PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

D3.6 Africa: Discussion report

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D3.6 Africa: Discussion report

Public

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One roundtable events were organised in the framework of Work Package as part of the IECEU project. The events focused on the WP3's four case studies on Libya, CAR, South Sudan and DRC. This report provides information on the roundtable event, and presents the main points of discussion during the event. The roundtable discussion and the subsequent seminar on Effectiveness of International Assistance and Local Ownership in the four case studies was organised by the Royal Danish Defence College on 31 October-1. November 2016. The roundtable participants included experts on the Africa in general, sub-matter experts, on peace and conflict studies as well as practitioners of crisis management. A total of 18 speakers explored the effectiveness of international assistance to the four African cases from different perspectives, drawing both a rather pessimistic picture of the current situation in the four countries in question, but also highlighting the difficulties for EU working as a conflict manager in this context.

Libya is plagued by international strife to such an extent, that EU had to withdraw from that mission. South Sudan has return into civil war, whilst the technical impact of the small EU airport mission is without doubt, the larger strategical and medium to long term impacts are not visible. In CAR the EU-force managed to stabilise a critical security situation which allowed for international humanitarian action, and for political dialogue to take place. The EU-force was a robust bridging mission that was replaced by a UN force, and the force managed to largely fulfil its mandate. However, the EU-force missions also highlights a number of internal EU challenges that needs to be addressed, and on the medium to long term impact of this type of military interventions. In the case of the DRC four cases were debated. The first was operation Artemis, the EU led military intervention into the town of Bunia, to stop and pre-empt an unfolding ethnic conflict. The operation was limited in size and time, and managed to achieve its objectives. However, the deployment did not prevent the flaring up of the conflict after it had left. The important implication of Artemis was that it was the first ESDP mission, and it became a trendsetter for the future more independent role of the EU, that some member-states wanted. In 2006 the EU again deployed a robust military force to primarily Kinshasa, mandated to assist the UN force MONUC in securing the DRC elections in that year. Again the EU-force deployment was limited in size and time, and managed to achieve its mandate. However, the deployment highlighted a number of lessons learned for the EU for future operations, especially around national caveats in operation, logistics, but also the different priority given by the member-states for EU led military operations, compared to for instance NATO-operations. This was very visible in the later CAR deployment, where it was difficult to get EU-members to commit and deploy forces. The two other EU missions in the DRC was the EUPOL and the EUSEC missions, that focused on help implementing the SSR program that constituted a central element of the peace-agreement. Even though the EU was involved many years, and
initiated a whole range of new initiatives, the missions did not manage to achieve their medium to long term objectives. The study shows that there was a discrepancy between project formulation and ambitions, and then the budget available and reality on the other hand. The EUPOL and EUSEC missions was plagued by being overambitious, and not taking the DRC context into consideration. Furthermore the study shows that there is a disconnect between what happens in Brussels and then what happens on the ground in the DRC, and there is an urgent need of securing better communication and cooperation between the two levels.
1 INTRODUCTION

One roundtable event and one public seminar have been organised in the framework of Work Package 3 of the IECEU project. The events focused on the WP3’s four case studies on Libya, CAR, South Sudan and the DRC. This report provides information on the events, and presents the main points and findings of discussion during the events.

The roundtable discussion was organised by Royal Danish Defence College 31st October 2016, and took place at the Danish Defence Library at Kastellet, Copenhagen. The roundtable was attended by thirteen participants, including African sub-matter experts, peace and conflict studies specialist, as well as practitioners of crisis management and EU-crisis management. A list of participants can be found below. Five speakers gave presentations that outlined the findings and major themes of from the studies, and each presentation was followed by sub-matter expert as discussant. Through this roundtable event the IECEU study findings on the effectiveness of EU civilian crisis management missions in the four cases studies were put within a wider context, and it was attempted to identify challenges that were to be of a more general nature. The main points of presentations and discussion is outlined in the below section.

On 1st November 2016 at the Danish Defence Library at Kastellet, Copenhagen, Royal Danish Defence College, in partnership with the IECEU partners, organised a public seminar on EU crisis management in Africa, focusing on the four case-studies. Thirty people attended. As was the case during the roundtable the participants were the sub-matter experts, Africanist, practitioners and people from the public with interest in the field.

The purpose of the public seminar was firstly to convey and present some of the preliminary research results to a broader audience, secondly to have in depth discussions on the findings from the four cases studies, and to draw out general conclusions from the four studies, which could be useful for future EU CSDP missions. An underlying goal was to receive feedback on the study report in an open peer review process, and the use of expert discussants helped generate an lively and informative discussion.
Aim of discussion: To identify common findings from case studies in order to make comparisons

Participants:

Dr. Annemarie Peen Rodt, RDDC
Dr. Thomas Mandrup, RDDC/SU
Dr. Judith Verweijen, Ghent University, Belgium
Dr. Arnold Kammel, AIES
Lasse Kristensen, former HoM EUAVSEC South Sudan
Elisa Norvanto, FINCENT
Agnes Foures, HoM, Project Zingo, CAR
Dr. Jyrki Ryohomäki, CMC Finland
Maruan El-Krekshi, Crisis Management Initiative

Welcome and introduction to the IECEU project and context: Prof. Annemarie Peen Rodt

Prof. Peen Rodt started by introducing the IECEU Horizon 2020 project, and its academic focus on EU conflict prevention and capacity building. The basic idea behind the project was to look and compare at EU operations in different regions and highlight the lessons learned and lessons identified, in order to improve future operations. Fortunately enough the project have received a lot of interest from the EU in Brussel, which shows that there is an interest in the project. By end October 2016 the project was nearly half-way in 3-year project period and the main part of research package is done. Currently comparative work is being undertaken, but still room for research. It is a this stage important point out and highlight weaknesses in the work, and remember that despite the fact the it is an EU-funded project, there is full academic freedom. It is however, also important to remember, that there is a need to be policy relevant, because the project needs to identify concrete proposals for the future.

