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Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

D3.7 Africa: Conclusion Report

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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHoM</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Mission / Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EUAVSEC South Sudan</td>
<td>European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>Former Detainees</td>
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<td>Foreign Policy Instrument</td>
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<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity (from 2005)</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan (before 2005)</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan (from 2005)</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organisation</td>
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<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (formerly IGADD, Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification)</td>
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<td>JIA</td>
<td>Juba International Airport</td>
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<td>JMEC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</td>
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<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>National Islamic Front (became NCP)</td>
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<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>South Sudan National Police Service</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TGoNU</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report draws together information and analyses from the preceding eight reports of IECEU Work Package 3 that examine the effectiveness of EU civilian crisis management operations in Libya, South Sudan, CAR and DR. Congo. The four cases are examined in separate sections. The following is based on the findings in the eight previous deliverables, and pools together the conclusions from these previous eight deliverables in WP3.

Libya

The IECEU case study on EUBAM mission in Libya illustrates the great challenges that the international community has in addressing protracted and increasingly complex conflict and post-conflict environments. The Civil war in Libya, the fall of long term dictator Col. Ghaddafi, and the resulting chronic and globalised conflict that followed, made Libya an extremely difficult and challenging place to operate in. The killing of the US Ambassador in Benghazi in 2012 was an illustration of the difficulties and dangers to international staff working in Libya. The Libya reports, assesses the contribution by the EU CSDP mission EUBAM Libya to the overall security of the state of Libya. The EUBAM Libya mission was launched in May 2013 with the objective of supporting Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders. After the security situation in Libya became unbearable in the summer of 2014, the mission was evacuated to Tunis and subsequently put on hold. Therefore its contribution to the security in Libya and its ability to support the Libyans in terms of the border management ended up being minimal. However, this does not mean that the mission would not provide valuable information and lessons for the future CSDP missions and operations. The Libya reports map the overall conflict trajectory in Libya and the particular contexts in which EUBAM Libya was functioning, and assess, on a strategic level, the processes that led to the mission and to its, at least temporary, closure. The reports firstly maps out the nature of the conflict, whilst the second part describes the particular context in which the EUBAM Libya was functioning, assessing the mission through its changing activities, as a part of the international effort to rebuild Libya and also raises up some critique that was presented at the time of the mission, such as the possible human

1 The text below is based on the two Libya studies to be found in D. 3.4 and 3.5
right violations by some of the Libyan partners of the mission. The history of Libya explains large parts of the volatility of the conflict and many of the conflict related difficulties that the EUBAM Libya mission faced, operating in what the academic literature has called the "accidental state", un-institutionalized in nature of the country and based on the regional and tribal tensions to create a system in which all power was concentrated on the top, but which lacked cohesion on all levels of governance. This allowed Col. Ghaddafi to rule, but it also built the Libyan state extremely volatile. After the fall of Ghaddafi, the Libyan state disintegrated and feel victim to a fractionalisation. The EU established its EUBAM Libya mission with a task to develop an Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy together with the Libyans and support and train the capabilities of Libyan border control, within this context. From the start the mission had severe problems related to the security situation, which first handicapped the work of the mission and ultimately led to its evacuation. However, the fundamental and more "lesson-like" problem identified behind the failure of the mission is the systemic fragmentation of the Libyan state, which prevented a symmetric relationship between the mission and the Libyan counterparts. The problem of changing counterparts on the Libyan side of the administration was confirmed by the interviews of the locals. In short, there was not a single accountable recipient representing a particular branch of border management that could have served as an established partner. Instead, the limited strategic planning that the mission was able to carry out was unproductive, partly because the absent and changing partners, partly because of the misplaced idea that the Libyans would be interested in IBM style way of arranging border management. While the strategic goals of the mission failed, it did, however, engage in some operational training, which's effectiveness is difficult to assess within the scope of this review, due to the relatively small scale of those activities and especially due to the present security situation, preventing a field trip to Libya.

The effectiveness study of EUBAM Libya is based on 18 interviews conducted between January 2016 and February 2017, combined with an extensive document and literature review. The originally planned field trip to Libya, mentioned in the grant agreement, was cancelled because of the security situation in Libya. Furthermore the mission had already been evacuated to Tunis at this point (from July 2014 on).
The DR Congo

The first EU mission, Operation Artemis, was deployed in the Ituri provincial capital of Bunia in 2003 with the aim of stabilizing a deteriorating security situation. The force was deployed parallel to the existing UN PSO mission in the DRC, and functioned as a bridging mission preparing the deployment of the UN force. In 2005 the EU launched both a EUPOL and a EUSEC mission, which were supposed to help train the Congolese police and military institutions as part of the SSR and state-building project initiated after the signing of the two peace agreements. The EUPOL project was ended in 2014, EUSEC in 2016. In 2006 the EU deployed EUFOR RDC to assist the UN and Congolese authorities to secure the national elections. The EU has therefore been involved in a wide range of post-conflict state-building initiatives as part of larger efforts to address the vast range of causes of conflict in the DRC.

As documented in the review, conflict and wars in the DRC go back beyond 1996, have had different expressions, been internationalized and linked to regional security dynamics, and exemplify the debate on the role and importance of natural resources in conflict and the impact of international responses to this type of conflict. The security situation in the DRC remains volatile, and in North Kivu alone there are still more than twenty non-state armed groups, and the debate over political secession surrounding President Kabila has moved conflict in the country into a new and potentially very dangerous phase.

EU involvement started with the deployment of Artemis in 2003, and the study ends with the closure of EUSEC in July 2016. All EU missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been part of EU support for the transition and implementation of the 2002 Peace Agreement in the country. A key challenge was that the sheer size of the DRC, the lack of infrastructure and the non-permissive environment made it a very difficult and complex undertaking. The Congolese partner has been resistant to reform, and the EU has found it difficult to undertake its SSR (security-sector reform) initiatives successfully. Some informants even called the EU project generally a failure, whilst others argued that the sometimes it is better doing something than nothing. Generally the short term military deployments have been more successful, and managed to achieve their objectives. The two capacity-building missions have been less successful and the results have been mixed. Problems interacting with the local partners, lack of use of local interlockers and experts, the frequent change of personnel

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2 The text below is based on the two DR. Congo studies to be found in D. 3.1 and 3.5
and lack of access to the lessons learned reports are but examples of the challenges faced by the missions and projects. There has generally been a discrepancy between ambitions and then the reality on the ground, which has increased the perception of failure and lack of success.

**South Sudan**

The South Sudan reports assesses the contribution by the EU CSDP mission EUAVSEC to the overall security of the state of South Sudan, and the success and failures of the EUAVSEC mission. The mission was launched in July 2012 following South Sudan's request for EU support to strengthening security at Juba International Airport, as part of the international community’s overall assistance to the country. A key challenge for South Sudan after independence was to establish a fully operational transport hub for commercial and passenger purposes. Improving airport security will not only contribute to the fight against crime and international terrorism, but also enable the increased flow of people and goods, thus helping to boost trade and promote regional integration. After the security situation in South Sudan deteriorated in December 2013, the mission – although not formally terminated - was evacuated and brought to an end when fulfilling its mandated deployment period in January 2014. Although having trained 350 personnel, the contribution to the overall security in South Sudan and its ability to support the South Sudanese Government in terms was limited. However, this does not mean that the mission would not provide valuable information and lessons for the future CSDP missions and operations. The European Union did not have a strong stance with regard to the independence of South Sudan. This development was mainly driven by the United States and China as well as the international community which saw the potential of a new-born resource rich country that could prosper and lead to economic benefits. Already at the independence celebration of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, in which the author of this analysis personally participated, the subordinated role of the EU became obvious. The former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Baroness Ashton was among the last political leaders to address the cheering population in the act of independence. Therefore, it is no surprise that the EU needed to find its role in the new state of South Sudan. The deployment of the EUAVSEC mission at the airport of Juba in order to enhancing airport and aviation security was only a

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3 The text below is based on the two South Sudan studies to be found in D. 3.2 and 3.5
minor step in the context of developing the country. Therefore it is also no surprise that the mission itself is much unknown in South Sudan today.

Central African Republic (CAR)\textsuperscript{4}

The Central African Republic (hereafter referred as CAR) has suffered from poor governance and underdeveloped security institutions throughout its independent history. The CAR has never had an effective central government, and it has struggled with recurrent insurgencies and military coups. Changes in power have merely been followed by violent conflict, leading to a replacement of one ruling elite with another. In this sparsely populated country that is unable to protect its citizens, there is little government accountability, and the weak security sector has been partially the source of the violent conflicts over the years. After the increased international presence in the country as a result of the conflict that erupted in the 2013, efforts have been focused on stabilization and rehabilitation of the country.

To respond to the violent conflict in CAR, the European Union (EU) unanimously decided to deploy a military operation (EUFOR RCA) to contribute to safe and secure environment and provision of humanitarian aid to affected population. EUFOR RCA’s deployment had a strong symbolic value for the EU’s global actorness, and the question of the EU’s political creditability can be seen to be the major reason behind the establishment of the operation. Despite the will to intervene, the EU member states were reluctant to contribute troops to such an operation, which reflected in its planning. As a result, EUFOR RCA was given a limited mandate in terms of tasks, area of operation, and time.

Despite its rocky beginning the achievements of EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic are numerous when measured against its restricted mandate. Firstly, security conditions improved extensively in the districts (‘arrondissements’) that were under European forces’ responsibility. While NGOs’ access to the third and fifth district was difficult or impossible prior to EUFOR, humanitarian workers could operate safely after European troops were deployed. The Bangui airport protection ensured by the European Union allowed air traffic to proceed without any serious incidents. Also, EUFOR succeeded in restoring basic freedom of movement for the citizens even if risks of attacks persisted

\textsuperscript{4} The text below is based on the two Libya studies to be found in D. 3.2 and 3.5
because of rampant criminality. Furthermore, EUFOR securing action contributed to the return of some IDPs who had taken shelter in the M’Poko camp, and even some refugees benefited from the reduction in tensions that European troops fostered and were able to go back to their residences. In addition, as EUFOR RCA took over from Sangaris, some French troops were freed for re-deployment to the provinces and therefore could cover more territory.

Ultimately, since the EUFOR action was a bridging operation, it succeeded in giving the MINUSCA enough time to deploy and for organising a smooth take-over with UN troops, which took place in March 2015. It must be stressed that EUFOR met all of these objectives without any casualties – this is particularly significant since Bangui was the most dangerous area of operations where an EU operation has ever been deployed. Whilst EUFOR was put to the test on several occasions, it has always responded in line with its robust mandate and with respect for the proportionality principle. Furthermore, the discrimination between combatants and non-combatants has never been infringed.

One of the most important achievements of EUFOR RCA lies in the excellent relationship that troops had with local citizens. By all accounts, the European force was respected and appreciated because it succeeded in building a relationship of trust with the Bangui population. Night and day patrols played a significant role in that success since EUFOR’s ubiquitous presence not only reassured many of the citizens but also allowed daily dialogue with the latter. With this structure, EUFOR was able to build a wide network of contacts that proved particularly useful for gathering of information and intelligence but also in reducing tensions and defusing potential violent crisis (e.g., in preventing riots). Another achievement that merits a special note is the solid co-operation and relationship between EUFOR and the humanitarian community. Information was regularly shared between military and civilian personnel, and EUFOR succeeded in securing tension-free access for aid workers to the various districts, since no escort action or confusion as to roles took place. Such a relationship is especially noteworthy in light of the mutual incomprehension and enmity that traditionally impair the effectiveness of collaboration between NGOs and peacekeepers.

1 INTRODUCTION
The Work Package 3 of IECEU project covers the case studies of EU CSDP projects and operations in Libya, South Sudan, CAR, and then the DR. Congo. Previous eight reports of WP3 have covered desk reviews on previous literature (D3.1, D3.2, D3.3 and D3.4), a study report on the findings of IECEU field research on the six capabilities influencing the effectiveness of EU crisis prevention (D3.5), and a discussion report describing the roundtable and seminar events organised by the Royal Danish Defence College (D3.6). This deliverable D3.7 draws together the above-mentioned reports and presents the main conclusions of IECEU case studies on the DRC, CAR, South Sudan and Libya. It provides a short outline of the current status of security sector reform and the related criminal justice sector reform in the four case countries, the impact of the EU engagements and operations, as well as of the main elements of EU engagements in these areas. The report also includes some recommendations on how the EU engagement in these two conflict contexts could be improved. Each case is handled separately.

2 EU ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN

Immediately after South Sudan became an independent country on 9 July 2011, all major international actors including the EU pledged their support for the development of the new-born country to help it achieve its national motto of justice, liberty and prosperity. Indirectly, the EU hoped by supporting South Sudan to avoid the risk of a regional conflict (with Sudan) and a state failure as doubts where raised whether the country could sustain itself from the very beginning.

