiers could have conversation about anything since the purpose was to
create a bond with the locals. All the CAR citizens who were interviewed for this research highlighted that
EUFOR succeeded in getting close to the population. One Muslim citizen living in the third district referred to
his experience with EUFOR as follows:

"EUFOR tried to have a dialogue with us. […] EUFOR men used to talk with everybody, be it
children or old men, EUFOR was open, they listened to what we had to say, exchanged ideas
with citizens, they gave us information, they gave us advice, and they used to look for
information for us. They were not just talking to the intellectuals or the rich people, they had a
dialogue with everybody. […] EUFOR, they used to visit us, to ask questions, to play with
children, they were together with the people. […] If there was a problem, they were there to intervene, and people got used to them."\textsuperscript{478}

This appreciation was shared by a Christian interviewee according to whom "EUFOR was much more appreciated by the population [than the other peace support operations] because it used to communicate frequently with citizens in the districts."\textsuperscript{479} Furthermore, the fact that EUFOR seems to have had Muslims within its troops, had an impact at least on some locals who were reassured by the presence of "Muslim brothers" among the Force:

"When you feel that you're hated by the Christians and then you see a brother, who says he is
Muslim, even if he is different, even if he has different color, it reassures you. You think to

\textsuperscript{475} Interview no. 37.
\textsuperscript{476} Interview no. 36.
\textsuperscript{477} Interview no. 37.
\textsuperscript{478} Interview no. 39.
\textsuperscript{479} Interview no. 35.
yourself, "Why can't we be together while they are together?" They don't belong to the same religion, but they serve in the same army together. That makes you feel good, it relieves people."480

Hence, EUFOR seems to have had adopted a “communitarian approach” that was largely praised by the population as reported by all the Bangui citizens interviewed for this research.481 As one third district high ranking official explained, “With EUFOR, the population really had the feeling that the force was by their side.”482

Such a positive attitude towards EUFOR by the CAR citizens was also recognized by several NGO workers, according to which EUFOR soldiers were respectful and instilled confidence.483 Furthermore, the European operation was largely praised for being very mobile, reactive, and visible by all the interviewees. It could intervene rapidly in the event of problems and handle violence without excessive use of force or disproportionate means.484 Its interventions were termed ‘balanced’.485 In addition, EUFOR was described as being less aggressive than other forces.486 Such an approach is extremely important when one is striving to build trust and gain the population’s support.

The EUFOR posture was particularly noteworthy since the rules of engagement were robust and hard-liners were regularly trying to challenge the troops via very provocative behaviour. For instance, soldiers often used to face militias, including children, who, while armed with rifles or machetes, behaved in a threatening way in order to trigger a violent response from EUFOR. During such provocation, a camera was often used to film EU actions in hopes of a skirmish affecting women and children. Such a film could have been used with the objective of turning the population against EUFOR and triggering an escalation of violence, which surely would have damaged the EU’s reputation. Despite all of the provocation EUFOR faced, the troop seem to have managed to keep their cool. Maintaining such an approach was highly important for the transformation process, given that confrontational military action is counterproductive in most cases – it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

One Christian Bangui citizen reported that some Christians thought that, since EUFOR was heavily involved in the third district, it was mainly there to protect the Muslim population. However, other interviewees argued that EUFOR was largely perceived as neutral because of its transparency, but also the way it is used to facilitate dialogue, listen and protect the minority as well as the majority. Nevertheless, these perceived bias did not seem to play a significant role in the Force acceptance and appreciation given that every

480 Interview no. 39.
481 Interview no. 38.
482 Interview no. 38.
483 Interview no. 12
484 Interview no. 40
485 Interview no. 13.
486 For example Interview no. 38.
interviewees recognized that EUFOR departure provoked a deep regret within the population no matter their ethnic or religious background. Naturally, one could assume that militias’ leaders, delinquents and bandits were happy to see EUFOR leaving, but the termination of the operation was largely perceived ‘unsettling’ by the Bangui citizens.

For all the reasons described previously, the operation succeeded in creating a large network of contacts with which it could gather or transmit valuable information but also reinforce the European flag’s popularity. An NGO worker who had daily contact with the EU mission described the EUFOR RCA’s presence in Bangui as follows;

‘EUFOR had worked really well with the local actors, be they government actors or civil-society members, especially in the third and fifth districts. They developed a network of contacts to speak with civil society, the districts’ chiefs, the mayor, the rebel groups, key religious players, local associations, in order to try to calm down, to direct, to listen and pass on some messages. There was at the same time proximity through the patrols and the contact with civil society. The population and the local actors, like the mayor of the district, really appreciated that. It was an essential factor in the stabilisation. EUFOR had done exactly what was needed to reassure the population by patrolling, being visible, and creating contacts. If I needed to speak to a certain person in the third and the fifth district, I knew that I could ask EUFOR, who’d put me in touch with the right person.’

According to a highly ranked ECHO official, the European operation succeeded in creating absolutely exceptional contacts. The proximity relationship created by EUFOR therefore played a crucial role in the operation’s acceptance and its popularity with the population. For one NGO worker who worked in the districts, foot patrols in the streets really made a difference. Not only did this patrolling improve security, but it also helped to collect and transmit relevant information about citizens’ needs to the NGO so that the latter could perhaps adjust its projects accordingly in some cases. It must be stressed that the EUFOR network and foot patrols were also an excellent source of human intelligence related to, for instance, militias’ (hostile) intentions, leaders’ identity, and criminal activities. The EU troops’ popularity was such that CAR citizens sometimes on their own initiative provided EUFOR with intelligence that was quite useful for purposes such as anticipating and reacting to riots or attacks. The intelligence gathered even helped EUFOR take down criminal groups and criminal networks.

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487 Interview no. 13.
488 Interview no.20.
489 Ibid; Interview no. 13.
490 Interview no. 14.
1.4.3 Training

Currently, the Member States are responsible for organizing pre-deployment trainings to their own nationals. Nevertheless, in absence of common standards or curricula, vary the training greatly. The EU has attempted to tackle to challenge of fragmented trainings by obligating the missions to conduct induction training for the mission staff. **Nevertheless, these trainings only provide an introduction to the host country and general CSDP matters, and thus do not overcome the issue of uniform training.** The quality of mission induction training varies as widely as do the member state commitments to pre-deployment training. It was stated during the interviews that a common foundation of pre-deployment training can enhance mission effectiveness and coherence by ensuring that mission personnel have a solid understanding of the operational environment and code of conduct. The interviewees highlighted that the main focus should be on cultural awareness and on understanding the mission’s operational environment, as the lack of understanding of the local culture, customs, and conflict drivers was seen to hamper the operation.491

According to the information gathered, at least some EUFOR contingents faced a lack of training not only before but also during the deployment. The Finnish pre-deployment training, for instance, consisted of a one-day combat exercise, and troops had only half a day’s training during the mission. Furthermore, the training given was not suited to the mission and the area of operation, which is an urban zone.492 It also seems that **no joint exercises were carried out with other contingents during the operation.** Very little information was provided prior to the deployment on the country’s characteristics. This probably explains the lack of knowledge of local culture that was observed among EU soldiers.493 In fact, members of one interviewee’s unit were, in essence, forced to dig for information on their own via the Internet.494 Still, according to one EUFOR officer;

‘There are many important things that should be trained [in] and things that could be improved through training that would help operators on the ground and thus the entire operation: training all members of the operation how to fight and to move in urban areas, first-aid training, how to work with the locals, improving attitudes towards the locals, providing teaching about African culture and its characteristics, training [in] how to properly interact with locals, training [in] body language’.495

491 Interview no.4.
492 Interview no.14.
493 Interview no.10.
494 Interviews no. 14, and no. 16.
495 Interview no.16.
Most of the personnel deployed to EUFOR RCA were professionals from their respective national defence forces, and hence many of the officers had participated in international exercises and trainings as part of their normal career. Protocol, procedures and terminology across the Member states are more or less the same. Nevertheless, pre-deployment training is also important for the military to ensure the coherence of multinational staff to be able to rapidly accomplish EUFOR RCA’s operational needs. A common module dedicated to the country of deployment was regularly recommended by NGO workers, since such instruction can be particularly useful in order to build trust among the population or reinforce it. A common module on the local culture, history, traditions, and ethnic composition and relations can improve soldiers’ efficiency in violence management since ‘there is a whole category of people whose violence can be defused very easily if you know how to handle them’. Furthermore, having the basic knowledge of the habits, and traditions can help to avoid some common cultural clashes facilitating the assimilation to the new environment. In addition, having up-to-date information on the parties, state and consequences of the conflict as part of the pre-deployment or induction training could help the officers to get orientated to their operational environment. In addition, cultural awareness training could be a tool to foster the cooperation within the multinational operation as well as the cooperation between the international troops and the local population.

1.4.4 Code of conduct

Although, EUFOR RCA was well perceived by the Bangui citizens as well as many of the NGOs and other international organisations, it must be equally stressed that three EUFOR RCA interviewees verified numerous cases of misconduct, even by officers, within the operation. This comprised of internal misbehaviour within staff of the EUFOR RCA in camp UCATEX, and towards the local population.

In terms of internal misconduct, it was mentioned by two interviewees that, for instance, heavy alcohol consumption was frequent among some of the contingents. Indeed, while EUFOR was designed to be a zero-consumption operation, soon it became accepted to enjoy two bottles of beer a day and finally it transpired that soldiers could drink as much as they wanted. An interviewee stated that this happened weekly, sometimes many times in the course of a week. Nevertheless, as the researchers could not get the access to the operation’s internal reports there is no further information on whether these incidents were reported.

Interviewees also reported cases of misconduct towards locals: aggressive behaviour and lack of respect. Some of the misconduct was clearly illegal. It seems that, for instance, some peacekeepers bought services of prostitutes, including with food. Few interviewees confirmed that heavy substance use

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496 Interview no. 10.
497 Interviews no. 13, and no.14.
498 Interview no.12.
499 Interview no.14.
500 Interview no. 14, Interview no. 16, Interview no. 17.
501 Ibid.; Interview no.16
was also common. According to an interviewee the misbehaviour was not addressed within EUFOR RCA, yet the reporting of the misconduct was at the responsibility of the national contingents. As described by one of the interviewees, to some degree this caused loss of trust among the officers.

‘Even some officers were responsible for misconduct. Because of these behaviour, ‘some [EUFOR] members lost their trust [in] their superiors [and] misconduct decreased soldiers’ will to commit to the operation and made them want to leave as soon as possible.’

According to EUFOR officer, soldiers from several contingents were involved in misconducts. As a result, reports made during the operation could not always be trusted, since they contained false information that distorted the operation’s image ‘back home’ and cast it in a falsely positive light. For example, misconduct sometimes went unreported because commanders did not want to be viewed unfavourably. Therefore, one interviewee recommended setting up some sort of channel that would allow bypassing the national commanders in certain cases so that the higher levels in the decision-making process would get accurate information from the field. Such a mechanism would help prevent leaders from lying about the situation on the ground.

This sort of misconduct can be said to hamper the operational capabilities. At the time of writing, investigations are being conducted on allegations of sexual abuse involving EUFOR RCA soldiers. On 29 January 2016, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein released a statement about sexual abuse allegations involving Georgian soldiers but also other nationalities that at time remained unclear. According to the UN, ‘two of the girls interviewed said they were raped by EUFOR soldiers, and the two other girls said they were paid to have sexual relationships with other EUFOR soldiers’. There is no doubt that if these allegations turn out to be true, a serious blow would be dealt to the EUFOR and EU image, particularly since Sangaris and MINUSCA troops too face serious sexual-abuse accusations. This potential aside, the overall picture remains positive: the European Union operation, as explained throughout this report, was praised for its success by a broad spectrum of actors, including NGOs, researchers, Bangui citizens, and CAR authorities.

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502 Interview no. 16.
503 Ibid.
504 Interview no. 14.
505 Ibid.
1.5 COMPREHENSIVENESS

The EU’s approach to the conflict in the Central African Republic can be described rather comprehensive. Several EU institutions in CAR share common objectives and, at least theoretically, represent a comprehensive approach of the EU towards CAR. This Chapter 1.5 provides an analysis of the comprehensiveness and the level of co-operation and co-ordination of the EU instruments, from both the EU and the non-EU perspective.

1.5.1 EU contributions

The European Union approach to the Central African conflict is, above all, based on security, which is obviously a fundamental condition for every peace process. Therefore, when the Anti-balaka launched its massive attack on Bangui on 5 December 2013, the European Union’s first action was to provide 50 million €508 in funding for MISCA through the African Peace Facility (APF)510. Then, the EU contributed to ensuring safety through EUFOR RCA with the purpose of giving enough time first to MISCA and the for the MINUSCA to deploy its troops. However, Brussels also decided to contribute to the state security apparatus’s reconstruction.

It should be reiterated that by around December 2013, the already ‘ghostly’ administration had totally collapsed. Policemen and judges had all fled out of fear of being killed by Séléka, and FACA had totally disintegrated in the face of the advancing coalition. There was general anarchy, given that no-one was able to enforce law. Even the prisons had been devastated and couldn’t accommodate any inmates. For these reasons, the European Union identified, early on, impunity as a major threat to the peace process. It was indispensable to reintroduce the minimum rule of law. Consequently, with regard to the police forces, the European Union launched a major state-building project called RESEJEP511 early on. This involved the rehabilitation of prison facilities and police offices but also the reconstruction of the penal chain, notably through the formation of police and gendarmerie. With regard to the military forces, as the follow up for EUFOR RCA the member states launched a military advisory mission (EUMAM RCA) first, on 15 March 2015, with the purpose of supporting the CAR authorities in preparation of the country’s Security Sector Reform, while, on 14 March 2016, the council had adopted a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a military training mission (EUTM CAR) for an initial duration of two years as a follow-up mission to EUMAM RCA.

508 Agreement on a second contribution, of €75 million, was signed in mid-2014, although APF support to the troops ended with the transfer of authority between MISCA and the MINUSCA on 15 September 2014.
510 It should be stressed that the APF assistance was essential for the functioning of MISCA.
511 The Cotonou Agreement (Article 11) forms the overall legal framework on which the APF is based. The APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF), which is not part of the general EU budget; This financial support is aimed at covering the costs of allowances, accommodation, and feeding of the troops, along with salaries of civilian MISCA personnel and various operational costs such as those of transport, communication, and medical services.
511 In French, ‘REGESP’ refers to ‘Projet de Réhabilitation des Secteurs de la Justice et de la Police’.
Any peace-building strategy requires, first of all, **a functioning state capable of delivering at least minimal services to its citizens**. This is why, over the past few years, besides the security sector reconstruction, the European Union has participated in the international community’s effort aimed at constructing the Central African administration. Brussels is widely engaged in dozens of projects with the objective of rebuilding the Central African state. It plays an indispensable role in supporting transition authorities through direct funding to the CAR budget but also through the provision of technical assistance to key ministries. The EU aims also to foster economic recovery by investing in infrastructure and public offices’ rehabilitation. However, since the very beginning, one of the member states’ main priorities has been the organisation of a political transition the objective of which was legislative and presidential elections.

**The European Union has been indeed the main financial contributor to the electoral process** that is considered a crucial step indispensable for giving state legitimacy for adoption and implementation of the future reforms intended to address CAR conflicts’ causes.

### 1.5.2 Intra-organisational cooperation and coordination

EUFOR RCA was integrated into broader European initiatives as a part of the EU’s global approach. The global approach was implemented via narrow co-ordination among EUFOR, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Development and Humanitarian Affairs (DG ECHO), Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO), and the EU delegation in Bangui. This co-ordination took place through regular meetings within the delegation but also through video-based teleconferences in Brussels involving OHQ, FHQ, European Commission staff, and the EEAS.