Congo case: Prof. Thomas Mandrup

Prof. Mandrup started with a disclaimer and pointed out that he had only recently been added to the project, and what he was presenting at this stage was a combination of the DRC review and case study, which, at a later stage, would be separated and constitute to separate studies. The presentation was consequently only the preliminary findings. The EU had been present in the DRC since 2003 – in five major engagements, but not operating alone. This by nature made it more difficult to identify the impact of these specific EU initiatives. The focus of the DRC study was firstly to identify what the EU has done in the DRC, what kind of projects and programs that has been undertaken. The difficulty in this is that it both back in time, which means that the involved are no longer available, and that the five programs very different in nature, time, resources available, scope and mandate, which constitute direct challenges in creating an overview, but also comparing the projects. The EU projects were initiated to help implement a peace-agreement that EU had
been involved in drafting. It was a tremendous task due to complex nature of the DRC conflict. The EU had to navigate within a political context, where the international community had taken sides, and had to embark on a complicated nation-building project. This had to be done whilst the number of armed insurgents were and still are active in DRC, especially in the East, constituting a constant threat to the local population. In essence the EU was involved in a post-conflict state-building project, whilst the conflict was still ongoing. That posed a significant challenge in implementing best practice SSR, since there were immediate security concerns that needed attention. One of the big challenges operating in the DRC is the size of the country and the lack of infrastructure. Difficult to sustain the infrastructure and provide logistics. For instance rails and roads are not being maintained. A direct consequence of this was the police training centres having difficulties of attracting students due to loss of income and distance to centres. The first EU operation was Artemis, which was launched in 2003. It was France-led dominated EU-operation, which got critical enablers from non-EU members such as South Africa and Canada. In 2006 the EU deployed EUFOR which was a military operation deployed in support of the UN force in the DRC to secure the 2006 elections, and was under joint French and German lead, and had participation from most EU-member states, and then Turkey. As part of the peace agreement the EU in the period between 2005-2015 launched both two EUPOL mission and then the military training mission EUSEC. All these initiative was a part of an EU promise to the Congolese government to support the implementation of the peace-agreement. It is difficult to investigate the impact of the Artemis operation, since it took place back in 2003, but it managed to stabilise an threatening security and humanitarian situation. The operation was limited in area of operation and in length, and it is difficult to assess the longer term impact of the operation.

Initial finding/ lessons learned

- No exit strategy, limited deployment time and robust mandate (Bunia). No long term solution, but that was not the aim. Good logistics due to proximity of Entebbe airport.
- EUFOR: Deployed to secure 2006 elections.
- Lessons learned: Largest part of force in Gabon. Vulnerable due to response time. FARDC/PR forces fortified airport making it difficult to use. No clear mandate made it difficult for EU forces to operate. National caveats made ops. difficult. Elections relatively successful, limited violence, local resistance.
- EUPOL – from IPU to PNC. 2004 Kinshasa. Objective changed over time, virtually no police present at beginning. First task was to make police force capable of handling elections. No long term police training. International funding went primarily to security forces.
- 15-year strategy to establish a professional security force. Problem of implementing the strategy.
- General findings:
  - Limited impact, different types of police leading to infighting and competition, lack of coordination. Corruption still a problem. Police not serving the interests of the population. EU and cooperation between international donors have worked well, but infighting between donors undermines the process. Lack of sustainability plan. Locals do not want reform, because funding will disappear. Judicial reform difficult also, magistrates do not dare enter certain areas.
  - EUSEC – much more problematic than EUPOL.
  - Main goal was to secure elections. Training of security forces not coordinated between donors. EU and UN problems of coordination. EU impact on local actors did not work well. Local parties where not trustworthy and did not want to cooperate.
  - Strategy change. Focus on logistics and HR elements. Important that soldiers got their pays. Problem with salaries being paid out to dead soldiers. Computers set up in operations centre in Kinshasa are not working, only one remains operational. Police instead using cell-phones to communicate, while many places there is no network cover. No common
doctrine or training manual, because the military forces are being trained by different actors.

- Important to identify what the EU are doing and what the UN are doing.
- HR focus started 2012. Focus on establishing a military education. After EUSEC closed down, the Congolese were supposed to take over funding themselves. The effects of this are yet to be seen. Still no military doctrine of the defence forces. Troops still trained by different countries.
- Coordination: Lack of trust and common interest a key challenge. Different interests, budgets-cycles, normative values etc..