In preparation for South Sudan's independence, the EU upgraded its representation to a full delegation in May 2011 and inaugurated the European Union compound in Juba. In addition to the EU delegation, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark and Spain have representations in the compound, while Sweden has an office in another part of town. At the independence celebration of 9 July 2011, the then HR/VP of the EU, Lady Baroness Ashton, declared that “[W]e will be your partner in achieving this, not just now, but for the long term. This partnership will be focused on helping the people of South Sudan, through working

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5 The data and text of this report is a condensed versions of the conclusions from the previous eight reports, and the text is based on these studies. The main text is therefore a condensed repetition of the main conclusion from the eight reports, enabling to produce individual recommendations for the four case countries in section 10, and for the main conclusion in section 11.
together with their government." Already before the independence celebrations took place, the Council agreed on 20 June 2011 to follow a comprehensive approach to Sudan and South Sudan with, inter alia, the aim of assisting South Sudan to become a viable, stable, and prosperous state.

The Comprehensive Approach set out, as a short-term option, the possible deployment of a civilian common security and defence policy (CSDP) mission to strengthen airport security and, as a medium-term option, the contribution to broader border management in South Sudan. The EU's engagement with South Sudan is based on the EU single-country strategy, which is aligned with the country's 2011-2013 National Development Plan. The document identifies the principal sectors for EU and member state engagement as rule of law, health, education, infrastructure (mainly water and sanitation) and agriculture/food security. Several EU member states and ECHO are also committed to humanitarian assistance in South Sudan. All of the EU-level instruments, except military intervention, have been deployed in the country: an EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan, the EUAVSEC CSDP mission at Juba international airport, Instrument-for-Stability financed initiatives, a large humanitarian assistance programme and European Development Fund (EDF)-financed programmes and projects.

The Single EU Country Strategy for South Sudan is the development response to the EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of 2011 to “follow a comprehensive EU approach to Sudan and South Sudan.” As the Strategy says, the comprehensive approach “covers all aspects of the EU's policy towards an independent South Sudan including political/diplomatic, security/rule of law, stabilization, development, human rights, humanitarian and trade. It also highlights the increasing role of EU development assistance in South Sudan and mandates the EU to take forward joint programming of development assistance in: justice/rule of law; education; health; water management and rural economic development in coordination with GRSS and in response to the SSDP.”

Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the South Sudan's Independence Day celebration, 9 July 2011, Brussels, 9 July 2011 A 273/11.

Paragraph 8, 3101st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels: Council of the European Union.

The overall comprehensive approach foresaw a sum of € 830 million to be spend within the period 2011-2013.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{2.2 CURRENT STATE OF EUAVSEC IN SOUTH SUDAN}\textsuperscript{11}

EUAVSEC South Sudan was confronted with a variety of challenges in its internal as well as external structures. Embedded in the EU’s comprehensive approach to South Sudan, the mission had to work in a very narrow margin of the whole spectrum of the approach, thus leaving not much room for actively contributing to enhancing the security situation in South Sudan. By also taking a closer look to the level of ambition set out in the mandate and the structure of the mission it is evident that a mission that never reached its full operational capacity of only 64 personnel – which was largely due to the South Sudanese absorption capacity – would have a strong impact on the situation in the country. This low level of ambition paired with hesitance of EU member states and institutions to deploy a more robust mission to South Sudan which security wise could have had a stronger impact than EUAVSEC South Sudan, leads to the conclusion that the overall success of the mission was on the one hand the fact that Juba International Airport continues to be an international airport and is very limited to the fulfilment of the training requirements as laid out in the mandate of the mission. Unfortunately for the sake of the country and its people, the mission did not contribute to the melioration of the conflict situation which however was also not in the mandate of the mission.

Furthermore, aside of the trained personnel, no real visibility and even not a strong ownership could be achieved although in general, public opinion in South Sudan was very favourable of a stronger EU engagement.\textsuperscript{12} It was surprising how little knowledge about the mission could be detected during the field trip especially related to acting senior government officials. The mission seemed to have been a drop into the ocean of all the problems the country of South Sudan was and still is confronted with. However, the mission also did not damage the image of the EU, the EU is still perceived positively and is expected to contribute more actively to resolve the conflict and to contribute to capacity building in the country.

\textsuperscript{11} The text is based on D 3.5 – South Sudan
\textsuperscript{12} Interviews no. 7, 9, 20.
2.3 IMPACT OF EU CSDP EUAVSEC IN SOUTH SUDAN

The European Union favours to attribute itself to the role of a global actor in international crisis management. In the case of South Sudan, the impact and visibility of the European Union in dealing with the crisis is nonetheless limited. This perception did not change with the deployment of an EU Aviation Security Mission to help improving the international safety standards at Juba International Airport as the restricted mandate strongly focused on technical cooperation and development rather than the bigger picture of crisis management and post-conflict stabilization. Therefore, EUAVSEC South Sudan had to operate within a limit spectrum of engagement in the overall comprehensive strategy of the EU towards South Sudan. Against the backdrop of various shortfalls in planning, logistics, procurement and overall strategy, the mission staff had succeeded to train an impressive number of South Sudanese officials in issues such as civil aviation, airport security, border management and overall public administration. The impact therefore on improving the security at Juba International Airport can mainly be seen regarding human resources. Furthermore, Juba International Airport is still open applying ICAO standards which is of high importance as South Sudan is still heavily dependent on air transport in order to trigger its economic potential. Therefore, as a senior EUAVSEC official has stated: “We have not finished our job and we should think of a relaunch.”

Already from its start, the mission was deployed in a mood of general South Sudan euphoria dominating the international community in 2011 and 2012 and thus it comes without surprise that also the EU fall into this trap and designed an overambitious mission regardless of the situation on the ground. This was even triggered further by the report of the pre-deployment mission which led to completely wrong assumptions about the situation on the ground, as the gap between the fact finding mission and the political decision was almost half a year and the situation in Juba entirely changed. Negatively for the mission to be deployed, nobody was aware of the changes. As a consequence, the mission personnel had to adapt to the situation and to carry out the mandate in a very flexible way.

The mission fitted perfectly into the overall international presence in South Sudan and the cooperation on the ground among those international stakeholders as well as the NGO

13 Interview no. 12.
14 Interview no. 15.
15 Ibid.
community was very good. However, it needs to be addressed that the cooperation on headquarters level between Brussels and New York should be improved.

South Sudan was very grateful to the European Union for deploying the mission. Nonetheless it needs to be questioned whether the South Sudanese were really aware of the limited impact the mission would have on security in the country. If so, a different type of mission might have been requested and it would have been interesting to see whether the EU and its member states would have been willing to take over a heavier burden. Furthermore, the personnel to be trained was below the expected level and basic issues needed to be commonly developed and trained.

The European Union is still perceived positively by the local population as well as the Government in South Sudan and the field trip has shown that expectations are pretty high that the EU will engage in a stronger manner in the future. Possible areas of future engagement of the EU would include DDR as well as SSR initiatives, the training of police and border personnel and some of the respondents were even asking for a peace-keeping operation by the European Union.\(^\text{16}\) Also the UNMISS was strongly in favour of the EU deploying a new mission, mainly in the sector of SSR.\(^\text{17}\)

EUAVSEC South Sudan has shown the difficulties for the European Union to put its comprehensive approach in place on the ground. A variety of actors and overambitious objectives and strategies led to a complex situation on the ground hampering the effectiveness of the overall EU approach to crisis management and conflict prevention. It has furthermore shown that the EU needs to be better prepared to launch a mission in a hostile environment such as South Sudan where EUAVSEC was not a bridging mission or operation, not replacing a former mission and were knowhow of the situation on the ground as well as good contact with the local communities were desperately needed.

Finally, the analysis of the mission should also be reflected in the overall question of the level of ambition the EU and its member states are willing to commit themselves in crisis management. The case of EUAVSEC South Sudan has clearly shown that the euphoria at the launching of the mission had quickly disappeared and the interest in the mission decreased. This can then lead to dangerous situations like the one of fall 2013 when the mission needed to be evacuated and no proper mechanisms were in place.

\(^\text{16}\) Interviews no. 18, 19.  
\(^\text{17}\) Interview no. 10.
Aside of the training outcomes achieved, a positive factor of EUAVSEC South Sudan was the fact that despite the security deteriorations, no casualties had to be reported. This was – as one interviewee mentioned – not that much a consequence of proper planning, but of luck and right intuitions.\textsuperscript{18}

South Sudan is a perfect example that comprehensiveness in theory needs to be properly related to comprehensiveness on the ground. As long as intra-institutional rivalries exist, as long as there is no real encompassing European strategy, the missions can only be of limited access. Despite all its weaknesses and shortfalls, the EU is still perceived positively as a donor not only of resources but also a real contributor to international peace, security and stability. Therefore, it cannot shy away from new requests calling for stronger European engagement especially on the African continent. If the lessons learnt out of all its CSDP missions and operations would be properly implemented, the EU could definitely better contribute to becoming a formidable force for the good in the world.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} Interview no. 15.
\textsuperscript{19} European Security Strategy (2003), 13.
3 EU ENGAGEMENT IN LIBYA

According to the EEAS list of civilian CSDP mission tasks, planning is a process and a method, the purpose of which is to translate intent into actions, striving to keep a clear view of the objective from the outset and to stay faithful to ensure its final success. As the intent of the EU, in the case of Libya, was to prevent the collapse of a very important neighbouring country, the planning process of EUBAM Libya is therefore connected to the power political situation from 2011 on. In that context, the EU was given the main responsibility in improving the management of the borders of Libya. As one interviewee, who was involved in the mission planning process notes, there was a huge optimism amongst the member states accompanied by a rush to get things done and to "get to Tripoli".

The first plan of the EU was to launch a military CSDP mission, EUFOR Libya, which would have aided in the delivery of the humanitarian aid, but according to an interviewee from the mission planning, EUFOR Libya was doomed from the start, as it, although having the political backing of the member states, had no chance of getting the invitation or buy in from the Libyans, who were adamant of having no "boots on the ground". Therefore it became evident that the EU would send a civilian mission to Libya. The reluctance of the Libyan beneficiaries towards foreign boots on the ground was reflected later in the security arrangements of EUBAM Libya, which had to be organized so, that there were no member state or other military forces involved in the mission. That is that the security arrangements were covered by a private company, which later was realized as problematic. One interviewee pointed out that EUFOR Libya's shadow had an impact in the way EUBAM Libya was planned, in a sense that the planners started constructing it on the basis of a military mission, but another interviewee argued that the groundwork done for EUFOR Libya did not have any effect in the shape of EUBAM Libya.

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20 The following test is based on the Libyan case study to be found in D3.5.
22 Interviewee P14.
23 The operation was never deployed but it was discussed after the downfall of Qadhafi in 2011.
24 Interviewee P13.
25 Interviewee P 2.
26 Interviewee P14.
One important factor that internationally preceded and effected the planning process of EUBAM Libya and tied the hands of the planners was the "Friends of Libya" meeting in Paris in September 2011, where, among other things, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were named as the ones assessing the needs of Libya in terms of economic recovery. This international framework worked together to share the load of activities to help and develop Libya, both in short term needs, such as reconstruction, and in the long term with state-building, institutional strengthening and rule of law. In terms of the state-building process the United Nations Special Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was central. UNSMIL was grounded on the UN Security Council Resolution 2009, dating to September 2011, establishing the mission and giving it the role of supporting Libya's transitional authorities. UNSMIL's role was to further state-building in Libya, as well as to support DDR and SSR.

Whereas the UN took the lead in the state building, in the above described international framework, the role of the EU was subsequently to focus on border management, which was an area in which the Libyans wanted assistance. But border management as a concept already opened two huge areas, land- and maritime borders, which eventually made the mission very eclectic. It was the general feeling among the people interviewed that EUBAM Libya became a mission that strangely tried to do everything, but who were also at the same time limiting themselves to the management of borders.

On the other hand, the Libyan interviewees stressed that it did not look appropriate that the EU launched a mission that was talking about democracy, when the need of the Libyan was to get security. The hints that there was a problem in communicating the comprehensiveness of the international intervention to the Libyan counterparts. This resulted in the Libyans see in EU as doing things in the "wrong order".

