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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Two roundtable events were organised in the framework of Work Package 4 of IECEU project. The events focused on the WP4's two case studies on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. This report provides information on the roundtable events, and presents the main points of discussion during the events.

The roundtable discussion on *Effectiveness of International Assistance and Local Ownership in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* was organised jointly by the Crisis Management Centre Finland and the University of Tampere on 16 September 2016. The roundtable participants included experts on the Middle East, on peace and conflict studies as well as practitioners of crisis management. Five speakers explored the effectiveness of international assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories from different perspectives, drawing a rather desolate picture of the current situation. Palestinians are among the highest per capita recipients of international aid in the world. But due to inability to address the prevailing political problems, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the intra-Palestinian conflict, this massive aid remains largely ineffective. In fact, the aid has left Palestinians aid-dependent and their economy weak. The aid to Palestinians has also directly or indirectly benefitted the Israeli occupying force. Technical assistance that has been preferred aid model since the second Palestinian intifada, channelling aid funds to budget support instead of development programs, and most recently prioritisation of strategic, high-level assistance by donors like the EU carry also other risks. It may lead the aid further away from the everyday situation of Palestinian population, and ignore the fact that specific social groups like refugees, as well as men and women, have different needs and for example different perceptions on security. To avoid such risks the EU aid efforts must adopt inclusive approach with broad understanding of local ownership in both design and implementation. This is particularly important in the current Palestinian situation where there is no functioning parliament and the Palestinian Authority is becoming increasingly autocratic in its actions. To find ways to better support conflict resolution and make aid more effective the EU was urged by the roundtable participants to make better use of its political and economic leverage towards the PA and Israel, and to look for and develop game-changers at various levels in order to get away from the current status quo.

The National University Ireland Maynooth (NUIM) held a roundtable event on 5 October 2016, during which the results of IECEU study on EUPOL Afghanistan were presented and discussed. The findings in the study report on Afghanistan were widely accepted. Some, like gender, corruption and terrorism comprising the threat were new to most. That is, the threat is more than physical violence designed to intimidate the population and overthrow an existing government. It



was universally agreed that excluding security from the mandate was a strategic shortcoming that no amount of tactical success could overcome. There was similar concurrence that EUPOL was a political mission with an operational capacity and that the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is not geared for an acute conflict environment.

It was broadly viewed that improved co-operation in military and civil institutions in the EU would benefit the CMC. EU procedures are cumbersome, over-prescriptive and there is too much central control. But there is no need for drastic structural reform. What is in place can be developed. There were shortfalls in the mission's preparation and planning, especially in situational awareness and the security context. EUPOL was under-resourced, too short, too late to deploy and too early to leave. NATO was a central security actor, yet there was minimal agreement with it and the EU.

Civilian policing vis-à-vis EUPOL was unsuited to a war environment. This had implications for the practicalities of delivery. The type of conventional policing promoted differed to mainstream US programmes and what was historically successful in an unconventional armed conflict setting.

Most people, in general, do not understand "Brussels." And in the context of the EEAS and CSDP, it appears that this also applied to mission members. This is compounded by the study report on Afghanistan being canted toward the practitioner's perspective. It would have benefited from 'field visits' to Brussels and some member states. This would have better represented these viewpoints. Visits to the European Gendarmerie HQ and European Police College (CEPOL) would also have been beneficial. Disclosing these shortcomings will give the research more chance of being accepted by the EU institutions responsible for missions like EUPOL Afghanistan.



1 INTRODUCTION

Two roundtable events have been organised in the framework of Work Package 4 of IECEU project. The events focused on the WP4's two case studies on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. This report provides information on the roundtable events, and presents the main points of discussion during the events.

The roundtable discussion on *Effectiveness of International Assistance and Local Ownership in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* was organised jointly by the Crisis Management Centre Finland and the University of Tampere on 16 September 2016. The venue took place at the University of Tampere, and was attended by seventeen participants, including experts on the Middle East, on peace and conflict studies as well as practitioners of crisis management. A list of participants is attached to the Annex 1. Five speakers gave presentations that outlined the decades-long trajectories of international assistance to Palestinians (Dr. Sahar Taghdisi Rad, King's College), discussed the situation of Palestinian refugees (Tiina Järvi, the University of Tampere), gendered perceptions and experiences on security by Palestinians (Dr. Riina Isotalo, CMC Finland), the question of local ownership (Dr. Leena Avonius, CMC Finland), and assessed the EU's role as the biggest aid provider and political player in the Palestinian territories (Dr. Dimitris Bouris, the University of Amsterdam). The discussions further explored how international assistance could be made more effective to support finding permanent solution to the protracted conflict, and how local ownership in aid mechanisms could be enhanced. Through this roundtable event the IECEU study findings on the effectiveness of EU civilian crisis management missions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories were put within a wider, highly complex setting of Israeli-Palestinian as well as intra-Palestinian conflicts, and seen in the context of statebuilding and other international aid efforts. The main points of presentations and discussion is outlined in the below section.