Discussion

Dr. Judith Verweijen:

- Good idea to focus on 2nd EUPOL. To get a more coherent paper and conclusions focus on 2nd EUPOL. Interesting to look at bilateral defence programs. Also interesting to look at perceptions of Congolese actors. For a lot of Congolese, the EU was not seen as a neutral actor as they supported (name?). Perceptions of Congolese army soldiers on these different actors.
- Wife of commander of army base: Families follow soldiers on deployment to front lines.
- Good idea to focus on both negative and positive sides of missions. On paper many things are well arranged, but it is not implemented due to lack of funding.
- Many soldiers that are trained are not being appointed to jobs. Consequence: Many are joining rebels instead.
- Focus on infrastructure does not produce results.
- Bilateral focus on infantry training, while EUSEC aimed at reforming the administration of army.
- Margin of fraud has been reduced. More accurate estimations of the size of the forces than earlier.
- Symbolic value should also be included in report.
- Focus on army rather than police: Difficult to do police work when it is the military that are doing police work and dominating areas.
- Common doctrine: Different donors with different doctrine does not necessarily represent a problem. Might not matter that much, as the units still have cohesion. It could however be a problem in joint operations between units.
- Fragmentation on donor and patronage.
- Head of EUSEC often tries to make a personal imprint. Makes it difficult to remain on track with different leaders taking different paths.

Thomas Mandrup:

- No common doctrine makes it difficult to shape the future of the military. Too much different equipment makes it difficult to repair and maintain.
- Judith: System not geared for long term planning. Problem of economic junctures and who might be in office.
- Problem with many actors makes it possible for Congolese to approach other actors when EU say no.

South Sudan case: Dr. Arnold Kammel
Background:

The independence of South Sudan caused it to become a landlocked country. It had to recover from two long civil wars and conflict between Muslim and Christian populations. The peace-agreement was reached in 2005, which included agreements on how to share the oil-revenues. The since the independence in 2011 bilateral relations were prioritised, which reduced EU influence in South Sudan. The outbreak of civil war 2013 between President and Vice-President was linked to ethnic tensions and personal matters between the two. A peace agreement was signed in August 2015. JMEC under the leadership of Festus Mogae. Vice-President (VP) Machar was expected to return to Juba in April 2016, but fled country in July 2016 after massive clashes. More than 1 mio. IDP's. currently. Tensions are continuing, Mashar still claims to be VP.

Preliminary findings:

- Planning capacity:
  - Mission followed standard CSDP rules for missions
  - Mission based on wrong assumption that second airport terminal could be constructed
  - Security situation different than reported by Technical Assistance Mission
  - Member states lost interest in mission. Euphoria for new South Sudan state in 2011 disappeared as situation did not improve.
  - SOR differed from view of Brussels institutions. Gap between mission in field and how Brussels assessed situation.
  - SIAC requirements did not fit South Sudan purposes.

- Operational capacity:
  - First aviation security mission deployed by EU
  - Only seven member states seconded personnel, no third states engaged
  - Problems of finding suitable personnel for aviation security
  - Budgetary constrains due to strict rules. However FPI proved very flexible.

- Competences:
  - Problem of recruiting skilled people in aviation security
  - Thus change from secondment to contracts to get right numbers
  - Lack of regional expertise.
  - Entry training should have dealt more specifically to situation

- Comprehensiveness
  - EUAVSEC lacked visibility
  - Weekly meetings between EUDel and EUAVSEC
  - Crucial moment: Evacuation of EUACSEC after deterioration on the ground. No evacuation plans foreseen and no chain of command properly decided. Better procedures might have helped the mission.

- Interoperability
  - Cooperation between EUAVSEC and other international organisations perfect on the ground.
  - Good relations with embassies and NGO’s
  - Different approaches between HQ’s, especially EU and UN.
  - Relatively good cooperation with local authorities.

- Successes
  - First CSDP mission in aviation security
  - Training of personnel under difficult conditions
  - Good cooperation with other actors
  - Due to limited mandate no harm
- Partial fulfilment of mandate
- Shortfalls
  - Mission based on wrong assumptions
  - Difficulties in deploying suitable personnel
  - No impact on overall security in South Sudan
  - Situation changed causing mission to be evacuated
  - No sustainable impact

**Discussion**

Lasse Christensen:

- Expectations often too high from politicians, not taking account on the actual situation and conditions.
- Time on ground 14 months. Lack of follow up from time TAM made their assessment until mission was deployed. Things change during 6 months.
- Difficult to train when trainees are illiterate and non-english speaking. Majority of heads of institutions where not suited for their positions. Civil administration staff was not experienced. These problems where not foreseen from home. Caused a bit of indisciplinary/unorthodox conduct from mission staff.
- Not sure if mission was overprovided with support staff. Necessary with staff, and mission was more underprovided than overprovided.
- Lack of strategic planning.
- Two areas of friction:
  - Evacuation plans made in Brussels without consulting the mission.
  - Lack of chain of command internally in EU mission.
- Important to learn from the lessons, bad or good. Problem internally in EU that they do not learn from the lessons learned reports.
- Problem that it is difficult to obtain classified documents that really should not be classified as they hold no secret information.

Arnold Kammel:

- Agrees that time span between TAM and deployment was too long. Should have been a follow up mission.
- Difficult to get in touch with the right people. Not possible via the EU channels, even though the study was EU funded. Could be because the EU delegation was not well-connected.
- Difficult to get info about the overall comprehensive approach. EU response was that project was terminated two years ago.
- Further problems of a change in people going in and out.