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27 "Friends of Libya" was a network of international agents, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, together with the EU, the Arab Leagua, Nato and states, such as the US, UK, France and Italy. Ralitsa Kovacheva "Friends of Libya are meeting in Paris. EUInside 1 September 2011, http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/friends-of-libya-are-meeting-in-paris
28 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.
29 Security Sector Reform.
30 Interviewee P17
31 Interviewee P16; Interviewee P17
32 Interviewee P16

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors' view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
The fact that EUFOR Libya never got off the ground, is illustrative of the problems that were ultimately hampering the road of EUBAM Libya as well. EUFOR Libya, a military CSDP mission to help in delivering the humanitarian aid in the post Qaddafi situation of humanitarian crisis, was according to interviews in Brussels a purely political idea, meaning that it had no realistic chances of survival in the context in which the Libyans were very adamantly in declining any foreign military element, which the EUFOR Libya would have included. EUBAM Libya’s strategic focus was on borders, and it relied on the UN and on the EU Delegation on a more strategic level. But the autonomy of the European Union to plan a mission was compromised from the start, as, according to one interviewee, the "Paris conference [The Friends of Libya meeting, September 1, 2011] rubber stamped" what had already been agreed in Doha earlier (April 13, 2011) in a prior meeting in which the EU was not represented, so the EU was left to follow the blueprint from Doha, without having a influenced in it. In addition, the problem with the mission mandate being so focused on borders, was that the EU had to compete against very strong players to "get the border project". Especially the United States was, according to a local interviewee much more invested in getting the Libyan to agree on developing their border management on the basis of the American homeland security model. Eventually this model was to prevail. When the EU lost the "border project" to the US, the whole ratio of the mission suffered a clear setback and can be seen in the way the new EUBAM Libya mandate is formulated to go beyond the border management reform.33

The loss of autonomy, due having to follow the decisions made elsewhere, effected the mission planning. Based on the interviews, the Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept34 was something that none of the member states originally wanted, but ended up having to live with, because of the above mentioned decisions of the international community. The desires of the member states, to do SSR and DDR, instead of IBM, was not met. The IBM focused mission then grew into various directions, partly mirroring the original wishes of the member states. In addition, the EU neighbourhood policy, which

33 Interviewee P16
34 Based on the Justice and Home Affairs Council conclusion from 2006, IBM consists of Border control, Detection and investigation of cross-border crime in coordination with other authorities, inter-agency cooperation for border management and international cooperation and Coordination and coherence of the activities of Member States and Institutions. Essentially this type of interagency cooperation was the model that the EUBAM Libya was also mandated to develop for Libya with the Libyans.
defined the EU’s goals towards Libya, had a role in the planning, but had not been updated in regards to the migration situation, which was developing towards critical\(^{35}\). The fact that the mission followed the desire of the Libyan’s to get help for border management did, according to interviewed, show in the acceptance by the Libyans of the EU’s leading role\(^{36}\). On the other hand, the member state involvement in the planning process was seen by one senior level mission member as making the planning “rigid and slow”\(^{37}\). Against this background it is interesting that the reasons behind the mission seems not to have fully reached the mission members, who listed many different reasons for the mission, such as the danger facing the uranium mines in Libya, or the specific threats of Boko Haram or Al-Qaeda, some of them clearly different than what the mission planners in Brussels said and different from what was achievable with the manpower at use. This might hint towards the mission members being at least somewhat unaware of why the mission was there, which can be seen to increase problems in terms of task emphasis and also call for better information sharing.

### 3.1 THE STATE OF EUBAM LIBYA

EU considers Libya and the southern Mediterranean as a key neighborhood\(^{38}\), a status which is only highlighted due to the flow of migrants from Africa and beyond to Europe, many of who use the shores of Libya as stepping stones towards Europe. From this perspective it is easy to see the eagerness of EU to take a leading role following the downfall of Ghaddafi in 2011, especially as it was considered a much, much easier task than the reality came to show. The problems, however, started already before EUBAM Libya was on the drawing board. Although some member states were keen on having a CSDP mission focused on SSR and DDR, assistance in border management was to become the responsibility of the EU in the division of tasks between the (mainly) western powers and organisations, such as UN, World Bank, IOM. After the shortly lived military mission EUFOR Libya, it was decided that the EU should plan a CSDP mission to assist Libya in strategic border management development, advising especially on the IBM concept and together with this approach to

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\(^{35}\) See Ch. 4.2. in “The Libya Review” (Deliverable 3.4)

\(^{36}\) e.g. Interviewees P13 and P15.

\(^{37}\) Interviewee P6.


provide capacity building training in select pilot programs on border crossing point and airport(s). The goal of the mission can therefore be considered strategic, although strategic impact is not necessarily the role of every CSDP mission. In short the politico-strategic goals of the EU was to stabilize Libya, democratize and modernize it, and generally to prevent a power vacuum and a war zone from been established just south of its shore. These goals were not reached, but in all honesty they were never reachable

Operational objectives that were planned for the strategic impact were mainly the development and modernization of Libyan border management agencies, with the ultimate goal of creating a modern multi-agency border management system following the IBM concept. As illustrated above and in the deliverable 3.4, the strategic emphasis of the mission ran into problems very soon, and the mission was forced to refocus on a more tactical level capability building. This line of operations ran into troubles as well. The problems that the mission faced were largely due to the implosion of the Libyan state and the security situation that kept worsening to the point that the mission had to evacuate, following other international operators and actually out-staying in the collapsed state of Libya many others. Based on the interviews and on the overall estimation on the Libyan conflict, based on research literature and described in more detail in the deliverable 3.4 of this project, it is beyond doubt that the ultimate evacuation was appropriate, the only question being should it have happened earlier.

The seeming failure of the mission to accomplish any of its tasks, however, is not the complete picture, as it can be noted from this the field study report. There were conflicting views on how effective the training that was given was and essentially could this training have been made more effective by providing also some equipment for the Libyans, therefore following the so called train & equip procedure. However, as especially the mission planners in Brussels tell in this deliverable, Libya was categorized as a rich country that could well purchase the equipment it needed itself. This line of thought rested on the idea that crisis management cannot be about buying things. In terms of operational objectives the issue of equipping therefore constitutes a clear disagreement between the strategic planners and

38 (a) through training and mentoring, to support Libyan authorities in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices;
(b) to advice the Libyan authorities on the development of a Libyan national IBM strategy;
(c) to support the Libyan authorities in strengthening their institutional operational capabilities.
the personnel in Libya. The local Libyans interviewed all sided with the EUBAM Libya personnel in saying that categorization of Libya as a rich country was a mistake, as all of the Libyan wealth was in “American banks”\(^{40}\). But it is impossible to say whether equipping would have made any real difference, as in the end the escalation of the conflict and the vast deterioration of the security situation forced the mission to evacuate first partly to Malta and later fully to Tunis, when its operational capability was effectively slashed to zero. In sum, the mission obviously did not fulfil its internal goals on politico-strategic nor operational level. It came closer having some effect on operational level, but on politico-strategic level it seems that either EUBAM Libya was an exercise of doing too little too late, or then it was heavily under resourced for the huge tasks that the member states assigned for it. It must be stressed that based on interviews and on the research literature, it is highly unlikely that even a heavily supported military mission could have accomplished any politico-strategic goals of the EU in the volatile state that Libya was in. Reaching any improvement will require multifaceted effort from the whole international community and will most likely take years. These realities should be considered more than they were in the planning and operations of EUBAM Libya.

The original primary goal of the mission was to have a strategic impact via improving the structures of the Libyan border management. Finally, as we know, this goal was not reached, but the question whether the best possible actions were taken to reach it is left unanswered. Again, a great deal of the problems that the mission faced was because of the security situation of Libya and in terms of making any progress, also the stateless nature of Libya, which prevented any sustainable effectiveness. The latter was present in the interviews, when the mission members and the officials in Brussels all recalled how difficult it was to have any kind of lasting contact with the Libyan counterparts. Libya lacked, and lacks, a modern bureaucratic state, a form that is essentially necessary in making sure that the agreements that are made and the plans that are being drawn are made between two institutions and not between two persons. The Libyan reality was the latter and therefore the mission had to start over again when the person in charge from the Libyan side changed, or be frustrated if the person in particular had no desire to cooperate. But could these problems have been overcome? Probably not, but then again the interviewees told that months were

\(^{40}\) Interviewee P16
wasted sitting in the working groups which went nowhere. As one person interviewed suggested, this might have been because the form of the cooperation was wrong. Instead of trying to find a common tune in workshops, the mission should have focused on higher lever steering groups for which they could have gotten ministerial attendance\textsuperscript{41}. Then again, another interviewee told that his understanding was that the Libyans did not want a multi-agency IBM concept at all, and the only way of being more effective would have been to realize this fact sooner\textsuperscript{42}.

This brings the question to timeliness. Was time effectively utilized and was the timing of the mission and its activities appropriate? As noted in the above it is questionable whether the mission wasted time in seeking a goal that was simply not reachable. However, ultimately this is not the fault of the mission but of the mission planning and beyond that, the fault of the badly placed strategico-political goals and operational objectives for reaching those goals. These both were out of sync with the political reality in and of Libya. Within this misplaced framework there really is not that much that the mission could have done more effectively, as, to aggravate only slightly, it was doomed from reaching any lasting impact because of its vastly outnumbered resources in relation to the huge task that the modernisation and re-organisation of Libyan border management would have required. In the conceptual framework that timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness form for the internal appropriateness of the mission, timeliness is essentially the deciding factor. As several interviewees stated, EUBAM Libya was in a right place at the wrong time. At the time of its deployment the operational context was simply too demanding. Yet, in terms of efficiency it seems that some improvement in the operational functions of the mission could have improved its short term efficiency. It did focus too long for improving the strategic level of border management with no hope of success, during which time it could have had more effect in practical training. However, for training purposes the mission was not optimally staffed and it lacked equipment to be used in training. But the parameters for efficiency were set in the mission mandate that mandated the mission to seek unrealistic goals, through this the responsibility of the failure of the mission ultimately rests on the member states, who, as can be seen from the interviews did place unreasonable expectations for the mission. The question of cost-effectiveness was did not come up much in the interviews, even when

\textsuperscript{41} Interviewee P15.
\textsuperscript{42} Interviewee P4.
asked. From the perspective of the functions of the mission, it seems that it was well funded and the mission basically got everything it wanted, albeit within the rigid procurement system that the EU uses and which was criticized by many interviewed. From the perspective of the EU tax payer, one can of course pose the question whether the mission was a complete waste, as it arguably did not have much lasting effects. Based on the interviews this is too harshly put, as interviewees both in Brussels and those who represent the mission saw the EU footprint in Libya as essential that the option of doing nothing as impossible. However, it does seem plausible that the EU's failure in the case of EUBAM Libya was to fail in reacting to the change of the situation with inadequate and outdated intelligence information and to cling to the mode of operation that was doomed from the day of deployment.

### 3.2 IMPACT OF EUBAM IN LIBYA

In May 2013 when the EUBAM mission launched, the dissolution and disintegration of the Libyan security sector was ongoing and the core question of integrating the hard core revolutionaries into the new security architecture remained unanswered\(^\text{43, 44}\) However, the serious integration of the Libyan politics and security sector had started much earlier. By the time the mission deployed, there was no monopoly on the legitimate use of force in Libya\(^\text{45}\) and in essence Libya was saturated with different armed actors corresponding with divisions in almost every division and cleavage present in Libya's internal politics\(^\text{46}\). The amnesty International had noted already in February 2012 that the Libyan militia was "largely out of control"\(^\text{47}\) and the situation since that had not gotten better, as the fragmentation first evident in the militia had slowly moved into the political system. Overall, based on literature\(^\text{48}\), it is evident that the planning and implementation capability of the Libyan state was severely hampered at the time the mission was established. In addition, it was becoming clear that the Political Isolation Law, barring a major part of the key figures in

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\(^\text{44}\) Ibid., 26-30

\(^\text{45}\) Smits et al.,"Revolution and its discontents: State factions and violence in the new Libya", 40

\(^\text{46}\) Ibid., 44


\(^\text{48}\) Lacher "Fault Lines of the Revolution: Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya"
administration from office, was going to be accepted in the National Congress, rapidly increasing the already present destabilization of the country.

The dominant conflicting actors in Libya were and are the multiple and diverse local interest groups, while the key fault line was between the revolutionaries who had risen against Gaddafi and the other political forces in the society, which had either taken up arms later, or had backed the old administration.\footnote{Ibid.} Since 2013 the conflict became more and more a clash between the two largest military coalitions, those associated with Zintan and Misrata\footnote{ICG, "The Prize: Fighting for Libya’s Energy Wealth", 8.}

The conflict started to escalate sharply in May 2014 when renegade military forces from Zintan, led by General Kahalifa Haftar, clashed with Islamist groups in Benghazi in an event called Operation Dignity. The operation led the revolutionary, Islamist and jihadi groups to unite against the Zintanis\footnote{Wolfram Lacher "Libya’s local elites and the politics of alliance building", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 21, 2016, No. 1, 64-85, 69.}. A subsequent offensive, named Libya Dawn, by the Misratan led coalition against the Zintanis, took place in July, when Zintani positions in Tripoli and its airport were attacked. This effectively ended the effectiveness of EUBAM Libya and led to its evacuation in the same month. The Libya dawn offensive consolidated the control of the Misrati-led alliance of the greater Tripoli, after which the country was effectively divided into two camps\footnote{Ibid.}. The country was further divided into two institutional settings, led by the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk - with competing claims of state institutions, like the Central Bank of Libya and the National Oil Company\footnote{ICG, "The Prize: Fighting for Libya’s Energy Wealth", 18.}. The Tobruk Government became increasingly isolated and it became open to influences from the Gulf area and Russia\footnote{Ibid.}.

In this picture, the external intervention, especially as small scale as EUBAM Libya had a minimal possibility to have an effect in further preventing the worsening of the conflict. This fact was also noted in the interviews in which every interviewee estimated that the mission had no effect on the conflict trajectory overall. EUBAM Libya mission was constantly handicapped by the politicization of the individual units or branches of the security sector, which manifested in the absence of any cohesive administrational structures, as reported...
also in the interviews. This is why research had already in 2013 recommended that a possible external security sector assistance should focus in creating structures and forums addressing the conflicting parties within Libya, instead of trying to build systems for external threats, based on the illusion of Libyan state cohesion\textsuperscript{55}. From this perspective it can be critically argued that EUBAM Libya was trying to pursue goals that were not only impossible, but also wrong in terms of considering the overall security and conflict situation in Libya. The country simply was not yet ripe for SSR or even border management reform. The mission failed in its task of operational conflict prevention to prevent further violent conflict, but it is wrong to accuse the mission of the failure, as the possibility for even a limited success was realistically never present. In order to have success, the mission should have been a totally different entity, with a different focus, and even in that case its success would have been questionable, as one can reason based on the difficulties that the UN UNSMIL mission faced, when focusing on exactly on those forum and structure building efforts that were called for.

