PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

D6.2 Identification of the Overlap

Lead beneficiary: AIES
Delivery date: M 22
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) operations and missions take place in a broad security environment that has undergone major transformations over the past two decades. Those evolutions are connected to the changing nature of security threats as much as to the concomitant adaptation of policy responses. For the EU as much as for any other crisis management actor, effective crisis management requires a sound understanding of the environment in which it operates, both in terms of ‘the problem to be tackled’ and in terms of ‘the types of policy responses that are required’.¹

In addition, the crisis management spectrum encompasses activities that relate to security, civilian protection, the rule of law, security sector reform, institution-building, electoral support, economic recovery and development, humanitarian assistance, human rights, good governance, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, etc.

This diversity of crisis management operations requires a wide range of policy tools and responses, both civilian and military. The establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy /Common Foreign and Security Policy has been accompanied by the anticipation that the European Union will represent a unique strategic actor due to its ability to mix civilian and military crisis management instruments as part of a comprehensive approach.

However, very often it is perceived that the two worlds, i.e. the civilian and the military are different worlds, with their own sets of principles, mindsets, procedures and budgets, and a low level of interoperability and cross-sectoral efficiencies.

This deliverable assesses the current state of play of CSDP civilian and military instruments, their overlap and the potential for more effective streamlining of the two instruments with a view of creating synergies and efficiencies.

An in-depth analysis is given of the current comprehensive approach within the scope of the CSDP and the interaction between civilian and military actors (the civil-military interface). It details how the current approach to comprehensive action has developed, the key topics related to it, ways in which the policy frameworks on comprehensive approach have been implemented within the EU and looks at new challenges and upcoming developments.

This state-of-play is complemented by a detailed analysis at both politico-strategic level and field-operational level of how the civil-military interface works and what potentials can be identified for

further development. At politico-strategic level the civil and military capability to plan and conduct operations is reviewed, where the main finding is that both are separate stovepipes, where requirements are identified separately and support platforms differ.

At field operational level, one case study with both a civilian mission and a military operation is further analyzed, i.e. the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) case study with the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) and the European Union Force Althea (EUFOR Althea). The case study does also confirm that the differences at politico-strategic level are continued at field-operational level, with differences in funding, equipment and reporting lines. Staff is left to deal with the differences at operational level.

The results have furthermore been tested by an online poll among experts and practitioners that was underlining the main assumptions of the deliverable.

The analysis is completed with a list of pragmatic recommendations to strengthen the civilian-military interface, which are grouped in two categories, i.e. temporal (short-medium-long term) and political feasibility (low-medium-high). They thus rank from possible short term measures with a high political feasibility, such as the development of a well-resourced and capable Military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) for non-executive military missions and for developing the CivMi interface to long-term measures with high political feasibility, such as ensuring that the political will is coupled with realistic levels of ambition for all aspects of CSDP capacities.
## ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>Air to air refuelling</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>BENESAM</td>
<td>Belgian-Dutch Naval Cooperation</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capability Development Plan</td>
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<td>CEUMC</td>
<td>Chairman of the EU Military Committee</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CivMil</td>
<td>Civil-Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>Crisis Management Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMKFOR</td>
<td>Commander Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of the Permanent Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civilian Strategic Options</td>
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<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>DGEUMS</td>
<td>Director General EU Military Staff</td>
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<td>DL</td>
<td>Deliverable</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office)</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ESDC</td>
<td>European Security and Defence College</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESCPC</td>
<td>European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Trainings Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>IECEU</td>
<td>Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSUR</td>
<td>Maritime Surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPCC</td>
<td>Military Planning and Command Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>Military Strategic Options</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operation Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCEN</td>
<td>Operations Centre</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;S</td>
<td>Pooling and sharing</td>
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<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<td>PFCA</td>
<td>Political Framework for Crisis Approach</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>Satellite Communications</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Working Package</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary military operations take place in complex environments populated by multiple civilian and humanitarian institutions and a challenging array of issues that are not precisely ‘military’ in nature. Besides the complex environment, there exist dynamic and interrelated threats which in addition to the uniqueness of each crisis and region require a combined and tailored response. This has increased the importance of addressing and managing the civil-military interface in general, particularly that between the military and the humanitarian community.

Though the comprehensive approach aspirations that have caused tensions in many contemporary civil-military relations may be novel, the debate between purist and pragmatist conceptions of civil-military organization and purpose is long-standing.² The purist view, initially and most comprehensively articulated in 1957 by Samuel Huntington³ calls for a clear separation between military and civilian functional domains in order to ensure military effectiveness, on the one hand, and civilian control of the military, on the other. His premise was that democracy and powerful professional military organizations do not rest easily with each other.⁴ The separation is especially necessary in liberal democracies, where values and decision-making are highly antithetical to the exigencies of privation, danger and uncertainty faced in combat.⁵ Only discipline and the cultivation of a core set of mission-supportive military values could provide a foundation that military professionals would need to be successful in this environment. Any detraction from this focus, any attempt to integrate civilian and military domains, would dilute military effectiveness.

Thus, when civilians grant military professionals the independent autonomy to cultivate their profession according to the dictates of combat, civilian leaders can expect in return both an effective military instrument and one so singularly steeped in the classic conservatism of military

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² The following theoretical deliberations about the different conceptions are based on Darrell Driver, “Europe searching for complementary military and civilian roles”, in: per Concordiam. Journal of European Security and Defense Volume 1, Number 4, 2011, 13-17.
values that it would not be capable of effectively vying for power in a liberal democracy. In this way, Huntington argued, separation and distinction breed effectiveness and obedience. In practical terms, this means that the civilian and military is arranged to separate units, with limited vertical interaction at other than management level. The pragmatist perspective is based on Morris Janowitz’s work “The Professional Soldier” of 1960 which serves as a counter piece to Huntington’s perspective. Its main line of argumentation is that the modern security environment has made the circumscription of military functions to traditional combat tasks impossible. Moreover, militaries, like other national instruments, should be rationally focused on an ultimate political objective and rendering service to the nation based on context and need rather than overly defined boundaries. According to the model described by Janowitz, the ideal civil-military interface, would be to break down cultural barriers between the military profession and the rest of society.

Since the introduction of the ESDP/CSDP the development of EU instruments available for deployment in support of crisis situations has developed rapidly. Indeed, a core capability of the EU and its unique selling point compared to other international actors is the range of civilian and military instruments available to it for crisis intervention. In fact, acting comprehensively seems to have become something of raison d’état for a Union ever more eager to become a global security actor. The term CivMil frequently appears throughout EU documentation including Council Conclusions (CivMil synergies), planning documents, concepts, studies, papers and non-papers. So, while the concept is well established, it is important to identify how CivMil is practically applied at a national level and how it functions given the complexity of a twenty-eight Member State EU.

In recent years, the EU’s apparatus for crisis management has also been subject to an impressive number of institutional innovations to support this ambition, although with only limited practical results. As argued by Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, this “distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management … was ahead of its

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7 See DL 1.3, 14.
9 See DL 1.3, 14.
10 Before the adaptation of the Lisbon Treaty the CSDP was known as European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).
time when conceived." \(^{12}\) CivMil relations in CSDP are no longer only about enhancing the relationship between the force and civil society, but rather about integration civilians and the military into the various stages of crisis management, from the strategic planning to crisis management to act upon root causes of conflict, coordinating the efforts of various actors involved and increasing cost-effectiveness in crisis management. \(^{13}\) The new European Union Global Strategy even further elaborates this approach and expands the notion of the comprehensive approach to an integrated approach with which the EU will foster human security. \(^{14}\)

Many of these CivMil instruments have been streamlined and proved effective in appropriate situations. This applies across the fields of humanitarian aid, development assistance, civilian missions and military operations/missions. When managed well, CivMil instruments can safeguard the EU’s democratic values while enabling the development of effective military institutions and wise strategic policies. \(^{15}\) The crucial question in the development of the EU’s effectiveness in crisis management is can these interventions be deployed cohesively and can the various instruments be coordinated effectively as envisaged in the EU’s Comprehensive Approach (CA)? The transition from policy to practice has often been problematic, particularly in one of the most important and challenging relationships in that matrix: the civilian-military nexus (CivMil).

### 1.1 Defining the CivMil cooperation

While striving towards enhanced CivMil cooperation and coordination alongside maximising CivMil synergies is a positive ambition, it has the potential to be a ‘false good idea’. There are many differences in a range of aspects of planning, conduct and support of missions and operations between the civilian and the military spheres of action. To establish coherence across all these areas requires significant financial and political capital.

Therefore, it is necessary to be clear how the term CivMil is understood and whether there is a need to define a level of ambition for it. Much of the technical exploration of these issues is contained in DL1.3, which analyses the definitions, procedures and implementation of the EU’s comprehensive approach and of CivMil in that context. It also contains detailed comparisons with


\(^{13}\) See Rasmussen, Linking instruments in development and foreign policy, 10.

\(^{14}\) EU Global Strategy 2016, 28.

\(^{15}\) In analogy to Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, “Conclusions” in American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era. ed. Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 308.
similar concepts in other organisations, such as NATO and the UN. Consequently, this deliverable will refer to DL1.3 and attempt to draw conclusions from the developments traced out there.

1.2 Limitations of the report

At the time of writing (January-February 2017), many new initiatives are launched to strengthen the CSDP-framework and many discussions are ongoing about the CivMil nexus. As such, its descriptive and analytical part can be seen as a historic overview that is up-to-date until the beginning of 2017. The same applies to a lesser extend for the policy recommendations, whose validity depends on future developments and as such have an expiration date.

1.3 Structure of the report

The report is structured in a manner that makes best use of the already elaborated deliverables, especially DL 1.2. and DL 1.3. and thus starts in chapter 2 by a detailed overview focusing on the civil-military relations at European Union level. It then focuses in chapter 3 on analyzing the how CivMil planning and conduct works at politico-strategic level. Chapter 4 takes this analysis one step further and reviews how this works at field-operational level, by focusing on the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it offers a unique possibility of assessing CivMil relations in the field. Chapter 5 presents the outcome of an online platform in which EU policy makers, practitioners and academics participated. This was done in the form of online polls, pushed to this targeted audience in order to gather relevant feedback for the research findings and to test the main assumptions of the DL.

Finally, chapter 6 takes stock of the previous chapters and lists pragmatic recommendations to strengthen the civilian-military interface, which are grouped in two categories, i.e. temporal (short-medium-long term), political feasibility (low-medium-high).
2 OUTLINE OF EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE

This chapter will paint an overall picture of the history and development of the European Union’s comprehensive approach.\textsuperscript{16} The focus of the chapter will be particularly on comprehensive action within the scope of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), excluding other EU foreign policy elements such as development cooperation. Interaction between civilian and military actors (the civil-military interface) within CSDP and the mission cycle will be discussed in depth. The chapter will start by presenting how the current approach to comprehensive action has developed, the key topics related to it, and important relevant documents. This continues with a look into the ways in which the policy frameworks on comprehensive approach have been implemented within the EU and the types of issues they have faced. Finally, remaining issues, new challenges and upcoming developments are discussed.