Peter Horne/RDDC-RUC:

- Juba (international) airport relatively well working today. Still no sustainable evacuation plan for UN, so not only EU.

**Central African Republic case: Elisa Norvanto**

The findings based on two separate studies, and on 23 qualitative interviews with people from ministries, NGO’s etc, and 34 interviews for second study.
Background on CAR-conflict:

CAR became independence in 1960 and is one of the worlds least developed countries. It has a history of violent military takeovers. A coup in 2013 sparked a civil war the ineffective security forces could not protect the population. The violence that followed combined with poor infrastructure resulted in many IDPs. The violence was based one ethnic and religious lines between Christians and Muslims. French initiative to stabilize situation. UNSCR (2127), authorized Chapter VII intervention. And led to the deployment of Operation Sangaris and MISCA to stop the conflict from spreading, and to stop unfolding humanitarian crisis. As further contributions where needed the EU Council decided on (2014/73/CFSP). However, the Ukraine crisis overshadowed the operation, so the EU Battle Group was not deployed. Initial plan called for 1100 troops, but ended on 945. 18 EU members contributed as well as non-EU countries Georgia and Montenegro. The aim of the deployment: To contribute to provision of safe and secure environment around Bangui airport.

Findings:

Political – Strategic level

- Internal Successes
  - EU proved to be a global security actor, achieving their political goal
  - Contributed to preventing the conflict
  - CAR did not become a terrorist haven
  - Operation part of the EU comprehensive approach
  - Military operational goals were met
- Internal Failures
  - EU response failure due to delay
  - Deployment delayed up to 6 months, when situation required a rapid deployment.
- External successes
  - Military intervention was the right decision
  - EU effort helped reduce tensions and improve security
  - EUFOR RCA brought added value to other foreign troops in the area
- External failures
  - Limited mandate in terms of time, area of operations and resources.
  - Security deteriorated once EU left.
  - Misbehaviour from EUFOR RCA toward population had a negative effect on the reputation of EU troops. A group of girls reported that UN troops had sexually assaulted a girl(s?). Also mentioned that EU forces had participated in similar situations.
  - Judith Verweijen comment: Difficult to establish scope of incidents, because of a number of mechanisms.

Capability 1: Planning

- Success: France as a framework nation.

Capability 2: Operational capacity

- Success: Multinationality and neutrality were advantages to other international operations.
- The structure of the operation was suitable for the operational environment
- Challenges: Inflexible funding mechanism, fragmented pre-deployment training or lack of it.
Capability 3: Interoperability

- Success: Good local networks
- Good task division between UN, France and EU.
- Limited resources pooled for larger impacts

Capability 4: Competences

- Success: Strong respect towards proportionality principle. EU described as less aggressive than other forces.
- Challenges: Inexperienced officers deployed to a challenging environment. Mainly reservists deployed.

Capability 5: Comprehensiveness

Capability 6: Technology

- Limited infrastructure

Operation ended in 2015. CAR carried out elections for the first time. 12,000 UN troops in place currently, but there are accusations that they are committing murders and crimes and they are resented by the population.

**Discussion:**

Agnes Foures:

- Incorporation of local police and security forces would have been useful.
- Language issues. Meetings had to be held in both French and English to avoid misunderstandings.
- Cooperation between international organisations needs improvement.
- Not sure if mission would have been more successful if longer. But transition to UN should be improved. UN not at full capacity. No agreement in place to share intel.

Judith Verweijen: A success *because* it was so short, or *despite* it was so short? Difficult to make that conclusion.

**Themes:**

- French role in the intervention was vital. France did not intervene because of economic interests. So why is it that the EU is intervening, and what is France and the neighbouring countries role in that, and in the conflict in general?
- Intelligence factor. What are the EU forces deploying into? Not optimal to deploy non-French speaking troops to French speaking countries.

**Libyan case: Dr. Jyrki Ryohomäki**

The EU-program investigated in the Libyan case was the European Union Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya). The mission came on the backdrop of the Libyan civil war and the fall of the regime of M. Ghaddafi, that resulted in Libya deteriorating into further civil strife and the rise of radical Islamic movements. For the EU the establishment of an Integrated Border
Management system (IBM) was at the strategic level an attempt to enable the weak Libyan authorities to control its borders, and thereby protect EU from the threat of mass migration from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where Libya functioned as a stepping stone. The mission was supposed to have a capacity building dimension focusing on training. It was launched May 2013 and was eventually evacuated in July 2014. However, a lot of staff had to rotate between Malta and Libya due to security concerns, that made a permanent presence in Libya impossible. On the surface of things the EUBAM mission was a complete failure. The IBM concept did not develop, and not much evidence of capacity building can be found. Nevertheless the EUBAM mission provides some important insights provided by the failures, especially on how the EU is planning and developing such missions.

Reasons for failure

- Inability to grasp complex nature of “state” in Libya.
- Politico-strategic: Too high ambitions of the EU, too little action when required. Not only EU responsibility, but road forced upon EU.
- Intelligence. Problem with mission planning before deployment.
- The reality was against the mission

Libya, an accidental state

- No interest in unitary state – the EU failed to realise that.