However, even though the country was not ripe for a SSR or DDR reform, as one can observe from the difficulties of the UNSIMIL mission, the expectations of the Libyan were definitely different than the EU was delivering. The local Libyans were perplexed of the EU's perceived emphasis of democracy and human rights in the situation in which they, according to their own words, were expecting action to reduce the number of militias and to improve the overall security\textsuperscript{56}. This was seen as doing things in wrong order\textsuperscript{57}.

External appropriateness of conflict prevention denotes to the ways in which the mission seeks to achieve its purpose stressing its relation to proportionality. The starting point of the external appropriateness criteria is that the intervention must do more good than harm. Proportionality in this framework refers to the way in which the intervention has to be in proportion to the challenge that it is facing from the conflict. That is, coercive, state sovereignty violating and local ownership stamping intervention in situation in which it is not

\textsuperscript{56} Interviewee P16
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
called for is externally inappropriate and vice versa, when mission is taking actions below the necessity to have an effect, is also inappropriate.

It is safe to say that EUBAM Libya did more good than harm. Nothing from the analysis, both in this deliverable and in its predecessor hint that its actions and operations carried any negative effects, although this is impossible to argue conclusively, because the security situation in Libya prevented a field work there that could have posed this question to the Libyan beneficiaries. However, it is safe to assume so. It is also safe to argue that the measures that the mission took were not externally appropriate in a sense that they fell far below what would have been necessary to have a sustainable impact. This is especially true, when we consider the mission's line of operations focusing on developing the IBM concept with the Libyans, but it is also true when considering the more tactical focus on training and capability development. Much more would have needed to have an appropriate effect, but, again, one must refer to the political realities of the conflict. Not much more was realistically achievable. A simple introduction of more resources for training, or even for strategic advising would have made no difference. It can be heard from the interviews that resources, human, technological, or financial, were never the biggest obstacles for the mission to achieve its tasks in fulfilling the mandate. The biggest obstacle was the deterioration of the conflict and the security situation, which prevented the mission from operating and utilizing even the small resources, in terms of manpower, that it had. The security was also the obstacle that proved to be impossible to overcome. It seems evident that there were serious problems with the services of the private security companies that the mission used. Certainly that is an area where improvements could have been made. But ultimately only a military contingent by a member state or an international military force could have in theory succeeded in providing the autonomy of operation for the mission, which would have improved the chances of the mission members too move outside the compound. However, as virtually all the interviewees reported, having such in a situation where the Libyans were adamant in having no foreign boots on the ground was impossible.

Through this analysis we, again, face the question of whether the mission was a waste of time and money, as its effectiveness is, based on the applied criteria, left small. In answering, one has to return to the situation at the launch of the mission. Already at that point the problems ahead were clearly visible and the ambitious and hopeful sentiment that
carried EUBAM Libya seems now misplaced. However, the alternative of doing nothing in the situation simply was not an option, from a political standpoint, which was the consensus opinion of the people interviewed as well. EU had to act. The political pressure to do so ultimately comes from the UN's decision to act on Responsibility to Protect -clause to topple Qaddhafi and staying passive in the turmoil that followed was not politically realistic. Unfortunately for the EU, its hands, considering the form and indeed appropriateness of that action were tied through its commitments with the international community. Based on these facts, the critical evaluation of EUBAM Libya must stress the politico-strategic level and the problems concerning the planning of a mission, which was not appropriate for the tasks ahead. These are the key points for any lessons to be learned from EUBAM Libya

In the assessing the overall success of the EUBAM Libya, the answer depends on what is considered as a reasonable yardstick. In terms of mandate fulfilment the EUBAM Libya clearly failed. It did not reach success in the tasks that were given to it, nor did it succeed in its primary task of developing an IBM system for Libya. However, this was mainly due to the difficult situation in which the mission was forced to operate. It was not given a chance to be successful and the people interviewed for this work were very honest and straightforward in concluding that the mission accomplishments were very limited.

The mission accomplished to establish EU presence in Libya and it did succeed in carrying out some level of activities, but using the conceptual framework of this project its level of success is left modest. The mandate of EUBAM Libya was very broad (internal goal attainment) and therefore very difficult to fulfil even partly. The same goes with the external goal attainment, requiring the mission to have an impact on the overall conflict trajectory. For the EUBAM Libya this was impossible.

One of the main problems that was raised up by the Libyans interviewed was that virtually all of the international organisations were competing against each other and that especially the race for who gets to manage the border management reform was fierce. Therefore in the evaluation of the overall success of the mission, one has to remember that the whole of the international intervention had serious problems, which EUBAM Libya could not have overcome solely by its own conduct and activities.

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58 Interviewees P16 and P17
4 EU ENGAGEMENT IN DRC

The EU suspended its aid cooperation with the DRC/Zaire from 1992-2002, when humanitarian was provided and continued via the ECHO system. EU–Congolese cooperation officially restarted with the signing of the National Indicative Plan (NIP) in January 2002, which released 120 million Euros from the 8th European Development Fund (EDF). In 2003 a new NIP was signed within the framework of the 9th EDF to the amount of 205 million Euros, which in 2004 was raised to 270 million Euros on the condition that progress in the transition could be detected (Hoebek, Carette, & Vlassenroot, 2007, p. 5).

Its actions have covered a wide range of projects: humanitarian and development aid, diplomatic and technical support, and two military operations, ARTEMIS in 2003 and EUFOR RDC in 2006. Since 2003, the central element in the EU's efforts to support the DRC was the backing of the transitional institutions to meet the requirements for the elections in 2006, since Joseph Kabila’s governments have attempted to (re-) introduce a formal state presence in the DRC. This involved financial and logistical support to the electoral process, support to create the necessary security conditions (with two Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions: EUPOL and EUSEC), support to the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) (EUFOR RDC), and an important election observation mission. The EU’s involvement in the DRC was also part of and influenced by the idea of the ‘security-development nexus’, which basically claims the existence of a causal relationship between ‘development’ and ‘security’, i.e. as one cannot grow without the other, a ‘whole of government approach’ is called for (Buur, Stepputat, & Jensen, 2007). The EU’s involvement in the DRC has also been influenced by the Cotonou Agreement, which stresses the importance of assistance, cooperation and political dialogue between the EU and the group of so-called APC countries, of which the DRC is a part. This privileged partnership, combined with the ESDP and CSDP projects and interventions, was part of the combined EU engagement. The EU’s presence in the DRC is furthermore also a clear demonstration of the increased coordination between the EU and the UN in crisis management. The four European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions in the DRC are the most visible of

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59 The following section on the DR. Congo is based on the Congo case study to be found in D3.5
60 The humanitarian aid department of the EU.
61 Africa, Caribbean and Pacific.
the wide degree of CFSP involvement in the country and the wider region (Hoebek, Carette, & Vlassenroot, 2007).

After the signing of NIP 2002, the EU became increasingly involved in the DRC. This happened in line with the efforts and priorities of a number of its member states. The development of the EU as an actor in world affairs has been mirrored by the widening scope of EU interventions, from the ‘classic’ development cooperation and humanitarian relief to innovative ESDP operations such as Operation Artemis in the summer of 2003 and a dedicated security sector reform (SSR) mission, EUSEC. In several respects the EU’s involvement in the DRC became a test case for a number of the later engagements. The general framework for this evolution was the support to the transitional process, which included the elections. The EU, together with its individual member states, was by far the largest donor in support of this process, and through its deployment of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 it also assumed an important role in the measures to secure the first electoral process in the DRC since 1965. However, it has not operated alone but in conjunction with other donors, in particular the combined UN involvement in the DRC, which is in line with what Javier Solana in 2007 argued was the preferred strategy for the EU’s ESDP missions. These could operate independently, but it was preferred that they did so in partnership with others, such as the UN, AU or NATO (UN, 2007). As the Channel evaluation of 2011 showed, the initial DDR program involved more than forty national and international partners spending an average of US$ 1.5 billion a year on development aid in the DRC (Channel Research, 2011, p. 61). The deployment and interventions in the DRC should be seen as a result of and part of what can be considered ‘effective multilateralism’ (Hoebek, Carette, & Vlassenroot, 2007). Whereas there is a large degree of convergence in strategic vision and objectives between the different strategic objectives and priorities in Brussels related to involvement in the DRC, this convergence has at times been more difficult to find in the missions in the DRC itself. While coordination mechanisms have existed in Brussels, in theatre it has often been left to ad hoc measures and individuals to coordinate the efforts.

The EUSEC and EUPOL capacity-building missions in the DRC were not established as a consequence of a renewed outbreak of violence but as an attempt to assist in implementing a complex peace agreement and thereby aid state (re-)building efforts in the DRC. The two missions were also established as part of a broad international effort in which many actors were active and in play at the same time. Within the area of SSR, the EU representative had
to coordinate and plan their efforts first of all with a complex group of local actors, secondly with a myriad of international organisations and actors, and finally with bilateral EU member states, which were in the DRC both as part of the joint EU effort and by virtue of running their own bilateral projects with the DRC government. This, the coordination and handling of so many interests, has turned out to be one of the key challenges for the EU engagement in the DRC, one that also makes it difficult to assess the role and impact of the EU initiative. Dealing with the SSR of the Congolese army, the question is where EUSEC training start and stop, and whether it can be meaningfully separated from the training conducted by MONUSCO/MONUC or bilateral actors. A related problem to this is found in the assessment of the impact of the EU-initiated programs, where the reporting of the activities is seemingly most often focused on quantity, not impact. In 2014 Rayroux and Wilén even went so far as to say that the EU’s peacebuilding in the DRC has been characterised by a paralysis and a dysfunctional SSR program. This is due to a conceptual discrepancy between the idea of local ownership and the de-facto externally defined, financed and executed SSR program, which leads to distancing from and local resistance to the program and reform in general (Rayroux & Wilén, 2014). The relevance of the assessment must be on the impact, i.e. to what extent have the EUSEC and EUPOL missions managed to reach their stated objectives, and why have they done so? Which endeavours have been successful and especially which have not? Due to the long period of the engagement of the EU in post-conflict reconstruction and reforms in the DRC, its involvement has also been influenced by international changes in the approach to peace-building, though the concept of local ownership has remained at the centre of the engagements (Rayroux & Wilén, 2014). Already in 2011 Channel Research produced an evaluation that documented a clear cleavage between local and donor perceptions of the challenges facing the partnerships in the DRC (Channel Research, 2011, p. 63). These cleavages still exist in 2017, where the donors are seen as being unwilling to consult effectively with local partner, whilst the donor side describes the Congolese partner as having limited capacity and often being plagued by corruption (5, 2017) (6, 2017)

The EU’s engagement in the DRC should be seen as an integral part of the EU’s whole of government approach, with initiatives being initiated in several sectors of the state. As

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62 MONUC was transformed into MONUSCO in 2010 to signal that the mission was entering into a new phase.
mentioned above, EUSEC and EUPOL both formed part of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) program in the DRC. Both missions ran simultaneously with the short-term deployment of the EU force (EUFOR) which helped secure the 2006 elections, but they followed the pre-emptive deployment of Operation Artemis in 2003. This mission helped to stabilise an unravelling security crisis situation with potential ethnic-based violence in Ituri province in the north-eastern corner of the DRC, and it was replaced by UN forces after it had stabilised the situation. Since 2010 the DRC has been an important partner and beneficiary of the Cotonou Agreement, and at times it has enjoyed high growth rates.

The objective of the EU projects related to the SSR program has changed over time. After the official start of the two-year transitional period in June 2003, the EU and the international donor community were heavily involved in assisting the transitional institutions (Hoebekes, Carette, & Vlassenroot, 2007). Consequently EU involvement started out as project to assist in preparing the Congolese security institutions to handle security related to the 2006 elections, later moving to the medium to long-term strategic objectives of creating sustainable frameworks for the future security institutions in the DRC, which included training, strengthening the judicial framework and increasing institutional capabilities. The changing objectives in the DRC were to a large extent also tied to the general security situation in the country, since the programs had to be conducted in a non-permissive environment, with high levels of instability and insecurity, and where local actors often paid lip-service at best to the implementation of reform proposals. All in all this was a very difficult environment to operate in, one where calculated risks, especially the risks of failure, were part of operational reality.