**The EU delegation** played an important role for the EUFOR RCA. Firstly, they acted as a link between the EUFOR RCA and key state actors, helping the staff to understand the local political and cultural dynamics. Secondly, the EU Delegation coordinated the funding, and acted as a link between the different EU agencies thereby facilitating the dialogue enabling the actors to work together in a comprehensive manner. The EU’s global approach translated into efficient and consistent co-ordination and co-operation among EUFOR RCA, DG ECHO, and DG DEVCO for implementation of humanitarian and development projects. As one EUFOR official explained, the force provided support to the European Commission for helping projects have a real impact on the ground, but those projects were also framed to complement and support the military action.512

A good illustration of the EU’s global approach as implemented in the CAR involved the **DG DEVCO RESEJEP programme**, which was aimed at training and equipping new gendarmerie and police units.

According to several EU officials, the co-ordination among EU actors turned out to be quite efficient. One highly ranking ECHO officer qualified EUFOR as ‘a perfect example of civilian–military co-operation’ because

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512 Interview no. 26.
the humanitarian perspective was integrated not only during the planning but also in the implementation phase.

‘ECHO people really wanted to work with us and opened the humanitarian sphere to us. We didn’t break humanitarians’ neutrality principle but we could work in good “entente”. There were sometimes some tensions, but in general, the relation was really good. There was a will from ECHO to explain things to us, because sometimes we did things because we didn’t know. They helped us to work in complementarity with humanitarians without breaking their neutrality. I really had good relations with most of the most important humanitarians’ actor what facilitated a lot our work.513

Therefore, EUFOR was, for instance, very reactive to securitisation requests. According to another EUFOR official, the EU succeeded in speaking with a consistent voice through its numerous representatives on the ground. Such a common front was particularly useful when the European actors, EUFOR in particular, strove to convince local authorities to follow recommendations – CAR authorities could not play one actor against another.

1.6 INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability, which is closely linked to comprehensiveness, refers to co-operation or collaboration; co-ordination; and potential civil–military, civil–civil or military–military synergies achieved through the co-operation/co-ordination. This section of the report provides an analysis of the co-operation and co-ordination mechanisms, or lack thereof, within EUFOR RCA, between the operation and other international actors, and with local stakeholders. In addition, the analysis is aimed at identifying factors with potential to hamper co-operation and/or co-ordination and thereby undermine the comprehensiveness of the CSDP operation or the EU as a whole.

1.6.1 Cooperation and coordination within EUFOR RCA

It seems that EUFOR RCA did not face serious problems with interoperability. One has to bear in mind that most of the participating states, including Georgia, had participated in operations in Afghanistan, but also that most were also members of NATO. Because of these common bases, the troops already had a high level of skills related interoperability. However, it must be stressed that some interviewees did report problems with language knowledge514 and information-sharing within EUFOR. These criticisms were
confirmed by two EUFOR personnel according to whom information-sharing was very limited.\textsuperscript{515} It seems that the national commander played an important role in information-sharing, and that sometimes proved to be a barrier.\textsuperscript{516}

A common issue raised the EUFOR RCA officers was the lack of reliable classified communication systems. For example, establishing the information system for the operation took more than three months, and the communication between Bangui and OHQ in Larissa took place via internet. Furthermore, the access to the operation information was limited and in some cases, the national caveats were hampering the sharing of information. In addition, some third of countries participating in the operation, such as Georgia, make the releasability of documents even more difficult, as the information can be circulated only among the EU Member States.\textsuperscript{517}

Furthermore, significant deficiencies were identified with regard to technical interoperability in the form of lack of common equipment, which limited the considerably the activities of the different units. Interviewees reported huge differences in equipment levels between national contingents. While some had everything they needed, others faced a lack of equipment that hindered soldiers’ capacity to do their job efficiently.\textsuperscript{518}

“Polish got almost everything what they wanted, Estonians had everything mgs, anti-tank weapons etc. They even wondered why they had taken so much with them”. Some soldiers seemed to be unable to operate their own equipment, because they had not been given sufficient training.\textsuperscript{519}

In the absence of a common funding mechanism, the national platoons are heavily dependent on home support in terms of equipping and maintenance. If the home country does not provide appropriate equipment to execute the tasks required during the operation, a considerable security and efficiency problem results for the whole operation.\textsuperscript{520}

\textbf{1.6.2 Cooperation and coordination with international military actors}

Owing to the nature of EUFOR RCA as a transition operation, co-ordination and co-operation played an important role in the overall effectiveness of the operation. According to the informants, both the EU and non-EU actors, the co-operation between EUFOR RCA and other military operations was relatively well co-ordinated. Some overlapping was identified, but the co-ordination was efficient in general. An important reason for such efficient co-ordination can be seen in the fact that the international military contribution in the

\textsuperscript{515} Interviews no. 16. and no. 17.
\textsuperscript{516} Interview no. 16.
\textsuperscript{517} For example Interview no. 27.
\textsuperscript{518} Interview no. 14.
\textsuperscript{519} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{520} Interview no. 13.
country was very limited, relative to the geographical size of the CAR\textsuperscript{521}. According to an EU officer, the objective of all the actors – France and the EU, UN, and AU – was to improve the security situation as much as possible with the limited resources available. Thereby, the military operations’ leaders strove systematically to co-ordinate the activities at several levels. \textit{An important enabler for this effective co-ordination was that the EU had worked a lot with the AU, the UN, and France before forming and deploying the troops.} Because of these planning meetings, the various actors knew each other’s strengths and weaknesses and the roles on the ground were assigned accordingly\textsuperscript{522}.

The Operation Headquarters (OHQ) of the EU’s mission was in Larissa, Greece. Co-ordination between the OHQ and ground was managed by the Operation Commander and Force Commander stationed in Bangui. Practical co-ordination on the ground was performed daily, ensuring that the activities would not overlap\textsuperscript{523}. The co-ordination was done mainly through regular meetings between the key actors. It was emphasised in the interviews that \textit{a lot of the joint planning was done at the political level before EUFOR RCA was deployed,} rendering collaboration on the ground systematic. In addition, the EU delegation had an important role in the field-level co-ordination among the AU, the UN, the EU and France\textsuperscript{524}. According to a non-EU official, there were also constant consultations between the EU and AU. The various branches of the effort, from military to civilian, worked together, and information was shared between actors\textsuperscript{525}.

An important enabler for the co-ordination stemmed from the fact that the military operations had similar objectives, thereby making the division of tasks easier. The calendars and roadmaps were adjusted such that the activities of EUFOR RCA, the UN, and Sangaris would support rather than conflict with one another. According to an EU officer, this pre-planning was relatively successful. Naturally, much of the planning was left to the last minute, but, all in all, the operations worked together efficiently. One EU officer highlighted the importance of the co-ordination for the effectiveness of the operation, not only for the sake of using limited resources more efficiently but also for making the local population aware of the roles and activities of the various operations. Efficient collaboration helped the locals to differentiate between operations.\textsuperscript{526}

There were also some shortcomings identified in the co-ordination among the military operations.\textsuperscript{527} Deployment of EUFOR RCA was very much initiated by France. Consequently, for the EU, EUFOR RCA was an operation that aimed to ease the French troops’ workload. The EU and the French together had to prepare for the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces, making co-operation clearly necessary. Nevertheless, according to a non-EU official, although the co-operation between the UN and EU was co-ordinated relatively well, there was room for improvement between Sangaris and other operations. According to this interviewee,
Operation Sangaris functioned quite separately from others, having quite different rules of engagement and approaching the population differently than the UN and EU troops did. At times, the reputation of Sangaris also influenced how EUFOR RCA officers were perceived by the local population, making differentiation between these operations even more important. According to an interviewee, the dominance of France (namely, the French embassy) complicated co-ordination among operations at times. For example, the France ambassador sometimes took decisions, even dangerous ones that were neither well communicated to nor approved by either Sangaris or EUFOR.

Another barrier to the co-ordination among the operations was identified as insufficient sharing of information among the supranational actors. For example, in the absence of an ‘information sharing agreement’, the EU and UN are not entitled to share all their information. This led to some delays in, for example, receiving crucial intelligence information from the ground that had an impact on the operational planning. In addition, lack of a shared HQ for the international actors was seen as having hampered the overall planning and execution of the operations. The good co-ordination efforts aside, the different military operations still had different mandates and so had different priorities and responsibilities, raising the question of why the three military operations could not be combined into one.

1.6.3 Cooperation and coordination with humanitarian actors

In addition to the international military forces, there were several other NGOs and intergovernmental organisations (IOs) supporting the stabilisation of the country. One of the main factors in EUFOR’s success was the quality of the co-operation with humanitarian and developments actors. For this purpose, EUFOR created a platform with OCHA leadership in order to exploit synergies between humanitarian actors and the European troops. Unlike the forum established by the MINUSCA later, the EUFOR platform was open to all actors of any size. An opening of this type was very useful since many small NGOs were leading valuable micro-development projects in the country.

This platform had several advantages. Firstly, EUFOR could co-ordinate its patrols with humanitarian actors’ project locations (or agendas) in order to make specific zones secure and improve reactivity, which is very important for maximising efficiency. Military and civilian personnel could express opinions and advise each other. Also, EUFOR could exchange information with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) with respect to security circumstances in the districts and citizens’ needs. Indeed, thanks to their regular patrols and contact network, the EU troops gathered information, for instance on Bangui citizens’ desires, which were regularly communicated to International Organisations and NGOs. This co-ordination was quite important.

528 Interview no. 14.
529 ibid.
530 Interview no. 4.
531 Interview no. 12; Interview no. 13.
because lack of a wide-scale network meant that the NGOs did not have the capacity to gather information that EUFOR had. Thirdly, the platform helped to put NGOs in contact with each other so that they could present and talk about their projects and therefore co-operate or co-ordinate. In addition, EUFOR would co-ordinate with the international organisations.

Relations between the mission and UN actors were handled through OCHA, for instance. According to an NGO representative, this co-ordination was efficient, and a EUFOR officer of high rank described the co-ordination with the IOM as ‘remarkable’. The IOM projects (largely EU-financed) and EUFOR mandate were indeed intended to be complementary, and this required a narrow co-ordination mechanism beyond what EUFOR was doing with the rest of the international community in Bangui. With this relationship, EU troops used to make specific areas secure so that the IOM could conduct projects, but, both entities also would exchange valuable information related to, for instance, youth-recruitment locations so that the IOM could intervene with a cash component in order to give people an alternative to armed groups.

According to one informant, contact between the key humanitarian actors and EUFOR RCA’s Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) team was frequent. Nevertheless, that interviewee noted that co-operation efforts were challenged by the fact that there were problems with internal communication between different nationalities within EUFOR RCA. The information given by the humanitarian actors often did not circulate among the EUFOR staff, and this made the co-operation inefficient at times. Another factor hampering efficient CIMIC-operations was one related to the French language. Many of the EUFOR staff did not speak French, and this rendered the CIMIC-related tasks challenging. After all, the purpose of the CIMIC team was to speak with members of civil society and pass on the information within the military. Information-gathering was often hampered by lack of language skills.

From the discussion of overlap of activities between EUFOR RCA and humanitarian actors, it seems that co-ordination among the military operations was better than the co-ordination among the various humanitarian actors. According to several non-EU actors, the coordination was notably good in terms of securization, discussion, and information sharing. Nevertheless, according to several humanitarian actors, there was still room for improvement, although, according to a non-EU official, it was handled better here than in other conflict areas. Lack of understanding of each other’s roles and working culture was at times perceived as hampering the co-operation between the civilian and military actors.

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532 Interview no. 10.
533 Interview no. 9.
534 Interview no. 11.
535 Interview no. 13.
536 Interview no. 10.
537 Ibid.
In addition, the areas where improvements were especially needed were related to **sharing of information and resources**. Sharing the information was highlighted as especially crucial for reaching common goals. In a country where hostilities towards humanitarian workers are common, the military are able to travel to places where it is too dangerous for the other internationals to go. Therefore, it is the military officers who are more likely to come across child soldiers. When this happens, it is important that these officers inform the humanitarian actors. This co-operation is an effective way of improving the release of child soldiers and serves as a practical example of how the co-operation can help to improve the overall stability and security of the country.

Nevertheless, the interaction between military and humanitarian actors can on some occasions, have a negative impact on each other. The key issue, overarching and widely documented challenge facing civil–military interaction within peace building, concerns the tension between the neutral and impartial provision of humanitarian assistance and the political and strategic objectives of military forces and of governments directing them. This was also the reason why many of the NGOs, such as Doctors without border, refused to cooperate with EUFOR RCA. Nevertheless, most of the NGO’s seemed to be happy with EUFOR RCA, since there was no role confusion, and humanitarians protection was done in such a way that NGO neutrality was generally not threatened.

### 1.6.4 Cooperation and coordination with the local actors

According to several interviewees, one of EUFOR’s most important successes lies in the excellent relationship of trust between the troops and the population. For understanding the dynamic that led to such a relationship, it must be explained that when EUFOR was deployed, the French troops were disliked and even hated by a portion of the citizenry. These feelings vis-à-vis Sangaris can be explained partially by the fact that Sangaris intervened as an interposition force for the purpose of stopping the fighting between anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka militants. Therefore, the French operation was quickly rejected by those people who wanted to fight each other at all costs. France’s unpopularity was also linked to the colonial past, which was frequently cited to discredit French forces. However, the main reason is probably that Sangaris, in December 2013, made a significant error in judgement by organising a forced disarmament of the Séléka. France thought that blame for the problem lay mainly with the Séléka fighters and underestimated the threat posed by the anti-Balaka. While France expected the violence to decrease after Séléka disarmament, Sangaris failed to account for the fact that the Séléka had actually become the de facto protector of the Muslim population in Bangui. When most of the Séléka were disarmed or had gone, a

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538 For example Interview no. 14; Interview no. 16.
539 Interview no. 10; Interview no. 33; Interview no. 34.
541 Interviews no.11, no.12, no.13, and, no 15.
542 Interview no.2.
543 Interview no. 22.
Muslim hunt organised by the anti-Balaka took place throughout the city. One local journalist described the local perception as follows: “at the beginning, Sangaris disarmed Séléka members but then let them at the mercy of the crowds who were thirst for revenge and who therefore hunted Séléka or Muslims and their families.”544 In consequence, the Muslim population felt great resentment toward the French troops for months. In fact, some Muslims even concluded that the French troops were Séléka allies.545 Because of the deep bitterness towards French troops within the third and fifth district, EUFOR tried to ease the tensions by using the multinational character of the operation. The first patrols contained only non-French troops, in fact, to build trust between EUFOR and locals. During this observation period, CAR citizens for the first time saw troops coming from regions other than France or Africa. This contributed to a progressive decline in tensions because there had been no controversial past between them. Since EUFOR RCA covered only two districts, it could patrol day and night from the FOC on foot not only along the main axes but also in the neighbourhood’s numerous narrow streets. Therefore, EU troops were omnipresent. Also, EUFOR rapidly adopted a more neutral posture by, for instance, wearing berets instead of helmets. This was, of course, a risk since Bangui is a dense urban zone where soldiers could easily be ambushed. In this difficult environment, despite their best efforts, peacekeepers are likely to cause civilians to be put inadvertently in harm’s way. African Union forces have returned fire into populated areas in order to protect themselves and civilians under imminent threat. French forces have also used force to suppress attacks against themselves and civilians. EUFOR RCA was also regularly put to the test by local armed groups, but the response always respected the proportionality principle and maintained discrimination between non-combatants and combatants.