The intervention

- International narrative argued that Gaddafi was a threat to the Arab Spring
- Alan J. Kuperman: Intervention multiplied the duration of the conflict sixfold and its casualties sevenfold
- House of Commons report on Libya. Must read.
- France led, the international community followed.

Aftermath

- Passivity from the international community, exacerbated the situation.
- Rand Corp. 13,000 troops might have been enough, if the reconstruction had taken place late 2011. Optimistic estimate.
- Harsh resentment towards foreign troops on the ground.

Internal aspects

- Libya a rentier state under Gaddafi. Removing him took away the stabilising element of the country.
- By 2013 several groups were fighting for power and resources. No national elites, only local interests.
- Shocks followed: Collapse of immediate political arrangements after the revolution 2. Structural regionalism, inability to distribute...

International framework

- Collapse realised by international community. Tried to engage state-building measures.
• Friends of Libya coordinated the effort. EU role to help attend the urgent priority of border control.

EUBAM Libya:

• Needs assessment done in 2012
• Problems already in planning, no sovereign in Libya, difficulty in obtaining information
• No SOMA.
• When the invitation finally came, mission was launched fast based on an outdated needs assessment.

Mandate:

• Support Libyan authorities

Effective results:

• IBM concept not bought and effective
• When asked if they wanted the IBM concept, the Libyans said no. This meant months of work wasted, as they had not been asked before.
• Training and mentoring was somewhat successful.
• When the mission was evacuated, the focus was on the operational.

Why failure?

• The undivided sovereignty, that was necessary for a strategic mission did not exist. No one to talk to.
• Heavily supported state-building and consolidation needed
• Too little, too late? Better to do something than nothing?

Lessons to learn

• Intelligence. Current, but also background. Problems in Libya could have been better anticipated by looking at history books.
• Mandate overly optimistic and should have been downscaled to improve effectiveness. Time wasted to develop grand concepts.
• By time of the evacuation of EUBAM Libya, securing a civilian crisis management operation was beyond the political capabilities of the EU.
• How can we fit the ambitions of the member states to the political reality?

Discussion

Maruan El-Krekshi

• Valid conclusions. Some nuances that need to be addressed.
• Not an issue of identity crisis of the Libyans, more of political isolation.
• Side lining key officials and placing own people lacking skills in the administration complicated things.
• Tribal matters not so important. Libya more important than tribe. The case of identity confusion was a matter in the 1950’s but not anymore.
• How to make a mission work: Identify the people to work with. Building relations with municipalities and communities in border areas to secure borders.
General discussion

Thomas Mandrup: Impact of military operations on EU normative projects. How does this affect the EU driven projects?

- How are these aligned?
- Different approaches. How adjustable are we if things do not go as we want?
- All member states have an interest, so it is difficult to prioritise

Judith Verweijen:

- How did these missions come about? The influence of France. How does it fit in a wider plan? When does the EU decide to conduct these missions, and when do they not?
- This dimension should be included. Is the EU more likely to intervene in countries where they have invested money? What is the wider framework of relations?

Agnes Foures:

- No strategy for CAR in spite of money going there.

Annemarie Peen Rodt:

- Different types of strategic goals. Not just geographic or geopolitical.

Lasse Kristensen:

- Why are missions always decided towards excellence? Not always appropriate. Goals must be realistic.

Common themes in the case studies

Arnold Kammel:

- Intelligence. Proper training. Is the education good enough? Late arrival of proper equipment.
- Strategy. What is the overall approach of the EU? What is the overall strategy, the medium-long term impact when engaging?
- Lessons learned. Have we learned at all? Important to learn from prior failures as well as successes.

Thomas Mandrup:

- Change of personnel every 6-12 months makes it possible to repeat prior mistakes
- Decreasing interest of member states. Could also be the other way around, if too important to leave national interests in the hands of the EU, nations act on their own. (Belgians in the Congo).
- Language and capabilities. Having the right people for the missions. Willingness from the member states to deploy the right capabilities.

Judith Verweijen:

- How come the EU is not able to mobilize knowledge ahead of a mission?
• Terminology of success is dangerous. Wider picture should be taken into consideration.

Lasse Kristensen:

• Important to have contact to people who has worked on the same area earlier. Information sharing.
• Important to specify that mission success is based on the whole context.

Annemarie Peen Rodt:

• It is less relevant to look at if EU is at fault. No point in pointing fingers, unless it makes sense. Strengths and weaknesses.
3 PUBLIC SEMINAR AT KORNLOFTET, KASTELLET

Speakers:

Dr. Annemarie Peen Rodt, RDDC
Dr. Thomas Mandrup, RDDC/SU
Dr. Judith Verweijen, Ghent University, Belgium
Lasse Kristensen, former HoM EUAVSEC South Sudan
Elisa Norvanto, FINCENT
Agnes Foures, HoM, Project Zingo, CAR
Dr. Jyrki Ruohomäki, CMC Finland
Maruan El-Krekshi, Crisis Management Initiative
Prof. Gorm Rye Olsen, RUC
P.E. Holger Bernt Hansen, Centre for Africa Studies, UC