2.1 Comprehensive Approach to Crises: Civil-Military Interaction in CSDP Missions and Operations

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a gradual shift from territorial, military and state-centric understanding of security towards a de-territorialised civil-military, and human-centred perspective.\textsuperscript{17} Peacekeeping operations have traditionally been regarded as a representation of an impartial, military observer status preventing crisis from further escalation by being present. Nevertheless, since the late 1990s, awareness has grown that the strengthening peace requires not only the provision of military security through armed peacekeepers, but also relies on functioning political and judicial systems as well as on a societal reconciliation process. This new multidimensional approach to conflicts has been employed for example by the United Nations and European Union. Accordingly, the new and broader crisis management and peace building operations focus on managing the transformation of post-conflict societies towards a stable and peaceful state. In order to be successful, peacebuilding operations now incorporate elements of traditional security provision combined with conflict prevention, humanitarian relief, institution-building and development tasks. The task of providing a full range of responses to the multiple challenges has sometimes forced development experts, humanitarian actors, police and

\textsuperscript{16} The topic is discussed more broadly in DL1.3 of the IECEU project.
\textsuperscript{17} Kaldor, Martin & Selchow, 2007
rule of law experts as well as military personnel into close proximity, thereby making the coordination and cooperation a necessity. Thus, the capability to pool and coordinate the existing resources is one of the key issues for the international security actors such as NATO, EU and UN. Efficient coordination and cooperation can help to avoid unnecessary overlaps, inter-institutional competition and help to build synergies between and within the organisations.

The institutionalization of the EU’s crisis management structures has been impacted by the traditional view on how to effectively manage a civil-military interface. In addition, the dominant role of NATO over the European security issues, and overlaps in memberships has caused a reluctance to develop the EU’s military capabilities, thereby hampering the development of an integrated civil-military organization in support of CSDP. However, due to the threats emanating from weak states and asymmetric conflicts, the accuracy to respond to crisis effectively by using the traditional model has been challenged. Civilian-military relations in CSDP are no longer only about enhancing the relationship between the force and civil society, but rather about integrating civilians and the military into the various stages of crisis management, from the strategic planning to crisis management to act upon root causes of conflict, coordinating the efforts of various actors involved and increasing cost-effectiveness in crisis management.

Hence, purposeful coordination and cooperation between the different actors is perceived to be of utmost importance for the effectiveness of the international conflict management and peace building efforts. It is based on an idea that a single actor or country do not have all the competences or resources needed to restore peace or manage and prevent crises and conflicts. Thus there is a need for joint planning, coordination and cooperation between the different organisations. To be stronger together requires acknowledging one another’s competences, identifying the combination of the full range of available capabilities and resources and using them in a coordinated and coherent manner, thereby reinforcing the desired progress and creating positive synergies, where appropriate. This is the fundamental idea behind Comprehensive Approach.

18 These institutional settings are further discussed in D1.3. Review on Civil-Military synergies and D6.3.
As the case studies conducted as part of the IECEU-project have shown, being able to work together in coherence is however not only an institutional, but also a cultural and political question. Coherence between the civilian and military actors has been recognized to be an important tool to increase the efficiency of international conflict prevention and crisis management efforts. Therefore, understanding the key elements enabling and on the other hand preventing interoperability of the EU’s civilian and military crisis management instruments is crucial. Through the case studies and analysis the project aimed to identify the key issues related to civil-military interoperability of the EU’s crisis management interventions.

To enhance the understanding on how the EU could use the full potential of the existing capabilities’ to respond to a crisis in a coherent and resource efficient manner this chapter discusses the key areas where civil-military synergies could further be utilized, and outlines practical examples of the implementation of comprehensive approach in the CSDP missions and operations. To enhance one’s understanding on the principles behind the EU’s civil-military relations, this chapter starts with a brief overview of the development of the comprehensive approach and the key concept relevant to guide civil-military interaction in CSDP.

### 2.2 Towards comprehensive approach to crisis management

The EU’s initiative to contribute to international peace building can be dated to 1992 when the Petersburg tasks were first agreed upon at the Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers near Bonn, Germany. The Petersberg tasks outlined the purposes where military units could be deployed and today they form an integral part of the Common Security and Defence Policy defining the spectrum of military functions that the EU can undertake in its crisis management operations.  

Today these tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, as well as, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including; peace-making, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilisation tasks.

Despite the agreement on the Petersberg tasks, it took until 1999 before the EU Member States modestly started to agree on the development of the European Security and Defence architecture.

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19 About CSDP- The Petersberg Tasks, 2016.
20 TEU Art. 42
As DL 1.3 outlines, since 1999, the EU has shown the ambition to strengthen its role as a unique strategic actor with an ability to mix civilian and military crisis management instruments as part of a comprehensive approach. While this has materialised in a number of institutional innovations, the current institutional arrangement for the CivMil interface has been built around compromises between the MS rather than developing effective CivMil structures.\(^{21}\) This increased engagement by the military in humanitarian crises has been controversial, particularly for humanitarians. The key, overarching and widely documented challenge facing CivMil interaction within peace-building concerns the tension between the neutral and impartial provision of humanitarian assistance and the political and strategic objectives of military forces and the governments that direct them.\(^{22}\)

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 was the first considerable attempt to build a common understanding of the notion of security, the key security threats and instruments that EU would employ to respond to them. Remarkable for an understanding of the EU’s capacities in the field of security, it was outlined in the ESS that the notion of security goes beyond purely military aspects of security policy-making, but it would include a wide range of civilian and military security issues in a comprehensive framework. Contemporary security threats such as organised crime, regional conflicts and the challenges associated with weak and failing states would require a multidimensional response, calling for a mixture of police, juridical and other means.\(^{23}\)

Hence, the European Union is a relative newcomer to the field of crisis intervention. The objectives of the Union’s foreign and security ambitions, as defined by the Treaty of the European Union (1992), include the safeguarding of the Union’s common values, its interest and integrity, the strengthening of peace and security, both within the Union and on the international stage, and the promotion of international co-operation, democracy, the rule of law and human rights.\(^{24}\) To achieve the set objectives, the Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP), was established, enabling the


\(^{23}\) Schroeder, 2011, 56.

\(^{24}\) TEU, title V.
EU to directly contribute to peacekeeping and crisis management by deploying its civilian and military instruments.\textsuperscript{25}

The legal basis for this comprehensive approach was set already in the Treaty of European Union in 1992 though it was not until the end of the decade that the EU started to take actions to promote the notion within its external relations. The rocky beginning of the development of the EU’s foreign and security policy architecture and the examples from the Balkan war brought forth the consensus among the EU member states that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a high risk of duplication, inefficient spending and even difficulty in meeting goals.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless, due to the political disputes among the Member States, together with a dominant role of US and NATO on the development of the EU’s military structures and capabilities, many of the identified deficiencies have been difficult to address.\textsuperscript{27}

\section*{2.3 Civil-military interface - the key concepts}

Civil-military interaction is a broad concept that is reflected through a number of specific doctrines, models and guidelines and policy approaches. There are several concepts or tools that are used by the EU and other international organizations such as UN and NATO to describe the relations between the civilian and military sides. Three concepts are usually mentioned in efforts to interconnect civil and military approaches to crisis management: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) and Comprehensive Approach (CA) or Integrated Approach. Sometimes making a clear distinction between the concepts can be challenging since the different organizations have developed their own interpretations. The concepts can for example describe the scope of interaction between the different agencies within one organization such as EU CMCO or UN Integrated Approach, or strictly between the military and humanitarian actors in the humanitarian disasters such as UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), or it can refer to the military capability or function to cooperate with the civilian population and external civilian actors. The interaction can take place beyond the organization borders between different security actors such as EU and NATO, or bi-lateral actors with an aim to manage crisis jointly. It can also seek to cover multiple levels of interactions with an aim to avoid

\textsuperscript{25} Matthiessen, 2013.
\textsuperscript{26} Koehler, 2010, 58 – 60.
\textsuperscript{27} To learn more see D1.3. and D6.3
contradictions between the actors and promote positive synergies where appropriate. The scope of interaction depends on what type of relations is possible or desirable for the specific situation.

As outlined in table 1, the different international organizations namely the EU, NATO and UN, have developed different concepts to guide and define the interface between the different actors and instruments. In this chapter we briefly describe the key ideas behind the different forms of interaction relevant to the European Union.28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil-military interaction - relevant documents and concepts</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key doctrinal waypoints</strong></td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td><strong>Core concepts and instruments</strong></td>
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The official EU policies and documentation lay the foundation to the EU’s crisis management approach. The EU member states national priorities and political agendas have a major impact on

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28 These concepts are further discussed in D1.3 Review of Civil-Military Synergies.

29 Adopted from Mölling, “Comprehensive Approaches to International Crisis Management”, 3.
the EU policy formulation process, on CSDP mission and operation mandates and on the staffing and financing of these interventions. Nevertheless, in recent years the EU has formulated several political strategies for fostering coordination among its various crisis-management actors and an extensive list of policies and documents related to civil and military functions within foreign affairs and CSDP has been adopted. The key legal policies listed below create the legal framework for the CSDP and civil-military interaction in crisis management.

**The European Security Strategy (ESS)**

The European Security Strategy (2003) originally built the framework for the EU’s role as a global actor. The strategy has been developed within the context of globalisation, end of the Cold War and enlargement of the EU. The strategy was adopted in 2003, ten years after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and it outlines three main principles on which all EU external actions are based. The principles, prevention, holistic approach and multilateralism, embody the notion of coherence, and strengthen the acknowledgment that the complex security threats require multidimensional response.30

**The European Global Strategy**

The European Global Strategy (2016) updates the older security strategy with a wider perspective on security and stability, bringing all EU external action under a single policy framework.31 In practice the global strategy identifies five priority areas, bridging internal and external security and sets out broad agendas for them. Specifically on conflict prevention and crisis management, one of the priorities in the global strategy is “an integrated approach to conflicts”.32 Under this heading, the strategy calls for expanding the scope of the EU comprehensive approach to act on all aspects of the conflict cycle from pre-empting to stabilization and settlement of conflict, as well as support to political economies of peace. Significantly strengthening the language on civil-military cooperation, the strategy also states that the EU should “…strengthen operational planning and conduct

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31 EU Global Strategy
structures, and build closer connections between civilian and military structures and missions, bearing in mind that these might be deployed in the same theatre.\textsuperscript{33}

EU Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) concept

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a military capability and function that aims to enhance the relationship between a military force and a civil society. It is a military approach to civil-military coordination. The definition of the EU’s CIMIC\textsuperscript{34} was set in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (2002) through the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and was based on the definition written by NATO.\textsuperscript{35} Even though the EU definition of CIMIC resembles the NATO concept, the EU perspective is wider, highlighting the selection of civilian and military instruments at its disposal in crisis management operations.

Initially, CIMIC was set up to enhance the coordination between the civilian and military functions on the ground. In addition, it is a function and capability that aims to enhance the relationship between a military force and a civil society. In a way, CIMIC is about ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population to contribute to force protection and peace and stability. Thereby, CIMIC derives from the military perspective that focuses primarily on force protection, and on the need to

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p 48.