On Thursday 5th October 2016 at the National University Ireland Maynooth (NUIM), the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention held a round table discussion on the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan. Twenty-two people attended. All of them had read the recent study report by the Edward M. Kennedy Institute on EUPOL Afghanistan (D4.3), which acted as the main reference point to tie the discussion together. The attendees included leading academics in this field based in Ireland, senior Irish Defence Forces experienced in UN peace missions, Irish police service (senior and operational personnel, one had served on the EUPOL Afghanistan mission), a former officer in the British Army with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, a senior military commander from continental Europe experienced in working in Brussels and implementing UN peace missions, a representative of the Irish government's foreign office and members of the Edward M. Kennedy



Institute. None of the participants had previously engaged in the research project. The Executive Director Peter Cassells of the Edward M. Kennedy Institute opened and closed proceedings.

The purpose of the round table was to identify potential solutions that would benefit a similar mission to EUPOL Afghanistan in the future. An underlying goal was to receive feedback on the study report in a quasi peer review process. The discussion was lively and informative. Those around the table were highly engaged. Excellent points were raised and good constructive critique on the research was provided. The Edward M. Kennedy Institute holds a list of the participants, however, as the discussion was based on Chatham House rules this list is not included. The reason being, despite not attributing a comment to a participant, it could be obvious where it came from.

The round table discussion was expertly chaired and facilitated by Tom Behan, a retired General in the Irish Defence Forces with extensive experience of the strategic and policy side in Brussels and also the tactical and operational side in-theatre. The agenda reflected the sections of the study report. Prior to the discussion three short presentations took place. Dr Kieran Doyle on the research project, Dr Aytekin Cantekin on EU institutions and policy regarding police missions and Dr William Matchett on the study report for Afghanistan.

2 ROUNDTABLE ON THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

The roundtable discussion on *Effectiveness of International Assistance and Local Ownership in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* explored the effectiveness of international assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories from different perspectives, including political economy, anthropology, peace and conflict studies and political sciences.

The roundtable was started by a presentation by **Dr. Sahar Taghdisi Rad** who gave a sobering analysis on the impact of international assistance to Palestinian society and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Palestinians have been recipients of international assistance for over six decades. Nowadays Palestinians receive highest per capita aid, but as Rad pointed out, the aid remains ineffective. She pointed out that in general it is estimated that some 60 % of international assistance remains within donor structure. And over 70 % of aid to Palestinians benefits either directly or indirectly the Israeli economy, due to which it can be stated that the international assistance in fact economically supports the occupying power. Instead of empowering Palestinians to build an economically viable state the aid flows have left them aid-dependent. The Palestinian economy remains small, and is forcefully integrated to Israeli economy. In fact, since 1993 Oslo Accords and particularly since the second intifada key Palestinian sectors of livelihood, agriculture



and construction, have been on decline. The donors have, particularly since the second intifada, reframed their aid from development aid to a combination of humanitarian aid and so-called 'soft aid' i.e. capacity-building, institution-building and budget support. Currently the aid is directed to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which in Rad's view cannot exist without international assistance. Due to the PA's dependency on international assistance it is also questionable to talk about local ownership. According to Rad, there is a growing mismatch between the aid given to Palestinians and their genuine needs. She called for putting into rest the liberal peace paradigm stating that 'economic development can bring peace.' To a question what would happen if international aid to Palestinians was stopped, Rad said that while humanitarian assistance is needed, cutting down other type of assistance might actually force Palestinians to develop their own economic system. She pointed out, however, that the currently prevailing lack of political will in Israel to resolve the conflict makes any effort to build Palestinian economy unpredictable.