Consequently, it must be stressed that EUFOR RCA was probably the most dangerous operation ever conducted by EU troops. The trade-off was that using berets was able to have an important psychological effect on the population because the troops’ posture was perceived as less aggressive.546 This contributed to trust-building with the locals.547 This approach was in stark contrast to the French troops’, which favoured caution, focusing on important armour and protection for the deployed staff. Incidentally, some observers criticised the latter approach. Among them was General Jacques Norlain, for whom light patrols appeared better adapted. He even opined that, in some cases, using excessive protection might prove counterproductive – ‘by doing so, we increase pressure, the soldier gives the impression of being afraid; [and] the effect on the enemies is disastrous’.548 French soldiers were introduced only little by little

544Interview no. 36.  
545 Interview no. 15.  
546 Interview no. 33; Interview no. 34.  
547 Interview no.2.  
548 French National Assembly report, p. 208.
after about one month had passed, when EUFOR had succeeded in creating a truly European force perception.549

In relation to the cooperation between EUFOR RCA and CAR’s security sector, it must be bared in mind that all CAR security forces had disintegrated in December 2013. Most policemen had fled or had been killed, courts had been destroyed, and judges were in hiding. Therefore, the EU wanted to create new police units in order to revive the CAR penal process. One has to note first that EUFOR had a small criminal and judiciary unit within the gendarmerie component that provided its expertise as part of the RESEJEP programme. Then, a few months after its deployment, EUFOR took the initiative also to arrange joint patrols comprising European forces and the newly trained CAR gendarmerie units.550 During these common patrols in the third and fifth districts, the Central African Republic forces (FACA) were put on the first line while EU militaries and gendarmes were a few metres behind in case need arose. Hence, the CAR gendarmerie could progressively gain confidence, undergo formation alongside the EU gendarmerie, and return to the districts. With EUFOR and EU assistance, FACA was able to reopen a police station also.

It should be noted that the co-operation on this specific issue was not planned before the operation launched, so it shows that EU forces could formulate important new initiatives once on the ground. The common patrols seem to have had a positive effect on the population, given that one of the Bangui citizens’ main disappointments or ‘sufferings’551 came from the lack of a FACA presence on the city’s streets. After several weeks of dialogue, EUFOR concluded that national forces were necessary for reassuring IDPs, many of whom wanted to see local forces actually on patrol in the districts before returning to their homes.

Even if the FACA presence was rather symbolic, in view of the lack of equipment and troops, CAR police had an important psychological effect for the population, who needed to be reassured to some extent by the national forces’ activities. One interviewee who had daily contacts with IDPs explained: ‘Many people couldn’t consider returning home without national forces’ presence. How could they go back home if even the police feared to do their job in these districts?’552

Furthermore, common patrolling with the CAR gendarmerie helped to reassure some Muslims Bangui citizens who were very suspicious about national forces because many citizens were told that, “the policemen were all anti-Balaka.” Not only during the patrols, EUFOR tried to convince people that these

549 Interview no.2.
550 It took time for these joint patrols to be put in place, however, because the EU military officers felt for a long time that the gendarmerie was not ready.
552 Interview no. 25.
allegations were false, due to its presence, EUFOR gave also population confidence enough to talk directly to the police and, this way, realize the police wasn’t the enemy they were told it was.\textsuperscript{553}

It must be stressed, however, that common patrols took place mainly near the end of the operation, limiting the initiative’s impact on the population accordingly.\textsuperscript{554} In future similar operations, it may be wise to consider such common patrols and co-ordination between the European Commission and military personnel in the planning phase in order to encourage efficiency, especially since bridging operations are meant to be short-term.

1.7 TECHNOLOGIES

This section addresses the need for proper technical equipment in order to best cope with the operation mandate in a difficult environment and to also look into the potential for applying pooling and sharing in the context of a CSDP mission.

1.7.1 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC TECHNOLOGIES

CAR has long been one of the least developed countries in the world, with poor and underdeveloped infrastructure. The lack of necessary infrastructure renders parts of the country accessible. There are no railroads, and, as it is a landlocked country, it has only limited waterways, with the Oubangui River being the most important. The road network is also limited\textsuperscript{555} and poorly maintained, and deteriorate in the rainy seasons. Consequently, moving around the country outside the Bangui area is difficult. Furthermore, the country’s communication network is limited. Fixed telephone lines are rare, and those that exist are in bad shape. The main communication channel for reaching the majority of the population is radio. There is also a broadcast television station, but it does not reach the entire population. Also, television sets are expensive, and the majority cannot afford them.\textsuperscript{556}

The lack of logistical and communication networks, and lack of skilled local human resources made the establishment and running of the operation challenging. EUFOR RCA was established under difficult circumstances. The security situation in Bangui area was dangerous, and EUFOR RCA had to build the camp with limited local resources and infrastructure, and before it had reached its full operational capability. Hence, after its deployment in April 2014, the Operation Sangaris, played an important role in supporting the EUFOR RCA staff to have minimal, decent conditions of living, until the EUFOR RCA was able to move to UCATEX on 20 July 2014. According to several EUFOR RCA Officers, building the camp took too long, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{553} Interview no. 39
  \item \textsuperscript{554} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{555} In 2011 there was a total of 23,810 km of roads in the Central African Republic and only 643 km was paved.
  \item \textsuperscript{556} Interview no.5
\end{itemize}
was built with too much care and resources, considering that the operation was meant to last one year maximum. For the first two months staff of EUFOR RCA stood with Sangaris at the M’Poko airport. That was considered as a real weakness, as it showed that such Force as EUFOR cannot be deployed in a country where there isn’t already an international Force able to take some things in charge.  

Indeed, the country’s poor infrastructure was highlighted several times to be one of the main obstacles for the stabilization of the country. Alongside, challenges related to poor road network the lack of internet connection and electricity, also created difficulties for the day-to day running of the operation. Consequently, the second problem was the information systems. As discussed in chapter 1.6 it took more than two months before the operation managed to establish secure information sharing and communication systems, as well as basic IT equipment. Until then, the staff had to work on their personal computers, and the only way to communicate with the OHQ was internet. Furthermore, during the mission, equipment deficiencies were identified in some contingents but few or none were addressed. Soldiers even complained about outdated software and cheap computers. Because of lack of an Internet connection and electricity, crucial information was lost or not available.

Furthermore, the operation also suffered from a shortfall in intelligence capabilities and from a lack of intelligence-sharing. One must remember that Bangui is a very dense urban zone with many narrow streets. Tensions could flare up quickly and turn into violent riots. Ability to gain precise intelligence rapidly was required for monitoring crowds’ and armed groups’ movements and concentration, for instance. This intelligence capability could have been provided by drones or helicopters, with which EUFOR could have been more reactive. However, as an air component is by nature very costly and heavy from a logistics perspective, no participation states wanted to provide such equipment to EUFOR RCA. Thanks to the focused co-operation with Sangaris and the UN, EUFOR RCA could partly fill that gap by sharing intelligence, but there is no doubt that the operation would have been much more efficient with its own intelligence capabilities.

1.7.2 POOLING AND SHARING
For the purpose of this analysis, pooling and sharing is understood as but as ‘institutionalised cooperation between states or other institutions, where capabilities/assets are shared, either in a bilateral, multinational and supranational context’. In the case of EUFOR RCA pooling and sharing of resources was important for the overall running of the operation. Due to force generation difficulties, there were gaps in capabilities, which were then filled up through bilateral agreements. Some of the critical capabilities, such as medical

557 Interview no.4
558 Interview no. 20.
559 IECEU-project D 6.1 Standardisation review: Comparing the analysis
care, would have not accessible without the bilateral agreements. For example, Germany offered strategic airlift capability for EUFOR RCA. On a bi-lateral level, France and Germany agreed to make the strategic airlift operation available also to Operation Sangaris.\footnote{Federal Foreign Office, ‘Germany willing to provide air transport for the EU military operation in the Central African Republic,’ updated in March 28 2016, at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2014/140328-EU_Mission_Zentralafrika.html.} For its part, Sangaris offered medical capabilities and a rapid-response force for EUFOR RCA. Sharing of information, as well as joint planning can also be seen as examples of pooling and sharing. In general, the tasks were divided among the UN, France, and EU, in line with their competencies and capabilities. Clear mandates, joint planning, and active consultation between partners can be identified as good practices for enhanced co-ordination between military actors acting in parallel. Consequently, the operations were composed, to some extent in complementary manner, in terms of composition and area of operation.

\section*{2 EFFECTIVENESS OF EUFOR RCA}

The EUFOR RCA assessment is based on the IECEU analysis guide, in which effectiveness is defined as when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner from the perspective of both the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent.\footnote{IECEU-project D1.4, Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention: Identifying the Success Factors, p. 8.} From the EU perspective, assessment related to internal goals is aimed at determining to what extent the European military operation met the EU’s politico-strategic goals and operational objectives as they are described especially in connection with the mandate. Internal appropriateness is examined in terms of whether the operation was implemented in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective way. From the conflict perspective, external goal attainment involves the extent to which EUFOR RCA prevented further violence and made a meaningful, positive, and sustainable contribution to conflict transformation. Finally, the examination of external appropriateness looks at whether the European force did more good than harm by respecting the proportionality and necessity principles. The operation can be framed as a success if all criteria are met well, while it can be considered a partial success if at least one of the four criteria has failed to be met.

\subsection*{2.1 Success for the EU}

\subsection*{2.1.1 Internal goal attainment}

\subsubsection*{2.1.1.1 POLITICO-STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES}

Although, the EU has provided financial support to CAR through various Commission projects, Trust Fund and Development Fund before the civil war in 2012 broke, it is still not self-evident why EU decided to intervene to the conflict. There is no one single explanation, yet based on the interviews, and the general

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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
discussion, the motivations can be coined to the following aspects; (1) EU’s desire to act as a normative power and hence a moral duty to intervene; (2) The matter of EU’s political creditability; (3) Regional stability and the need to prevent the CAR from becoming a failed state, and (4) A result of a French diplomatic offensive aimed at Europeanising the military intervention in the CAR.

Bearing the European Security Strategy (ESS) in mind, we can observe that the CAR crisis represented at least two potential threats toward the EU. The first is the threat posed by regional conflicts, which affect European interests directly and indirectly because ‘they destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organized crime’. The second threat is state failure, relevant since CAR had been considered as a failed state since long time, yet in December 2013 the CAR state was on the verge of total collapse and anarchy. The European Security Strategy indeed recognises that ‘collapse of the state can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability’. In accordance with these threats, an European External Action Service (EEAS) official confirmed that EU action in the CAR, including EUFOR, had three strategic objectives. It was aimed, firstly, at contributing to preventing additional regional destabilisation; secondly, the EU sought to contribute to keeping the CAR from becoming a rear base for criminal groups and terrorists; and, finally, Brussels aimed at helping prevent spill-over because of which communitarian tensions and potential radicalisation could have contaminated neighbouring countries, most clearly via refugee flows. Another European objective was to contribute to CAR conflict resolution and ‘support the return to the constitutional order’.

It must be acknowledged that these threats were much more indirect (and in the realm of the potential) for the European continent, given the distance between the EU and the CAR. For instance, state failure, regional conflicts, and terrorism would be much more dangerous to the EU if such threats came from the Balkans or Eastern Europe. However, it must be stressed that conflicts in distant countries can influence the EU, as the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria examples attest, notably in terms of refugee flows. Furthermore, the data provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicated in 2015 that “[t]he last five years have seen a dramatic increase in organized violence” the number of people who died in organized violence in

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563 Although, the CAR as such is far a way from the EU’s frontier there was a potential for spill-over to the neighbouring countries and thereby, affecting the stability of the whole region and EU’s neighbourhood.
564 The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based on EU’s core values. The strategy singled out five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime.
566 Ibid.
567 As explained earlier, notable spill-over could have occurred with Chad because of Muslims’ massacre and the flow of refugees. However, the radicalisation scenario lacked credibility. Where is it explained? I mean the spill over scenario or the radicalisation?
568 Interview no.24.
569 Ibid.
2014 being the highest since 1994\(^576\). Therefore, as the Economist put it, the EU is “facing a ring of fire on its eastern and southern flanks”\(^571\) since it is surrounded by countries in crisis as evidenced by conflicts in Ukraine, Libya, Syria and Iraq but also by instability in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria, Chad, and Niger that all struggle with violent Islamist extremism of one kind or another. Any of these countries’ instability can have an impact on the European Union as a whole – for example, in a form of flows of refugees, disruptions to trade and resource access, kidnapping or killing of European citizens, terrorism, human-rights violations, or crimes against humanity – and hence impinge on some EU vital interests.\(^572\)

Given the dangers already facing the Sahel and Central Africa, the European Union had to prevent an additional extensive civil war and humanitarian tragedy in a region already plagued with long-term serious conflicts as in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia or the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Beyond the threats that the CAR crisis posed for the region’s stability, it should be stressed that the European Union, just as the whole international community did, had an obvious moral duty to intervene in order to prevent large-scale massacres from taking place. However, contributing troops to the CAR was also a matter of political credibility for Brussels, since, for a long time, the European Union has been describing itself as a unique kind of power that, according to Article 21.1 TEU, assigns high priority to the protection of universal values such as peace, fundamental freedoms, and human rights all over the world. In reality, according to Ian Manners, five core norms guide the action of the European Union; these are peace, liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and democracy. This broad normative foundation has been developed ‘over the past 50 years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria, and conditions’\(^573\). It seems that these universal values have such importance for European Union identity and actions on the international scene that the descriptions ‘normative power’\(^574\), ‘civilian power’\(^575\), and ‘exemplary power’\(^576\) have often been used for distinguishing the EU’s norms, policies, and methods from those characteristic of traditional states and international organisations.


\(^572\) According to Sven Biscop, Europe’s vital interests are 1) to prevent direct military threats against Europe’s territory from materialising; 2) to keep open all lines of interaction with the world, most notably sea lanes and cyberspace; 3) to assure the supply of energy and other natural resources that society and the economy need; 4) to manage migration in an ethically acceptable way; 5) to mitigate the impact of climate change in order to limit the multiplier effect on security threats and, of course, to save the planet; 6) to uphold the core of international law, particularly that on interdiction and the use of force in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and 7) to preserve autonomy in decision-making by preventing undue dependence on any foreign power. See Sven Biscop, ‘Global and operational: A new strategy for EU foreign and security policy’, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Working Papers 15 (2013), p. 6.


\(^574\) See for instance, Zaki Laidi, La norme sans la force (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2013); Ian Manners, pp. 235–258; Bernard Adam, Europe puissance tranquille ? Rôle et identité sur la scène mondiale (Brussels: Éditions GRIP, 2006); Pierre Buhler, La puissance au 21ème siècle.


Logically, the European Union declared several times that it was ‘extremely concerned by the continuously deteriorating crisis in the Central African Republic’\(^{577}\) and by its ‘severe humanitarian and human-rights consequences’\(^{578}\). Thereby, considering the EU’s traditional discourses on human-rights protection and, in particular, the concerns of Brussels about the gravity of the situation in the CAR, the European Union could not refuse to respond to France’s appeal for assistance, given that doing so would have seriously damaged its credibility and its image. The EU had to follow its words with actions in order to be consistent, especially since 1) the CAR crisis was a low-intensity conflict in which Member States had reasonable chances of acting without risking many casualties and 2) France had launched a diplomatic offensive to put pressure on its partners publicly. Thus, a refusal to act would have fed harsh criticism and Eurosceptic discourses on EU passivity, hypocrisy, and lack of solidarity, particularly in France\(^{579}\). Furthermore, if the EU had refused to help France, this would have been a political blow to the CSDP, which had not deployed a military peacekeeping operation for five years.