\textsuperscript{34} Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation at all levels - between military components of EU-led military operations and civil actors external to the EU, including the local population and authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organizations and agencies - in support of the achievement of the military mission along with all other military functions” (CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management operations, 2008). The development of the EU CIMIC has been marked by two conferences. The EU CIMIC Conference held in June 2002 was oriented towards political, strategic and conceptual levels, and aimed to delimit the functions between civilian and military actors in crisis situations, including the formulation of the guiding principles. The second EU CIMIC conference in June 2003 was more orientated at the operational and tactical levels. To read more about the development of the concept view: Nik Hynek, “EU crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty: civil-military coordination and the future of the EU Operational Headquarters”, European Security, Vol. 20 (2011): 81- 102. Accessed 5 August 2015. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2011.556622.

\textsuperscript{35} The EU CIMIC Conference held in June 2002 was oriented at political, strategic and conceptual levels and aimed to delimit the functions between civilian and military actors in crisis situations, including the formulation of guiding principles. The second EU CIMIC conference from June 2003 was more oriented at the operational and tactical levels and a draft document concerned with generic guidelines was presented there as an initial step for further consultations between involved actors. In AJP-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, (NATO, 2003), the CIMIC is defined as “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies”. 
cooperate with local authorities and civilians to reach that aim, as a part of a complex military operation.\textsuperscript{36}

In practice, CIMIC interaction usually takes place in two cases: the crisis management operation is partially dependent on civilian institutions and the population for resources, information and even security or/and there is cooperation of the military force with other international or non-governmental organizations.\textsuperscript{37} Depending on the specific context of each operation, CIMIC-oriented measures may assume various different functions. Core functions of the European CIMIC are similar to those defined by NATO and include Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Civil Environment and Support to the Military Force.\textsuperscript{38}

An EU concept for CIMIC for EU-led military operations was published in 2008\textsuperscript{39} by European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which is responsible for planning and implementing CIMIC at the political and strategic levels, and for the procedural roles for civilian and military capacities. This includes coordinating the planning, communication, information exchange, separation of mandates and long-term goals, and the transition of responsibilities between military and civilian actors in crisis situations.

Many factors impact on the EU’s ability to develop a comprehensive approach and to achieve effective resource-wide coordination. These factors have been identified and are well known through numerous studies, reviews and papers on the CA.\textsuperscript{40} Equally there have been efforts to mitigate the factors that impede increased coordination such as the CIVMIL Cell and the creation

\textsuperscript{36} Khol, 2007, p. 122.

\textsuperscript{37} Marjan Malešić, \textit{Crisis Management in the EU: International Coordination} and \textit{Civil-Military Cooperation}, (Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences)

\textsuperscript{38} Agata Mazurkiewicz, “NATO and EU approach towards civil-military relations in military operations”, \textit{Polityka i Społeczeństwo} Vol. 2 No. 12 (2014): 125 -140,

\textsuperscript{39} To learn more about the concept, visit:

\textsuperscript{40} See for example Marjan Malešić, Crisis Management in the EU: International Coordination and Civil-Military Cooperation, (Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences)
of the CPMD alongside provisions in the Lisbon treaty. However, it is evident that the EU could
improve external crisis management with the resources it currently expends.

Within the CA, the CivMil issue is a major one and it can be a determining factor in the overall
achievement of a true CA. The issue of CivMil cooperation and coordination is sometimes
described as CIMIC but that is to confuse it with the long-standing theory and practice of the
relationship of deployed military forces with all other actors in theatre. The issue of CivMil in the EU
goes beyond that, and is a cornerstone of the more comprehensive concept of Civil-Military
Coordination or CMCO. Although the CIMIC concept is primarily concerned with coordination in
theatre, rather than an overall strategic concept of complete institutional cooperation, CIMIC
nevertheless represents an important operational component of CMCO.41

EU Civil-military Coordination (CMCO) Concept

Since the adoption of the EU CIMIC Concept in 2002, EU has declared its ambition to develop both civilian
and military crisis management capabilities, and in this respect, there was a need to develop a concept
that would address the need for effective coordination of actions of all relevant EU actors under the
Council.42 In 2003 the EU formulated its concept for Crisis Management Coordination (CMCO)
which refers both to internal EU processes with respect to civil-military coordination within CSDP,
as well as to civil-civil coordination between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and
Commission competences. Since the adoption of the ESS, the EU has declared its ambition to
develop both civilian and military crisis management capabilities, and in this respect, there was a
need to develop a concept that would address the need for effective coordination of actions of all
relevant EU actors under the Council.43

CMCO can be defined as:

- a culture of coordination
- the procedure to translate the Comprehensive Approach into practise

41 Hynek, “EU crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty”
42 Radek Khol. “Civil- Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management”, in 6th International Seminar on
- the prerequisite for building an effective EU response to a crisis and concerns the planning as well as implementation phase
- ensuring within the EU an effective co-ordination of the whole range of the EU’s instruments, with the challenge that the instruments may be subject to different institutional and thus decision-making processes
- also concerning cooperation with external actors.\(^4^4\)

The efforts to find an acceptable all-encompassing definition of the CA, including the CivMil aspect, have been ongoing for many years. There have been many studies and papers on the subject, each one contributing to the overall picture. The Joint Communication of 2013, for example, does not specifically define the CA but rather compiles a menu of the desired attributes and outcomes of an ideal version of the CA.\(^4^5\) The CivMil aspect is specifically singled out in recognition of its importance in the overall drive to achieve maximum impact of the EU’s combined instruments.

Cécile Wendling comments that a common denominator for comprehensive approaches is that they refer to a mindset recognizing a holistic approach.\(^4^6\) The UN uses a concept of ‘Integrated Approach’, which goes beyond CMCO to a system-wide coordination across the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions.\(^4^7\) The concept, introduced in the notion of “Integrated Missions” in 2006, underlines the need to involve all the relevant UN agencies in the reconstruction process. Practically this means sharing common strategic plans among the various UN agencies, in particular between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UN country teams.\(^4^8\)

CMCO is the conceptual cornerstone of the EU efforts towards implementing a comprehensive approach.\(^4^9\) Whereas CIMIC is mainly located at the operational and tactical level of the crisis


\(^{4^9}\) Post, 2011, 57.
management operations, CMCO is located at the political-strategic level, reflected in a crisis management concept (CMC) integrated at the level of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The objective is to integrate civilians and the military into the various stages of crisis management, from strategic planning to crisis management, including training and exercises.\textsuperscript{50} EU CMCO is not to be confused with the UN-CMCoord, which is the humanitarian framework of the dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies.\textsuperscript{51}

Until the establishment of CMPD and the formulation of the Lisbon Treaty, the CMCO concept provided the most significant conceptual coordination reference to the EU Comprehensive Approach to a crisis.\textsuperscript{52} There is still no single body within the EU structures that would be responsible for ensuring the implementation of Comprehensive Approach to CSDP. Nevertheless, the conceptual conditions for implementing a Comprehensive Approach are more underdeveloped than the institutional ones.

**The Treaty of Lisbon (2007)**

9/11 impacted the development of the international community’s perception towards international security, shifting from robust peacekeeping towards the stabilization of fragile states.\textsuperscript{53} This new security context, together with lessons learned from CSDP missions, changed the perception on the appropriateness of strictly separate civilian and military crisis management structures. This led to the need to develop a 'culture of coordination' within the EU foreign policy instruments, which led to an institutional reform activated by the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon.

\textsuperscript{50} Knutsen, 2008, 29. 
\textsuperscript{51} It acknowledges the necessity of the collaboration in order to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistence and when appropriate pursue common goals. UN OCHA leads the establishment and management of interaction with military actors. The key elements of the interaction are information sharing, task division and planning. To learn more, read: MCDA Guidelines 2003 (Rev. 1-January 2006).
\textsuperscript{52} The key elements of the CMCO are; 
1) Comprehensive Analysis: All actors involved must have a coherent understanding of the crisis at hand and how to solve it. 
2) Comprehensive Planning: Aims at collecting all different actors in a common planning effort. 
4) Methodology for Measuring Progress: Commonly conducted evaluation on a continual basis.  
5) Management of Capabilities: Use available (and make available) relevant instruments and make them inter-operational. (Johansen, 2011, 57 -65.)
The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) can be referred to as a fundamental document for the CSDP actions, as it contains a number of important new provisions related to the crisis management, including a mutual assistance and solidarity clause, the creation of a framework for Permanent Structured Cooperation, the expansion of the Petersberg tasks, and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.54

Thereby, the Treaty significantly changed the EU’s security architecture attempting to enhance internal coherence within the EU’s external policy, greatly affecting CSDP.55 Implementation created the dual-hatted Vice-President of the Council and High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs. Due to this new role, the High Representative has a mandate to represent the EU externally. This new position streamlined EU’s policy-making on the external security field thereby enhancing the horizontal and institutional coherence.56

Another significant initiative towards more coherent external actions was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Its main objective was to create a coherent, consistent and effective European Union, particularly in relation to third parties – and amongst these conflicting parties. To ensure institutional coherence the European Union Military Staff and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability were transferred into the EEAS. The institutional coherence was further enhanced by a creation of a new body, Crisis Management Planning Capability (CMPD) that was established under EEAS with a purpose to coordinate the civil-military competences within the external actions.57

Thus, the Treaty of Lisbon had a significant impact on the EU’s external security governance, and institutional coherence. As the result of the Treaty a range of new players were introduced into the EU’s external security architecture with an aim to better coordinate the civilian and military competences that the EU has at its disposal.

**Comprehensive Approach (CA) to crisis management**

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54 Mix, 2013, 2-4.
55 See for example Wouters & al., 2012.
56 Schroeder, 2011, 75-76.
The term ‘comprehensive approach’ was not coined in EU development policymaking circles but has emerged from discussions on the integration of civilian and military components in the CSDP. To date, there is no universal definition and the concept is interpreted in different ways, depending on the context; varying from a simple understanding of a need to promote synergies between civil and military actors to a larger understanding of the need for coordination and joint efforts between all actors in crisis areas including the diplomatic representation, humanitarian and development agencies, as well as trade and economic instruments.

Despite the fact that a comprehensive approach cannot be unequivocally defined, the principles and mechanisms it employs are widely accepted and applied. Comprehensive Approach can be seen to be the major conceptual innovation in the EU’s attempt to enhance horizontal and institutional coherence within its foreign and security policy. From the outset, a central characteristic of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis, particularly in the context of CSDP, has been the endeavour to achieve synergies between military and civilian parts of EU interventions.

The development of the concept has been promoted by the UN family in the search for better linking of security and development concerns; by NATO in the search for better interaction between its military efforts and endeavours in civil reconstruction; and by the EU need to enhance internal coherence within the different instruments and actors. Table 2 presents the definitions used by the UN, EU and NATO referring to the comprehensiveness in relation to crisis management missions.