4.1 THE STATE OF THE EUSEC AND EUPOL IN THE DR. CONGO

It has been argued that Africa is shaped like a pistol, with the Congo being the trigger. This is one of the explanations for why, from early on in the DRC conflict, the EU has been a central actor in it. The DRC was early considered to be of strategic importance to the EU, though interest in this has faded in the past five years. Even though EU officials argue that the DRC is still of strategic importance to the Union, the focus seems to have moved north, to the areas that are producing streams of refugees or that have active Islamic radical militant movements. The DRC has neither. It can also be argued that the EU’s involvement in the DRC, and in central Africa in general, has been and still is driven by the narrow political
interests of specific members of the EU, especially France and partly Belgium. To put it bluntly, the EU is very unlikely to have deployed Operation Artemis and the EUFOR RDC had it not been for France’s national interest in doing so. This can also explain why internally the EU has scaled down its involvement in the DRC, because since the war in Libya, Mali and its heavy involvement in the Central African Republic, France has moved its focus away from central Africa. The EUFOR RDC deployment was interesting in the sense that it was the only operation which included all EU members\textsuperscript{63} at the time, but also because of a subsequent feeling that Germany had been pressed into conducting and leading the operation by France when it should have been focusing on its engagement in Afghanistan. The later deployment in the Central African Republic is instructive because of the lack of willingness among EU member states to take part in what was considered to be a deployment driven by French interests.

According to Article 42 of the TEU, the main purpose of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) of the European Union is to provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets, which it may use on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. One local informant in the DRC argued that looking back at the four ESDP missions in the DRC they had been a theoretical success, but that the lack of implementation on the ground was a failure (2, 2017). The EU had managed to assist in drafting central legislation and creating the frameworks for the SSR program, including on the police side the establishment of the CRSP with representatives of all the relevant government branches, the EU and MONUSCO. However, the actual implementation of the agreed programs did in not take place more than 70 pct. of the cases (2, 2017). This was confirmed by EU staff members, who argued that programs were often insufficiently planned and that the assessment studies prior to writing and designing the actual program had not been carried out professionally enough. The programs had often been too ambitious and unattainable, and the budget available to implement them limited (1, 2017). This informant even went so far as to say that the projects had in general not been designed against the backdrop of the needs of the Congolese, but on what the international experts thought was the best (1, 2017). The result has been that the EU can look back on a number of projects that did not constitute the major change and reform that were intended.

\textsuperscript{63} Denmark was excluded due to its opt out from EU military cooperation.
One local informant argued that the EU seems to have been more focused on domestic visibility and less on the impact on the ground (9, 2017). A third informant argued that one of the explanations for why the impact of UNPOL had been limited was that it had focused on the national level, not the local level where most PNC officers operate. It was therefore a structural fault in the EU project design that resulted in the limited impact (2, 2017). In addition, the EU had also been faced with the fact that the forces they had to operate with had limited or even no police training, and several informants highlighted this as a major obstacle to the reform effort (2, 2017) (5, 2017) (9, 2017). Also the EU had experienced that it could not count on the local Congolese partner to deliver on its promises, which often left the donor exposed to criticism and required it to finance the whole project so it could run (2, 2017). However, as one high-level Congolese informant argued, this was also due to the fact that the EU had the misconception that the Congolese partner, which was just coming out of a war situation and had limited human and economic resources, would be able to deliver in such a jointly financed partnership. That was unrealistic and was an important explanation for why the Congolese partner so often failed to produce the agreed funds for the projects (5, 2017). An illustrative example of this is the biometric payments system, where the system, and the idea behind it, does work, but where in practice it has only a minor impact (1, 2017) (2, 2017). Another example is the centralized focus on legislation, where the laws for the police are fine and would work in a functioning democratic state, but not in the DRC in its current form (2, 2017). A third informant even argued that the EU, like a number of the other donors, did not understand Congolese thinking related to ‘partnership’ and development aid, where the Congolese considered funding to be a ‘gift’ (3, 2017).

One of the objectives of the missions in the DRC has been that, for the projects to be successful, they need to have a high degree of local ownership and buy-in. One local informant argued that in the case of the EU it had been more question of the ‘adaptation’ of the donor plan and that local participation should be considered to be involvement rather than ownership (3, 2017). A central international EU staff member argued that there had been a big difference here between EUPOL and EUSEC in the sense that, in its relations with the PNC, EUPOL had been part of a much more open and coordinated effort together with other donor partners and the local beneficiaries than had been the case with EUSEC.

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64 The author has experienced this himself on several occasions in theatre in the DRC, where in both police and military training bases the government did not provide the agreed subsidies for the deployed personnel.
One of the reasons for this was the early drafting of key legislation for the police, which increased local ownership for the reform program (4, 2016).

The missions in the DRC have been important for the EU in the sense that this was the first time that the ESDP was tested, and it provided the EU with an opportunity to test its ambition to become a comprehensive global player, with a tool box that was more diverse and more attractive than, for instance, those of NATO. During its four operations the EU managed to partner with other international organizations, in particular the UN, in providing comprehensive tools in post-conflict situations in the DRC. The challenges for the EU were to be found at several levels. The national interests and normative liberal ambitions of the EU in its engagement with a reluctant Congolese partner meant that projects were suspended due to issues arising at the strategic political level, but the impact was felt on the actual projects on the ground. This led to high levels of frustration and mistrust on the part of the Congolese beneficiary. The next problem was that the EU had too limited a budget and too long a response time, making it a difficult partner to work with. Internally in the EU problems were also visible in the project planning and design phase. The Union’s projects were described as over-ambitious and unrealistic, being driven by changing international seconded personnel, who arrived with their own personal ambitions. This meant that the projects were often designed without a thorough and in-depth understanding of the Congolese context and having made little or no use of Congolese interlocutors and local networks in general. This meant that it was often difficult to get access to the relevant Congolese actors, making projects often unrealistic and leading the EU to fail to achieve its stated objectives for the missions. The EUSEC mission to introduce a biometric salary payment system is a case in point. The system was established, but due to the size and nature of the DRC and the lack of funds, the system is not fully operational. One issue here is an unrealistic expectation and a lack of understanding of what could and can be expected of the Congolese partner. The latter was just coming out of a war situation, and a number of the central actors within the Congolese system had an interest in blocking or at least delaying the project. Another problem related specifically to EUPOL, but also partly to EUSEC, was that the main focus was placed on reforms at the national level in Kinshasa, though in reality most PNC personnel work and operate at the local level.

Internally in the EU there are some structural problems, where, due to the partnership with bilateral donors in the projects, it has often proved impossible or very difficult to get access
to the ‘lessons learned’ reports from the previous projects. This had a significant negative effect on mission planning.

### 4.2 IMPACT OF THE EU MISSIONS IN THE DRC

In assessing the overall success of the EU’s engagement in the DRC, the answer depends on what is considered to be a reasonable benchmark for assessment. In terms of fulfilling the mandates, Operation Artemis and EUFOR RDC achieved their goals, while the EUPOL and EUSEC did not do so to the same extent, which the current escalation of instability and violence in the DRC involving the security forces testifies to. The two military operations had narrow, realistic mandates, and lasted only a short time. However, they did not manage to have greater strategic impacts on the security situation in the DRC in general. The EUPOL and EUSEC missions were given unrealistic objectives, which they partly failed to achieve. However, if the benchmark is moved, these two missions had a positive impact on first the security sector’s ability to handle security in the 2006 elections, and subsequently to start the actual SSR program and to draft the framework document related to it. The two missions did not manage to create two well-functioning security institutions, the PNC and the FARDC, which in 2017 can still best be described as a ‘traffic-jam’, to paraphrase one informant. The relevant question, of course, is to what extent this is the responsibility of the EU missions, or whether this also has to do with the fact that the Congolese partner has been unable or even unwilling to implement the needed reforms. The paralysis of the EU’s engagement is not always the fault of the Union, and this leaves the question the extent to which it would have been better not to engage in the DRC as long as the local beneficiary was non-permissive. However, knowledge of this would only have become available if proper, in-depth studies of the situation had been conducted and if institutional memory had been maintained and distributed within the EU system. Another major challenge was that, despite the fact that the international donors interacted with one another and coordinated their efforts, the differences in national interests, norms and mandates often resulted in bilateral engagement and donor competition. This was also due, however, to the fact that the Congolese prefer bilateral partnerships because they are easier for them to control. The DRC has turned out to be a complex and difficult environment for the EU to operate in, and its missions have found themselves caught between a reluctant partner and a domestic political reality that made it difficult for them to operate. One important lesson from the DRC has been that it is not possible to engage effectively in the country when the normative
political ties are too narrow and when bureaucratic system has too long a response time. The EU should also become better at using and engaging with the local knowledge base, which has often been remarkably absent in the DRC.

Operation Artemis was politically an important step in the development of the EU as a global conflict manager. It was launched at a time when the international community was split over the US-led decision to invade Iraq. The EU member states were divided between the group that had joined the invasion and those that opposed it on the basis of its supposed illegality. However, the real tension was mostly played out in the NATO alliance, which created a space for the EU to step up its role as a conflict manager. That the French-led Artemis force had a significant British contingent should also be seen as an attempt to create rapprochement between the EU members through what was seen as an European mission. The decision to invade Iraq had also undermined the UN, and especially the UNSC, as the key global actor for peace and security management. The Artemis operation was also an example of the UN, with UNSG Kofi Annan at the forefront, seeking alternative alliances and actors in its role of managing international peace and security. The two institutions therefore both found themselves in a place in time and history when they needed partners to strengthen their relative importance.

The operation was also an illustration of the important role played by national interests in deciding where and how the EU should intervene. Had France not driven the process of creating support for the operation, it is very unlikely that it would have taken place. France had, as shown in this section, a direct historical and strategic interest at stake, and the deployment of Artemis created an opportunity for France to repair its damaged image and influence in central Africa, as well as in the world in general. France showed the world that it was living up to the normative values expressed in the UN Charter and that it was willing, together with its EU partners, to deploy into high-risk zones of conflict to help the UN strengthen its role as the global conflict manager. The normative element therefore played a significant role in legitimizing the deployment, and it was presented as being in stark contrast to the allegedly illegal US-led invasion of Iraq.

The first question that needs answering is to what extent the operation managed to reach its objectives. The aim was contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, and to prevent what was described as a potential ‘genocide’ from happening. Among France’s allies there was some scepticism
about whether there was a genocide, but it was recognized that they were facing a ‘serious’ humanitarian crisis and that war crimes were being committed by the actors in the conflict. However, the French military planners managed to get a mandate that was realistic, with the tools they needed, including approval of the use of force, and with a short deployment time. The Artemis mission therefore avoided the mission creep that so many UN and later NATO missions have experienced, and it had only a very narrow objective. The deployment of Artemis meant that the parties to the conflict knew that the force could and would use force if need be, and it managed to create a security situation where refugees could start to return to the town of Bunia. The Artemis force therefore served as a much-needed bridge for the deployment of a larger UN force in the area, but it did not manage to solve the underlying causes of conflict. However, that was not the objective of the deployment, the EU force instead providing robust assistance to a weaker and more lightly armed and mandated UN force.

Operationally the EU force reduced the risk by keeping half of its force in Uganda and by having Entebbe airport so close to the zone of deployment. Entebbe has two runways, which means that it is possible to reinforce or evacuate the deployed force at short notice. The airport had and still has a high loading and reloading capacity, which made it a good logistical rear base. The mission was self-sustainable in the sense that it brought in its own logistical supplies, with international partners like South Africa and Canada providing the necessary lift capability. In budgetary terms this mission was, like the 2006 EUFOR RDC, covered financially by the Athena mechanism, while the national contributions was covered by the deploying nations themselves.

The EU and Solana presented EUFOR as a success. As was the case with Artemis it had been deployed for a short time, four months, and had a clear mandate. It had the agreement of all the actors involved in the conflict, but the GR had prepared to block reinforcements arriving through the airport in the event of a military confrontation. EUFOR was therefore vulnerable if reinforcements had to be brought in, which could at least have delayed the deployment. However, this is speculation, since it never came to the feared confrontation. EUFOR managed to help the election take place in a relatively orderly manner. The EU managed to deploy an EU-run and sustained force, in cooperation with the UN MONUC force on the ground. It thus had strategic similarities to Operation Artemis, which was also an attempt to implement the ESDP’s policies and priorities, and to do so in close cooperation
with the UN. It was also a success in the sense that it managed to get contributions from 21 EU member states under German lead and therefore had less of a French footprint than was the case with Artemis.

However, the mission also showed that national caveats made the operation difficult to run and that in that sense the EU looked like most other international missions. The operation also highlighted the clash of priorities that exists between NATO and EU contributions, where, for instance, strong voices in Germany and the UK argued that the assets should have been used in Afghanistan instead. This criticism may have informed some of the later deployment in, for instance, the Central African Republic, where once again the force was a French-dominated deployment.

5 EU ENGAGEMENT IN CAR

Relations between EU and the CAR are based on a regular political dialogue under the Cotonou Agreement. The EU is the key partner of the CAR and is the country's main donor. Today the EU promotes its comprehensive approach as a strategy to tackle the complex development and security challenges in the CAR. Currently, EU priorities in the Central African Republic can be divided into five categories: (1) Security, (2) Humanitarian assistance, (3) Stabilization, (4) Resilience and sustainable recovery, and (5) Regional Impact of the crisis.