In conclusion, **EUFOR RCA was a success from a politico-strategic perspective** since it contributed to preventing the CAR conflict from provoking spill-over and further regional destabilisation. Indeed, even if criminal gangs persist in the CAR, the latter did not become a terrorist haven. Quite the contrary, the action taken by Brussels provided support to France and the MINUSCA, which together succeeded in eventually organising presidential and legislative elections. That means that the Central African Republic returned, to some extent, to a constitutional order, even if state authority barely reached regions beyond Bangui. By helping to avoid additional humanitarian tragedies, the EU could show its flag and present itself with the image of a normative or exemplary power. It protected its credibility, which had been eroded to some extent because of a reluctance to act. Also, it is important to note that, while Member States showed some solidarity with France and avoided a potentially very embarrassing situation, the EU capitals’ weak participation nevertheless created some important tensions with Paris. Finally, the review of external goal attainment will show that the EU did contribute to conflict resolution in the CAR, albeit in a very limited way.

### 2.1.1.2 OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Assessing the security situation’s progress during the time of the EUFOR mandate is rendered difficult by the lack of reliable statistics about the rate of violence not only during the deployment but also before the operation. Furthermore, assessing violence always poses a problem of definition: that is, what type of violence must be taken into account? Therefore, one has to use various indicators in order to build a wider

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\(^{578}\) Foreign Affairs Council, 3286th meeting, 16 December 2013, minutes, p. 7.

\(^{579}\) As Paris had already intervened on its own in Mali a few months before, the French political classes but also journalists expressed frustration early on about recurrent inaction of Member States and Paris’s isolation. Frustration was so great, on the right and left alike, that some French representatives urged President Hollande to boycott the 19–20 December European Council meetings if Member States refused to contribute at least financially to the operation. Annick Lepetit, a Social Party spokeswoman, demanded a ‘frank explanation with the European partners’ because once again the EU was absent in a crisis situation and ‘France mustn’t pay the blood money twice’. Member States’ inertia would have meant a slap in the face of France that could have created serious political tensions within the EU.
picture of the security improvement within the zone of operation. Even if this research were unable to refer to any violence statistics, it must be stressed that numerous sources confirmed an improvement of the security situation in Bangui during the EUFOR mandate.

When EUFOR was launched, according to one international NGO representative, the situation had already improved noticeably in the fifth district, because micro-development projects had been implemented by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), but a lot of work remained to be done. In contrast, the third district was much more dangerous and has always been very volatile. However, according to a local interviewee at that time there was no major difference in terms of security between the third and the fifth districts. They were described equally chaotic. Despite of MISCA presence in the area, according to a local journalist and a third district resident, MISCA sometimes refused to intervene in violence. Consequently, the attacks could last for hours before any international intervention would occur. Furthermore, the neighborhoods faced robberies, rackets, and killing sprees regularly. Armed groups even used to control some territories within the districts. That being said, every person interviewed in this research – NGO and International Organization (IO) workers, researchers, and EU officials – confirmed that there was a significant reduction in cases of violence and attacks after the European force was deployed. More important is the fact that the local authorities just as much as Bangui citizens themselves, praised EUFOR for the improvements it made to security in the areas under its responsibility:

“At that time, [before EUFOR deployment] every night you had shooting, every night, it was unbearable [...] But when EUFOR started with its operations, calm resumed little by little”.

As concluded by a Muslim citizen, as a result of the EUFOR RCA’s activities, considerable security improvements took also place in the third district:

“Before EUFOR, you had attacks every day, but when EUFOR came the attacks ceased. When they were there in the PK5, there was no retaliations, no attacks. There was sometimes small kidnappings, but no attacks.”

The following indicators prove concretely that violence was curbed. First, the camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at the Bangui airport that harboured thousands of people partly emptied during EUFOR’s

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580 Interview no. 40.
581 Interview no. 36, 39.
583 Interview no. 36.
584 Interview no. 39.
presence. In December 2013, according to the Secretary-General’s report, 60,000\textsuperscript{585} people had taken refuge at the Bangui airport’s M’Poko camp to shelter from attacks perpetrated by militias and rebels. The number had reached \textbf{80,000}\textsuperscript{586} when EUFOR reached its FOC (full operating capability). It must be stressed that about 80% of the IDPs who sheltered at the M’Poko camp came from the third and the fifth districts\textsuperscript{587}. Furthermore, according to two surveys conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in August and November 2014, the vast majority of citizens coming from the districts in question had the intention to go back to their place of origin.\textsuperscript{588} In light of the security improvements in the city, it seems that, while many people had left the capital, fleeing primarily northward\textsuperscript{589}, some of them decided to return to their homes, and this includes homes in areas that EUFOR patrolled.

The process had begun in April 2014, but it continued under EUFOR responsibility.\textsuperscript{590} Of course, it is impossible to know exactly how many people left the IDP site to go back to their homes, but when EUFOR left the country, only about 20,000\textsuperscript{591} remained at the M’Poko camp, and in any case IDP return was visible in the districts. It must also be noted that, according to a CAR expert who was in Bangui during the EUFOR mandate, ‘what we also witnessed is that some who had been displaced inside Bangui and did not live per se in the third and fifth came back to resettle there because they had the feeling this place was more secure than other neighbourhoods’.\textsuperscript{592} According to data gathered for this report, even some refugees from neighbouring countries returned to the third and fifth districts during the EUFOR presence\textsuperscript{593}. The figures were limited, but this is additional confirmation that dangers diminished.

One has to bear in mind, however, that security is not the only criterion for refugees’ and IDPs’ return. According to surveys conducted by the IOM, a low rate of return does not necessarily mean that security is insufficient. Indeed, even if ‘the main enabling conditions to return [were] highly influenced by security-related factors\textsuperscript{594}, the home’s destruction was considered by 58\%\textsuperscript{595} of the interviewees to be an element preventing their return. Although it was a major concern, security was only one factor among others.\textsuperscript{596} Reasons for remaining displaced included damage to the building, lack of financial means and jobs, lack of help from international organisations, and the absence of economic activity in the target areas. Furthermore, some of the respondents did not want to return because they had managed to establish economic activity at

\textsuperscript{586} Interview no.9.
\textsuperscript{587} \textit{Ibid.}.
\textsuperscript{589} See the annexes for more details with regard to districts of origin and districts of return.
\textsuperscript{590} Interview no.23.
\textsuperscript{591} Interviews no.12 and no.13.
\textsuperscript{592} Interviews no.9, and no.13.
\textsuperscript{593} Interviews no. 15, and no.12.
\textsuperscript{594} Interviews no. 15, and no.12, and no. 25.
\textsuperscript{596} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{596} See the annexes for discussion of motivations among the population.

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the displacement site. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that all of these obstacles were factors over which EUFOR had no power.\textsuperscript{597} It could only provide safety within its area of operations so that other actors, such as humanitarian workers, NGOs, and international organisations, could set up the development projects required to trigger refugees’ and IDPs’ return.\textsuperscript{598} It could only calm the tensions so that the political transition could run its course and, one would hope, lead to a reconciliation process.

It must be also noted that when EUFOR left, economic activities had resumed.\textsuperscript{599} For instance, the Bangui market, located in PK5 (the third district) – which is the country’s biggest market – along with many shops, had reopened.\textsuperscript{600} A certain number of banks had resumed activity too. While road traffic had been highly limited for months, it was thanks to EUFOR work that hundreds of cars, buses, and taxis could again freely circulate daily. Though there were some minor incidents, which were handled well by EUFOR, planes could take off and land safely at the Bangui airport\textsuperscript{601}. Even some bars and night clubs reopened their doors\textsuperscript{602}. One additional piece of evidence of considerable improvement in the security situation had to do with humanitarian activities in the third and fifth districts. It must be stressed that, according to several interviewees, ‘when EUFOR was active it was probably the best period in terms of access to the districts’.\textsuperscript{603} Before EU boots hit the ground, reaching these districts was quite dangerous, and, in fact, one IOM official confirmed that the organisation’s teams could not even get to these areas\textsuperscript{604}. Soon EUFOR had set up effective and ‘smart’ co-ordination with the humanitarian personnel so that they could work daily under EU protection but without being ‘escorted’, which would have endangered their neutrality.\textsuperscript{605} Daily patrolling by EUFOR was adapted in line with the humanitarian activities, to deter potential attack but also to react quickly in the event of problems\textsuperscript{606}. The NGOs’ teams felt more secure and therefore were more open to visiting certain places.

All of these facts are indications that when EUFOR left Bangui, life had resumed and people were less scared. The lack of statistical data notwithstanding, it seems that there was a clear perception among citizens that security improved, as evidenced by the progress described above. Furthermore, EUFOR would not have been so popular had the security situation not improved. Still, it must be noted that, even if ‘basic security conditions and freedom of movement improved in districts 3 and 5 of Bangui on account of the EU

\textsuperscript{597} EUFOR, however, asked the IOM in particular – since it had house-reconstruction projects in place – to give some money to the returning displaced persons for rebuilding their homes.

\textsuperscript{598} For instance, by focusing on reconstruction and providing families with the financial means to pay their rent.


\textsuperscript{600} Interviews no. 37.

\textsuperscript{601} Interviews no.13, and no. 10.


\textsuperscript{603} Interviews no.10, no.13, no.11.

\textsuperscript{604} Interview no. 11.

\textsuperscript{605} Interview no.12.

\textsuperscript{606} \textit{Ibid.}; Interview no.13.
presence, one should remain careful not to paint an overly idyllic picture of the situation. In EUFOR’s presence absence, banditry, criminality, and deadly attacks between Muslims and non-Muslims have persisted. Even if the population have, rightly, detected an improvement in security, EUFOR had its limits, as any peace operation does. One CAR expert aptly commented:

‘You know, you cannot do anything against these kinds of criminal acts: you arrive at nighttime, you kill, you leave again. This happened very regularly, but it’s like that; these are the limitations of the peace mission: you cannot possibly ensure the security of entire neighbourhoods and avoid criminal acts to be carried out [...] there have been a lot of criminal acts during EUFOR’s presence, but this hasn’t quite been the bloodbath it could have become if EUFOR hadn’t been there at all.’

With regard to the most important EUFOR objective, one must remember that EUFOR initially was meant to last up to six months after reaching of FOC, which took place on 15 June. The European operation was a bridging operation dedicated to providing safety until MINUS deployment. When the Security Council decided, in April 2014, to launch a UN peacekeeping operation, EUFOR’s purpose became to aid in the MINUSCA deployment. According to the original mandate, EUFOR had to leave the country by 15 December 2014. However, it became clear in September that the MINUSCA would not be ready to take over at that time. The EUFOR operation commander judged an additional three months to be required for providing a smooth hand-over to the MINUSCA in Bangui. The extension was proposed by the United Nations and by interim president Samba-Panza on 10 September 2014 and approved by the Council on 7 November. However, the UK, Germany, and other Member States were clear that there should be no further extension of the operation. Maintaining EUFOR’s presence for a further three months was aimed at allowing a better hand-over to the MINUSCA, including conducting joint patrols and providing backup rapid-reaction forces while MINUSCA forces bedded in. The fragile nature of the security situation in Bangui meant that not extending EUFOR for a short while would put the security gains at risk. Therefore, EU member states showed some flexibility. Finally, it should be stressed that, thanks to EUFOR, Sangaris troops could deploy about 300 additional men outside Bangui, toward the north-east of the country.

Despite these successes, several interviewees argued that EUFOR should have stayed longer because the MINUSCA operation was not ready to take over from EUFOR in March 2015. Indeed, the information gathered indicates that the security situation deteriorated in the districts when EUFOR left, notwithstanding the MINUSCA presence. According to the local interviewees all that violence resumed to some extent after EUFOR left. One local journalist explained the problem as follows:

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608 Interview no. 15.
“The situation didn’t automatically deteriorate, but it was still fragile. You just needed one Muslim or one Christian to be killed for violence to resume. And when violence resumed there were no interposition force between armed groups anymore. EUFOR presence was a real deterrent that prevented attacks from happening, but the MINUSCA didn’t interpose when it took over. Armed groups therefore understood that they were free to carry on their activities as they wished so again”. 610

That assessment was confirmed by a representative from an international NGO who declared that the security seriously deteriorated after EUFOR left. Consequently, the organisation could not access the third district anymore:

“The MINUSCA force couldn’t capitalise on EUFOR success in terms of security stabilisation, in terms of relationship with the citizens, in terms of incidents’ prevention. I think this is because MINUSCA hadn’t the means to be mobile until recently. In September and October, it was nearly unthinkable to go to the third district. We only succeeded in going back to the third district, I would say, in December”.372

Another interview argued that ‘when EUFOR left, it was actually more dangerous for us to go to the third and fifth district; we stopped going there611. All the interviewees regretted EUFOR’s withdrawal because it ‘was the most effective military contingent; no-one understood why they left […]. EUFOR was much smaller but much more effective and loved by the population’.612 Many interviewees agreed also that the violence that erupted in September 2015 would have been much better dealt with by EUFOR.

‘EUFOR was much quicker to intervene, and its intervention was balanced. It was very good at dealing with the population when there was a problem […]. [T]hey were able to calm down the tension without violence, without damage. They handled the relationship with citizens much better. I don’t know the reasons, but this is something everybody says in the neighbourhood’.513

All of the interviewees complained in one way or another about the MINUSCA implementation. The co-ordination mechanisms were much better with EUFOR than with the UN troops, who clearly demonstrated a lack of will for dialogue with humanitarian actors.614 As described by one NGO staff member;

610 Interview no. 36.
611 Interview no.13.
612 Ibid.
613 Ibid.
614 Interview no.12
“When UN troops arrived, ‘they changed the […] layout EUFOR had put in place in the third and fifth districts, which didn’t suit at all the population and destabilised the zone. They didn’t make that choice for rational reasons but just because that’s what they usually do. They didn’t listen to people already present in the districts.”

Also, the MINUSCA force was much less mobile than EUFOR. It did not patrol on foot, as EUFOR had, day and night. It was much more static and worked with checkpoint-based logic. Furthermore, the MINUSCA mind-set seemed to be totally different in comparison with EUFOR. The humanitarian community expressed worry, in fact, when learning that EUFOR would leave, because MINUSCA personnel did not listen when told that they should work as EUFOR did – that is, discuss things with the locals, not change the format of the force, and maintain close proximity. The UN operation was criticised also for not having retained the information network that EUFOR had succeeded in building: ‘when EUFOR left, all the work they had done with networking on the ground but also with authorities was lost’. In addition, the MINUSCA staff were depicted as sometimes being ‘cowboys’ – that is, acting much more provocatively than EUFOR. At last, UN military and civilian components were criticised for not talking to each other, thereby forcing humanitarian actors to speak to each separately.

All Bangui citizens interviewed for the purposes of this study, regardless to their ethnic or professional background, felt negatively about MINUSCA. Indeed, nearly two years after EUFOR departure, the MINUSCA is criticized for being not efficient enough and even passive in front of attacks taking place not only in Bangui (including the third and fifth district) but also in the provinces. Empirical material suggests that despite MINUSCA presence, police officers have been held in hostage by criminal groups in the third district and UN peacekeepers have been accused of fleeing combats or hiding in their armored vehicles and their bases. A resident of third district concluded his perception of MINUSCA as follows:

“[The Muslims] can be attacked just in front of the MINUSCA. People get killed in front of the MINUSCA, but [it] does not do anything. That's the question we ask, what are they here for? This is not only a Muslim who says that, everywhere, even the Christians say that. They're there, they have their weapons, their trucks but they do not do anything. You can try to reach them to ask for protection, but they reject you. We do not know what is going on. People die next to MINUSCA and they do not act. We do not trust them.”