Table 2. Comprehensive approaches

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<tr>
<th>“Comprehensive Approaches”</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>NATO</th>
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58 Council Conclusions on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach, 2014.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>What is meant by &quot;Comprehensive Approach&quot;</th>
<th>Known as ‘<strong>Integrated Approach</strong>’</th>
<th><strong>Narrow:</strong> civil-military integration within crisis management missions and operation. <strong>Broad:</strong> EU institutions and member states seeking to enhance coherence within the wide range of policies, instruments and actions for a more coherent and effective action upstream and beyond crises.</th>
<th>Contribute to crisis in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account all actors' respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emerged from;</td>
<td>A need to better link the security and development concerns.</td>
<td>A need to enhance internal coherence within the different instruments and actors within EU.</td>
<td>In search for better interaction between military efforts and endeavours in civil reconstruction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examples of concepts and instruments at missions level</td>
<td>Integrated Missions with Integrated Command and Communication structures. I.e. UN Country teams</td>
<td><strong>Narrow:</strong> Cooperation between the civilian and military missions/operations during the planning and conduct of missions. I.e. OPCEN. <strong>Broad:</strong> Coordination across the EU policies and instruments on the ground. I.e. EU Delegations, EU Special Representative, EU missions.</td>
<td>Cooperation with external civilian actors and other international organizations. Training, lessons learned, planning &amp; conduct, cooperation, public messaging. CIMIC-teams, PRT Quick Impact Projects</td>
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**The Joint Communication document by the EU High Representative and the Commission published in 2013**[^59], together with the Councils conclusions on comprehensive crisis management in 2014 and the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises - Action Plan of 2015 (7913/15), have sought to clarify the implementation of the concept. The Joint Communication outlined the following measures that seek to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of EU external policy and action in conflict or crisis situations. Those measures are;

1. Develop a shared analysis;
2. Define a common strategic vision;
3. Focus on prevention;
4. Mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU;

5. Commit to the long term,
6. Linking policies and internal and external action;
7. Make better use of EU Delegations;
8. Work in partnership.

Depending of the context and purpose the comprehensive approach can be understood as a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management (narrow) or Comprehensive Approach to EU external action (broad).\textsuperscript{60}

The narrow understanding to Comprehensive Approach defines it as a civil-military integration limiting the approach to crisis management. This definition is similar in some respects to the definitions of a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management used by NATO, with the difference that whereas NATO focuses on the cooperation with external civilian actors, the EU Comprehensive Approach to crisis management is firstly internal – concerned with bringing together military and civilian actors in CSDP.

The broader understanding of the Comprehensive Approach for the EU is an integrated EU approach towards a third country or towards another region or group of countries.\textsuperscript{61} This Comprehensive Approach to an EU external action, referred to also as a ‘Whole-of-EU approach’, is a joined effort by the EU institutions and member states that seeks to enhance the wide range of EU policies, instruments and actions for a more coherent and effective action upstream and beyond crises. The integration is not limited to CSDP, humanitarian or development instruments, but it seeks to create favourable conditions for transitions and consolidate progress by looking for synergies across inter-connected policy areas.\textsuperscript{62}

In both cases Comprehensive Approach is a general working method which focuses on results or effectiveness, aiming at promoting coherence among the EU institutions, instruments and policies to better achieve the objectives of the EU’s external actions.\textsuperscript{63} Whether the narrow or broad

\textsuperscript{60} Faria outlines in her article “What EU Comprehensive Approach?”, the two main interpretations used to define EU’s Comprehensive Approach. In addition, in a study by Volker Hauck and Camilla Rocca, \textit{Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU member states}, (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2014) they introduced three scopes of comprehensive approach according to which “narrow” involves only civil-military, coordination, “medium” entailing, e.g., diplomacy, security/crisis management, humanitarian action and development, or “system-wide” that includes diplomacy, security/crisis management, humanitarian action, development, rule-of-law support, employment/business cooperation and trade.

\textsuperscript{61} Rasmussen, 2013, 29.

\textsuperscript{62} Faria 2014, 10.

\textsuperscript{63} Treaty of Lisbon, 2007.
interpretation is applied, civil-military cooperation is one of the key components of the EU’s Comprehensive Approach. For the purpose of this study Comprehensive Approach is understood as the coordination and cooperation between the civilian and military actors under the CSDP. As the Comprehensive Approach in this context is about combining civilian and military capabilities for enhanced effectiveness of European Union conflict management and prevention efforts it is paramount to highlight how the comprehensive approach could further be promoted in the context of CSDP missions and operations.

**Comprehensive approach action plan**

The 2015 action plan’s purpose is to identify key areas in the 2013 joint communication that should be prioritized before others. First of these focuses on developing a common strategic vision through a new type of *Joint Framework Document (JFD)*[^64], which would set out overall EU and member state objectives and priorities in a given area. Through this, all EU actors in the area can focus their efforts in a coherent and comprehensive way. Relevant to crisis management, the JFD would also link with other existing documents like the Political Framework for Comprehensive Approach (PFCA), in those cases where it is necessary. The second key area in the action plan focuses on mobilizing and improving strengths of the EU in crisis management. The focus here is on capacity development, transition and rapid deployment related to EU missions, particularly joint field missions or strengthening EU delegations when required. The action plan also included a timetable of reporting for its implementation, with first reporting due in 2016.

**Political Framework for Comprehensive Approach (PFCA)**

PFCA is a tool that sets the political context for the crisis identified by the Political and Security Committee (PSC). It is a tool intending to enhance coherence within the EU’s external actions, as it combines civilian and military expertise and input to define common objectives. The significance of this tool in relation to consistency and searching for positive synergies is that it not only brings together the CSDP experts from the EEAS, but also respective Commission organizations to discuss and advise on comprehensive EU actions on crises at hand.[^65] In addition, it takes into account both political and operational aspects of the crisis management intervention thereby aiming at avoiding contradicting mandates.

[^64]: Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises Action Plan 2015, 7913/15.
**Crisis Management Concept (CMC)**

Another important concept setting the premises for civil-military interaction is CMC that forms the basis of the operational planning and the conduct of a crisis management mission. It is formulated once the political framework for the crisis management mission has been established. CMC is relevant for the civil-military interaction, as the strategic planning over a mission/operation is conducted in a so-called integrated way, involving both civilian and military planners and in consultation with other services within and outside the EEAS. The involvement of the wide range of expertise to the strategic planning of the crisis management mission is important in order to ensure that the available in-house expertise is utilized.

**Standard Operation Procedures, Manuals, Guidance, Rules and Directions**

The above concepts are examples of formal procedures ensuring the integration of the civil-military expertise in the planning of the crisis management interventions. The key documents laying the normative foundations for the civil-military coordination on the ground are the Standard Operation Procedures and Crises Management Manual. These documents include some guiding principles for civilian-military cooperation. In addition, both civilian and military entities have developed manuals and guidebooks for their own use and the civil-military cooperation is often promoted. Furthermore, the governance for civil-military cooperation and coordination is also included in most of the military mission mandates and operation plans.

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**2.4 Implementation of the EU Comprehensive approach**

Although intra-EU cooperation on crisis management has developed significantly during the Common Foreign and Security Policy period, implementation of the comprehensive approach still faces issues. As identified in the CSDP lessons learned process and discussed in DL1.3, many of the issues in practically implementing a comprehensive approach to CSDP are related to the observed differences in the way CSDP actors are organized, financed and regulated. In many cases civilian and military actors lack corresponding structures and operational mechanisms to put their capabilities into action in a coherent way. Overall, this lack of symmetry has been a practical...

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66 Rehrl, 2015, 28.
67 D1.3 Civil-military synergies.
68 2014 CSDP Lessons learned report.
obstacle in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. This is viewed as resulting in diminished cooperation and coordination both in the policy level as well as the operational level.\textsuperscript{69}

Partly due to these different structures in the EU's military and civilian crisis management, no integrated missions have been deployed by the European Union, with most deployments having been purely military or civilian in nature. In many cases these deployments have served in the same areas of operation, while retaining completely separate operational structures and mandates.\textsuperscript{70} Though separate missions can be and have been effective, the comprehensive approach calls for further integration of both civilian and military activities in the field, with the aim of improving the effectiveness of EU actors responding to conflicts. This chapter looks into implementation in the policy level, while later chapters will look into specific military operations and civilian missions deployed in the same area and the observed overlaps in their activities.

Considering the timespans involved and the range of policy tools and strategies, as well as other documents defining the EU's comprehensive approach, it is not surprising that its implementation has been varied at times. However, it has been noted that the implementation of the comprehensive approach is not an end goal in itself, instead being viewed as a development process.\textsuperscript{71} Discussions on comprehensiveness have been seen as stuck in the political level, while practical implementation and translating policy into action has been criticized as largely incomplete.\textsuperscript{72}

In broad terms, the challenges faced by implementation can be divided into three categories\textsuperscript{73}:

- \textit{Political} – Finding consensus on a commonly acceptable model of comprehensive action between EU member states has often been challenging, with solutions falling short of original ambitions.

- \textit{Organisational} – The range of actors and instruments involved in comprehensive actions are broad and require a high degree of institutional cooperation. Changes in working methods and institutional cultures are required for coherence among all actors.

\textsuperscript{69} DL1.3, pages 105-108.
\textsuperscript{71} Missiroli, 2016, 48.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Faria, 2014, 11.
• **Contextual** – The EU comprehensive approach will need to be flexible enough to be able to respond to a range of crisis situations that can differ from each other significantly. This requires a high degree of institutional adaptability.

In practice, many issues cross these categories or are a result of their interactions. Particularly important are the conceptual differences of the meaning and purpose of comprehensiveness between relevant actors in all of these levels, which has been a continuous debate throughout the CFSP era.**74** During this time, EU member states, bodies of the EU and relevant civilian and military actors have interpreted comprehensiveness from their own perspective and adapted different definitions of it. While political factions and agencies have differing opinions in the political level, civilian and military actors differ in their perspective in the field as well. These differences in institutional and working cultures bring an added social aspect to implementation that has to be considered when multiple institutions are cooperating on a multidimensional topic such as comprehensive crisis management.

More significant than intra-EU differences on the concept of comprehensiveness are perhaps those differences that exist between member states and the EU institutions. As interest in comprehensive external action has grown within the EU, many member states have also included the point of view in their own policy planning. This has led to a range of definitions broadly similar, but each with their own emphasis based on the priorities of the member state.**75** The resulting complexity of comprehensive approach is further exacerbated by institutional differences in these member states, as no standard model of organizing national institutions tasked with crisis management has been put forward. Four different types of implementation models for the comprehensive approach have been identified**76**, each with their own focuses:

1. National approaches – Focus on developing coherence within national institutions on a broad range of actions, from development to security, also called the “Whole of government approach”.

2. Intra-agency approaches – Focus on bringing different agencies or units together to work on an issue in a holistic way, exemplified in the UN integrated mission approach.

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**74** Ibid.

**75** Hauck, V. & C. Rocca, *Gaps Between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and Member States*, 13-14

**76** Hull, 2011, 7-11.
3. Inter-agency approaches – Focus on a more ambitious type of cooperation among national as well as international actors, of which few examples have been brought forth as of yet.

4. International-local approaches – Focus on host-donor relations and cooperation among national institutions and international partners, both organisations as well as states. Common in development cooperation.