Tiina Järvi looked into the situation of Palestinian refugees living in camps in Lebanon and the occupied West Bank. The daily lives of Palestinian refugees are highly dependent on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) that was established in 1949. Over the decades UNRWA has become like a state within a state, as it runs its own schools and healthcare system and also provides livelihood opportunities to Palestinian refugees. This is particularly the case for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon where they have no right to services outside the camps. In the West Bank the Palestinian refugees are entitled to use the PA public services, but they often prefer to use UNRWA services that are available free of charge. Lending support to Rad's argument regarding the changing nature of aid from development to 'soft aid,' Järvi brought up that since the 1990s UNRWA has struggled with declining budget funds, and has redirected its support from long-term support to short-term projects approach. Despite that a political solution to the Palestinian refugee question in the near future is not foreseen, UNRWA's mandate is limited to three-year periods. Järvi's recent research amongst Palestinian refugees points out to the fears the refugees have on the possible closedown of UNRWA. Due to the UN resolution that divided historical Palestinian region in the 1947, the Palestinian refugees hold the UN responsible for their refugee situation, and insist that they are entitled to assistance rather than recipients of charity. Palestinian refugees have, for example, resisted the UN efforts to resettle them in third countries, and insist that their right to return home - guaranteed by the UN resolutions - must be respected and put into practice. In some camps efforts to improve living conditions of refugees have also been rejected by refugees, as they resist any 'normalisation' of camps. They insist that the core problem of Israeli occupation must be solved. Järvi also pointed out that her respondents in the refugee camps in Lebanon were concerned that the arrival of Syrian refugees has lessened their own work opportunities, and that worsening socio-economic conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps may lead to acts of violence and terrorism if not addressed.



In her presentation **Dr. Riina Isotalo** examined Palestinian perceptions on safety and security in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, underlining that men and women view safe and unsafe places differently and have different perceptions on security. For Palestinian men the safest place in their own view is the street or a market place. Female respondents perceived home to be the safest place, even though most civilian casualties of Israeli-Palestinian conflict occur in homes. Both men and women considered Israeli checkpoints to be increasingly dangerous places, but while Palestinian men feared for their lives at checkpoints women's main concern was family reputation. Isotalo's research indicated that the highest security-related concern of interviewed Palestinian women were sexual harassment and family violence. For them, not only the Israeli military but also Palestinian men were seen as a potential threat. International assistance, including the EU through EUPOL COPPS, has helped the PA to establish family protection units to the police stations, but due to the West Bank's division to A, B and C-areas and the restrictions on Palestinian mobility set by the IDF, Palestinian women may not have access to these services. The lack of access to civilian police services has forced Palestinians to turn to traditional, clan-based conciliation methods. Isotalo asked whether the international donors and aid agencies have, in their increasing focus on strategic assistance and the related move away from the grassroots level work in communities in fact contributed to strengthening of unequal justice institutions. And it is not only access to police services, but also the mobility of emergency services that is severely restricted by the occupying power, said Isotalo. Unable to solve the problem related to access, the PA has encouraged the communities to be self-reliant in the occurrence of emergencies. This can be seen as an enforced form of local ownership.

Based on the IECEU case study on the effectiveness of EU crisis prevention capabilities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories **Dr Leena Avonius** discussed the question of local ownership. She reminded about earlier, positive assessments on EUPOL COPPS's material and training support to the Palestinian Civilian Police (PCP). It has also been pointed out, and this was confirmed by Avonius' own research earlier this year, that EUPOL COPPS takes local ownership into account for example in planning its activities in the West Bank. But Avonius stressed that there is a discrepancy between how local ownership is understood by the EUPOL COPPS and the PCP on the one hand, and by Palestinian civil society on the other. EUPOL COPPS and the PCP respondents to the IECEU research perceived it sufficient to include the PA representatives in the EUPOL COPPS's planning and implementation processes. But Palestinian civil society actors called for a more inclusive approach to SSR by EUPOL COPPS, insisting that the mission should involve also other than PA representatives in the processes. Following a narrow understanding of local ownership in the current political situation, where there is increasing distrust towards the PA in the West Bank society and the future of the PA is uncertain, carries a risk that the EU-supported reforms may have little sustainability if political situation changes radically. As there has been no



functioning parliament and thus no effective civilian control of security sector for many years it is particularly important for the EU to set the reforms firmly within the framework of democratization, and ensure that SSR process is transparent and inclusive. Avonius completed her presentation by pointing out structural problems in the EU CSDP instrument – short rotation cycle of experts and one-year mandate periods – that deter international experts from adopting inclusive approach in their work and leave them with scarce opportunities for developing a deeper understanding of political and conflict dynamics, and of local society and culture.