South Sudan – EU CSDP Missions – Expectations vs. Reality – Lasse Christensen

- Political speech before mission vs. reality on ground. Difference in perception from member states and Brussels.
- If discussions are not in line of reality, it could have an influence on the success or failure of mission.
- Strength and capabilities of mission is dependent on political decision.
- Problem to aim high? Not necessarily, but could be.
- South Sudan mission end goal: To make Juba airport live up to international security standards in an 18-month span. Normal span is 5 years.
- Situation complicated by number of factors. No aviation security in place at beginning.
- Setting an end-goal at good enough instead of excellence would have been better
- Mission did however stop Juba airport from going into a so called black hole
- Mission management was slightly undisciplined, with approval requests and reports sent to Brussels after projects had begun.
- Ukraine example – weak EU influence. Tired of experts from EU and US. Suffering from expert fatigue. Experts did not synchronize or coordinate advice. Different ways of designing a security sector.
- Too much focus on buzzwords. Political pressure to deliver results fast, resulting in few results being achieved related to the strategic aim. First 12 months were in reality wasted when relating to the strategic goal.
- Same challenges in all EU missions. How can that be addressed? Political system only partly to blame, as they are under pressure from public and media. Focus moves away very quickly in public and media, exemplified by the situation in South Sudan. No focus on the crisis there in the public or media.
- Go for second or third best solution and show political courage. Implementing highly complicated concepts and standards might not be the way forward, but should be more realistic.
EU standards or best practice is not even possible in the EU itself (Frankfurt airport), making it difficult to persuade others to implement them. Africans are well aware of the EU double standards.

Success can also be bypassing problems in order to solve larger issues.

EU as conflict manager – Gorm Rye Olsen

1. Background and the fight against terrorism
2. EU interests and policy instruments
3. Somalia, Mali, CAR

Historical setting

EU involvement did not begin until after the cold war
Cairo summit 2000 and onwards
What were the EU interests in this process? Why has the EU involved itself in Africa?
- Idealism? A wish to improve situation in Africa. Implementing European ideas in Africa.
- To prove EU as an effective international actor/conflict manager?
- Bureaucratic or institutional self-interest?

Fight against terrorism
- Islamic radicalization after 9/11
- This perception has a strong influence on EU foreign policy.
- Decision making in the EU
  - National level: some states are more interested in Africa than others
  - France strongest state in the EU, having a big influence on decision making on Africa.
  - Majority of states have no interest.

Concerns of the EU
- Somalia: The EU reluctant – comprehensive approach. Threat from terrorism from Somalian failed state. Channelling of funds into Somalia in order to stabilize the country. EU however only interested due to US pressure
- Mali: French interest and pressure on EU to proclaim as a threat to European security with link to radical Islamism.
- CAR: Also a failed state, but no EU interest. French tried to add pressure, but reluctance from EU to get involved.

The implemented EU involvement
- Somalia: 1. Comprehensive approach, 2. support of AMISON, 3. EUTM.
- EU Stake: Stability.
- AU member states acting on national interests. Aimed at curbing domestic critique as well as gaining funding for troops.
- Mali: 1. Funding of African Troops, 2. EUTM
- EU stake: Fighting Islamist threat
- AU: Resources, training national interest.

A pattern? CAR
- French troops
- European troops on the ground, as well as Georgian troops. EUFOR-RCA.
- EUTM 2016.
- Inside the framework of comprehensive approach
- EU stakes? Show world that EU was able to act as a conflict management actor, but not totally clear

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• AU stakes: National security (Boko Haram), prestige. Sends signal to donors.
• Conclusion: A market for conflict management in Africa. Troops in return for money, logistics and no critique.

Comments by Holger Bernt Hansen

• More than one factor in EU approach to Africa
• Common security area
• Leading role of militias. High number of young people joining militias increases security risk. Not just the armies. Present at elections, where political parties have their own militias to use in case elections do not go as they intend.
• Other interests than just security management. African security higher on the agenda in last years. Also looking at Africa as a continent in different way with the new world order.
• Africa will have 1/3 of the world’s population, attracting interest from China. This is a reason for the increased involvement from the EU.
• Europe reacting on increasing Chinese involvement. Not just funding, but also Chinese people moving to areas in Africa.
• Africa increasingly becoming a market - so not just terrorism and security interests.
• Aid agenda. Is economic diplomacy replacing aid? Value agenda. EU Doubt about what we are doing with our values when approaching Africa? Preaching days are over. Uncertainty about value system.

• On Lasse Kristensens observations.
• A question of ideals vs. realities.
• African alternative to EU with China changes perspective. Important to adjust to realities and not just own ideals.
• Important to get off the high horse

Discussion

• Judith Verweijen: Institutional interests, at national level could be taken into consideration. Especially from defence sector. Must be a raison d’etre for military institutions and defence industry.
• What drives the aid agenda? Institutional interest of the aid industry.
• Set of institutional interests on different levels.

• Humphrey (correct name?) Perhaps better to see where we have shared values, instead of being dictated values.
• Knowledge. Many in African elite have studied in US and EU, so they already are aware of approaches.