The EU’s approach to the Central African conflict is, above all, based on security, which is perceived as a fundamental condition for every peace process. Since 2008 EU has deployed two military missions and two operations in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); (1) European Union Force in Chad and Central African Republic

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65 The following section on CAR is based on the CAR case study in D3.5
66 The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, was concluded for a 20-year period from 2000 to 2020. It is the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU. The Cotonou Agreement was designed to establish a comprehensive partnership with 3 pillars: 1) Development cooperation, 2) Political cooperation and 3) Economic and trade cooperation (for the period 2000-2007). For more information: European Commission, 2016, ACP - The Cotonou Agreement, visited: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm_en
67 Since 2013, EC has committed approximately 83.5 million €. The contributions comprises of financial and human resources for affected population, several humanitarian and development projects such as protection, access to sanitation, health care, and nutrition assistance. Contributions are also made to support the emergency response capabilities of the UN and NGOs. See: European Commission, 2016, Central African Republic, accesses, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/sub-saharan-africa/central-african-republic_en
(EUFOR Tchad/RCA), (2) European Union Force (EUFOR RCA) in 04/2014 - 03/2015, (3) European Union Military Advising Mission (EUMAM), which mandate expired on 16 July, 2016, and ongoing (4) EU’s Military Training Mission (EUTM RCA), working towards a modernized, effective, inclusive and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA). Characteristic for the CSDP, in the CAR the instrument is used as a short-term intervention seeking to complement the EU’s broader stabilization efforts, as well as the efforts of its international and bi-lateral partners in the country. EUTM will provide education and training to the country's military and strategic advice to CAR's Ministry of Defence and general staff, thereby contributing to the defense sector reform (DSR) within an overall locally owned SSR process coordinated by MINUSCA. This is believed to contribute to the comprehensive recovery from the crisis and help strengthening the Rule of Law Principles and the State authority.\textsuperscript{69}

Although, the EU has defined a clear end-date for all its military interventions in CAR it has not defined an end-state for its engagement. Ideally, the engagement would be adjusted over time to the particular conditions and needs of the country and its people. In the case of CAR there would be no quick fix and responding to the multidimensional crisis requires comprehensive response as well as time and resources. Progress in any one area would not be sustainable without significant and simultaneous engagement in other areas. In order to be successful, conflict resolution and prevention should incorporate elements of traditional security provision combined with conflict prevention, humanitarian relief, institution-building and development tasks ranging from education to economic development\textsuperscript{70}. Thus, the overall aim of the EU’s is to support long-term socio-economic recovery, in the framework a comprehensive state- and peacebuilding agenda, and to help build a more stable country, supporting the transition process and helping put the country on track towards a sustainable recovery. Furthermore, the EU supports the transition authorities in their efforts to find a political solution to the crisis. While doing so, the EU maintains regular dialogue with the CAR authorities, in close coordination with its international partners. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR), Repatriation (DDRR), and the implementation of

\textsuperscript{69} Interview no. 4.
Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programmes have been identified as critical steps for the early stabilization of the Central African Republic.\textsuperscript{71} All these elements are interlinked and thus the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process must be implemented in close cooperation and coordination with these programmes.

The UN is leading the SSR process in CAR, but the EU has supported it namely through its CSDP instruments.\textsuperscript{72} Due to the widely spread insecurity, immediate assistance from the international community is needed to help restore a minimum capability to CAR’s security and defence forces. Since 2014 the European Union’s engagement in SSR in CAR has focused on the Defence Sector Reform (DSR) focusing on reforming and training the armed forces of the Central African Republic (FACA), so that the national forces can provide the first line of defence for the protection of CAR citizens. In close coordination with MINUSCA the EU contributes to develop self-sustainable FACA capabilities necessary to fulfil their respective assignments in the security sector and to allow them a proper progressive development of accountable, credible, and ethnically balanced FACA that is under democratic control.\textsuperscript{73} Reforming FACA is perceived as an essential tool in stabilising the country, since the lack of reliable and effective national defence forces is believed to be one of the root causes for the conflict.\textsuperscript{74} It is also essential for successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of dispersed armed groups. Lack of effective security forces – most of the army being stationed in Bangui - has encouraged communities to develop their own means for protection.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, poor border security and FACA’s inability to protect its citizens from looting and violence of criminal organisations and rebel groups together with FACA personnel themselves having been regularly accused of looting and of killing CAR citizens, has indeed made FACA to loose legitimacy among the population.\textsuperscript{76}

Until the population perceives FACA accountable and legitimate, the DDR is not likely to be

\textsuperscript{71} ‘Immediate Priorities for Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic’, the High-Level Side Event on CAR at the 70th UN General Assembly, October 1, 2015.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Interview no. 7.
\textsuperscript{74} See for example D3.3 ‘The Review on the Central African Republic’, IECEU-project
\textsuperscript{75} Poor border security and unpatrolled rural areas, the CAR has been a safe haven for transnational armed groups and criminal networks, a fact that has led to the deployment of multiple foreign armies throughout the country over the past decade. Thus, many rebel groups were first self-defence militias founded in order to protect their communities or their villages from national and foreign criminals such as road-cutters but also from foreign rebels or raiders coming, most notably, from Chad and Sudan. See D3.3 The Review on CAR.
\textsuperscript{76} Interview no. 5
sustainable. Hence, the functioning defence sector is perceived to be a cornerstone in the country’s reconstruction process.

Nevertheless, while CSDP military interventions have primarily focused on the defence reform the EU seeks to continuously liaise and coordinate with MINUSCA regarding all the SSR activities in order to avoid overlap and duplication during the mandated period of EUMAM RCA and EUTM RCA.77 Hence, alongside developing the defence capabilities reforming CAR’s other security institutions, such as the gendarmerie and the police, simultaneously are necessary to ensure balance to the defence reform.78 Rehabilitation of police stations and gendarmerie brigades, rehabilitation of barracks and training centres together with defence reform is believed to help protecting CAR’s territorial integrity and its civilians, as well as support the restoration of the rule of law and public security. In addition, the national and local justice mechanisms should be strengthened alongside the defence reform to bring an end to the environment of impunity in which soldiers and armed groups operate.79 Currently, one of the most challenging aspects of the ongoing conflict in CAR is impunity.80 There is an urgent need to bring to justice perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, to investigate and try serious crimes, including crimes against humanity and war crimes. Hence, an important part in possible conflict resolution is to be found in addressing the impunity and creating social cohesion between the different sides. Consequently, since the very beginning, one of the member states’ main priorities has been the organisation of a political transition the objective of which was legislative and presidential elections. The European Union has been indeed the main financial contributor to the electoral process that is considered a crucial step indispensable for giving state legitimacy for adoption and implementation of the future reforms intended to address CAR conflicts’ causes. All these processes must be planned and implemented in close consultation with the local stakeholders and civil society, ensuring the process to be locally owned.

5.1 THE STATE OF THE EUFOR MISSION IN CAR

77 Interview no. 3.
78 Ibid.
79Interview no 1.; Interview no. 8. and no. 11.
80 Policemen and judges had all fled out of fear of being killed by Séléka, and FACA had totally disintegrated in the face of the advancing coalition. There was general anarchy, given that no-one was able to enforce law. Even the prisons had been devastated and couldn’t accommodate any inmates. IECEU- Project. D 3.3 The Review on the Central African Republic.
EUFOR RCA was a partial success. In the arena of internal goal attainment, the European peacekeeping operation reached its politico-strategic objectives and fulfilled its mandate successfully: all of its operational objectives were met. As for external goal attainment, EU troops improved the security conditions considerably and prevented violence from diffusing, escalating, or intensifying even if they could not stop every crime. Also, EUFOR was relatively efficient and cost-effective, and it definitely did more good than harm, yet it must be stressed that the EUFOR mandate was quite narrow, especially when compared with the MINUSCA mandate. The United Nations force of 12,000 was mandated mainly to protect the country’s entire civilian population; to provide good official channels and political support for the efforts to address root causes of the conflict and establish lasting peace and security in the CAR; to devise, facilitate, and provide technical assistance for the electoral process with the aim of the holding of free, fair, transparent, and inclusive elections and promoting and supporting the rapid extension of state authority. Accordingly, the MINUSCA mission was quite ambitious, while EUFOR’s 900 men only had to ‘contribute to the provision of a safe and secure environment’ in two districts.

The objectives of the 2,000-man Sangaris force too were much wider than EUFOR’s mandate: according to Resolution 2127, the French operation was aimed at taking all necessary measures to support MISCA in discharging its mandate, which consisted of contributing to the protection of civilians and the restoration of security and public order, through the use of appropriate measures; to the stabilisation of the country and the restoration of state authority throughout the country’s territory; to the creation of conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance to populations in need; to the DDR or DDRRR process led by the transitional authorities and co-ordinated by BINUCA; and to national and international efforts to reform and restructure the defence and security sectors, led by the transitional authorities and co-ordinated by BINUCA.

82 Sangaris was mandated to support the MINUSCA when the latter took over from MISCA, on 15 September 2014.
As in previous CSDP military operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, the effort was a small-scale and reactive operation with a clear exit strategy. The planning was geared toward meeting a set end date instead of reaching an end state that involves ‘obtaining the situation upon which an operation can be terminated successfully’. In other words, the EUFOR operation was not meant to last until a specific situation was reached, such as the conclusion of a peace agreement or the resolution of a conflict; instead, it was for a limited duration after the FOC declaration. Admittedly, the participating states showed some flexibility with the initial end date, since the mandate was extended, but they clearly opposed any further extension. Hence, EUFOR RCA was a short-term mission without any political mandate. As indicated by the bridging-operation concept itself, the European troops sought only to provide time enough and aid in the MINUSCA deployment. Thereby, EUFOR confirmed Member States’ refusal to risk engaging in long-term and wide-scale peace operations with potential to continue for years or decades before a political solution to the conflict is negotiated. Consequently, one can conclude that EUFOR internal goal attainment was relatively easy to achieve because of its narrow mandate, especially in comparison with the MINUSCA and Sangaris mandates. However, at the same time, the operation’s limited objectives prevented the European troops from making a significant contribution to external goal attainment in terms of further conflict prevention and conflict transformation at the national level. In simple terms, more internal success meant less external success. The Figure 2 and Figure 3 summarises the discussion on the effectiveness of the EUFOR RCA.

FIGURE 1. The key achievements and enablers for EUFOR RCA

86 The only exception is EUFOR Althea, which has been active in Bosnia–Herzegovina since 2004.
Achievements and enablers

- EU contributed to preventing the CAR conflict from provoking spill-over and further regional destabilisation.
- Military intervention was appropriate instrument to use for the situation.
- EUFOR RCA had an important role in supporting the French operation Sangaris, AU and UN efforts to diffuse the conflict and restabilization of the country.
- Close cooperation and coordination; the tasks were divided among the UN, France, and EU, in line with their competencies and capabilities.
- The Area of Operation was strategically selected and EU’s efforts helped to reduce the tensions and improving the overall security in the area.
- EUFOR operated in the spirit of comprehensive approach and cooperated with the Commission programmes and EU Delegation on the ground.
- Succeeded in providing time enough and aid for the MINUSCA deployment.
- The humanitarian actors could safely conduct their projects, civilians had relative freedom of movement.
- IDPs’ return movement advanced under EUFOR responsibility.
- Operation composition was appropriate to the operational area.
- EUFOR RCA was received well and perceived positively by the locals especially when comparing to the other military operations.
- Good local networks and confidential relations contributed to the up-to-date situational awareness.
- EUFOR RCA facilitated the dialogue between the different parties by bringing the actors around the same table.

FIGURE 2. Key challenges for EUFOR RCA

Challenges

- Difficulties in force generation delayed the deployment of the operation almost by 6 months > the situation on the ground would have required a rapid intervention.
- Force generation challenges showed the EU member states’ lack of political will and commitment towards the CSDP.
- The way how the military operations are funded and inflexibility of the financial instrument affected on the contributions and the running of the operation.
- The mandate was limited in terms of time, area of operation and resouces, and it had only a limited and temporary impact on the conflict resolution.
- The international operations had different approaches towards the local population.
- Issues related to multiculturalism; national caveats, language barriers and doctrinal differences affected on the effectiveness.
- Lack of local infrastructure made the establishment and running of the operation challenging.
- No functioning host government to involve or support the planning of the operation.
- The misbehaviour of the EUFOR RCA personnel towards the local population had an negative impact on the reputation of the EU troops.
- Lack of air surveillance capabilities and reliable classified communication systems hampered the information collection, sharing and management.
5.2 IMPACT OF THE EUFOR IN CAR

From the EU perspective, the operation was a success, as indicated by numerous statements provided by EU officials. For instance, according to the EEAS, ‘EUFOR RCA has successfully completed its mission in Bangui’ since ‘the level of security in Bangui has significantly improved, facilitating the deployment and actions of humanitarian actors’.

When the EUFOR mandate ended, the EEAS stressed the fact that IDPs were going back to their homes and the first refugees were beginning to return to the Central African Republic but also that the country’s economic and social life had resumed, with the PK5 market continuing its development and people’s freedom of movement having improved significantly.

When the European Parliament Security and Defence subcommittee visited Bangui, on 18 to 20 February 2015, its president, Anna Fotyga, declared at the end of the visit: ‘We could take note on the ground to what extent EUFOR action made the difference at a crucial moment […] We could also find that EUFOR represents a successful model of bridging operation between the EU and the United Nations and that this co-operation model should be exploited further.’