In the final presentation of the roundtable **Dr. Dimitris Bouris** provided a wider analysis on the EU's political, economic and aid actions in the region since the 1970s. He highlighted that the EU has been instrumental in conceptually pushing forward the efforts of conflict resolution; an example on this is the two-state solution, introduced by the EU in the late 1990s and later adopted by others. The EU has also become the biggest aid-provider with no less than 500 million euros of annual aid to Palestinians. However, in Bouris' view the EU has been weak in addressing the political questions in a more concrete manner, and has ended up compensating the lack of political pressure with funding assistance. But in the absence of clearly defined political objectives the EU aid money has been wasted. The EU's trade and aid policies have also been inconsistent with each other. Since the PA Prime Minister Fayyad presented his plan *Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State* in 2009 the EU has been heavily involved in Palestine's statebuilding efforts. But, Bouris asked, can one really support statebuilding in a situation where there is no real state in place? In its support of Fayyad's plan, the EU has provided technical assistance, but this prioritisation has had its political consequences. Bouris pointed out that by supporting the statebuilding of the PA in the absence of parliament and other democratic structures and when laws are passed by Presidential decrees rather than a parliamentary procedure the EU is running a high risk that it in fact supports the formation of yet another autocracy in the Middle Eastern region.

The presentations were followed by a lively **general discussion**, during which some critical issues were taken up. The EU's internal decision-making difficulties were raised, including how powerful member states may and often do hinder decisions in highly divisive matters like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The EU's total aid sum to Palestinians is also so high that spending it through implementing projects would be difficult, due to which budget support has been preferred. The roundtable participants also wondered why the EU was not contesting the Israeli actions that destroy EU-funded Palestinian properties even when it has economic leverage to do so. At the same time the PA does not request compensation on destroyed property either, as it does not consider itself as a true owner of donated facilities. As a result, Israel continues its destructive actions and the international community including the EU keeps on pouring aid to Palestinians. Instead of accepting the ineffectiveness of aid the EU was urged to more vigorously address the



political problems that are well known to all, including the Israeli occupation. Another point of criticism towards the EU that was raised was its weak action to support Palestinian unification. While there were diverse views on how willingly different Palestinian groups were seeking for unification it was agreed that without it the Palestinian-Israeli conflict cannot be solved. The EU and other international donors should also put more pressure on the Palestinian Authority that is currently moving towards a more autocratic direction. Related to this, it was asked whether the aid to Palestinians should be conditional. But a problem with the conditionality of aid is that even currently the recipients of international assistance spend a significant amount of human resources and aid money to fulfil various requests by the donors. Adding more requests might in fact make the aid even more ineffective. The issue of local ownership also raised a number of comments. It was pointed out that 'local ownership' is a fashionable phrase that was preceded for example by 'participatory approach' in the aid jargon. But in the Palestinian context ownership is like a scapegoat, as Palestinians own neither their territory nor their sources of livelihood. It was also reminded, however, that irrespective of what term is used it is important for donors and aid agencies to respect the people's right to make decisions in their own matters.

3 ROUNDTABLE ON AFGHANISTAN

The three brief presentations set the scene. This allowed for three headings to be introduced to benefit the objectives and 'takeaways': 1), strategic first (Brussels) or EUPOL Afghanistan first (mission); 2) findings of the study report; and 3) lessons identified and proposals. These topics leant themselves to pulling in the main sections of the study report.

Strategic first (Brussels) or EUPOL Afghanistan first (mission) presentation covered/presented the strategic issues for EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Global Strategy and soft power projection. This provoked discussion about the big picture. Without knowing this, as one participant noted, "everything else is incidental." There was unanimous agreement that there is an urgent need for the EU to change the current approach to police missions like EUPOL Afghanistan while recognising how difficult this is in Brussels. That is, it is difficult for institutions in Brussels to accommodate views by 28 member states in getting them to agree on a police mission and its purpose.



This led into a salient point. A participant pointed out that the study report did not explain why the EU decided to intervene in Afghanistan in the first place.¹ It was generally felt that this was due to the US asking for assistance to train a large police organisation or the EU looking to demonstrate its conflict prevention side on the world stage. This, most felt, went to the heart of the issue, what was the strategic aim of the EU in Afghanistan? It was suggested that this was unclear because getting 28 member states to co-operate meant that the aim of the mission was deliberately vague. A participant explained: “The language has to be acceptable to 28 member states. On occasions, days are spent over one word.” Another added: “When the Council welcomes the presentations of the Global Strategy, this is very different to endorsing it.”

It was suggested that PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) would be a good vehicle to develop a security-centric police mission for an armed conflict environment.² Also, some practices and procedures in NATO might be worth copying.

From Brussels’ perspective, a participant said: “They look at the world in concentric circles dedicated to security in Europe, to secure EU borders and then security outside of Europe in areas that impact on Europe’s security.” Another noted, “Internal and external security threats are interlinked.” The downside of concentric circles for Afghanistan, as several participants pointed out, is that it was thousands of miles away from the centre.