It is among these types of different approaches that the common EU approach has to be found. Examples of implementation on all of these types of approaches can be seen in the current policy frameworks. Clearly the development of the concept of comprehensive action has interacted with and been influenced by the growth and development of the Union and its bodies as well as those of member states. The resulting changing political realities and different areas of focus have also played a role in how the EU comprehensive approach is defined and implemented. This has led to a culture of discourse and even experimentation within the domain of comprehensive action, as different approaches are debated and put into practice. Change has been a constant and remains so.

**Comprehensiveness and civil military interface**

Specifically related to the narrow concept of comprehensiveness and the EU civil-military interface, current issues in implementation are for the most part related to the observed asymmetry between the EU’s civilian and military CSDP elements. Development has taken place within both civilian and military CSDP, but cooperation is still lacking. Particularly before the Lisbon treaty, the political focus of the EU was seen to be more in developing common military capabilities, including the establishment of the EU rapid reaction force, while civilian development has lagged behind.\(^77\) Establishment of the European External Action Service in 2010 has been a major step in helping the civilian side in catching up to the military, by creating comparable civilian elements for planning, support and management of missions. The institutional focus of the Lisbon treaty has been seen as particularly developing coherence and effectiveness, through standardized coordination mechanisms for planning missions.\(^78\) Though this has not led to fully comprehensive bodies within EU agencies, it has resulted in increased cooperation and coordination. Different elements of CSDP have become better integrated overall and the socialisation of civilian and military staff has

\(^{77}\) Drent, 2011, 5-10.
\(^{78}\) Drent, 2011, 12.
fostered new connections and a new culture of cooperation, which in turn will support the further coherence in the mission cycle and the development of joint missions.\textsuperscript{79}

In fact, it has even been said that CSDP has been ‘civilianized’, with new focus on civilian crisis management and soft power.\textsuperscript{80} Yet these developments have stopped short of creating joint civil-military institutions for supporting missions and operations, or deploying joint CSDP missions. Here political and organisational challenges intersect, as common concepts of comprehensiveness need to be shared by all relevant partners, including member states and EU institutions. This has been difficult to reach, which in turn has influenced the way these concepts are mainstreamed from the politico-strategic to the field-level.

### 2.5 Policy framework implementation

As a primarily policy-driven project, it is useful to analyse the documents that have guided EU level thinking on comprehensiveness, the types of follow-up actions they have led to and how these have been implemented.

**European Security Strategy**

The European Security Strategy of 2003 was the first broad policy framework that set out the concept of comprehensive action and has been instrumental in exploring and establishing the ways in which an EU comprehensive approach could practically be implemented between different security sectors. The implementation of the ESS was first reviewed in 2008\textsuperscript{81} at the end of Javier Solana’s term as the high representative for CFSP and before the Lisbon treaty became effective. Although the review called for a comprehensive approach, its focus was sectoral, presenting the state of play and actions undertaken on each of the global challenges presented in the original strategy separately. The report did highlight a lack of organisational capacity within the EU institutions and called for appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanism and systems to support combining civilian and military expertise for mission planning. The report also detailed capacity development requirements for civilian and military missions, discussing needs for interoperability within both realms separately, without going as far as calling for joint missions.

\textsuperscript{79} Missirolli, 2016, 48.
\textsuperscript{80} Drent, 2011, 5-10.
\textsuperscript{81} Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, S407/08.
Overall, both the ESS and its review in 2008 are mute on the role of the military in the EU's external action, focusing mainly on civilian capabilities and only mentioning military capabilities in a few instances. This has been explained as wariness on part of member states to take strong positions on common EU military capabilities and comprehensive integration due to both funding cuts\(^\text{82}\) as well as overlaps between NATO and EU defence cooperation.\(^\text{83}\)

**Joint communication on the Comprehensive Approach**

To frame the debate on comprehensiveness, the joint EEAS-commission communication in 2013 set out eight measures on which the development of a comprehensive approach should focus.\(^\text{84}\) The range of measures aimed to bridge the policy-practice divide, including elements relevant to the political decision making related to CSDP capabilities and mission planning, as well as the functioning of missions.\(^\text{85}\) The communication seems to have reinvigorated action on the comprehensive approach. Since the communication, specific advances have been made in this regard, including the creation of the PFCA approach, sharing analysis through a common Early Warning System, improved coordination through a joint EU Crisis Platform and establishment of the first joint geographic Operations Centre in the Horn of Africa as well as shared secure communications. Considering the range of advances, the comprehensive measures implementation in the field has taken large steps forward. Although it should be highlighted that measures presented by the communication are not exhaustive and the comprehensive approach will not be 'ready to go' after they have been completed. Instead, they should be viewed as providing a snapshot of the state of implementation in 2013. Since the adoption of the communication, it has been clear that further work is required, particularly in implementation in the mission level.\(^\text{86}\)

**Comprehensive Approach action plan of 2015**

Since its inception, the 2015 action plan as the most recent document has become the leading overall framework for practical implementation of the comprehensive approach. In order to address

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\(^{82}\) Telò, 2013, 33.

\(^{83}\) Howorth, 2013, 65, 72-76.

\(^{84}\) European Commission, “The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises”; (1. Develop a shared analysis; 2. Define a common strategic vision; 3. Focus on prevention; 4. Mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU; 5. Commit to the long term; 6. Linking policies and internal and external action; 7. Make better use of EU Delegations; 8. Work in partnership.)

\(^{85}\) Explained further in DL1.3, pages 70-77.

the perceived implementation gap between the politico-strategic level and the field, the 2015 action plan also included specific cases with proposed initiatives on the eight key measures for four regions: The Sahel, Central America, Afghanistan and Somalia. This can be seen as a way of fostering practical examples of comprehensive action in the field. Additionally, the action plan included an overview of ongoing initiatives to implement the comprehensive approach, which is summarized below.

Table 3. Initiatives under the comprehensive approach 2015 - 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus area</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Joint analysis, Options and Strategic Vision</td>
<td>1.1 Systematic application of the PFCA, bringing together subject matter experts from the EEAS and Commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Conduct conflict analyses for selected countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Joint programming in up to 50 countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sharing Information</td>
<td>2.1 Enhance cooperation and develop practices for exchanging information on crisis situations between EU bodies and member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Facilitate access by EU institutions to information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>3.1 Global roll out of the Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mobilise EU - proactive EU policy response</td>
<td>4.1 Crisis Platform format gathering all services from EEAS and Commission working on given crisis in a systematic way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Linking policies and internal and external action</td>
<td>5.1 Develop a comprehensive approach to support the implementation of the EU energy security strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 Identify actions and priorities to comprehensively implement take action on managing migratory flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Make better use of EU delegations</td>
<td>6.1 Ensure appropriate expertise in embassies on security, conflict prevention, conflict analysis and sensitivity, dialogue and mediation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.2 Enable the co-location of EU actors in delegations to build operational synergies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Work in partnerships</td>
<td>7.1 Engage more closely with the UN and other international actors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An extensive progress report on the 2015 action plan and the 2013 joint communication was published in July 2016, covering ongoing activities on the different initiatives and measures outlined in them. As the primary documents included a broad range of suggestions, the report summarized main activities without in-depth analysis, giving particular focus to regional cases and the second priority action of mobilizing EU strengths. Notably, discussion was lacking on developing the comprehensive approach in the narrow conception on civil-military cooperation, with the report focusing on broader CFSP elements. Perhaps of most interest for field missions, the report discussed the establishment of a joint EU compound in Mogadishu "As a physical manifestation of the comprehensive approach", which would be a step forward after previous failed attempts. The report also included specific examples of rapid deployment and co-location of crisis management experts in EU delegations and EUSR offices. Developing a more mobile pool of expertise for external action could have a practical effect on the capabilities and effectiveness of field missions, as slow recruitment and gaps in staffing have been particular issues for civilian missions.

Looking forward, the report also included next steps to be taken on the initiatives listed in table 3, and suggested drafting a longer interval 2-year action plan for 2016 - 2017 on the implementation of the comprehensive approach. This could significantly improve tracking the progress of implementation, or as the report says: "Taking forward an action plan which focuses on a number of key issues will be instrumental to progressively generalise, through concrete examples, the Comprehensive Approach." This approach has gathered support, since after years or even decades of discussions on comprehensiveness with lacking or ambiguous implementation, there are increased calls for short-term implementation through smaller-scale projects instead of large overarching frameworks.

**EU Global Strategy**

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89 Ibid.
90 See DL6.3 on staffing.
91 2016 progress report.
As the most recent policy framework related to comprehensive action, published in 2016, little can be said of the implementation of the new EU Global Strategy at this date. Though its development and the way it will be implemented are relevant in the near future and worthy of review. The fact that it took eight years to develop the Global Strategy after the ESS review has been seen as an outcome of the rapid change in the international security environment in the intervening years, particularly due to the conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine.\(^{93}\) The reason for this is not so much the emergence of these conflicts, but their nature; the European migrant crisis has further deepened the links between internal and external security, while the multidimensional or hybrid aspects of these crises require more coherent and coordinated responses. Additionally, during this time period EU institutions have gone through significant changes in their organisation and roles, requiring time to institutionalize these roles and working methods, but also offering new possibilities for cooperation.

Supporting the Global Strategy, it was followed in November 2016 by an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence\(^ {94}\), one of several such plans specifying initiatives to put the Global Strategy into practice in different policy fields. This new approach to implementation builds on previous experiences of gaps in translating policy into practice within CSDP, opting for more specific initiatives and shorter reporting spans. While the first review of the ESS was undertaken after 5 years, the first reports on the implementation of the EUGS are due in mid-2017.\(^ {95}\) Substantively, the recommendations of the implementation plan build on the earlier initiatives/measures put forth by the 2013 Joint Communication and the 2015 Action Plan. These are divided into tasks seen as mutually reinforcing: Responding to external conflicts and crisis, building the capacities of partners, and protecting the Union and its citizens. Specific actions are proposed under all headings.

The implementation plan also specifically discusses the future of EU field missions, calling for more credible, deployable, interoperable, sustainable and multifunctional missions. A non-exhaustive list of the types of missions is presented below.\(^ {96}\) The range of mission types, including joint civil-military missions presents a new level of ambition, which will require significant advances in the issues identified in the comprehensive approach.

Possible future types of CSDP missions are defined as:

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\(^{93}\) Zandee, 2016.
\(^{95}\) Ibid.
\(^{96}\) Ibid.
- Joint crisis management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions surrounding the EU.
- Joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations.
- Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations inter alia using the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission-tailored Force package.
- Substitution/executive civilian missions.
- Air security operations including close air support and air surveillance.
- Maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe.
- Civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising, training) inter alia on police, rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, and resilience, response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions.
- Military capacity building through advisory, training, and mentoring missions, including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.