Arnaud Danjean, another member of the subcommittee, even stated: ‘This is a great mission that worked amazingly well from everybody’s opinion on the ground’. For the EU Council, the extension to EUFOR’s mandate that was requested by locals and the United Nations was further proof that the operation was ‘useful’ and ‘efficient’.

A few days before EUFOR left the country, the operation commander declared: ‘[T]oday we leave Bangui. We leave an appeased city with an ongoing political process, refugee camps emptying out, IDPs going back home. I have the feeling indeed that the duty is accomplished’.

At press conferences, General Pontiès stated repeatedly that the

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88 Ibid.
operational objectives had been met\(^{93}\) and that the EU had reason to be proud because of what had been done in terms of security, freedom of movement for humanitarian workers, help for MINUSCA deployment, and support for the national reconciliation and dialogue process.\(^{94}\) Finally, it must be stressed that all EU officials interviewed, at EUMS, EEAS, European Commission, and CMPD level alike, described EUFOR RCA as a success story despite several shortcomings that are explained below.

The empirical material suggests that EUFOR was well perceived by the local population.\(^{95}\) While the scope of the operation was geographically more limited than the other international forces, it appears that they had found the right balance, from the populations’ perspectives, between ensuring their security, being approachable, being helpful and being reactive when needed.\(^{96}\) That information was systematically confirmed by all the people interviewed in this research, including seven Bangui citizens living in the third and the fifth districts\(^{97}\). Male IDP respondents even stated that in Bangui, ‘there [was] a difference between [international] forces: some [were] efficient like EUFOR, but MINUSCA and Sangaris, in contrast they [didn’t do] nothing’.\(^{98}\) The results of this study indicates that EUFOR was particularly appreciated by Bangui citizens on account of its close proximity in relationships with citizens but also its results on the ground in terms of security improvements.\(^{99}\) The positive perception of EUFOR on the part of local citizens but also local authorities was systematically confirmed by interviewees and in the press. According to one NGO worker, people had difficulty understanding why EUFOR left, since it was effective and loved by the population.\(^{100}\)

\(^{95}\) See for example Norwegian refugee council, 2015.
\(^{98}\) *Ibid.*
\(^{99}\) Interview no.31, and no.13.
\(^{100}\) Interview no.13.
There seemed to have been consensus among the population that the security improvements were, at least partially, a result of the EUFOR RCA presence.\textsuperscript{101} It even seems that the M’Poko camp IDPs, along with citizens of the third and fifth districts, were worried when EUFOR was set to withdraw, because ‘they recognised the efforts EUFOR [had made] for the security situation’.\textsuperscript{102} In sum, Bangui citizens regretted the EUFOR withdrawal.\textsuperscript{103}

Despite the positive perceptions, EUFOR RCA was not completely free of criticisms. First, EUFOR was criticised by citizens for having taken too much time to deploy.\textsuperscript{104} It seems that the delays in deployment detreated EU’s creditability and prestige among the local population. People could not understand why the European Union needed so much time to deploy its force while serious violence was taking place.

Second, while EUFOR’s area of operation was considered as a well-considered strategy, several local interviewees suggested that the operation should have taken responsibility of other districts.\textsuperscript{105} Especially the fourth and the eight ones should be included into the area of operation, since the latter also faced important security concerns. As a whole, the information gathered indicated that the locals would have wanted EUFOR to operate in a larger area.

Finally, one journalist reported that since EUFOR was heavily involved in the third district, some people thought that EUFOR was mainly motivated by the Muslim protection.\textsuperscript{106} However, other sources argued that the European force was generally considered as impartial since it protected equally the different communities and supported various projects in both districts.\textsuperscript{107} Overall, despite the criticisms EUFOR benefited from a wide support from the population, with the exception of the armed groups that the force used to fight.

\textsuperscript{102} Interview no.31.
\textsuperscript{103} Interview no. 13.
\textsuperscript{104} NEUFO, 24 January 2017
\textsuperscript{106} NEUFO, 17 January 2017
\textsuperscript{107} NEUFO, 20 January 2017; NEUFO, 24 January 2017
There were also opposing views in terms of the appropriateness of EUFOR activities. When EUFOR started its disarmament operations in Bangui, people from the third districts felt negatively towards the EUFOR activities. As described by a Bangui citizen, it was a part of the third district population who did not want militias to be arrested, and consequently people who supported the bandits were angry with EUFOR. However, in particular, IDPs at the M’Poko camp – had difficulty in understanding why the European troops did not arrest some militia leaders, since the latter prevented IDPs’ return to the districts. Those militias were responsible for all kinds of illegal traffic and therefore used to try to destabilise the transition and peace process. Hence, the regular citizens wished that EUFOR could have done more in order to enhance the sustainability of the stability in the area.

In fact, the leaders of the bandit groups were well known to EUFOR, but political factors kept EU troops from receiving authorisation from Brussels to arrest these persons. The result frustrated those members of the population who knew that EUFOR actually had identified the dangerous troublemakers. In consequence, even if the local population perceived EUFOR’s security impacts as positive, some of them felt frustrated because EUFOR did not do enough with regard to certain dangerous groups. The fact that it took until October 2016 before some of the key rebellious leaders were captured, indicates that the effectiveness and sustainability of the EUFOR RCA’s efforts in CAR could have been enhanced with an extended mandate.

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108 Interview no. 30
109 Interview no.25
110 Interview no.25.
111 Interview no. 35.
112 Round Table Discussion, Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC), 31 October – 1 November, 2016.
6 IDENTIFIED WAYS FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 SOUTH SUDAN

A number of detailed observations on the EU conflict preventions and crisis management capabilities and suggestions how to improve them in the case of South Sudan have been discussed in the IECEU D 3.5. This section will provide just three areas, addressing of which is believed to have positive impact on the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention capabilities.

Training and knowledge: the EU should develop trainings that are stronger related to country specific information as well as intercultural competences. It should also ensure that incoming mission members will attain good knowledge and understanding of the host society, including political and conflict dynamics. Pre-deployment training is a responsibility of seconding EU member states, therefore emphasis should be given to harmonize the training policies and ensure coherent training standards.

Technology and Equipment: in order to have the necessary equipment at the foreseen time at the mission, it is necessary to shorten the supply chain (by creating a central warehouse). It is also necessary to have the right equipment on the ground, i.e. that fits the purposes and conditions of the host country as well as that there is potential for support and maintenance of the equipment on the ground. Emphasis should be given to communication equipment and channels that are suitable especially in remote and underdeveloped countries such as South Sudan.

Planning: The time between the fact finding mission and the actual political decision and deployment needs to be shortened in order to provide a realistic picture of the situation on the ground. It would have been wise to keep a core team with accurate equipment on the spot in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly. Such a core team on the ground would also help in avoiding an inaccurate picture of the situation on the ground at the point of departure. If the deployment of such a core team is impossible, the role of delegations should be strengthened in order to have a comprehensive EU approach at mission level.
6.2 LIBYA

The considerations to be made after the careful and multi-dimensional analysis of EUBAM Libya can be compressed into three dimensions or perspectives that need to be considered and taken aboard when thinking of the way forward in Libya and also in terms of CSDP operations that face the same political context on the drawing board and the same security challenges on the field. 1) First and foremost, the problems of the EU can be seen coming from an inadequate understanding of the changing nature of conflicts, a multi-dimensional phenomena of which's aspects were especially visible in Libya. 2) The second point to take the is the understanding that the EU cannot set the agenda of the international community by itself and this plays a role in the division of labour within the international community regarding the nature of its concerted intervention. 3) Thirdly the mission personnel structure and the mission mandates, especially in cases like Libya should be designed to be more flexible. In the case of EUBAM Libya the ability to bend the mandate when the original mandate became impossible to fulfil allowed the mission to accomplish the little that it did in terms of effectiveness and to have a positive impact on the conflict. This is, contrary to the other two points a lesson that has the positive element, indicating something that did work in the case of EUBAM Libya

1) Changing nature of conflicts. This is obviously too large of an aspect to tackle in the frame of this report, but nevertheless needs to be considered as a fundamental problem if considering the problems of EUBAM Libya. The framing and the planning process of the international community in terms of the conflict and reconstruction in Libya made the mistake of following a very conventional thinking based on an idea that there would be a clear conflicts cycle to which the international community could make successful interventions, thus altering the course of that cycle. In addition, the planning and intervention of the international community took it as a starting point that Libya is at least predominately a standard nation state, with an identifiable organisation structure, which the UN's UNSMIL mission responsible of the state-building functions could support. However, Libya had never formed an organisation structure similar to the ones that the western interventions were planned for, thus leading to serious problems in the strategic execution of the mission. The asymmetric nature of the conflict was not considered and the multidimensional and complex
political geography of Libya was largely unaddressed in planning. This is evident especially when observing the early stages of the mission, when the mission tried to negotiate the IBM border control mechanism with an illusory counterpart that kept changing all the time. Instead of focusing on the high political level, the EU mission should have had a more local perspective in which it would have framed the border issue through the de facto border controllers, such as the tribes in the south. There are indications that some NGO’s working in the field of mediation and peace building have had success with this approach. It is evident that the roles and priorities of a multinational agent, such as the EU, need to be different.

2) International agenda setting. In the international division of labour in the case of the Libyan reconstruction, the Friends of Libya was central in coordinating the efforts of the international community. In this body it was de facto decided that it would be EU’s responsibility to focus on developing the border management capabilities with the Libyan, not to do SSR, which was the desire of many Member States, which, however, did not have a say in this body. The fact that EU’s task was to be something that was not what many Member States had originally planned created problems visible in the planning process of EUBAM Libya. The lesson here is that in the case of an international crisis of the magnitude of the one in Libya, the EU cannot fully control how it can use CSDP as an instrument. The EU just does not have that unity and leverage on the international level.

This all resulted in a situation where the mission planners had to plan for a mission of which’s execution was difficult to start with and towards which substance the Member States were surprised off guard. The member states were mentally geared towards an SSR mission, even a military mission, like the EUFOR Libya, which never left the drawing board. Because of this the resulting civilian mission, EUBAM Libya, came out less perfect for the situation. This is an issue of the politico-strategic level that the mission, operational level cannot do much about. It is however, important to emphasize that the EU functions always as one element in an international effort, which should also be reflected on the mission planning and political process -levels. In the case of Libya the mismatch of the ambitious political process feeding into the planning process did handicap the operational level. This should be addressed so that the flow of information from the field to the politico-strategic level and back should function in both ways.

3) Mission mandate. From the operational point of view the mission is of course guided by its mandate. In the case of EUBAM Libya, the mandate was suited for a mission that would
have had a strategic impact on the development of the Libyan border control, with the primary focus being designing, together with the Libyans, a sophisticated IBM border management concept and its implementation. This was not accomplished because of numerous reasons. On the one hand the mission had great difficulties in gaining and keeping connections to their Libyan counterparts, which was by and large related to the false conception of the conflict that the mission was based on. As the Libyan counterpart kept changing (i.e. there was no administrative continuity), the mission was unable to establish a working relationship with the Libyans. But on the other hand the mission also failed to "sell" the desired concept for the Libyans which eventually opted for the competitive project offered by the United States for a border management system following the single organisation US-model. It therefore seems that the strategic failure was also due to some lacking capabilities on the strategic know-how by the mission members. However, after the mission had failed on the strategic level of the mandate, it was capable of redirecting its effort to capability building in the form of mentoring and advising the Libyan border officials. In that capacity the mission was relatively successful before its evacuation. The point to take with in this case is that the mission mandated should be flexible enough to allow the redirection of existing capabilities so, that a mission can contribute positively even when its primary function becomes unachievable.

6.3 DR. CONGO

There are some key issues that underpin the recommendations and ‘way forward’ that follow. 1) One is the strategic policy ambitions expressed in Brussels vs the actual programing and implementation in missions, where there seems to be a discrepancy between ambitions and actual feasibility on the ground? 2) To what extent has the vast EU engagement through four manager engagement managed to reach their overarching objective of creating long-term peace and stability in the DRC? Taking the current situation in the DR Congo into account, what impact has the EU missions had on the security and stability of the DR Congo, and with the closure of the EUSEC mission in July 2016 did the EU leave a more secure and stable country? A number of detailed observations on the EU conflict preventions and crisis management capabilities and suggestions how to improve them in the case of the DR Congo have been discussed in the IECEU D3.5. So to avoid too much repetition, this section will provide just three areas, worth focusing on which this study
finds would have a significantly positive impact on the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention capabilities.

**Training and knowledge:** as mentioned in the study all donors talk about local ownership as a key to success of the operations and programmes. However, the DR Congo shows that often there is, for various reasons, local resistance to local ownership, which makes it difficult to implement this ambitions in practice. The missions have, with some exceptions, been really badly at identifying local interlocutors and expertise that could secure access and cooperation from the local authorities. The knowledge transfer to incoming EU-staff has been limited, and the programming has been conducted without the needed understanding of the situation on the ground. The EU should develop trainings on local ownership and the stress the importance of identifying local experts and interlocutors and using local expertise. All too often international experts are brought in, without having the needed experience and background working in the DR Congo context. The improved training and selection of personnel should also ensure that incoming mission members will attain good knowledge and understanding of the host society, including political and conflict dynamics. Currently preparatory training is a responsibility of seconding EU member states, which means that while some experts received training prior to deployment others have no pre-departure training at all. A related issue is that the lessons learned reports often not are available to the incoming mission staff, because of bureaucrat rules blocking the sharing of these reports from Brussels to the missions in country.