Throughout Europe there is an impetus to get EUPOL-type missions right. Examples cited were Brexit and national elections next year in Germany and France. Put another way, EU efforts in Afghanistan that would have resulted in increased stability in Afghanistan would have avoided the current migrant crisis today in Europe that occupies much of the political debate in member states. The same applies to places like Iraq and Libya. As it is, these countries remain unstable despite the international community’s best efforts to the contrary. The concern is that the push from the far right would dilute the EU message and address the migrant crisis in a different way. It is therefore crucial, in the opinion of all participants, that the EU needs to strengthen its external policy by including security in future police missions. That is, a future police mission cannot afford to ignore the security situation in an armed conflict environment. On this, a participant stated: “It is not necessary to replace the Crisis Management Concept, but to revise it.” In the words of one: “There is a way to address CMC to include armed conflict. CMC is very generic.”

¹ This was inserted into the conclusion section of the report in the final draft - ‘4.3 The Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.’

² PESCO is designed to address the complexities of bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties in Europe in an effort to improve security and collaboration between the EU member states.



Five points were identified that applied to the EU civil and military missions: 1) situational awareness (which the EU is bad at, according to most participants); 2) strategic autonomy on intelligence; 3) appropriate chain of command and control (a Germany/France paper is being drafted on this topic, which is believed to raise the prospect of merging military and civil planning); 4) performance of the mission and its members; and 5) improving response times to a crisis situation. It was generally felt that there could be more collaboration between EU military and civil institutions and that the former was far better resourced than the latter. The issue with NATO on force protection also needed resolved as a matter of urgency.

The round table highlighted that there are two realities – Brussels and the field mission. There is a significant gap between the two that needs to be bridged. The issue was not a failure by Brussels to recognise the ground reality, but a failure to act on it. One participant asked, “Strategic, tactical, operational. What is the right balance?”

Findings of the study report were discussed in detail. A suggestion was that the European Police College (CEPOL) in Hungary could play a role in taking best practice across Europe and blending it into a European police brand for a conflict context. It was also proposed that the European Gendarmerie Force in Italy (described as thirty staff at an HQ) could complement this. Because there was no sense of identity in the police model to be used from the EU there was no sense of identity in the mission. As several participants pointed out, however, the European Gendarmerie Force lacks doctrine. This is not a problem unique to Europe. A lack of doctrine for policing a conflict is endemic in the international community. Yet, as the study report showed, an effective doctrine-based police mission has happened under US stewardship and was, ironically, based on a European police model. A participant stated: “It is depressing to think that arguing for an appropriate police model capable of dealing with security and with intelligence at its heart is a radical idea.” Another noted: “For the US they see the EU approach as too soft and for the EU they see the US approach as too hard.”

Most participants, and all those who formerly worked on the EUPOL mission, believe that EUPOL consistently underestimated how too broad a spread on security-free activities was undermining the mission’s impact. The mission needed to have a narrower focus based on relevant tasks. To quote one participant who served on the mission: “We tinkered around the edges.” While gender and human rights were widely lauded, particularly the healthy female/male ratio of staff, the consensus was that the mission tried to do too much. It was not that, due to human rights and gender the mission had no resources to perform other tasks, rather, the mission had made itself irrelevant to the Afghans and international partners by excluding security from its mandate. Essentially, in all its activities EUPOL was working on the fringes.



A participant who had worked at ISAF HQ in Kabul pointed out that, despite the lofty aims on gender, it delivered little that was tangible in contrast to other missions. He and others who served in Afghanistan said the mission had a poor reputation. It was widely known in Afghanistan that EUPOL had limited synchronisation and co-operation with others in the Security Sector Reform field, particularly with police missions run by the US. In the opinion of most participants, because EUPOL was not well viewed by the Afghans and international partners the gender and human aspects – which it was well placed to promote – underachieved.

It was universally agreed that the planning phase of EUPOL Afghanistan in 2007 was poor and there is little confidence that this has dramatically improved, in spite of the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010. The question was posed: “Is it that a committee is destined to come up with an un-implementable plan?” The point being that the Political Security Committee (PSC) was in charge of the planning phase for the mission, and still is. One participant asked, “If the mission was happening now, how would this be done?” He further pointed out that the UN recognised similar internal shortcomings and have recently finished a strategic review. This, he recommends, would be a useful document for the EU to study with the aim of doing something similar. His understanding of this is that the UN suffered from overarching mandates too general in character. An intensified awareness of this created a push toward more specific mandates.

For participants who have worked in Brussels, they see the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) as under-resourced. This is the main body for a police mission. One person - the director - is expected to do everything.