2.6 Other actors and CivMil: the case of UN and NATO

Clearly it is not just the EU that is struggling to define and develop a more coordinated and cooperative way to streamline the collective effectiveness of its various instruments. It is important to note that NATO is a military alliance and therefore does not possess the range of instruments that the EU or the UN has at its disposal. This leaves NATO with a more CIMIC-focused profile. However, even within that limitation, NATO still embraces its own version of a comprehensive approach. In addition, the UN has in many respects outdone the EU with its Integrated Mission concept. Even before the UN formalised this concept, its effectiveness was being demonstrated in its UNMIL Mission deployed in Liberia in 2003. The system developed by the UN is not necessarily the ideal model on which to base the EU’s CA, however, it would likely be a move in the right direction. While a detailed examination of this is outside the remit of this chapter, it would be prudent for EU planners to study the UN mission development closely and critically.

CivMil coordination and cooperation is evidently an important aspect of the CA. It is worth noting that the urgent need to develop a CA in the EU Crisis Management strategy came from the EUMC and the EUMS as early as 2009/10. The outgoing DGEUMS in 2010, made this issue the central theme of his final address to the PSC. At that time, the concept was entitled Operational Implications of a Comprehensive Approach (OICA), in recognition of the need to encompass not
just the CivMil aspect but also the wider implications for all EU actors concerned with Crisis Management. While it was widely accepted that coordination was the higher principle to be attained, the reality is that nobody actually wanted to be coordinated.\textsuperscript{97} This inflexibility still exists and it is a major obstacle to the further development of CivMil, and indeed of the CA. The other principal impediments are chain of command issues, financing issues, and the planning and conduct sequences and capacities. There is also the overarching issue of the role of the Brussels institutions, EU Member States and the interaction between these two vital actors.

### 2.7 Remaining issues and new challenges

Considering the recent developments in the broader implementation of the comprehensive approach, substantial and foundational obstacles to fully comprehensive civil-military cooperation on crisis management remain both on the politico-strategic level and in the field. Particularly in the field relatively few steps have been taken towards integration between civilian and military actors or joint missions. While initial measures have focused on developing comparable civil-military approaches to planning, command and review, the issues of funding and mission support still remain in making joint elements feasible.\textsuperscript{98} The different funding mechanisms for civilian and military missions bring an additional level of complexity to joint missions. Currently joint missions would have to coordinate the funding of logistics, premises and services between the EU budget, the Athena mechanism as well as member state support, not considering other possible funding instruments. Unifying and formalizing CSDP funding for both civilian and military missions would require significant legislative work, which has not been undertaken yet and faces its own obstacles.\textsuperscript{99} While previously left largely undiscussed in primary policy documents, the implementation plan on the new EUGS includes initiatives on funding of joint field missions.\textsuperscript{100}

At the mission level, the issues of command authority and chain of command also need to be settled before joint missions can be deployed. The obstacles here are significant, including constitutional blocks by some member states for putting staff under foreign military command.\textsuperscript{101}

Additionally, while the military command structures in EU member states have a long history of

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\textsuperscript{97} See several interviews carried out in the framework of the IECEU project.
\textsuperscript{98} Detailed in DL1.3, pages 77-80.
\textsuperscript{99} European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, 2.
\textsuperscript{100} Council of the EU, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, 2016.
\textsuperscript{101} Pirozzi, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management.
development through NATO cooperation, the EU’s civilian mission chain of command has only
developed recently. The ambitions for deeper integration are not new in this regard, as the 2003
Concept for Crisis Management Coordination (CMCO) already included suggestions that have not
been fully implemented. Specifically the recommendation for the establishment of a single
coordination body for crisis management has not been developed further. This is also one of
recommendations that the general CSDP lessons learned process has repeatedly called for, in
addition to greater civil-military integration of all components of the mission cycle.

Finally, for the development of joint missions, potential areas for duplication or overlap still exist
both on the military and civilian sides of CSDP missions. At the moment both sides still have
completely independent structures for establishing, supporting and implementing missions. In the
case of potential joint missions, decisions will have to be undertaken to what degree these
structures are kept or combined. There are significant differences between civilian and military
actors, including different duties and to a certain degree, different operational capabilities, which
can lead to a justification for the existing parallel structures. Duplication becomes an issue when it
concerns operational efforts, particularly if there is an observed lack of coordination of EU
interventions or an impact on cost-effectiveness.

2.8 Conclusions

The European Union’s Comprehensive Approach and the integration of civilian and military
capabilities in crisis management have a long history of development, beginning with the
Petersberg tasks. Though for most of its history comprehensiveness has been more of a goal or a
political ambition than a specific approach to solving crises.

The CivMil aspect of the CA is an important aspect of overall coordination in the EU. The
difficulties in this area reflect the universal and historical conflict between the political/civilian
control of military forces and the requirement by military leaders for recognition of expertise,
optimum use of resources and freedom of operation. Typically, civilian leaders, both officials and
politicians, tend towards a model of overall control of military forces. The main danger in this

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104 These components are further detailed in DL6.3, considering interoperability between civilian missions
and military operations.
situation is that instead of balance between these competing concepts there is an over-intrusive interference in technical military areas instead of a constructive, consultative control mechanism that will result in technical efficiencies and a synergetic relationship.

The difficulty for the EU is that this requirement for balance is manifested by both the Brussels institutions and by the MS themselves. While there are a wide range of approaches employed by MS, some states place more political emphasis on this question. Institutionally, there is a clear determination to maximise civilian control, equating it with political control. This approach reflects a widespread political view that the military should have no role in developing policy. A more constructive approach might be offering the military a substantial role in developing new policy but only an implementing role in current policy,

The practical implementation of the comprehensive approach has received increased attention in recent years as a series of policy documents have been published, culminating in the new Global Strategy. The establishment of these implementation and action plans as well as their yearly progress reports can systematize efforts to implement the comprehensive approach in EU external action. This can also make it easier to track different initiatives undertaken by bringing all the relevant information under one framework.

The range of practical recommendations, initiatives and measures outlined in the newer policy documents on the comprehensive approach have grown increasingly ambitious, the development of the language on joint missions being a good example of this. While previously it was common for commentary and analysis on comprehensiveness to discuss what the concept means in practice, attempts to answer these questions are now being undertaken. The change of perspective from broad policy frameworks to a grassroots implementation through smaller projects seems to have reinvigorated work on comprehensiveness and lifted it from a buzzword to a practical plan. The ultimate goal still is a broader range of joint civil-military capabilities for crisis management, as the mission types envisaged by the global strategy’s implementation plan make clear.

Although the ground up approach seems promising at the moment, fundamental issues on command and control, legislation and funding of missions will need to be tackled for joint missions.
to become functioning entities, capable of fulfilling the roles set out for them. The solutions for these issues will have to be found in the political level.
3 CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE: PLANNING AND CONDUCTING MISSIONS/OPERATIONS

As it has been shown, although there have been structural changes and positive signs of implementing the CA as well as CivMil, there exist fundamental issues especially in the operational aspect of CSDP. This includes command and control, legislation alongside funding/financing/support of CSDP missions and operations. Therefore, this chapter seeks to analyse the question of how much these issues affect the CivMil in the EU. The EU is a political and economic alliance. Its Council of Ministers and delegations (COREPER, PSC etc.) bring their national positions on the CivMil issues into the EU planning and decision-making fora and processes. The key question that arises in this context is how to retain civilian control through mechanisms and processes that make maximum use of the military expertise, capabilities and advice. This is not just about the functioning of the EU chain of command; it is much more about the status of military guidance, influence and decision-making at the Brussels level. It is an issue that overhangs the institutional and conceptual efforts to advance the CivMil in the EU.

The EU is in a constant state of development and refining of its policies and instruments. It is even arguable that the CA, before it is even fully defined, is now supplantted by the notion of an EU Integrated Approach, that is, taking action using combined instruments, of which the military is one among many. A number of instruments reside in the Commission and others in the EEAS. As the EEAS develops, expands and consolidates its position, it becomes an increasing challenge to find coherence across all the various instruments. It is also important that the EU as a global player must take care to preserve its position as an international organisation, which is based on democratic and human rights values rather than one serving its own or MS interests. It is anxiously the case that the EU is seen largely as a neutral, honest broker, concerned with the betterment of the areas in which it deploys crisis management interventions. This could change rapidly and negatively in the absence of properly coordinated and coherent interventions.

This means that it is important that the military voice is heard in the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) from the earliest point of identification of a crisis, through to the conduct and even the termination of the crisis intervention. High level decision makers should be cognisant of the potential and the limitations of the military instrument in a given crisis situation from the earliest point. It is commonly the case that international interventions are launched in the crisis resolution spectrum rather than in the pre-crisis stage when prevention is the main objective. The EU Crisis
Management interventions are no exception to this. Hence, it is important that the EU's CMP are capable of delivering rapid reaction in a coherent and comprehensive fashion. Effectiveness and credibility will be determined largely by this ability.

### 3.1 Crisis Management Procedures (CMP)

The CMP are extensively outlined and the players and steps in the process are detailed in DL 1.3. The question for the EU planners is whether the CMP are fit for purpose and capable of producing coherent rapid reaction as required in crisis situations. The CMP have been developed and reviewed since the founding of the ESDP/CSDP. They have been improved and streamlined in many aspects, most notably in the increased ability for rapid deployment. What has not changed very much is the location and number of decision-making points, which has implications for executive action and for the length of time it takes to deploy an intervention.

Yves de Kemabon, a retired French General, former COMKFOR and Head of EULEX Kosovo, carried out the most recent and comprehensive review aimed at streamlining the EU CMP and improving the CivMil efficiencies. However, the review was conducted in a scenario which has been described as less than ideal for these objectives. It has been noted that the lack of common understanding among the European Commission, the EEAS and the Council of the EU has hampered the creation of coherent strategies for the EU to effectively respond to crises and conflicts. In regard to the shared analysis, the most noteworthy step taken in this direction has been the creation of the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) approach.

**The PFCA Approach**

As outlined in DL1.3, a PFCA outlines not just the situation or the conflict, but also the range of options (CSDP, diplomacy, sanctions etc.) for the EU to respond and is prepared by the EEAS geographical desk with the support of civilian and military representatives, and the respective EU delegation. The PFCA was prepared for the first time in 2014 to address the Ukrainian crisis, where it has been reported to have helped in forming a common EU strategic vision; showcasing

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105 See: European Commission, “The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises”.

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the potential of the document.\textsuperscript{106} In a scenario where CSDP is selected as the best instrument to
be used in a particular situation, the EEAS would then prepare its options (either civilian or military)
in accordance with the revised Crisis Management Procedures (CMP).

One of the objectives of the 2013 revision of the CMP was to align civilian and military planning
processes and harmonise civilian and military procedures as much as possible. Currently the
development of the CMC by the CMPD includes both civilian and military inputs (CPCC and
EUMS, respectively).\textsuperscript{107} A recent lesson, however, indicates that whilst the revised CMP has
proved functional, it has not contributed to a faster launching of missions and more efforts are
needed in this regard.\textsuperscript{108}

The creation of the PFCA, therefore, is probably the greatest contribution by the de Kermabon
Review to greater CivMil synergy. This is generally acknowledged and it is accepted that at the
strategic level the mutual understanding has greatly improved. However, what is not clear is
whether this greater understanding has filtered down through the planning and conduct procedures
of the CMP. One of the mechanisms that has contributed to developments is the creation of the
Crisis Platform.