615 Interview no.31.
616 Interview no. 25.
617 Interview no.31.
618 Interview no.12.
619 Interview no. 33 – 40.
620 Interview no. 36, 38.
621 Interview no. 39.
A local NGO representative expressed the same criticism. According to him, “despite [MINUSCA] presence, Muslim used to kill Christians […] without any reaction from the MINUSCA”. These accusations against the MINUSCA reached a climax in October 24th 2016, when several civil society organizations launched a “dead city” demonstration in order to denounce and protest against the MINUSCA’s passivity in front of attacks all over the country.

Assessing the MINUSCA operation it out of the scope of this study, however it must be stressed that interviewees unanimously complained about serious flaws within the UN peacekeeping force. These criticisms are legitimate, but one has to draw an important distinction between what depended on EUFOR and what did not. The criticisms of the MINUSCA have to do with the force itself: its procedures, its equipment, its soldiers’ discipline – in short, its way of working. Had EUFOR remained longer, that would not have changed anything in the MINUSCA operation’s standards and efficiency, particularly since the latter actually reached its FOC in late April. Even today, the MINUSCA force suffers from lack of mobility in the country because it does not have the required equipment. It seems that EUFOR tried its best to transfer all information and intelligence that had been gathered for months, most notably through common patrols during which UN troops could adapt to the districts’ context. The problem is that the MINUSCA way of working was just different – for instance, in terms of co-ordination with humanitarians or proximity with citizens. EUFOR troops had in general better equipment and training than UN soldiers which for instance lacked of night vision devices. Furthermore, it must be noted that EUFOR could focus all of its forces on two districts while MINUSCA responsibilities cover the whole country. Therefore, it was impossible to allocate the same resources as EUFOR did.

One can state, in conclusion, that all of EUFOR RCA’s operational objectives were met. Firstly, the European operation succeeded in reducing tensions and improving the overall security situation in its area of operation. Then, EUFOR held the position long enough to allow the MINUSCA force to take over in good conditions. Admittedly, security deteriorated to some extent when EUFOR left, but the districts did not return to chaos and, at the same time, this deterioration had more to do with MINUSCA standards of operation than with a lack of time to deploy. Furthermore, it must be stressed that, while it had shortcomings, the MINUSCA force succeeded, with Sangaris and EU help, in ultimately stabilising the situation. In April 2016, Bangui’s security situation was truly better than when EUFOR had been in charge. Thirdly, humanitarian actors could safely conduct their projects, civilians had relative freedom of movement, and IDPs’ return movement advanced under EUFOR responsibility. It should be kept in mind also that even some refugees returned to the districts during EUFOR deployment. Finally, some Sangaris troops were re-deployed to the provinces. In light of all of

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622 Interview no. 37.
623 Interview no.
625 Interview no. 21.
626 Interview no.25.
the foregoing, it must be stressed that EUFOR RCA was a success from the perspective of operational objectives.

### 2.1.2 Internal appropriateness

As explained above, internal appropriateness is about the extent to which the implementation of an operation has gone according to EU plans. Timeliness, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness are the three key indicators of internal appropriateness. The first of these refers to early response and includes, in the main, efficient planning, preparation, generation, and deployment. Furthermore, the mandate’s appropriate fulfilment on the ground requires deployment without significant delays. With regard to the cost-effectiveness criterion, the intervention displays internal appropriateness if the operation’s costs do not outweigh its benefits for the intervener, from a material but also a political perspective.

#### 2.1.2.1 Timeliness

EUFOR’s timeliness assessment is a nuanced affair. Admittedly, the European Union needed nearly six months for deployment of this operation after CMC approval by the Council even though the situation on the ground was urgent. The Member States needed six force-generation conferences to project an operation comprising fewer than 1,000 men. This is, of course, quite problematic from a credibility perspective, but it must be stressed that in reality the operation was planned fairly rapidly. Indeed, a CMC was adopted within only a month, because the PFCA was skipped but also since some reflection had already been conducted in the months preceding the December 2013 European Council meeting. Fast-tracking was implemented with success even if it is difficult to give any estimates of the time that was saved. According to Niklas Nováky, who conducted numerous interviews with EU officials, ‘many were surprised that the operation’s planning moved quicker in Brussels than in EU capitals’. Furthermore, it seems that some Member States felt that EUFOR’s planning process had been ‘too quick’ to consider all planning documents adequately. The operation was meant to reach its FOC at the end of April, in which case the operation would have been deployed from scratch in approximately four months. However, given the lack of Member States’ support, the operation commander had to postpone the FOC date to 15 June 2014, making it six to eight weeks later. Of course, the Athena mechanism posed a problem and delayed the operation. The EU must think about a budgetary mechanism that is consistent with the emergency procedure in case of need. Still, one has to recognise that the main reason the initial timeline was not followed was the Member States’ lack of political

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627 Interview no.14.
628 Interview no. 25.
629 Niklas I.M. Nováky, ‘From EUFOR to EUMAM’, p. 103.
630 Niklas I.M. Nováky, ‘From EUFOR to EUMAM’.
will as evidenced by the six FGCs, the time needed to provide the augmentation referred to above, and the refusal to address all the operation commander’s requirements.

Of course, one has to question the Member States’ lack of political will. Some EU officials\textsuperscript{632} have pointed out that the crises first in Ukraine and Crimea, then in Donbass played a significant part in the reluctance shown by Member States. Polish worries about Russia support this thesis: the contribution promises put forth by Warsaw fluctuated with the events occurring in the associated field. Romania, Moldova, and the Visegrád countries also scaled down or cancelled their offers during the Ukrainian crisis. It is certainly reasonable to believe that Western foreign affairs ministries have paid a lot of attention to the Ukraine/Russia crisis at the expense of other files. However, it appears doubtful that the force-generating conferences would have gone differently if Europeans’ foreign-affairs gaze had not been turned to the east. A military confrontation between a European state and Russia has never been seriously considered in recent times, at least officially. But even if the fear of a Russian invasion had been real, one has to concede that the EUFOR operation would have required only about 600 men from the EU, because Georgia and France had already covered about half of the troops required. It is ridiculous to believe that such a small detachment would have made a difference in a Russia scenario. Seemingly paradoxically, it is the states that had the most to fear in a Russian intervention (Georgia, the Baltic States, and Poland) that decided to join the mission – doing so because it was in their interest to show solidarity with France in order to benefit from diplomatic and military support in potential upcoming cases such as precisely that.

Therefore, the Member States’ refusal to provide more support to EUFOR RCA is rooted in the fact that they could not or did not want to bear the financial cost associated with the operation, because they did not consider the CAR worth it. This is the key reason Belgium, which is a traditional contributor to the CSDP, did not participate in the operation. While lack of military means can be an explanation for countries such as Luxembourg, obviously it cannot explain every Member State’s lack of support. This is true in particular for Germany and the UK. Furthermore, it must be stressed that, while the Estonian army is only 6,000\textsuperscript{633} strong, Tallinn provided 50 person for the entire duration of the operation.

In sum, from a timeliness perspective, one has to admit that EUFOR RCA was a failure, because the timeline was not met and, secondly, the timeline was not appropriate. Given the urgency of the situation on the ground, which was repeatedly underscored by the operation commander, the Member States’ need for six conferences for only partly meeting the operation requirements is troubling. Not only couldn’t the EU agree one more time to use the Battlegroups, which still were perfectly adapted to the crisis configuration, but they needed six months to deploy just 900 men within a EUFOR format.

\textsuperscript{632}Interview no.9; Interview no.23; Niklas I.M. Nováky, ‘From EUFOR to EUMAM’, p. 96; Elvis Humic, 2015.

Admittedly, the planning does seem to have been done expeditiously, but such a performance matters little if Member States refuse to provide the equipment and troops required on time. It is true that the institutional structures used for decision-making differ from one country to another. However, at the end of the day, what matters is the result in terms of lives saved and reduction of violence in the crisis-beset country, and the problems in the CAR case stemmed from a lack of political will, not from cumbersome institutional procedures. Based on the interviews the inability to deploy the operation rapidly diminishes considerably the overall success of the operation.

### 2.1.2.2 Efficiency

On the basis of the information gathered, it must be stressed that, some important internal criticisms aside, EUFOR was generally perceived as efficient by locals and NGOs but also by EU officials. As, discussed above in chapter 2.1.3, this efficiency lies partly in the counterinsurgency approach used by EUFOR. Considering the EU’s ability to implement its counterinsurgency approach and build trust towards the local population, one can conclude that EUFOR was efficient. It used its troops at most to lead night and day foot patrols that, according to all interviewees, made a real difference with the population. The operation benefited also from a component mix that was particularly well adapted to facing the challenges arising in the area of operation. The CIMIC component played an important role in the EUFOR success by contributing to force acceptance. It led a few initiatives, including that for the unity bridge, that improved citizens’ living conditions and fostered the force’s acceptance, and simultaneously it engaged in extensive dialogue with the districts’ civil society (for instance, with neighbourhood chiefs, who are a moral authority within the city). The gendarmerie component made a significant contribution through patrols among the population, with which it improved EUFOR popularity too. It helped to build the wide contact network that was so useful for gathering of valuable intelligence and information. The Italian engineers improved locals’ living conditions and EUFOR’s image by participating in the unity bridge’s construction and leading infrastructure work as part of cash-for-work programmes. Neither should the importance of the Special Forces be overlooked, since they were useful also when EUFOR had to take down criminal gangs. Finally, the EUFOR infantry was indispensable for challenging violent armed groups and deterring aggression. Finally, one should not forget that EUFOR was praised several times for being very reactive and open to co-ordination and

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634 For example with a presidential system as in France, the head of state is allowed to initiate military action of his own volition, while in a parliamentary regime as in Germany, representatives must give their consent before any operation.

635 The main objective of counterinsurgency, is to foster development of effective governance via a balanced application of military and non-military means in order to legitimize government. It is aimed at addressing the population’s core grievances with the purpose of isolating citizens from insurgency that uses grievances, as a weapon against the state, to undermine its legitimacy and cultivate more insurgents. Therefore, it must be stressed that in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, the population is the critical dimension of any success. As David Galula put it, winning hearts and minds is actually the first law of counterinsurgency, because the real battlefield is for the population’s will.

636 Interview 27.
information-sharing with humanitarian and IO actors. In summary, as one EUFOR officer put it, the operation did ‘the best it could with what it had’. 637

This efficiency is particularly noteworthy since EUFOR faced several shortfalls that hindered its daily missions. It must be stressed firstly that EUFOR never reached the number of troops the operation commander had expected. Initially, General Pontiès called for a force comprising between 1,100 and 1,200 men, but the operation ultimately deployed only about 900 soldiers. This somewhat hampered the force’s efficiency in violence management. This shortfall in terms of troops would have been particularly problematic had EUFOR needed to manage protracted peaks in violence. 638 Another problem EUFOR faced involved the size of the contributions. Several Member States provided troops below company level: sections or platoons. Therefore, EUFOR had to internationalise its troops below the company level, which is actually forbidden under NATO doctrine because units need perfect mutual comprehension. To be sure everybody understood each other and avoid friendly fire, EUFOR had to set up an important liaison detachment dispositive within the force. 639 It must be stressed also that EUFOR lacked heavy weapons to protect itself. 640

2.1.2.3 Cost-effectiveness

From a cost perspective, it must be stressed firstly that no EU soldiers were killed in action, even though EUFOR faced regularly exchanges of fire. According to one high-ranking officer, the incidents could be quite violent, involving most notably use of hand grenades against patrols. Several military personnel were injured during fighting, and some even had to be repatriated to Europe because of the severity of their injuries. These attacks notwithstanding, the only EUFOR casualty was a death from malaria. 641 The EUFOR achievement is even more noteworthy in light of the fact that several soldiers in Sangaris and MINUSCA ranks died during clashes with militias.

The success with EUFOR’s mandate is particularly noteworthy because the operation could not get all of what it required. Despite a lack of soldiers, EUFOR succeeded in patrolling night and day. Good co-ordination with other international forces helped to fill a gap that could have seriously impeded EUFOR success. No waste or duplication was reported. For purposes of limiting costs, synergies were exploited. For example, a MEDEVAC role (Role 2) was shared with Sangaris and logistical support was organised jointly, even if at a basic level.

637 Interview no.10.
638 Interview no.20.
639 ibid.
640 Interview no. 17.
It is true that the EU suffered in terms of credibility because of the difficulties in assembling the necessary forces, political procrastination, and the repeated calls to ‘fall into line’, none of which sent the image of a determined and coherent actor on the international stage. Still, the EU achieved a political and operational success, because EUFOR was able to implement the bridging-operation concept successfully. Therefore, the EU demonstrated yet again that it could be a useful partner for the UN in difficult situations. Once on the field, the EU could confirm or remind that it was a military actor to be taken seriously, likely to bring genuine added value in the domain of peace operations, especially thanks to its global approach and the strength of the European tools deployed. Furthermore, despite limited means, EUFOR could multiply its effects on account of narrow co-operation with other EU instruments and with NGOs and IO. It hence could use its resources and contact network in an efficient way and win the citizens’ support. Brussels proved that it now possesses experience in the crisis-management field and that its procedures are fully functional. Indeed, the planning process was led rapidly, especially since this involved successfully testing the emergency procedure for the first time. The efficiency of the EU action on the central African stage shows that Europeans clearly have adequate means at their disposal to live up to the delicate challenge of carrying out peace missions.

In sum, there can be no doubt that EUFOR RCA enhanced the Union’s role as a military conflict manager and saved CAR citizens’ life at little cost. Though there were delays in deployment, the cost-efficiency report remains positive, since the failings of EUFOR during the operation were brought about significantly more by issues of political will than by problems of a technical nature, such as lack of knowledge, human error, poorly adapted procedures, or bad allocation of resources. Consequently, EUFOR RCA is deemed a success from a cost-effectiveness perspective.

2.2 SUCCESS IN ADDRESSING THE CONFLICT

The following subsections are aimed at examining whether EUFOR RCA fulfilled the overall purpose of operational conflict prevention. Two perspectives must be considered. Firstly, the EUFOR intervention must be assessed from an external goal attainment perspective for determining whether the force’s action prevented the conflict from becoming (more) violent. The second objective is to ascertain to what extent the European troops contributed to CAR conflict transformation and long-term sustainable peace. From the external appropriateness perspective, success requires EUFOR to have respected the necessity principle and proportionality principle.

2.2.1 External goal attainment
According to the IECEU success criteria, the indicators for external goal attainment are, if this has not already taken place, whether violent conflict erupts or, if violent conflict is already occurring, whether it continues, diffuses, escalates, or intensifies.\textsuperscript{642}

### 2.2.1.1 Conflict diffusion in the area of operation

Given EUFOR's restricted mandate in terms of geographical scope, one has to consider the operation external goal attainment from an area-of-operation perspective firstly. When EUFOR deployed, violent conflict had already begun, most notably in the third and fifth districts, which, one must recall were the most dangerous ones. Thanks to Sangaris and MISCA, the violence had already been curbed to some extent, especially in comparison with the situation in December 2013, but clashes were frequent and tensions remained high. It is obvious that the area of operations was not stabilised, as evidenced by the difficulties in humanitarians accessing it. After EUFOR reached its FOC, however, European troops prevented the conflict diffusing, escalating, or intensifying, and EUFOR succeeded in progressively reducing the number of attacks. Admittedly, violence continued, EUFOR was regularly caught in serious clashes, and some civilian died under its watch. Nonetheless, the European contingents contributed to a great reduction in violence. The effect of EUFOR on the ground was significant in terms of humanitarian aid access and direct limiting of human-rights abuses inflicted on civilians.