Lessons identified and proposals are wide ranging. There was unanimous agreement that a three-year mandate was too short. Typifying the outlook on this, a participant stated: “Capacity building cannot be done in short two to three year timeframes. This gives no time to develop the police, especially given the threat environment. It is not possible to overcome strategic failures with tactical successes. There was a failure to anticipate and learn.

There was concern that Brussels and the mission were disconnected and that this demotivated mission members. The discussion also raised concern about a lack of honesty in the ‘feedback loop.’ Many participants with experience in such missions recognised this issue. The less a mission does the more it reports, seems to be a feature of these missions. It is therefore unclear whether mandates changed because of accurate reporting back to Brussels or because of budget.



The aspect of institutional memory was discussed, one participant pointing out that, “A mission or EU without institutional memory will not even know if it is repeating the same mistakes.”

On implementation, a participant noted: “You need to get a detailed specification of objectives and activities and map these against each other and against the mandate. These are the margins, the nice things that Brussels may not know about. Without knowing this, it is hard to judge the success or otherwise of the mission. But from what I know, mandates and objectives were worded in a way that guaranteed success.” From another angle: “EUPOL was succeeding as Afghanistan was failing,” was how a different participant put it.

With regard to personnel, selecting people who have actually policed a conflict or the type of semi-military force like a Gendarmerie is prudent. These are different police cultures to that normally found in Europe, and most of the western world for that matter. The observation around the table was that modern policing has got away from basic competencies and is focused on business models and management concepts.

Most participants claimed that those who fail to perform in missions tend to transfer into another mission, leading one participant to state: “We reward failure.” According to another participant: “These missions tend to attract a preponderance of dysfunctional personnel.” It was generally felt that time and investment in a selection process would weed out most of the weak candidates and save a lot of time and money thereafter. Ultimately, the view was that, if the strategy is wrong the selection will be wrong. Of this one participant said: “There is a definite failure. What is due to Brussels and what is due to ill-suited people on the frontline is unclear.” Linked to selection is pre-deployment training. No participant believed that this was adequate.

Risk aversion is down to member states, not Brussels. A lot of member states are not forthcoming about their commitment and do not articulate what type of contribution they bring.

To help the EU it was felt that recommendations in the research should be linked to concrete questions for Brussels to consider. The discussion produced the following. What does success look like for a police mission in an armed conflict environment? And is this the same as what success looks like for the host nation? Did we know what the main strategic objective of the Afghans was? What was the strategic objective of the international community? How can the EU inculcate the theatre situation into the CMC and planning documents? Is the mandate duration appropriate? What does the division of authority and responsibility between Brussels and the mission look like? Is the existing CMC menu still relevant? Will new systems of CMC procedures, CONOPS, OPLAN and MIPs work better? How can the strategy and policy side improve? Can the EU brand its own police model for an armed conflict environment? Is this needed? What does the



mechanics of actual implementation look like? Is it training, mentoring or strategic advising? How should personnel be selected and their performance evaluated? How long should their deployments be? Where does institutional memory repose - Brussels or the mission? What is the nexus between policing and the rule of law? How broad should the mandate be? Does a police mission need to be closer linked to the EU delegation? How relevant is a police mission in an armed conflict environment that does not deal with security? And if one accepts that corruption, gender and terrorism are inseparable elements in complex ideology-based threats, how can a mission that excludes security deal with gender and corruption? The same extends to human rights. Lastly, what has been done to address the NATO force protection issue?

Following the round table, feedback was welcomed after the participants had time to reflect on the discussion. The following is part of an email sent a week afterward.

“Methodology: report will be vulnerable to accusations of bias, because it relies primarily on interviews with those involved (who inevitably have a certain perspective); might be best to acknowledge this upfront and say outright that the report in part reflects the view from those involved in the operation on the ground in Afghanistan. Not sure whether there is scope, but it might still be worth arranging interviews in Brussels with EEAS and member state delegations? There is also some other literature that would be worth looking at EUISS (European Union Institute for Security Studies) and ICG (International Crisis Group) websites.”

Another post-discussion proposal was that, any research to go in front of Brussels or for publication should be ‘fact checked’ by Brussels, as the EU is a complicated area in bodies, law and policy that people within it understand best.