• Lasse Kristensen: Answer to Holgers questions.
• Juba International Airport: Fear that it would be a hub for terrorist travel as well as drug trafficking. Also, easiest way of EU to act.
• Experienced corruption, but did not do corruption. However, impossible to work without having contact to corrupt people, due to extent. Example of Israeli citizen bribing his way into doing business.
• Missions tightly controlled by Brussels. Not always for the good of the mission.
• Values. Not big difference in reality, but the context might not make it possible.
- Gorm Rye Olsen: Insecurity about own values in EU.
- Big change on security side. US establishing small bases in Africa in close cooperation with the French. Special forces providing larger striking capability, but with smaller forces. Public pressure makes it difficult to station larger forces.

Libya – The impossible task? Dr. Jyrki Ruohamäki

- EUBAM Libya – European Union Border Assistance Mission
- Short mission.
- Strategic dimension: IBM
- Capacity building dimension: Training
- Mandate wise, mission was a complete failure. IBM concept not developed and no evidence of capacity building today.
- Reasons for failure
  - Problems of grasping complex nature of "state" in Libyan. Mission planned as if Libyan state was functioning.
  - Too high ambitions of EU. Libyans did not want advanced IBM concept. Intelligence
  - Misplaced mission
- Different levels of identities, but still a sense of feeling Libyan.
- Intervention happened to stop Benghazi bloodbath. House of Commons argued “that intervention to protect civilians drifted into a regime change by military means”
- France led, international community followed.
- Democratic deficiency behind EU’s normative power.
- Aftermath: Passivity of international community after Gaddafi was displaced. Ground intervention unlikely.
- Libya’s state as a rentier state distributing the oil wealth kept people from uprising. Removal of Gaddafi took away this distribution and destabilized Libya.

International framework

- When danger of collapse was realised, international community tried to establish state-building measures
- EU interest in Libya framed in neighbourhood policy.
- EU did not have seat at Friends of Libya meeting in Doha
- EU given role to help modernise the Libyan border control.

EUBAM

- Needs assessment team only spent short time on ground, and experienced severe problems in getting there. Could not go to southern part of Libya.
- Lack of information was carried to planning.
- When mission was launched, information was not up to date and situation on ground had worsened.

Mandate

- Support of Libyan authorities in enhancing… etc.

Mandate fulfilled?

- Libyans discarded EU IMB model, as they wanted a single agency model (US Homeland Security model).
Training and mentoring was more successful, but it is not possible to validate its effect anymore.

A failure?

- A functioning state that was necessary for the mission did not exist.
- It would have been necessary with heavy capacity state-building
- Second or third best options should have been pursued

Lessons to learn

- More focus on intel and mission planning
- Problems should have been anticipated
- Overly optimistic mandate
- Should EU develop its capacity of crisis management to a transformative process instead of a linear process with an overly optimistic goal?
- How can we fit the political ambitions of member states to the political reality?

Comments by Maruan El-Krekshi

- Agrees with most of Jyrki’s presentation
- Comments on state administration:
  - More of a failure of the transitional process in Libya than an EU failure
  - Problem with national counterparts. Political isolation law prohibited transitional process. Everyone in state administration was replaced with the law of political isolation.
  - Libya receives a large number of migrants. Role perceived in Libya as being a police man for Europe/EU.
  - EU perception of sealing of borders in south Libya not optimal, as tribes in areas have conducted trade there for centuries.
  - AU perspective. Gaddafi regime poured a lot of money into the AU.
  - Financial and public effort put in AU from Libya. Gaddafi killing was against human rights, Islamic rights, but in light of Libyan situation with revolution, it would have complicated the situation much more if he had been alive.

General questions and comments

- Jyrki Ruohamäki: Regional aspect could have been better handled by EU.
- A different kind of system of talking to people should have been in place. More understanding of the local power structure was needed. No one inside the Libyan power structure to talk to.
- Thomas Mandrup: Should EU have stayed out of Libya? Why did EU end up in Libya? Who put pressure on Brussels?
- EUFOR Libyan mission. Completely unrealistic. Ambition of France, Italy, but no one else. No real possibility because of Libyan resentment towards foreign military presence.
- Humphrey: Mistrust present between EU and African elites. Trust must be earned.
- Symbolic value of Gaddafi killing huge. But on higher level, in perspective of African leaders, the west looks hypocritical. Gaddafi killing has blocked AU in becoming independent from EU.

Elisa Norvanto – CAR – Caught in regional and national state interests?

Background CAR
- Least developed and poorest country in the world.
- Power shifts through violent coups. National resources controlled by elites, resulting in clashes in past years.
- Wide corruption, state not able to protect its citizens.
- Suffering both from internal problems, but also external

Why did EU intervene?

- Violent coup in 2013 sparked civil war. Marginalized Muslim population in the north wanted change and seized power. Coup developed into an ethnic conflict.
- France has been involved in CAR since 1960, but only to protect its own citizens. France assessed in beginning that the conflict was not so violent, but 6 months after the coup, CAR was “on the edge of genocide”. French initiative to UN and EU missions.
- Political creditability
- To address security threats

The mission

- Restricted mandate
- 950 troops, including 150 from Georgia
- Targeted most critical spots in CAR, but problems only moved to other districts in Bangui that were not targeted.
- Deployed April 2014, operational June 2014.