However, EUFOR does not seem to be the only entity responsible for violence reduction: according to the information gathered, a series of labour-intensive programmes (THIMO) played an important role. These programmes are aimed at providing infrastructure necessary for improving access to basic public services, creating short-term employment, improving people's living conditions and economic and social situation, and providing training and skills development locally to unemployed people. The objective is to offer alternatives for citizens, especially young people who would otherwise be tempted to join militias and criminal groups because of their financial vulnerability. One has to recall that one of the main reasons for the CAR crisis is lack of economic opportunity, a factor exploited frequently by militias and rebel groups' leaders to recruit fighters. Therefore, not only did THIMO provide cash so that citizens could address their basic needs, but the money earned can be used to commence economic activity and get a long-term job. It must be stressed that the EU spent millions of euros to finance these projects, through several actors, especially the IOM, which led an important cash-for-work programme in Bangui since March 2014. In July 2015, the IOM reported that more than 17,000 people had been recruited to work through THIMO projects.\textsuperscript{643} The third and fifth district represented 85% of these workers, which is quite unsurprising since most of Bangui's population can be

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\textsuperscript{642} Initiation is when a conflict turns violent in the first instance; continuation is when a conflict continues over time and reoccurs; diffusion is when violent conflict spreads to another geographic area; escalation occurs when new actors become involved in an existing conflict; and intensification refers at least to a process by which the violence itself increases and can include an increase in both the number and the degree of violent incidents.

\textsuperscript{643} International Organization for Migration, 'CAR cash for work beneficiaries final report', April 2015, p. 4.
found in these two districts. These projects played such an important role in alleviating the violence that one CAR expert argued that the EU actually ‘bought peace’⁶⁴⁴ in the districts through the THIMO projects.

Such a declaration may be excessive, but one high-ranking EUFOR official confirmed that the cash-for-work programmes led by the IOM did contribute significantly to violence control.⁶⁴⁵ A local NGO representative confirmed that such a programme was an important contributor for the effective disarmament process. The simple jobs provided by the programme encouraged several militias’ members and leaders, youth and delinquents to stop the criminal activities and participate in the disarmament process.

“We cooperated a lot with EUFOR that worked regularly with NGOs on cash-for-work programmes. Due to these programmes, we recruited the leaders, we gave small jobs to the delinquents, and after a few days, they had the minimum to survive and therefore gave up their weapons. EUFOR with its small jobs, it brought back order.”⁶⁴⁶

Indeed, since EU funding could provide higher wages than any militias, many militiamen left their armed groups or at least never joined them, in order to earn money through THIMO. In fact, it was reported at one point that many locals in need of money within the third district turned against the militias because, progressively declining in numbers and support, these were attempting to prevent IOM programmes from taking place. This indicates that the European Union development fund had probably been an important factor in EUFOR’s results. However, it must be stressed that the EU was able to use this instrument only because troops were present to provide security. Indeed, the militias’ reaction — threats of reprisals against the IOM — eventually led that organisation to state that ‘it would only carry on its activities upon the condition that its projects were protected by EUFOR patrols’.⁶⁴⁷ Given EUFOR’s excellent co-operation with the IOM, the European force was accepted, particularly since Italians engineers worked side by side with IOM workers at some points on infrastructure projects. Hence, one can see how EU tools can be integral to a comprehensive approach.

In summary, EUFOR’s contribution to violent conflict prevention in the third and fifth districts has been significant. From a sustainability perspective, the results are more modest, since shortly after EUFOR handed over its responsibilities to MINUSCA forces, the security situation deteriorated, as evidenced by the difficulties humanitarians encountered in accessing the districts. The deterioration reached its peak during the September 2015 riots, which caused 77 deaths. It seems that the EUFOR action could have been more sustainable, with respect to the key districts’ main troublemakers, who had been identified by the end of the

⁶⁴⁴ Interview no.20.
⁶⁴⁵ Interview no.27.
⁶⁴⁶ Interview no. 37.
⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.
operation.648 These militia-leaders numbered only about 30 but were able to attract many more people and hence possessed serious nuisance capability. The operation could have stopped these chiefs but never received the mandate to do so or appropriate authorisation649 from Brussels, which perhaps ‘didn’t want […] the European contingent to say goodbye to the CAR in the middle of shootings, fires and hostile riots’.650 This task was left to MINUSCA troops, who ultimately did not carry it out, at least not fully. Therefore, the troublemakers in question benefited from MINUSCA weaknesses, and some of them provoked the September–October 2015 riots. Despite these setbacks, the MINUSCA, with Sangaris’s aid, succeeded in getting the situation under control. In November 2015, after the Pope’s visit, during which the pontiff called on fighting factions in the CAR to lay down their weapon 651, violence and tensions calmed down progressively. While the MINUSCA still suffers from a serious lack of equipment and training, it succeeded in providing enough security for elections to be held. Of course, Bangui is far from being a safe city – the situation remains fragile, with reports of killings, looting, and gunfire – but it has not relapsed into chaos. On the contrary, in April 2016, the security situation in Bangui was even better than when EUFOR was in charge of the districts. Therefore, one can conclude that EUFOR was a success from the conflict-prevention perspective in Bangui.

2.2.1.2 Contribution to conflict prevention

With regard to EUFOR’s contribution to conflict prevention in the country at large, the results are much more modest, since the EU did not deploy beyond Bangui. Certainly, the contribution was positive, as it freed additional French troops to leave the capital for the provinces, yet one must recognise that EU action was not meaningful in this respect. Indeed, EUFOR freed only about 300 men, not many in relation to the size and needs of the country. Furthermore, EUFOR’s impact on the provinces was only indirect. In consequence, at national level, EUFOR RCA’s actions must be regarded as only a partial success.

In light of its impact on conflict transformation,652 it is clear that EUFOR contributed to conflict transformation, because it, with other forces, assisted in bringing about security conditions under which the conflict can be resolved by the parties involved. Indeed, the European operation participated in making secure the capital, where an estimated 800,000 people lived in 2014. The capital is the political, economic, and commercial heart of the country,653 and no reconciliation or peace process could have ever been implemented or triggered without a (relatively) stable capital because it hosts national and international institutions and organisations. Thanks to protection by EUFOR, international and national actors such as NGOs could do

648 Interview no. 25.
649 It seems also that these troublemakers benefited from national political protection that prevented the international community, including the EU, from acting.
650 Interview no. 20.
652 Impact on the conflict transformation refers to a process in which parties to a conflict consciously work towards a modification of the structural dimension of a conflict with the short term objective of prevention of renewed violence (or a reduction in its intensity) and with the long-term objective of sustainable peace.’ Laurent Goetschel, ‘Conflict transformation’, in Vincent Chetial, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 92.
653 Interview no.10.
their job and work on reconciliation initiatives and election arrangements but also finance THIMO activities and thereby address to some extent the problem of unemployment among vulnerable youth. Also, EUFOR itself supported dialogue initiatives to foster inter-community contacts. These projects were, of course, led at only micro-level but nevertheless had some success.654

2.2.1.3 Limited mandate- limited impact

That said, while EUFOR’s action for conflict transformation was positive, its meaningfulness and sustainability, again, are much more modest. The mandate was not a political one, and EUFOR RCA was not intended to steer a political process towards reconciliation. It was a nine-month bridging operation that was not deployed outside the capital. The EUFOR contribution to conflict resolution would have been more important if Brussels (and other international actors) had had the will to arrest harmful troublemakers and radicals who did not want any reconciliation or stabilisation to take place. Sangaris and MINUSCA actions have been much more meaningful so far, because there seems to be ‘general consensus, including among affected people, that the deployment of MISCA and Sangaris averted large-scale massacres of civilians’.655 Definitely, EUFOR helped Sangaris deploy outside the capital and increase its freedom of movement656; EU troops thereby made a positive contribution to conflict transformation nationally. Still, one cannot say that EUFOR's contribution was meaningful. Sangaris still lacked the resources required for such a large country, so many people were unable to benefit from Sangaris protection. A larger European contingent would have had a much bigger impact, since the ‘small number of peacekeepers deployed meant that forces were stretched very thin, and affected people were critical of peacekeepers for failing to respond rapidly to security incidents’.657 In conclusion, EUFOR is a partial success not only from a conflict transformation perspective but also in its external goal attainment.

2.2.2 External appropriateness

In essence, determination of the external appropriateness is governed by the proportionality and necessity principles. By the former criterion, one can judge whether an operation did more good than harm and used proportionate means, while the latter condemns unnecessary interventions or illegitimate measures. Bearing this in mind, one must stress at the outset that the European military intervention was necessary and legitimate in consideration of the widespread killings that took place in the Central African Republic. As for the use of force, the fact that no targeting, intentional or not, of civilians was reported must be emphasised. In fact, some sources indicate that EUFOR refused to fight back and retreated on some occasions for fear of harming civilians. As was explained above, EUFOR soldiers regularly faced serious provocation from

654 Interview no.20.
657 Veronique Barbelet, p. 11.
militiamen but always kept their calm, even when confronted with serious threats. Again, its interventions have been described as balanced\textsuperscript{658} and even respectful. No ‘cowboy’ attitude was reported; quite the contrary, as evidenced by the good reputation EUFOR gained. Accordingly, the EUFOR action can be considered proportionate.

On the other hand, it seems that some EU peacekeepers misbehaved, as indicated by the noteworthy allegations of sexual abuse by staff and testimony about alcohol consumption and use of prostitutes, all mentioned above. Nevertheless, even if this misconduct took place, it does not seem to have been widespread, on account of the good reputation EUFOR enjoyed but also the positive comments by the NGOs’ workers. Still, such behaviours must be addressed, not just because they are illegal and morally unacceptable but also since they can have a serious impact on the entire force’s credibility and reputation and thereby jeopardise the operation, especially in a country such as the CAR, where manipulation and instrumentalisation are tools commonly used to fight peacekeeping missions.

On balance, even though some soldiers misbehaved in one way or another, the European operation clearly did more good than harm, since EUFOR RCA can be characterised success in fulfilling its mandate. It contributed to saving many lives not only in its area of operation but also outside Bangui through Sangaris re-deployment. It is, of course, impossible to know how many lives were saved; estimates would border on pure guessing. However, given the serious human-rights violations and widespread murders that took place in the countryside and in the capital alike, one can reasonably claim that many people survived thanks to the EU peacekeeping operation.

Finally, it is important to note that the EU action did not stem from an early-warning process designed to prevent violence from occurring on a wide scale. Indeed, while there was a fact-finding mission led by CMPD and EUMS in Bangui in June 2013 with the purpose of gathering information for a possible future CSDP operation, ‘[t]he options identified by the mission […] would not be followed upon [sic] until December, when the CAR’s security climate would deteriorate dramatically.’\textsuperscript{659} For months, Member States observed increasing violence in the country. Yet, though there were numerous alarming reports, France had to intervene unilaterally to prevent widespread massacres because the EU refused to use Battlegroups. Therefore, one can conclude that the external appropriateness criterion was met with only partial success.

### 3.3 OVERALL SUCCESS

In conclusion, EUFOR RCA is deemed a partial success. In the arena of internal goal attainment, the European peacekeeping operation reached its politico-strategic objectives and fulfilled its mandate successfully: all of its operational objectives were met. As for external goal attainment, EU troops improved the security conditions considerably and prevented violence from diffusing, escalating, or intensifying even if they could not stop every crime. Also, EUFOR was relatively efficient and cost-effective, and it definitely did

\textsuperscript{658} Jean S. Renouf, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{659} Niklas I.M. Novaky, ‘From EUFOR to EUMAM’, p. 97.
more good than harm, yet it must be stressed that the EUFOR mandate was quite narrow, especially when compared with the MINUSCA mandate. The United Nations force of 12,000 was mandated mainly to protect the country’s entire civilian population; to provide good official channels and political support for the efforts to address root causes of the conflict and establish lasting peace and security in the CAR; to devise, facilitate, and provide technical assistance for the electoral process with the aim of the holding of free, fair, transparent, and inclusive elections and promoting and supporting the rapid extension of state authority. Accordingly, the MINUSCA mission was quite ambitious, while EUFOR’s 900 men only had to ‘contribute to the provision of a safe and secure environment’ in two districts.

The objectives of the 2,000-man Sangaris force too were much wider than EUFOR’s mandate: according to Resolution 2127, the French operation was aimed at taking all necessary measures to support MISCA in discharging its mandate, which consisted of contributing to the protection of civilians and the restoration of security and public order, through the use of appropriate measures; to the stabilisation of the country and the restoration of state authority throughout the country’s territory; to the creation of conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance to populations in need; to the DDR or DDRRR process led by the transitional authorities and co-ordinated by BINUCA; and to national and international efforts to reform and restructure the defence and security sectors, led by the transitional authorities and co-ordinated by BINUCA.

As in previous CSDP military operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, the effort was a small-scale and reactive operation with a clear exit strategy. The planning was geared toward meeting a set end date instead of reaching an end state that involves ‘obtaining the situation upon which an operation can be terminated successfully’. In other words, the EUFOR operation was not meant to last until a specific situation was reached, such as the conclusion of a peace agreement or the resolution of a conflict; instead, it was for a limited duration after the FOC declaration. Admittedly, the participating states showed some flexibility with the initial end date, since the mandate was extended, but they clearly opposed any further extension. Hence, EUFOR RCA was a short-term mission without any political mandate. As indicated by the bridging-operation concept itself, the European troops sought only to provide time enough and aid in the MINUSCA deployment. Thereby, EUFOR confirmed Member States’ refusal to risk engaging in long-term and wide-scale peace operations with potential to continue for years or decades before a political solution to the conflict is negotiated.

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661 Sangaris was mandated to support the MINUSCA when the latter took over from MISCA, on 15 September 2014.  
665 The only exception is EUFOR Althea, which has been active in Bosnia–Herzegovina since 2004.
Consequently, one can conclude that EUFOR internal goal attainment was relatively easy to achieve because of its narrow mandate, especially in comparison with the MINUSCA and Sangaris mandates. However, at the same time, the operation’s limited objectives prevented the European troops from making a significant contribution to external goal attainment in terms of further conflict prevention and conflict transformation at the national level. In simple terms, more internal success meant less external success. The Figure 2 and Figure 3 summarises the discussion on the effectiveness of the EUFOR RCA.
FIGURE 3. The key achievements and enablers for EUFOR RCA

Achievements and enablers

- EU contributed to preventing the CAR conflict from provoking spill-over and further regional destabilisation.
- Military intervention was appropriate instrument to use for the situation.
- EUFOR RCA had an important role in supporting the French operation Sangaris, AU and UN efforts to diffuse the conflict and restabilization of the country.
- Close cooperation and coordination; the tasks were divided among the UN, France, and EU, in line with their competencies and capabilities.
- The Area of Operation was strategically selected and EU’s efforts helped to reduce the tensions and improving the overall security in the area.
- EUFOR operated in the spirit of comprehensive approach and cooperated with the Commission programmes and EU Delegation on the ground.
- Succeeded in providing time enough and aid for the MINUSCA deployment.
- The humanitarian actors could safely conduct their projects, civilians had relative freedom of movement.
- IDPs return movement advanced under EUFOR responsibility.
- Operation composition was appropriate to the operational area.
- EUFOR RCA was received well and perceived positively by the locals especially when comparing to the other military operations.
- Good local networks and confidential relations contributed to the up-to-date situational awareness.
- EUFOR RCA facilitated the dialogue between the different parties by bringing the actors around the same table.