4 CONCLUSIONS

The roundtable discussion on the Occupied Palestinian Territories put the EU aid efforts within a wider context of international aid. This context is highly complex, affected by diverse and often contradictory political interests of conflict parties as well as foreign governments, donors and aid agencies. Palestinians are among the highest per capita recipients of international aid in the world. In general, the roundtable participants perceived that the aid to Palestinians is ineffective. A major reason for the ineffectiveness of aid is the inability of international community to address the prevailing political problems, particularly the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the intra-Palestinian conflict. If political problems are not addressed, international assistance can



actually contribute to maintaining the status quo of occupation. Ineffectiveness of aid is also related to the prevailing liberal peace paradigm, according to which economic development will bring peace. In fact, as the Palestinian case shows, the aid has left Palestinians aid-dependent and their economy weak. The aid to Palestinians has also directly or indirectly benefitted the Israeli occupying force. Technical assistance that has been preferred since the second Palestinian intifada, and more recently prioritisation of strategic, high-level assistance by donors like the EU carries also other risks. It may lead the aid further away from the everyday situation of Palestinian population, and ignore the fact that specific social groups like refugees, as well as men and women, have different needs and for example different perceptions on security. To avoid such risks the EU aid efforts must adopt inclusive approach with a broad understanding of local ownership in both design and implementation. This is particularly important in the current Palestinian situation where there is no functioning parliament and the Palestinian Authority is becoming increasingly autocratic in its actions. To find ways to better support conflict resolution and make aid more effective the EU was urged by the roundtable participants to make better use of its political and economic leverage towards the PA and Israel, and to look for and develop game-changers at various levels in order to get away from the current status quo.

The round table discussion on Afghanistan validated the findings in the study report, but at the same time showed some flaws. In particular, more interviews with people in Brussels and member states would have better represented these perspectives and balanced that of mission members. Visiting the European Gendarmerie and the European Police College (CEPOL) to establish first-hand what they offer to a police mission like EUPOL Afghanistan would have similarly added to the intellectual rigor of the research.

To conclude, the round table discussion by a panel of experts - practitioners, academics and government policy makers - was an indispensable peer review process that raised important points and excellent proposals. The participants provided valuable critique for the purpose of helping those in a challenging EU construct to develop future missions. The issues raised will undoubtedly benefit the research.



ANNEX 1: OPTS PROGRAMME AND LISTS OF PARTICIPANTS

'Local Ownership and the Effectiveness of International Aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories'

Time: Friday 16 September 2016, at 10.00 -14.00
 Location: University of Tampere, Building Linna (street Kalevantie 5), 5th floor, room 5014.
 Organisers: * CMC Finland and IECEU-project,
 * Social Anthropology / School of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Tampere

Palestinians have been recipients of international assistance for over six decades. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNWRA) started its still ongoing work in 1950. Repeated violent conflicts since Israel occupied the Palestinian territories in 1967 have caused immense human suffering and material destruction, and flows of humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance in the region. Since the early 1990s Palestinian state-building process has formed an integral part of efforts to find negotiated, political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The EU plays a key role in state-building support to the Palestinian Authority. Despite all these efforts the solution to the conflict does not seem to be any closer, and with intra-Palestinian conflict and division between the West Bank and Gaza since 2007 and the hardening right-wing politics of Israel it may be even further away than before. It has even been argued that the technical assistance provided by internationals maintains the current status quo of Israeli occupation rather than supports Palestinians to build a genuinely sovereign state. Another criticism towards international assistance regards the lack of local ownership in designing, managing and distribution of aid. This roundtable focuses on the efforts of international assistance to Palestinians, and examines through examples from the UN and EU assistance projects the above lines of criticism. The speakers of the event will explore how to make international assistance more effective to support finding permanent solution to the protracted conflict, and how to enhance local ownership in aid mechanisms.

10.00 - 11.45 Morning session, chaired by Prof. Laura Huttunen (UTA)

10.00 - 10.15 Opening words from organisers

- Mr. Jari Mustonen (CMC Finland)
- Dr. Susanne Dahlgren (UTA)

10.15 - 11.45 - International assistance and local ownership

- Dr. Sahar T. Rad (King's College) - "The political economy of aid in conflict zones: from delayed development to prolonged conflict"
- Ms. Tiina Järvi (University of Tampere) - "An Ambivalent Entity - Palestinian refugees' perceptions of UNRWA in Lebanon and West Bank"
- Dr. Riina Isotalo (CMC Finland seconded expert) - "Security, protection and violence - gendered perceptions and practices in Palestine"

11.45 - 12.15 Coffee

12.15 - 14.00 Afternoon session, chaired by Susanne Dahlgren (University of Tampere)

12.15 - 13.15 - EU assistance to the OPTs and local ownership

- Dr. Leena Avonius (CMC Finland) - "Local ownership and the EU support to the Palestinian SSR"
- Dr. Dimitris Bouris (University of Amsterdam) - "The EU in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: between the Scylla of state-building and the Charybdis of the Occupation".