3.2 EU Crisis Platform

The Crisis Platform consists of the relevant EEAS, Commission and Council General Secretariat
services, including the relevant CSDP actors and is convened on an ad hoc basis, generally in
reaction to a crisis, such as Libya in 2013. While the platform facilitates better coordination and
information sharing between the military and civilian functions, it has not been able to bridge
structural barriers within and across institutions, such as the intersection between shorter-term
security policy and longer-term development cooperation. According to an official from the EU
Military Staff, the Crisis Platform improved coordination at the top of the hierarchy, but not at the
working level where duplication continues. In addition, the ad hoc use of the Crisis Platform did not

\textsuperscript{107} De Kermabon, “Decision making/shaping”, 71.
\textsuperscript{108} Council of the European Union, “Annual 2014 CSDP lessons report”; Panel of Experts discussion (Official
from Ministry of Defence, Official from Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Official from Ministry of the Interior) 28
August 2015.
ensure smooth transitions between the activities in the realm of the CSDP and longer-term Commission measures. ¹⁰⁹

**The De Kermabon Review**

It is evident that the de Kermabon review worked effectively in streamlining the CMP and the introduction of a fast track approach where needed. However, even this success has a questionable outcome. It is apparent that the fast track is becoming the norm, which leads to undesirable gaps in the planning process. Notwithstanding the use of the fast track approach, delays are still inbuilt in the system because de Kermabon had little influence over the decision-making points in the CMP. The review did manage to have the Implementing Military Directive (IMD) approved by the EUMC. However, this was a difficult step to achieve because some MS were unhappy with any decision-making authority devolved to the military. Given that this is merely a technical ‘to do’ list for the Mission/Operation Commander, it highlights the difficulty of initiatives in the CivMil area. Probably the most significant failing of the de Kermabon Review is in terms of achieving greater CivMil synergies in the CMP. As noted above, the introduction of the PFCA advanced the idea of a shared civilian and military forum for the identification of a crisis response. However, it did not prescribe any similar device further down the chain of the CMP.

**3.3 The Separate Planning Processes**

From the Crisis Platform through the PFCA and then to the CMPD for the drafting of the MSO/CSO and the CMC there is joint consultation. In both the military and civilian domains downstream from this point the CMP are both narrow in scope and poorly resourced. The organisations below the CMP chain are distinct and separate and not necessarily entirely fit for purpose. The CPCC has a handful of planners and the EUMS is primarily focused on strategic planning. These bodies feed into the CMPD separately and the resultant CMC is geared to the CPCC or the EUMS as appropriate. In the course of the CMP process the EUMC will set up the OHQ/MHQ to continue the planning and conduct the operation/mission and the CPCC will set up its MHQ similarly.

3.3.1. CIVILIAN PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY

The CPCC is essentially a planning and conduct body that is capable of performing the principal functions required of it. It has an adequate budget for its activities and it has adequate competencies in the planning, conduct and mission support areas. The main deficiency is in terms of personnel resources, especially in planning staff, but also in other areas of conduct and support. Some of these deficiencies can be alleviated by assistance from the EUMS, especially in the matter of planning staff, but there are limits to the extent to which this can solve the problems because of civilian-specific issues and areas of technical speciality. There are examples of planning assistance by the military to the CPCC, for instance in planning for the EUMM Georgia mission. This is a different procedure from attempts to unify the civilian and military planning processes. One CPCC official felt that there was scope to enhance informal cooperation and mutual assistance but questioned the wisdom of attempts to move towards joint planning.

Previous attempts to more closely align military and civilian planning resulted in the CIVMIL Cell which had many problems, not least that it was military-led. It was short-lived and led to the establishment of the CPCC. Ongoing reflections and periodic reviews continue to offer pertinent recommendations, such as the activation of EU Operations Centre (OPCEN) for example. It is likely that there will be an ongoing need for a dedicated civilian planning and conduct body and it is reasonable to accept that the continuing development of the CPCC will fill that need adequately. What will require development is the relationship it will have with its military counterparts.

3.3.2. EU MILITARY STAFF (EUMS)

The EUMS has two roles that are not always compatible. The first is as the strategic military planning body for the EEAS and the second is to provide secretariat and research support to the EUMC. These roles regularly overlap and sometimes conflict. The CEUMC and the DGEUMS both have advisory roles towards the HR/VP and these too may not always be in harmony. There are functions which the EUMS exercises on behalf of the EUMC which may conflict with other bodies in the EEAS. For instance, EUMC military advices to the PSC are drafted by the EUMS, agreed by the EUMC and forwarded to the PSC by the CEUMC. This could include an advice on a document drafted by the CMPD, with EUMS input.

When a decision is made to use the military instrument, such as the deployment of a military mission, it will fall to the EUMS to do the initial planning and construct the initial planning documents with the CMPD. This process will continue until the new mission HQ is set up and
staffed. However, in the case of non-executive missions, the MHQ does not have the capacity to do any substantive planning, so this function stays with the EUMS. This places a huge burden on an already overstretched EUMS. This has been recognised in recent years and the EU OPCEN was identified as the solution.

### 3.3.3. EU OPCEN

In March 2012, the Foreign Affairs Council activated, for the first time, the EU OPCEN, with the aim of coordinating and strengthening CivMil synergies between the three CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa. Initially, the mandate of the OPCEN was for three years and subsequently on 01 December 2014 it was extended until the end of 2016 and expanded in geographical and functional scope to the Sahel region.¹¹⁰

In the Horn of Africa the OPCEN supported three missions: the military (naval) operation, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, which protects humanitarian aid shipments and fights piracy off the Somali coast; the military mission, EUTM Somalia, which contributes to the training of Somali Security Forces and provides military advice to the Somali National Authorities; and the civilian mission, EU CAP NESTOR, to strengthen maritime security capacities in the Horn of Africa.

Later, the EU OPCEN supported a further three CSDP missions in the Sahel region: the military mission, EUTM Mali, to assist the authorities to restore constitutional and democratic order, the rule of law and human rights and neutralize organized crime and terrorist threats in Mali; the civilian missions, EU CAP SAHEL MALI and EU CAP SAHEL NIGER, to give advice and training to support the national authorities’ efforts to strengthen their security capabilities.

The OPCEN is a good example of the potential for more cohesive coordination at the EU level but in reality it was not much more than a liaison office for the associated missions and operations. Each one has its own chain of command and reporting lines and each one used the OPCEN largely as the Commander/HOM decided. The OPCEN has no place in either the civilian or military chain of command. So, while it was a move in the right direction it was merely a first step towards effective CivMil coordination. It should be remembered that it took until 2012 to activate the OPCEN; that it has no role in the chain of command; that it was a temporary activation for three

years; that it was first confined to the Horn of Africa and later extended in time and scope. This illustrates some of the difficulties in reaching consensus on even small incremental steps which could lead to better CivMil coordination and cooperation.

3.3.4. THE MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY

The OPCEN was deactivated from 31 December 2016 and the remaining staff moved to the EUMS to form the nucleus of a planning and conduct capability for EU non-executive military missions. This follows the EU Foreign Affairs Council in its Council Conclusions of 14 November 2016 (paragraph 16.) in which it addressed a number of CSDP issues including the ability of the EU to react to crises, under the heading of “Adjusting structures, tools and financing”:

“16. To improve the EU’s capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, as part of an effective EU’s Comprehensive Approach, the Council prioritises the following:

a. Adapt the existing EEAS structures to develop the necessary structures and capabilities for the permanent planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations in view of enhancing civil-military synergies and more seamless planning and conduct, with distinct but coordinated civilian and military chains of command. To this end, the Council invites the High Representative to present proposals, as soon as possible, with a view to their implementation in the first semester of 2017, to establish as a short term objective, and in accordance with the principle of avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO:

(i) enhanced political strategic level planning and oversight of missions and operations with particular emphasis on civ-mil synergies;

(ii) a permanent operational planning and conduct capability at the strategic level for non-executive military missions, working jointly and ensuring an integrated civilian-military CSDP engagement, with the planning and conduct capability for civilian missions.

These will work under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC.”

There are some striking aspects to this paragraph. Firstly, there is the reference to avoiding duplication with NATO. It is unclear why this needs to be said in this particular context. It is probably more politically motivated than serving as any kind of guidance to planners. There is also the exhortation to find ways of “enhancing civil-military synergies and more seamless planning and conduct, with distinct but coordinated civilian and military chains of command.” This is interesting
language and is indicative of what goes on behind the drafting of such Council conclusions. The aspiration to find synergies is there, as it must be, but also there is the reassurance of distinct but coordinated chains of command. At once, there is a recognition that a more synergetic process is required but also that there are limits to that process. This could be interpreted as excluding certain areas for further development at this time. Here it explicitly refers to the chain of command while suggesting that the planning processes will also remain separate but with areas of coordination. This mandate may actually point the way forward for the CivMil interface for the foreseeable future. That is, an incremental development of cooperation, coordination and synergy.

In terms of concrete mandate, paragraph 16.a.(ii) requires the HR/VP to establish as a short term objective, “a permanent operational planning and conduct capability at the strategic level for non-executive military missions, working jointly and ensuring an integrated civilian-military CSDP engagement, with the planning and conduct capability for civilian missions”.

This is a positive move and is conducive to a comprehensive military planning and conduct capability. This is likely to be called the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and is required to work jointly with the CPCC. As the MPCC will at least initially be situated within the EUMS, both bodies are based on existing EEAS structures and will be set in a context of reinforcing CivMil synergies and more seamless planning and conduct, while retaining separate civilian and military chains of command. There is a short implementation time; the Council expects implementation in the first semester of 2017.

It will be vital to ensure that the requirement of “working jointly and ensuring an integrated civilian-military CSDP engagement, with the planning and conduct capability for civilian missions” is followed through. This means in practice, a close working relationship between the MPCC and the CPCC. The modalities of that process will determine whether this will represent a breakthrough in joint CivMil planning and conduct, resourcing and support. While there are reasons to be optimistic, there are also limiting factors, such as the requirement to achieve the military planning capacity from existing structures, with the inference that it will also be from within existing resources.

The idea that the MPCC will reside within the EUMS is more of an interim solution pending the creation of a new and autonomous planning and conduct capability. It is likely that the military professionals in the EUMS, together with their civilian colleagues in the CPCC, will develop the best working practice within the constraints imposed. But with that in mind, it is clear that the MPCC is a military body, within the EUMS, tasked exclusively to plan and conduct military (non-executive) missions.
Consultations with EUMS staff indicate that this is seen as a preliminary step in a planning and conducting capability for all military missions, including executive ones. Furthermore, this is envisaged as the logical end-state of this development and it would eventually require about 200 additional planning and operational personnel. This would seem to lead in the direction of a permanent OHQ in Brussels, a matter that is quite some distance from political agreement.

However, as the military planning and conduct capabilities develop under this initiative, it is extremely important that it is used to best effect to develop CIVMIL synergies and in this regard it seems to present an important opportunity.