FIGURE 4. Key challenges for EUFOR RCA

Challenges

- Difficulties in force generation delayed the deployment of the operation almost by 6 months>
- the situation on the ground would have required a rapid intervention.
- Force generation challenges showed the EU member states’ lack of political will and commitment towards the CSDP.
- The way how the military operations are funded and inflexibility of the financial instrument affected on the contributions and the running of the operation.
- The mandate was limited in terms of time, area of operation and resources, and it had only a limited and temporary impact on the conflict resolution.
- The international operations had different approaches towards the local population.
- Issues related to multiculturalism; national caveats, language barriers and doctrinal differences affected on the effectiveness.
- Lack of local infrastructure made the establishment and running of the operation challenging.
- No functioning host government to involve or support the planning of the operation.
- The misbehaviour of the EUFOR RCA personnel toward the local population had an negative impact on the reputation of the EU troops.
- Lack of air surveillance capabilities and reliable classified communication systems hampered the information collection, sharing and management.
3 ASSESSMENT OF THE EU’s IMPACT

The assessment of the EUFOR peace operation is based on analysis guidelines that are detailed below. However, it must be noted at this juncture that impact has to be interpreted as the positive or negative consequences that the EUFOR action had within its area of operation, most notably in terms of violence prevention; freedom of movement for civilian, NGO, and humanitarian actors; IDPs’ and refugees’ return; and MINUSCA deployment.

3.1 The EU perspective

From the EU perspective, the operation was a success, as indicated by numerous statements provided by EU officials. For instance, according to the EEAS, ‘EUFOR RCA has successfully completed its mission in Bangui’ since ‘the level of security in Bangui has significantly improved, facilitating the deployment and actions of humanitarian actors’.

When the EUFOR mandate ended, the EEAS stressed the fact that IDPs were going back to their homes and the first refugees were beginning to return to the Central African Republic but also that the country’s economic and social life had resumed, with the PK5 market continuing its development and people’s freedom of movement having improved significantly.

When the European Parliament Security and Defence subcommittee visited Bangui, on 18 to 20 February 2015, its president, Anna Fotyga, declared at the end of the visit: ‘We could take note on the ground to what extent EUFOR action made the difference at a crucial moment […]’. We could also find that EUFOR represents a successful model of bridging operation between the EU and the United Nations and that this co-operation model should be exploited further.

Amaud Danjean, another member of the subcommittee, even stated: ‘This is a great mission that worked amazingly well from everybody’s opinion on the ground’.

For the EU Council, the extension to EUFOR’s mandate that was requested by locals and the United Nations was further proof that the operation was ‘useful’ and ‘efficient’.

A few days before EUFOR left the country, the operation commander declared: ‘Today we leave Bangui. We leave an appeased city with an ongoing political process, refugee camps emptying out, IDPs going back home. I have the feeling indeed that the duty is accomplished’.

At press conferences, General Pontiès stated repeatedly that the operational objectives had been met and that the EU had reason to be proud because of what had been done in terms of security, freedom of movement for humanitarian workers, help for MINUSCA deployment, and support for the

669 Ibid.
national reconciliation and dialogue process.\textsuperscript{673} Finally, it must be stressed that all EU officials interviewed, at EUMS, EEAS, European Commission, and CMPD level alike, described EUFOR RCA as a success story despite several shortcomings that are explained below.

### 3.2 Local perspective

The empirical material suggests that EUFOR was well perceived by the local population.\textsuperscript{674} While the scope of the operation was geographically more limited than the other international forces, it appears that they had found the right balance, from the populations’ perspectives, between ensuring their security, being approachable, being helpful and being reactive when needed.\textsuperscript{675} That information was systematically confirmed by all the people interviewed in this research, including seven Bangui citizens living in the third and the fifth districts\textsuperscript{676}. Male IDP respondents even stated that in Bangui, ‘there [was] a difference between [international] forces: some [were] efficient like EUFOR, but MINUSCA and Sangaris, in contrast they [didn’t do] nothing’.\textsuperscript{677} The results of this study indicates that EUFOR was particularly appreciated by Bangui citizens on account of its close proximity in relationships with citizens but also its results on the ground in terms of security improvements.\textsuperscript{678} The positive perception of EUFOR on the part of local citizens but also local authorities was systematically confirmed by interviewees and in the press. According to one NGO worker, people had difficulty understanding why EUFOR left, since it was effective and loved by the population.\textsuperscript{679}

There seemed to have been consensus among the population that the security improvements were, at least partially, a result of the EUFOR RCA presence.\textsuperscript{680} It even seems that the M’Poko camp IDPs, along with citizens of the third and fifth districts, were worried when EUFOR was set to withdraw, because ‘they recognised the efforts EUFOR [had made] for the security situation’.\textsuperscript{681} In sum, Bangui citizens regretted the EUFOR withdrawal.\textsuperscript{682}

Despite the positive perceptions, EUFOR RCA was not completely free of criticisms. First, EUFOR was criticised by citizens for having taken too much time to deploy.\textsuperscript{683} It seems that the delays in deployment detreated EU’s creditability and prestige among the local population. **People could not understand why**


\textsuperscript{674} See for example Norwegian refugee council, 2015.


\textsuperscript{676} NEUPS, 24 September 2017; NEUFo, 17 January 2017 ; NEUFo, 20 January 2017; NEUFo, 24 January 2017; NEUFo, 26 January 2017; NEUFo, 1 February 2017; NEUFo, 6 February 2017.

\textsuperscript{677} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{678} Interview no.31, and no.13.

\textsuperscript{679} Interview no.13.


\textsuperscript{681} Interview no.31.

\textsuperscript{682} Interview no. 13.

\textsuperscript{683} NEUFo, 24 January 2017
the European Union needed so much time to deploy its force while serious violence was taking place. Second, while EUFOR's area of operation was considered as a well-considered strategy, several local interviewees suggested that the operation should have taken responsibility of other districts. Especially the fourth and the eight ones should be included into the area of operation, since the latter also faced important security concerns. As a whole, the information gathered indicated that the locals would have wanted EUFOR to operate in a larger area.

Finally, one journalist reported that since EUFOR was heavily involved in the third district, some people thought that EUFOR was mainly motivated by the Muslim protection. However, other sources argued that the European force was generally considered as impartial since it protected equally the different communities and supported various projects in both districts. Overall, despite the criticisms EUFOR benefited from a wide support from the population, with the exception of the armed groups that the force used to fight. There were also opposing view in terms of the appropriateness of EUFOR activities. When EUFOR started its disarmament operations in Bangui, people from the third districts felt negatively towards the EUFOR activities. As described by a Bangui citizen, it was a part of the third district population who did not want militias to be arrested, and consequently people who supported the bandits were angry with EUFOR. However, in particular, IDPs at the M’Poko camp – had difficulty in understanding why the European troops did not arrest some militia leaders, since the latter prevented IDPs’ return to the districts. Those militias were responsible for all kinds of illegal traffic and therefore used to try to destabilise the transition and peace process. Hence, the regular citizens wished that EUFOR could have done more in order to enhance the sustainability of the stability in the area.

In fact, the leaders of the bandit groups were well known to EUFOR, but political factors kept EU troops from receiving authorisation from Brussels to arrest these persons. The result frustrated those members of the population who knew that EUFOR actually had identified the dangerous troublemakers. In consequence, even if the local population perceived EUFOR’s security impacts as positive, some of them felt frustrated because EUFOR did not do enough with regard to certain dangerous groups. The fact that it took until October 2016 before some of the key rebellious leaders were captured, indicates that the effectiveness and sustainability of the EUFOR RCA’s efforts in CAR could have been enhanced with an extended mandate.

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685 NEUFO, 17 January 2017  
686 NEUFO, 20 January 2017; NEUFO, 24 January 2017  
687 Interview no. 30  
688 Interview no.25  
689 Interview no.25.  
690 Interview no. 35.  
691 Round Table Discussion, Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC), 31 October – 1 November, 2016.
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**Theses**


**Web sites**


**Articles and papers**


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Interview no. 37 (2017) Interview with a head of a local NGO, CAR citizen, Bangui, 24 January 2017


Interview no. 40 (2017) Interview with a Radio podcaster, Christian, CAR citizen, Bangui, 6 February 2017

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Round Table Discussion, Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC), 31 October – 1 November, 2016.
ANNEX 1. Internal and external effectiveness at political-strategic level

**Internal goal attainment and appropriateness**
- EU proved to be a global security actor.
- Contributed to preventing the CAR conflict from provoking spill-over and further regional destabilisation.
- CAR did not become a terrorist haven.
- EUFOR RCA was a bridging operation preparing the ground for larger UN or AU operation to take over.
- EU contributed to returning the constitutional order.
- Operation was part of the EU's comprehensive approach.

- From timeliness perspective the EU's response can be considered as a failure due to the delay.
- Difficulties in force generation delayed the deployment of the operation almost by 6 months - the situation on the ground would have required a rapid intervention.
- Force generation challenges showed the EU member states' lack of political will and commitment towards the CSDP.

**External goal attainment & appropriateness**
- Military intervention was appropriate instrument to use for the situation.
- EUFOR RCA had an important role in supporting the French operation Sangaris, AU and UN efforts to diffuse the conflict and restabilization of the country.
- EU's efforts helped to reduce the tensions and improving the overall security in its area of operations.

- The mandate was limited in terms of time, area of operation and resources, and it had only a limited and temporary impact on the conflict resolution.
- The security situation deteriorated in the area once EUFOR RCA was terminated, although the situation did not escalate into a chaos.
Annex 3. Network of French bases

### Internal goal attainment and appropriateness
(Mandate objectives achieved, efficiency, cost-effective implementation timeliness)

- The operational goals were met.
- Improved the security conditions considerably and prevented violence from diffusing and escalating.
- Succeeded in providing time enough and aid for the MINUSCA deployment.
- Created conditions to the provision of humanitarian assistance to populations in need.
- The synergies between the military operations was an important element in planning and cost-effective execution of the EUFOR RCA.
- EUFOR RCA had a clear end date.
- The composition of the EUFOR RCA was important contributor for the effectiveness of the small operation.

### External goal attainment & appropriateness
(Impact to conflict (escalation, continuation...) and do no harm)

- EUFOR RCA brought added value to the other foreign troops operating in the area.
- EUFOR helped Sangaris deploy outside the capital and increase its freedom of movement; EU troops thereby made a positive contribution to conflict transformation militarily.
- EUFOR RCA was received well and perceived positively by the locals especially when comparing to the other military operations.
- EUFOR RCA facilitated the dialogue between the different parties by bringing the actors around the same table.
- The humanitarian actors could safely conduct their projects, civilians had relative freedom of movement.
- IDPs' return movement advanced under EUFOR responsibility.

- The inflexibility of the financial instrument (ATHENA) hampered the effectiveness of the operation.
- Challenges related to multiculturalism, information sharing, and information management hampered the EUFOR RCA’s internal coordination.

- Due to the limited mandate and resources the impact of the EUFOR RCA was rather modest and only regional.
- The misbehaviour of the EUFOR RCA personnel toward the local population had an negative impact on the reputation of the EU troops.

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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
Annex 3. Network of French bases

Annex 4. EUFOR RCA area of operations


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Annex 5. IDPs’ stated reasons for not returning home

Annex 5. IDPs’ stated reasons for not returning home


Case study – Central African Republic:

Aim: The study is designed to assess the achievements and potential shortcomings of the past and ongoing crisis management missions of the European Union. The study reviews the effectiveness potential of EU capabilities with an aim of identifying lessons and best practices from EU (and other international) engagement in support of providing stability and security for the region.

Analysis framework:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>EU perspective</th>
<th>Non-EU perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politico-strategic</td>
<td>Member States, EEAS, OHQ, Council, etc.</td>
<td>Other international actors HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational field</td>
<td>EU staff on the ground</td>
<td>Other international actors Local actors on the ground</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effectiveness is when a mission or operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner from the standpoint both of the EU and of the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent.

Internal effectiveness refers to the EU perspective, which considers

- Internal goal-attainment: the extent to which the EU achieved what it set out to do
- Internal appropriateness: the extent to which the implementation goes according to EU plans (in terms of timeliness, efficiency, and effectiveness)

External effectiveness refers to the conflict perspective, which considers

- External goal-attainment: the extent to which (further) violent conflict is prevented
- External appropriateness: the extent of proportionality in prevention effort and effect

Capability is the capacity to deploy a combination of resources through collective organisational routines to reach goals.

In this project, capabilities are divided into six categories:

1) **Planning capacity**: Strategic/operational planning, management, budgetary constraints, consultation on lessons identified from reports, situational awareness

2) **Operational capacity**: Leadership, training, mission organisational structures, the mission decision-making process, human resources (deployment and expertise), technologies, mission funding, culture, security, housing, and procurement

3) **Interoperability**: Co-operation/collaboration; co-ordination; and civ–mil, civ–civ, and mil–mil synergies

4) **Comprehensiveness**: Co-operation and co-ordination, with civilian, military, and other actors alongside NGOs, locals, and the international community
5) Competences and skills (knowledge and skills): Communication, training, and professional background

6) Technologies: The technological resources available, pooling and sharing, and EDA priorities

**Themed interview on the EU (EU perspective)**

1) Have you worked in the CAR? What are/were your role and responsibilities related to the CAR?

**PART 1: Contextualisation of EU engagement in the CAR**

**Theme 1: Actors and co-ordination**

1) Who are currently the key local and international stakeholders/actors in the CAR in terms of conflict prevention and stabilisation? Who is the ‘biggest’ with regard to power? Why?
2) Can you describe the forms of co-operation between the EU and the key international and local actors in the CAR? Is the co-operation sufficient?
3) What is the role of the EU Delegation in the overall co-ordination of the EU efforts? Is it sufficient?
4) How would you describe the co-ordination and co-operation between individual units/departments in the EUFOR operations? (Good, satisfactory, …)
5) Is the division of tasks and responsibilities among the international actors clear?
6) What are the barriers and enablers (if any) to closer connection between EU and UN activities in the CAR?
7) How has any overlap in activities between the international actors been rectified?
8) Are the long-term visions of the international community (i.e., the UN, the EU, the AU, China, France, the US, etc.) for the development of the CAR contradictory? If so, in what way?
9) Have the synergies between the EU and other international actors been fully utilised if one thinks in terms of civil–military, civil–civil, and military–military dimensions?
10) What have been the main lessons identified in relation to the co-operation and co-ordination between the international and local actors in the CAR?

**Theme 2: International engagement in the CAR and Security Sector Reform (SSR)**

1) What are the EU member states’ interests (together or individually) in the CSDP mission/operation?
2) What is the most important strategic objective in terms of SSR in the CAR? For whom, and why?
3) What have been the main achievements supported by the international actors in terms of conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts in the CAR?
4) What are currently the most important aspects of the SSR process in the CAR?
5) What have been the most effective ways of implementing the SSR process or instruments for doing so?
6) Have the capabilities and resources sufficed for implementation of the SSR? If not, what capabilities have been lacking?
7) How are the achievements of international actors monitored/evaluated? What about the local actors’?
8) What have been the main barriers to carrying out the reform process / bringing stability to the CAR?
   a) Internal barriers (within the EU – e.g., other institutions and barriers related to instruments)
PART 2: Appropriateness of EU activities in the CAR

Theme 3: EU engagement in the CAR

1) What are/should be the EU’s role and responsibilities in the CAR?
2) Which short-, medium-, and long-term strategic objectives have been realised or foreseen for the CAR?
3) Are the EU activities in the CAR sufficient? What could be done differently?
4) Can you give some examples of where and how, in your opinion, the EU could improve the effectiveness potential of its capabilities in relation to conflict prevention and stabilisation efforts in the CAR?
5) What is the added value that the EU can bring to stabilisation efforts in the CAR?
6) How are the EU-set goals expected to affect the balance of power at the local level?
7) How did/do various interest groups attempt to influence EU decision-making?