13.15 - 14.00 - general discussion



Biographic information of speakers:

Dr Leena Avonius works as Researcher at Crisis Management Centre Finland. Her current research on the EU CSDP operations in the occupied Palestinian territories is a part of the international IECEU research project. Dr Avonius also holds the title of Docent of Asia-Pacific Studies at the University of Helsinki. Her research interests include Southeast Asian region, socio-political transformation, peace and conflict, human rights and indigenous rights. Dr. Avonius has also worked as human rights expert for international crisis management operations of the EU and OSCE in Ukraine, Georgia and Indonesia.

Dr Dimitris Bouris is an Assistant Professor of EU Security/European External Relations at the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam and a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe (Natolin Campus). Prior to joining the University of Amsterdam, he was a Research Fellow in charge of the southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy at the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair at the College of Europe (Natolin) and a visiting lecturer in Middle East Politics at Kingston University. Dr Bouris is the author of "[The European Union and Occupied Palestinian Territories: State-building without a State](#)" which was published by Routledge in 2014 (Hardback) and 2015 (Paperback) and the co-editor of the "Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy" (forthcoming Palgrave Macmillan). He has published a number of scholarly articles in peer-reviewed academic journals as well as policy briefs and op-eds for major news and policy outlets. His research focus lies at the intersection of International Relations (IR theory, peacebuilding, state-building, security sector reform, conflict resolution), EU Studies (EU External Relations, EU Common Security and Defence Policy) and Middle East and North Africa Studies (with a particular focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Libya).

Dr Susanne Dahlgren, Docent, acts as a Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology at University of Tampere. Her longtime research engagement with Yemen has produced among others, *Contesting Realities, The Public Sphere and Morality in Southern Yemen* (Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press). Her recent articles are published in *Arabia Incognita: Dispatches from Yemen and the Gulf*, ed. Sheila Carapico (Charlottesville VA: Just World Books).

Dr Laura Huttunen is Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Tampere. Her research interests include Bosnian diaspora and anthropology of migration and transnational relations. Her recent project "Absence and liminality: Missing persons and the social order" looked at the question of missing persons in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina and beyond.

Dr. Riina Isotalo is a social anthropologist whose work among Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories, Jordan, and Lebanon explores aspects of their lives and transnational mobilities, and, gender, security, and violence. Since 2006, she has been actively involved and held leadership positions in the 1325 Network Finland. She is the author of *Many Routes to Palestine* (2005), the co-author of *Managing Muslim Mobilities* (2014) and has published several articles and book chapters. Dr. Isotalo currently works in a civilian crises management operation in Ukraine.

Ms Tiina Järvi is a social anthropologist doing her doctoral dissertation on the future aspirations of Palestinian refugees at the University of Tampere. She is focusing on the spatialities of refugeeness, in particular, and the role of different sovereignties and relationalities in creating the everyday and the hopes for future.

Mr. Jari Mustonen is the acting Head of Development at Crisis Management Centre Finland where he has worked in various roles since 2007. He has experience in military crisis management and peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Middle East, and has also worked in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office and the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories. Mr. Mustonen holds an MA in history.

Dr Sahar T. Rad is a lecturer in International Political Economy at King's College London. She has previously taught at SOAS and the University of Westminster. Her areas of research include conflict and economic development, political transition and economic transformation, political economy of international organisations, the global development architecture, and international trade and investment. She has worked extensively on the economies of the Palestinian territories, Libya, Jordan, Egypt and Morocco. Dr Rad has also worked as an economist in several international institutions including the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, and the African Development Bank. She is the author of 'The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine: Relief from Conflict or Development Delayed?' and the co-editor of 'Trade Policies, Employment and Poverty in Arab Economies'.



**List of participants in the roundtable event on the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
16 September 2016.**

Name	Organisation
Unto Vesa	University of Tampere
Laura Salonen	Crisis Management Initiative
Ilkka Uusitalo	Crisis Management Initiative
Jyrki Ruohomäki	University of Tampere
Tuomo Melasuo	University of Tampere
Wolfgang Mühlberger	Finnish Institute for International Affairs
Mari Korpela	University of Tampere
Salla Korhonen	University of Helsinki
Mikko Lohikoski	City of Turku
Jari Mustonen	CMC Finland
Susanne Dahlgren	University of Tampere
Sahar Taghdisi Rad	King's College
Laura Huttunen	University of Tampere
Riina Isotalo	CMC Finland
Dimitris Bouris	University of Amsterdam
Tiina Järvi	University of Tampere
Leena Avonius	CMC Finland