Achievements and enablers

- 34 individuals interviewed of which the answers are based
- EU contributed in preventing the conflict from spreading
- Military intervention was appropriate for the situation
- Close cooperation and coordination with UN and France. French dominated mission in French speaking area.
- EUFOR operated in spirit of comprehensive approach and cooperated with commission and EU delegation on the ground.
- Operation composition appropriate to the operational area.
- Number of IDP’s decreased substantially during mission.
- In that sense, EUFOR mission was a success.
- Good knowledge of area and background, good local network contributed to good situation awareness. Played a big role. EU Force Commander had large autonomy in working the local community.

Challenges

- Deployment delayed 6 months with difficulties in force generation. This was problematic, as the situation called for rapid deployment.
- Showed lack of political will from some member states towards CSDP.
- Way of funding military operations affected the contributions and the running of the mission
- Mandate limited in terms of time.
- Different approaches to local population from different international organizations.
- Issues related to multiculturalism
- No functioning host government
- National caveats
- Local infrastructure, or lack of same. Critical, especially at beginning of operation
Lessons to learn

- Misbehaviour from EUFOR towards local population affected attitude towards operation.
- Lack of air surveillance capabilities

Agnes Foures comments:

- If capital in CAR falls, country falls. Important to learn.
- EUFOR should have been deployed to 4th district in Bangui.
- EUFOR had identified which rebel chiefs that should have been arrested, but lacked the mandate to do so.
- Different groups are now rearmed and are not happy with changes made during EUFOR deployment.
- Success in terms of trust-building with the local population when EUFOR was present.
- Exit strategy was more of an exit date than a real strategy. Lack of transition.
- Information intelligence. More a case of many nations working to obtain information than a multinational coherent force working together
- Psychological context should be taken into account. IDP’s were not willing to return to areas where not even the police dared go.

Thomas Mandrup – DR Congo

- Much bigger scale – time and space
- Conflicts in Congo go back a long time. Difficult to control.
- Congo has not always been a collapsed state. Congo under Belgian colonial rule functioned relatively well.
- Most of EU’s activities in Congo is done in cooperation with others

FARDC

- Lacks the most basic equipment
- Lack of discipline and command and control
- "Fighting with your family on your back". Families move with the soldiers.
- MONUSCO, EU and bilateral involvement – support and training – first in UN history. Lack of coordination between donors has been a problem.
- Normative human rights agenda. UN not allowed to support groups that violate human rights. This does not work in reality.
- Some progress in decreasing number of child soldiers. New recruits coming in that are better trained and educated human rights wise.

DDR(RR) and SSR

- Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement.
- Security Sector Reform
• Difficult due to context

EU in DR. Congo
• Ops. EUFOR 2006. Deployed 4000 troops to secure elections. Half the force never went into Congo, stayed in Gabon.
• EUPOL 2005-2014. Help build up the police force, riot control training.
• EUSEC 2005-2016. Focused on attempt to create military force that could provide security.

Artemis
• Short term goal in stabilizing and creating security
• Logistically well working due to proximity of Entebbe airport

EUFOR
• National caveats made mission difficult
• Lack of clear mandates
• Partly a success

EUPOL
• Involved in many processes. Training, both for short term tasks, but also long term such as human rights.
• Lack of coordination for training courses. Officers attending same courses offered by different donors.
• Limited impact, infighting between donors.
• Local resistance to reform. Judicial reform problematic.
• Focus has been on the armed forces instead of the police.

EUSEC
• "Sometimes better to do something than nothing"
• Military law being implemented
• Findings:
  • Biometric payment system implemented, but still problematic.
  • Ops room established in Kinshasa not in operation anymore.
  • Normative issues like human rights agenda.

From a good idea to real impact
• No real military training since 2002

Judith Verweijen comments:
• Interesting how EU pushes through security sector reform
• Always another donor moving in when EU moves out
• Not a new situation. Huge continuance in security sector reform. Donors letting themselves be played.
• New recruitment might not solve problems, as existing troops are not being reached by security reforms.
4 CONCLUSIONS

The two events formed a central role process in the writing of the individual case studies, and later in the formulation and identification of common findings from the different case studies. The external experts and the participants in the events also functioned as an open peer review process, where the academic and methodological quality was tested and commented upon. This provided the authors of the individual case-studies essential feed-back. The general conclusions from the four cases scrutinised was:

- Planning overambitious: The missions and program generally suffered from a discrepancy between ambitions and objectives on one side, and then resources available and realistic mission objectives.
- In all the case studies a decreasing interest from the EU member states could be detected, and it was often replaced by national interests and bilateral initiatives. It was considered too important to leave to the EU.
- The missions suffered from an intelligence gap, which was caused be lack of ability and will to share and cooperate on intelligence, which damaged the missions.
- Late arrival of equipment: The logistical support was insufficient and there is a need for a the establishment of central logistical hubs.
- The EU suffers from the fact that it is product of the will and ambitions of its many member states. It lacks and overarching approach and common strategy defining its role in the world.
- All the operations suffered from language challenges and capability problems, meaning that the committed personnel was not always trained for the job they were send in to do. The reason was often that national interests decided whom the member states were willing to deploy.
- There is a need to establish and improve the lessons learned and identified frameworks, and securing that rotated personnel has got access to these reports.
- There is an immediate need of establishing a central database compiling the existing knowledge of the current operations for future use.
- The deployed personnel and the planners needs to have the needed operational background to be able to maximize the effect of the missions.