**Short rotation cycle versus long-term goals:** the problem of short rotation cycles of staff is not a problem unique to the EU. In the case of the DR Congo it meant that combined with the lack of knowledge transfer, that the new staff had a difficult task of being effective, and there is a tendency to use of the shelve solution, rather than tailor the projects to the Congolese situation. At the same time there has been the problem of many individual donors operating in parallel, sometimes in coordination, but often in competition with each other. The EU member states should consider to second personnel for longer deployments to EU CSDP missions and operations. The mismatch between the current short rotation cycle of experts and the EU CSDP engagement with long-term, strategic advising, mentoring and institution-building work must be addressed by the EU. However, in the current EDF PROGRESS mission in the DRC, a number experienced seconded personnel can be found, which is positive, since they have the local experience and knowledge. Consequently the
EU should map out and consider alternative models on how the CSDP missions are structured, and make better use of mixing contracted and seconded international staff, and secure better and more centralised pre-deployment training.

**Pre-mission assessments:** One thing that is striking looking at the EU engagement in the DR Congo, and which come up in several interviews with local and international informants has been insufficient planning and programming, overambitious programs deemed to fail or at least only limited ability to achieve the stated mission goals. A key issue related to this is that the EU need to be better of creating the needed knowledge base both in terms of basic understanding of the local Congolese dynamics, and political and societal structures, but also a constant up-to-date intelligence of what is happening underneath venire of the visible. The problem is that programming then risks being done without this knowledge, risking doing more harm, simply because the knowledge is not present. Twisting the statement by one informant, “it is not always better to do something than nothing”. Another related finding from the DR Congo cases has been that EU has been much more successful in its less complex, short-term military deployments, with a narrow and limited mandate, than in its long-term often complex and overambitious missions. This is not to say that the EU should refrain from SSR-engagements, because EU’s comparative advantage lies within this ability to do holistic missions, combining military and security related initiatives with the broader developmental initiatives. However, the findings show that EU should be better at identifying realistic program objectives, using local expertise, and do so in close coordinating with the other donors.

**6.4 CAR**

The EUFOR CAR missions was an overall success story for the EU, where the organisation as I did during the two military operations in the DRC, managed to function as a dominant international actor taking responsibility handling and addressing an international threatening security situation. That being said the EUFOR missions also illustrated the split that exist between EU members, and the mission did not, as was the case during the EUFOR RCD mission in 2006, to receive support from most EU member states. France was the dominant actor and framework nation of this operation, and in that respect the mission resembled the earlier DR Congo intervention Operation Artemis in 2003, where the EU tag in reality constituted a frame for a French dominated mission. There is not necessarily anything wrong
with that since the EU provides legitimacy for an intervention that is dominated by one of its
dominant states. The flip-side to this is to what extent the lack of willingness of many member
states to contribute significant force contributions, or even participate in these missions is
an indication of a disagreement on strategic direction of the EU, and to what extent the EU
deployed military missions are used as a cloud to service the strategic interests of a limited
number of EU member states in Francophone Africa? The risk to current and future EU
CSDP missions in post-colonial Africa are obvious. That being said, the EUFOR RCA
mission managed to be deployed in time to help stabilize an unfolding humanitarian and
security crisis in CAR, at a time when other international actors such as ECCAS, AU and
the UN had failed to do so effectively.

Pre-mission assessment and force composition: The knowledge of the situation and
background for the current conflict in CAR was often superficial, and the general strategic
interest amongst EU member state on and in CAR was very limited, with the exception of
France and a few other member states. The result was that the pre-mission assessment of
the situation and dynamics of the conflict in the DRC were superficial, and the decision 'to
do something' had the risk of violating the premise of 'doing no harm'. Because France had
significant national strategic interest in the CAR, and in the region in general, and had a
military presence already CAR, it was dominating the EUFOR RCA mission planning and
actual execution of the mission. However, the pre-mission planning was negatively
influenced by independent knowledge and intelligence. Despite this the composition of the
operation was well-suited for the operational environment in Bangui. EUFOR had both
Special Forces elements, conventional military forces, gendarmerie elements that could
undertake robust policing, CIMIC, and military engineering components, that proved to be
useful in a complex mission environment like the one in the CAR. The study shows that the
non-military elements played an important role in the day-to-day relations and contacts in
the mission’s area. However, like in the earlier EU military deployments the effectiveness of
the force was negatively influenced by its multinational nature, where national caveats,
language and interoperability constituted a problem. In addition to these more general
problems, the mission was found to be negatively influenced by the lack of information and
intelligence sharing amongst the EUFOR TCC, but especially also with the other actors on
the ground. A second problem was the lack of funding for the CIMIC component activities
that reduces the capacity of that dimension of the operation.

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The content of this document reflects the authors' view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
Mandate and operational effectiveness: EUFOR RCA was a strategic success for the EU since it both managed largely to fulfil its mandate and thereby can be considered a success in achieving its internal goals. As was the case with the two military interventions in the DRC it had limited and achievable operational objectives, a fixed and short deployment mandate being a bridging mission, and a limited area of operations. Even though the force was tested on several occasions in its area of operation, it managed to improve the security situation in its area of operation. The mere presents of a robust, effective international force had a deterring effect on the local actors. At the end of its mandate EUFOR RCA managed to successfully hand over to the UN force in CAR, MINUSCA. The deployment of the EUFOR RCA secured humanitarian access, and meant that IDP’s could return home. A key to the success of the mission was its limited and clear mandate, and its short deployment time. The flip-side to this was, that the EUFOR RCA only had a short term positive impact on the security situation in the CAR, and the missions of this type cannot stand alone if longer term objectives are to be achieved. The mandate and the decision to deploy was to large extent dominated by the framework-nation France, that early in the conflict in CAR had deployed operation Sangaris, and where the EUFOR took over the responsibility from. The advantage of this was that the EUFOR RCA was deployed into statically important geographically sections of Bangui, to maximise the operational impact. However, the force was a failure in the sense that the EU member states refused to deploy the EU Battlegroup, that only a limited number of EU member states contributed, and the actual deployment of the force was slow and delayed. However, the study finds that the multinational nature of the EUFOR RCA force increased its legitimacy amongst the local population, compared to that of both MINUSCA and Sangaris. This stresses the point that though it operationally it is good to have a frame-work nation to take lead in the military operations, the multinational force composition is important for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the operation.

National coordination and dialogue: One of the successes of the EUFOR RCA turned out to be its ability to building valuable and amiable relations with local stakeholders. The force was consequently generally appreciated and respected by the affected population in the area of operation, and more so than was the case of MINUSCA and Sangaris. By launching both night and day foot patrols helped the EUFOR’s to successfully executing its mandate. These patrol both worked to reassure the sense of security for the local population, whilst it also enabled the force to engage in regular dialogue with the citizens and create a close-
proximity relationship. The force operated using a COIN inspired strategic approach, trying to pre-empt the influence and challenges constituted by the insurgency. The positive interaction and use of local stakeholders and interlocutors meant that the force got access to invaluable information and intelligence. The EUFOR RCA mission was also good at securing coordination and cooperation with other international actors and EU Commission tool's present in CAR at the time.
7 CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction to the combined report, the four case country, and in actual fact the seven missions investigated are difficult to compare. Their nature, size, objective, budget, priority, context of operation etc. were very different. The EUBAM mission had to evacuate and did not stay long enough to have a significant impact, whilst the small EUAVSEC mission had a very narrowly defined mission and objective. Is it for instance meaningful to compare for instance Operation Artemis and EUFOR RCA, when the strategic context and the time it was deployed were so many years apart? What these studies do provide are a series of lessons learned and lessons identified, and which illustrate that some key features can be found in several of the deployed operations.

At the strategic level EU is still an alliances of independent states, and cannot be analyzed without taking the national interests into consideration. The robust military deployments in the two French speaking countries, DRC and CAR, cannot be understood without including the interest of France. All three military deployment were dominated by France, and cannot be understood without scrutinizing France strategic interest and historical role in that part of Africa, and now operating under an EU banner. This also explains why, especially in relation to Operation Artemis and EUFOR RCA, many EU member states opted politically support the operation, but not to contribute troops on the ground, and if they did in non-combat roles. However, the military operations also constitute the area where the EU has had the highest level of success in the sense that the missions had a limited area of operation, had a short deployment period, and had clearly defined mandated operational objectives, and in, in general, had the needed capabilities at their disposals. The three military operations were by EU considered to success, in that they managed to reach their objectives, which in the case of Operation Artemis and EUFOR RCA were to stabilize a critical security and humanitarian situation, act as a bridging operation until the UN operation was deployed and operational. However, all three missions had the feature in common that there medium to long term impact on the security situation in host countries were limited, but that was not the objective of the missions. The four other operations analysed in the different studies in this report are all directly or in-directly part of post-conflict capacity building efforts in South Sudan, DRC and Libya, and therefore involved in precisely the longer term objective of creating lasting peace and security, and therefore having a long-term impact. These missions in general was negatively influenced by the fact that these projects failed in their
design to strike a realistic balance between the ambition of the programs, the resources available, and then an in-depth understanding of the situation and the institutional dynamics on the ground. The projects were generally found to be overambitious, and done from the outside in, without establishing and maintaining local peer groups assisting in that process. The result was projects designed by incoming EU seconded personnel, without the needed knowledge and network on the ground and in the host-nation in general. This was also due to the fact that the international staff lacked the will to use the local knowledge present, and often opted for expat expertise, often with general knowledge of SSR, but not from the host-country. Consequently the projects and programs were design following standard international project design frameworks, and not tailored for the specific situation, country, region, local community, because the knowledge was not there. This constitute a major problem, because the local expertise could be found, and in some instances individual EU seconded staff managed to create contact and include local peer-groups in designing of the programs. This was for instance the case in the early parts of the EUPOL engagement, but disappeared in the later parts of the program. So when it happens it is due to individual EU staff having the network, and knowledge to identify the relevant peers and local capacities to include in the process. However, often this has not been case, and a common response from the deployed staff is that there is no local capacity, and they therefore needed to bring it in from the outside. This is, however, not always the case, but is of course an easier way to operate when arriving in a complex post-conflict environment. Nevertheless another key feature found in several of the cases was the lack of information sharing. In the military missions the sharing of intelligence constituted a challenge, which of course has to do with the nature of intelligence work in general, and the partnership agreements that the services have honour, and which limits the ability of the individual states sharing their intelligence. Added to that a major finding in the studies are that there seems to be a disconnection between Brussels and the missions and delegation in the four case studies. The lessons learned reports from previous projects are not accessible, and are, due to the interests of the bilateral partners in the projects, not accessible to the EU personnel in the field. This was found in most of the cases, and constitute a major problem that the staff coming into a mission area do not have access to the lessons learned from the previous missions. The risk of course being that the same mistakes found to have been done in the first mission could be repeated. A related challenge was found in the fact that often did the seconded personnel from member states not have the needed qualifications to effectively engage and
undertake the task at hand. This had to do with the actually capacity and training of the deployed personnel, but also very much had to do with the lack of needed language-skills, that blocked for being effective in mission. The language skills, and the historical connections were also of significant importance whether the member-states decide to deploy in the first place, and if so they had personnel with the needed language skills. Basically the French speaking missions constitute a challenge especially to the countries in Northern and Eastern Europe and can explain why it was difficult to get troop and staff commitments from these states in these missions.

In several of the cases there was a tension between the EU and then the national interests of the individual member states. This was visible at several levels, where for instance the initial support for a mission seems to fade away, and unless national interests were at stake, the willingness to stay engaged and support the missions reduces over time. Another related finding is the clash that exist between the core national interest of individual member states, and then the EU missions on the ground. To paraphrase this some things are simply too important to leave to the EU, which for various reasons end up constitute bilateral projects and programs running parallel with the EU projects. The reasons for this was often a wish of securing control of design and focus of the mission, which points to an internal tensions in-between EU-member states. However, it also stresses an important point relating to the reasons why units in the international system, and in this case EU member states, engage in development aid, for instance the UK support for SSR program in the DRC, or the numerous bilateral programs in South Sudan. Development aid, and post-conflict capacity building programs, is an effective way of increasing a units influence in the international system. Furthermore, nationally owned programs tends to be easier to secure domestic support for, than often larger multilateral programs. The result being that bilateral and EU programs work in parallel, and sometimes overlapping, and without the effective and needed coordination measures put in-place. A final challenge found in the selected cases were, that EU generally is slow to respond. That was both the case in CAR and in several of the project and programs in the DRC. This means that from the initial idea being presented until the actual mission is operational is a slow and bureaucratic process, which many local partners found difficult to understand and accept, and even argued that the EU was one of the most difficult donors to work with amongst other things due to these reasons. In addition to this, some of the cases identified, that problems of late arrival of equipment constituted a
significant challenge. This points to the need of establishing a central logistical hub that can support the missions more expediently.
8 REFERENCES