Theme 4: Effectiveness of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR RCA actions

1) What were the most important objectives of the CSDP operations?
2) What are the vision (ideal state after the operation) and mission (what the operation an attempt to achieve)?
3) What were the operation goals on the ground? Are they in line with the mandate? How or how not?
4) What were the strategic and operational objectives of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR RCA operations and desired outcomes as defined by the OPLANs, and have they been met?
5) To what extent were the operation mandates sufficient for making a positive/meaningful impact on the conflict?
6) What difficulties existed in terms of reaching the operation objectives? How were these overcome?
7) How has the CSDP mission/operation (EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR RCA) fit into the overall stabilisation process of the region?
8) To what extent were the manning, equipment, and training for the operations appropriate for achieving a positive impact on the conflict and stabilisation?
9) Were the available resources appropriately allocated and used in the operations?
10) What have been the political and diplomatic consequences of the presence of EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR RCA?
11) What other consequences have the operation had for the conflict area (in terms of civil society, local government structures, etc.)?
12) How has the impact of the operation on local/regional society changed in the course of the CSDP operations/missions?
PART 3: Effectiveness potential of the capabilities

Theme 5: Capabilities

Planning and situational awareness

1) What were the major drivers in establishment of CSDP interventions in 2008, 2014, and 2015 in the CAR?

2) Have both military and civilian perspectives been taken into account in the planning of the EU engagement?

3) How comprehensive has the planning and execution of the operations been? Were all aspects of society (military, political, social, cultural, economic, etc.) considered in the planning and execution from the beginning? Was/is this a suitable, effective approach? What can be improved, where, and how?

4) How much have the local actors been consulted in the operation and EU strategic planning? Which local partners participate in the EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR RCA operations? Who is included, and who is excluded? How are partners selected?

5) What concerns/barriers have been evident in the pre-planning, planning, and continuation phases of the mission?

6) Does the planning take local capabilities into consideration and does the mission/operation support local capabilities?

7) What is your view of the deployment system and timelines related to deployments? Have the timelines been followed? If not, why?

8) Have national caveats influenced the planning and execution? How? What has been done to overcome the obstacles?

9) How are gender and human rights taken into account in the operation documents (mandate, CONOPS, OPLAN, and MIP) and the functioning of the operation? Could you give a practical example of this?

10) What estimate would you give of the state of situational awareness with regard to the CAR?

11) Is the field office receiving enough intelligence information for creation of accurate situation analyses in the relevant area of responsibility? If not, what could be done better?

12) What are the methods and means of obtaining situational awareness?

13) What have been / are the barriers and factors that enhance obtaining situational awareness?

Human-resources aspects (expertise needed and deployment)
1) What resources, skills, and knowledge are needed for enhancing joint functioning between the operation and other relevant actors (i.e., the UN, the AU, local authorities, and NGOs)?
2) What is the role of the Force Commander / EUMS, EUMC for the overall effectiveness of the operation activities on the ground?
3) Is there some kind of expertise that has been lacking at some point in the operation cycle (e.g., in gender and human-rights issues)?
4) What kind of background/skills/knowledge is needed for executing the tasks of the peace support operation effectively in the CAR?
   a) On the part of the local staff
   b) On the part of the international staff
5) What is your view of the deployment and rotation cycle?
6) Are there shortcomings related to the deploying of personnel?
7) What kinds of modules should be included in the training of international staff who are deployed to the CAR? What about the national staff working in the EU operation?
8) Did you receive enough pre-mission training and guidance prior to your deployment? Did it meet the needs?
9) Did you receive enough training during the operation? Did it meet your needs?

Local ownership and local staff contribution

1) Is the EU intervention (CSDP operation) a preferred and popular policy option from the locals’ point of view?
2) Was the intention behind the EU response clear for the country in which the conflict was situated?
3) What roles do local partners have? How are these roles decided upon? Do local actors adhere to and agree with the roles they have been given? Why or why not?
4) Has the stabilisation process received support from the key local actors, and, in general, do the measures taken / activities have local support? Whose support?
5) Did/do the operation’s capabilities meet the local needs / expectations / operational requirements?
6) How do you see the development of local ownership among the counterparts of EUFOR RCA and EUMAM RCA?
7) Do some ethnic groups have more ownership than others? If so, in what way?
8) Have the expectations at the local level been managed appropriately by the EU?

Information-sharing technologies and capabilities

1) What information-sharing technologies are in use in EUFOR RCA?
2) How has the information-sharing developed in CSDP operations over the years?
3) What are the crucial capabilities related to sharing of information?
4) What are the barriers to information-sharing and the factors that enhance it?
5) Do the goals for the operation take technological capabilities into consideration?
6) Have there been shortcomings in technological capabilities? What is or was missing?
Pooling and sharing of civil–military capabilities

1) What kind of pooling and sharing of civilian and/or military capabilities was/is done in the various phases in the operation cycle (the planning phase and operational phase)?

2) If certain gaps or needs were identified during the planning or operational phase of EUFOR RCA, were/are these capabilities generated or implemented in the framework of pooling and sharing? For example, if a need for training became evident, was this capability produced via pooling and sharing?

3) Could you give some practical examples of pooling and sharing of civilian and/or military capabilities? How could they be utilised in CSDP missions and operations?

Theme 6: Something else that you would like to comment on in relation to EU engagement in the CAR

Themed interview on the EU (non-EU perspective)

1) Have you worked in the CAR? What are/were your role and responsibilities related to the CAR?

Part 1: Contextualisation of EU engagement in the CAR

Theme 1: Actors and co-ordination

1) Who are the key actors in the CAR in terms of conflict prevention and stabilisation?

2) What kind of co-operation/co-ordination did you have in place with EUFOR? Was there a formal procedure for regular meeting between your organisation and EUFOR? What about with other IOs and NGOs? What were the topics of the meetings? Did you share information? What kind of information? Do you think it was sufficient?

3) Did EUFOR call upon your organisation for assistance?

4) In your opinion, are there contradictions in long-term visions within the international community (e.g., visions of the UN, the EU, the AU, China, France, and the US) for development of the CAR? If so, in what way?

5) Have the synergies between the EU and other international actors been fully utilised if one thinks in terms of civil–military, civil–civil, and military–military dimensions?

6) What have been the main lessons identified with regard to the co-operation and co-ordination between the international and local actors in the CAR?

Theme 2: International engagement in the CAR and Security Sector Reform (SSR)

1) What is the most important strategic objective in terms of SSR in the CAR? For whom, and why?

2) What have been the main achievements supported by the international actors in terms of conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts in the CAR?

3) How are the achievements of international actors monitored/evaluated? What about the local actors’?

4) What have been the main barriers to carrying out the reform process / bringing stability to the CAR?
   c) Internal barriers (within the EU – e.g., related to other institutions or to instruments)
PART 2: Appropriateness of EU activities in the CAR

Theme 3: EU engagement in the CAR

1) What are / should be the EU’s role and responsibilities in the CAR?
2) Which short-, medium-, and long-term strategic objectives have been realised or foreseen for the CAR?
3) Are the EU activities in the CAR sufficient? What could be done differently?
4) Can you give some examples of where and how, in your opinion, the EU could improve the potential effectiveness of its capabilities in relation to conflict prevention and stabilisation efforts in the CAR?
5) What added value can the EU bring to stabilisation efforts in the CAR?

Theme 4: Effectiveness of EUFOR RCA

1) During the EUFOR deployment, to what extent did you observe an improvement in the security situation, in terms of a reduction in violence? What indicators or data are behind this observation? Did you detect a significant difference between the time before the EUFOR deployment (when protection was under Sangaris responsibility) and after?
2) Did you notice refugees or IDPs returning to the third and fifth district during the time of EUFOR presence? Is this based on ‘gut feel’ / estimation or figures?
3) Did you observe a deterioration in the security situation in the months prior to the EUFOR deployment – that is, between January and June 2014?
4) Did you notice a deterioration in the security situation after EUFOR left the country?
5) What would be your main criticism with regard to the EUFOR approach to the conflict, of the EUFOR action in the third and fifth districts? What could have been done better?
6) What humanitarian consequences did the EUFOR delay in deployment have (five months, more or less) In terms of violence, murders, attacks, etc.?
7) To what extent were the EUFOR operation activities sufficient for making a positive/meaningful impact on the conflict?
8) What difficulties have there been in terms of reaching the operation objectives? How were these overcome?
9) What consequences has the operation had for the conflict area (civil society, local governmental structures,)?
10) In your opinion, what was the overall impact of the EUFOR presence?

PART 3: Effectiveness potential of the capabilities

Theme 5: Capabilities

Situational awareness

1) What are the methods and means of obtaining situational awareness?
2) What were/are the barriers to gaining situational awareness and the factors that enhance it?

**Human-resources aspects (expertise needed and deployment)**

1) What resources, skills, and knowledge are needed for enhancing interoperability in operations between the military operation and other relevant actors (i.e., the UN, AU, local authorities, and NGOs)?
2) What kind of background/ skills/ knowledge is needed to conduct the tasks of the peace support operation effectively in CAR?
   c) On the part of the local staff
   d) On the part of the international staff
3) What kinds of modules should be included in the training of international staff who are deployed to the CAR? What about the national staff working for any peace-support operation?

**Local ownership and local staff contribution**

1) Is the EU intervention (CSDP operation) a preferred and popular policy option from the local standpoint?
2) Was the intention behind the EU response clear for the country in which the conflict was situated?
3) What was the Bangui citizens’ perception of EUFOR – what was the relationship like? Did the citizens welcome the European soldiers? According to my research, EUFOR was perceived as much more neutral than Sangaris or MISCA. Do you agree with this assessment?
4) How did the CAR authorities welcome the EUFOR operation?
5) Has the stabilisation process received support from the key local actors, and, in general, do the measures taken / activities carried out have local support? Whose support?
6) Do some ethnic groups have more ownership than others? If so, why?
7) Have the locals’ expectations been managed appropriately by the EU?

**Information-sharing technologies and capabilities**

1) What information-sharing technologies are used by your organisation in the CAR?
2) What are the barriers to information-sharing and the factors that enhance it?

**Pooling and sharing of civil–military capabilities**

1) Could you give some practical examples of pooling and sharing of civilian and/or military capabilities? How could they be utilised in CSDP missions and operations?

**Theme 6: Something that you would like to comment on in relation to EU engagement in the CAR**
CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction to the combined report, the four case country, and in actual fact the seven missions investigated are difficult to compare. Their nature, size, objective, budget, priority, context of operation etc. were very different. The EUBAM mission had to evacuate and did not stay long enough to have a significant impact, whilst the small EUAVSEC mission had a very narrowly defined mission and objective. Is it for instance meaningful to compare for instance Operation Artemis and EUFOR RCA, when the strategic context and the time it was deployed were so many years apart? What these studies do provide are a series of lessons learned and lessons identified, and which illustrate that some key features can be found in several of the deployed operations. The detailed lessons learned report can be found in deliverable 3.6 and 3.7.

At the strategic level EU is still an alliances of independent states, and cannot be analyzed without taking the natural interests into consideration. The robust military deployments in the two French speaking countries, DRC and CAR, cannot be understood without including the interest of France. All three military deployment were dominated by France, and cannot be understood without scrutinizing France strategic interest and historical role in that part of Africa, and now operating under an EU banner. This also explains why, especially in relation to Operation Artemis and EUFOR RCA, many EU member states opted politically support the operation, but not to contribute troops on the ground, and if they did in non-combat roles.

However, the military operations also constitute the area where the EU has had the highest level of success in the sense that the missions had a limited area of operation, had a short deployment period, and had clearly defined mandated operational objectives, and in, in general, had the needed capabilities at their disposals. The three military operations were by EU considered to success, in that they managed to reach their objectives, which in the case of Operation Artemis and EUFOR RCA were to stabilize a critical security and humanitarian situation, act as a bridging operation until the UN operation was deployed and operational. However, all three missions had the feature in common that there medium to long term impact on the security situation in host countries were limited, but that was not the objective of the missions. The four other operations analyzed in the different studies in this report are all directly or in-directly part of post-conflict capacity building efforts in South Sudan, DRC and Libya, and therefore involved in precisely the longer term objective of creating lasting peace and security, and therefore having a long-term impact. These missions in general was negatively influenced by the fact that these projects failed in their design to strike a realistic balance between the ambition of the programs, the resources available, and then an in-depth understanding of the situation and the institutional dynamics on the ground. The projects were generally found to be overambitious, and done from the outside in, without establishing and maintaining local peer groups assisting in that process. The result was projects designed by incoming EU seconded personnel, without the needed knowledge and network on the ground and in the host-nation in general. This was also due to the fact that the international staff lacked the will to use the local knowledge present, and often opted for expat expertise, often with general knowledge of SSR, but not from the host-country. Consequently the projects and programs were design following standard international project design frameworks, and not tailored for the specific situation, country, region, local community, because the knowledge was not there. This
constitute a major problem, because the local expertise could be found, and in some instances individual EU seconded staff managed to create contact and include local peer-groups in designing of the programs. This was for instance the case in the early parts of the EUPOL engagement, but disappeared in the later parts of the program. So when it happens it is due to individual EU staff having the network, and knowledge to identify the relevant peers and local capacities to include in the process. However, often this has not been case, and a common response from the deployed staff is that there is no local capacity, and they therefore needed to bring it in from the outside. This is, however, not always the case, but is of course an easier way to operate when arriving in a complex post-conflict environment. Nevertheless another key feature found in several of the cases was the lack of information sharing. In the military missions the sharing of intelligence constituted a challenge, which of course has to do with the nature of intelligence work in general, and the partnership agreements that the services have honor, and which limits the ability of the individual states sharing their intelligence. Added to that a major finding in the studies are that there seems to be a disconnect between Brussels and the missions and delegation in the four case studies. The lessons learned reports from previous projects are not accessible, and are, due to the interests of the of the bilateral partners in the projects, not accessible to the EU personnel in the field. This was found in most of the cases, and constitute a major problem that the staff coming into a mission area do not have access to the lessons learned from the previous missions. The risk of course being that the same mistakes found to have been done in the first mission could be repeated. A related challenge was found in the fact that often did the seconded personnel from member states not have the needed qualifications to effectively engage and undertake the task at hand. This had to do with the actually capacity and training of the deployed personnel, but also very much had to do with the lack of needed language-skills, that blocked for being effective in mission. The language skills, and the historical connections were also of significant importance whether the member-states decide to deploy in the first place, and if so they had personnel with the needed language skills. Basically the French speaking missions constitute a challenge especially to the countries in Northern and Eastern Europe and can explain why it was difficult to get troop and staff commitments from these states in these missions.

In several of the cases there was a tension between the EU and then the national interests of the individual member states. This was visible at several levels, where for instance the initial support for a mission seems to fade away, and unless national interests were at stake, the willingness to stay engaged and support the missions reduces over time. Another related finding is the clash that exist between the core national interest of individual member states, and then the EU missions on the ground. To paraphrase this some things are simply too important to leave to the EU, which for various reasons end up constitute bilateral projects and programs running parallel with the EU projects. The reasons for this was often a wish of securing control of design and focus of the mission, which points to an internal tensions in-between EU-member states. However, it also stresses an important point relating to the reasons why units in the international system, and in this case EU member states, engage in development aid, for instance the UK support for SSR program in the DRC, or the numerous bilateral programs in South Sudan. Development aid, and post-conflict capacity building programs, is an effective way of increasing a units influence in the international system. Furthermore, nationally owned programs tends to be easier secure domestic support for, than often larger multilateral programs. The result being that bilateral and EU programs work in parallel, and sometimes
overlapping, and without the effective and needed coordination measures put in-place. A final challenge found in the selected cases were, that EU generally is slow to respond. That was both the case in CAR and in several of the project and programs in the DRC. This means that from the initial idea is presented to the actual mission is operational is a slow and bureaucratic process, which many local partners found difficult to understand and accept, and even argued that the EU was one of the most difficult donors to work with amongst other things due to these reasons. In addition to this some of the cases identified that problems of late arrival of equipment constituted significant challenge. This point to the need of establishing a central logistical hub, that can support the missions in a more expeditiously.