In this context it is important that the MPCC is placed on a firm foundation and is adequately resourced to properly fulfil its mandate, especially the requirement to work jointly with the CPCC. Initially, at least, the MPCC will have a small number of personnel, while the CPCC is an established EU organisation with an extensive structure and more than 70 personnel. It is difficult to envisage how the working relationship will function given the huge disparity in all aspects of each organisation. Therefore, it is vital that a dedicated coordinating unit is created to build and develop a strong bridge between the two bodies. This unit should be staffed jointly from the CPCC and the MPCC. It should have a clearly defined mandate and competence and the mandatory support of the heads of the CPCC and MPCC. Support and encouragement from the DSG for CSDP and Crisis Response will also be required to ensure that the maximum levels of joint processes and procedures are achieved.

In the mission planning phase there could be joint work in the areas of security, logistics, force protection, medical, CIS etc. even more importantly it would provide an opportunity to ensure that planning of civilian and military missions is not done in isolation but with considerable consultation and mutual support. In the conduct phase there would be opportunities for enhanced, formalised and regular consultations between the heads of the MPCC and CPCC at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all aspects of the missions. It would also facilitate joint reviews by CMPD and even joint reporting to the PSC by the Civilian and military Mission Commanders. This is very important as it would help to develop the CIVMIL interface at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, thereby countering the tendency for separateness at the strategic level to cascade down to mission ground level.
As Council conclusions of November 2016 have illustrated, the Council of the EU is clear on the distinct and separate natures of the civilian and military chains of command. It is, therefore, not an exaggeration to suggest that there is almost no possibility of establishing a unified chain of command for military and civilian missions. However, that is not the same as excluding a close coordination and cooperation and indeed the finding of synergies. What it does mean is that this will not be easy in conceptual, practical, legal or political terms. Nevertheless, the challenge is one that must be faced if any meaningful coherence of effort in CivMil by the EU is to be achieved.

The chain of command is a critically important issue in military organisations and missions/operations. This is also true to a similar extent in civilian organisations and missions. In the EU there are clearly established and rigid chains of command that operate separately downwards from the PSC, which exercises political control and direction of all CSDP missions and operations. So at least there is a common starting point in the PSC.

DL1.3 has identified several obstacles to the creation of an integrated chain of command, including the absence of joint Command and Control structures between the CSDP activities and prohibitive Member State constitutions. As highlighted previously, the Council acknowledges the distinct but coordinated civilian and military chains of command. There are therefore, political, legal and operational obstacles to any form of unified command for military and civilian missions, which also applies to other EU instruments.

There are explicit aspects to the exercise of military command. In most MS, and non-EU States too, military command and its exercise are the subject of specific legislation and are separate from any forms of civilian command and control. Most often in the civilian context terms such as “in charge” are used, which in a military context is a much lesser and variable form of control and responsibility than “in command”. Conversely, the term “in command” is rarely used in the civilian context. This reflects to some degree the difficulties involved in attempting to unify military and civilian chains of command.

However, while the military chain of command may be a unified one from the PSC to the junior soldier in the mission/operation, this is not to say that there cannot be a defined set of relationships between the military and civilian officials at various levels. There may be EU Delegations and EUSRs in the theatre of operations and there will be a MD for the region at the EEAS HQ level. It
should not be difficult to work out how these relationships should work. Currently, a lack of clarity on respective responsibilities exists.

The TEU gives the PSC responsibility for the political control and direction of all CSDP missions. However, there is little or no specific direction on how this control and direction will be exercised. Up to now it has been exercised through the CEUMC for military missions and operations. In this regard, the EUMC is also brought into the chain of command to a certain extent. This is essentially a pragmatic practice on the basis that it is impractical for the PSC to command a military mission/operation on a daily basis. Additionally, it can leave a mission or operation commander unclear as to who he/she is legally answerable to in matters which could have serious implications and consequences. This is an area that merits more proactive rather than reactive attention in the future.

3.5 Financing mechanisms of civilian missions and military operations

Financing CSDP missions and operations is a crucial issue when addressing the operational capacity of CSDP. Due to the different nature of civilian missions and military operations, different mechanisms currently exist that impede a proper implementation of the comprehensive approach.

DL1.3 has already addressed this difficult question:

“The different financing mechanisms of civilian missions and military operations have been commonly recognised as one of the main limitations to the implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis management. This has resulted in lack of resources that are available for CSDP missions and operations, and hindered operational effectiveness. This has been observed in particular in those cases that would require a combined civilian-military response, where the financing would come both through the Athena mechanism and the member states. Financing has been a limitation to, for example, better utilisation of shared logistics, premises and medical services which could otherwise be areas that would contribute to a better use of existing resources in the spirit of comprehensiveness. Whilst the need to reform CSDP financing mechanisms has been widely acknowledged, and recently discussed at various levels, it has been concluded by
some interlocutors that a reform will not take place any time soon owing to the different positions by the member states.”

While the conclusion may be justifiably pessimistic, there are aspects of CSDP mission and operation financing that could be adjusted and synergies that could be achieved with the required degree of political willingness and institutional flexibility. Currently military missions are largely financed by contributing MS with some agreed specified common costs borne collectively through the Athena Mechanism administered by the Athena Special Committee. Civilian missions are largely financed from the EU budget with MS in many cases paying salaries and some subsistence expenses at varying levels. In 2015, for example, commitments for the 11 ongoing civilian missions (excluding preparatory and emergency measures) amounted to €258.25 million of a CFSP budget of €320.77 million.

In addition to these two distinct funding streams there is also the security-development nexus. Development funding is specifically excluded by TEU from use on any military activity. This is a generally accepted fact but what is subject to a certain degree of interpretation is the definition of military activity. There are related security implications and potential reputational dangers in not providing basic equipment for troops trained under the EU banner. For example, it would make little sense to set up a troop training mission such as EUTM Somalia, or Mali or Niger but not equip the troops with even the most basic requirements to operate, such as clothing or minimum salaries. This could arguably lead, inter alia, to desertion to insurgent groups.

There are options to enable and finance a train-and-equip programme, such as the concept of Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD). This was initiated in 2015 and below is an extract from a joint Press Release by the HR/VP and the European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development in July 2015:

“The main aim of these new proposals is to use EU assistance more effectively and flexibly to help partners prevent or manage crises on their own. It should thus strengthen the link between security and sustainable development and contribute to ensuring the respect of the rule of law, good

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governance as well as enhanced civilian control and oversight over the military in third countries...Today's proposal follows up on the Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High Representative entitled "Capacity building in support of security and development" of April 2015, which identified gaps in the EU's ability to support building the capacities of partners in the security sector...To address this, the extension of the IcSP aims to enable the EU to provide more effective assistance to security sector actors, including military actors under exceptional circumstances, in partner countries. To help partners build their capacity to contribute to sustainable development and the achievement of peaceful and inclusive societies, assistance may cover the provision of capacity building programmes in support of security and development, including training, mentoring and advice, the provision of non-lethal equipment, infrastructure improvements and other services."113

This is an imaginative approach and has the potential to develop a capability to train and equip the security forces of partner states in a coherent fashion. However, to identify it will not automatically put it into effect. It requires political will and a drive within the institutions to find ways to make it work. Notions of institutional territorialism and selective interpretations of both TEU and other rules have to be minimised. The political will of the MS must also be harnessed in this regard.

3.6 Political Will

Political will is always a very strong driver of change and development in the EU and the CivMil interface is no exception in this regard. In fact, it is probably the case that political will is an even more necessary ingredient in this area. It is often the only way to unblock situations where the struggle between an effective policy and achieving political unanimity is deadlocked. There are signs that there is a strengthening of political will in the CSDP area in recent times, especially since the adoption of the ToL. Now with the approval of the EUGS and concrete work to implement its provisions there is even more reason for optimism in regard to the political will to develop the CSDP. Recent political developments worldwide as well as the rise of asymmetric threats, non-state conflicts and mass migrations of peoples may all serve to strengthen the political will to develop capable and coherent EU crisis response mechanisms.

The development of the PRISM concept is a clear recognition of the need to refine, streamline and coordinate the EU's crisis response mechanisms and instruments. The military has a role to play in all five categories and an early and clear recognition of this will provide significant forward momentum in the CivMil interface.

### 3.7 Individual issues

There are a number of singular issues which could be considered in the general context of enhancing CivMil in the EU. These are matters which individually may not address the overall coherence of CivMil efforts, but could contribute to a better level of mutual understanding and appreciation while simultaneously providing a practical assistance or service to a civilian or military mission. Some could also bridge the gap between the current situation and the more ambitious objectives like joint missions. Examples of these might be:

**(i) Military Component of Civilian Mission**

There might be merit in exploring the idea of the EU deploying relatively small military components within EU civilian missions. This could be relevant to a civilian mission in an insecure area of operations where there is no force, such as NATO, to provide a secure base or locality to operate. The EUPOL Afghanistan relationship with ISAF, for example, illustrates how the EU could provide some military or military-type protection element where no such supportive force exists. There would be many issues to be surmounted, however, such as command and control, legality and financing. It could provide a practical enabler to the civilian mission while also contributing to a developing working relationship.

**(ii) Civilian Component of a Military Mission**

Similarly, there may be possibilities to embed civilian experts and even components in military missions and operations. There are already civilian POLADs in military missions. Is it a great leap to expand this to experts or even capabilities in civilian disciplines across the range of competencies/instruments of the EU. Again, as with above, there may be many obstacles to overcome but the potential benefits would make investigation worthwhile.
(iii) Military Advisor (MILAD) in EU Delegations

There are already a small number of EU delegations that have a military adviser. It may be a good time to expand this initiative. It is another good opportunity for development of mutual understanding.

(iv) Council – EEAS - Commission

CivMil must be considered within the context and mechanisms of the main structures of the EU – the Council, the EEAS, the Commission and the Parliament. The position of the military instrument within these structures is vital to understanding the benefits and the limitations of CivMil. Military issues are dealt with in a variety of ways in the different MS, too varied and complex to even summarise here. Generally, the military has limited influence in policy development of EU MS. At Brussels level, the military delegations are part of the MS PermReps and generally a part of the PSC delegation. This has a limiting effect in the military view being developed and advanced. In the EEAS, the only military component is the EUMS, numbering roughly two hundred personnel. The CEUMC and the DGEUMS have designated advisory roles vis-a-vis military advice to the HR/VP. There is no military staff or component in the Commission.

If, therefore, CivMil is an important component of the CA and has a significant impact on the capability of the EU in CM intervention, this is not reflected in the structures determining the direction and development of CSDP. Consequently, it becomes important that working relationships, mutual understanding, a sense of partnership, parity of esteem and recognition of relative competencies are developed and fostered. These are important matters and are necessary to engender trust and to create a situation where realistic CivMil development can take place. The creation of institutions, bodies and fora alone will not build that trust.
4 CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE: CASE STUDY BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

As previously described, the current setup and structures that are determining the direction and development of CSDP are not always reflecting the importance of CivMil in concrete crisis management operations/missions. Therefore, this paper will build on one theatre in which both civilian as well as military have been deployed in the context of CSDP namely Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU’s engagement

It was the bitter experience of failure in the 1990s conflict in the Balkans that provided the trigger for the start of EU crisis management as we know it today. The case study deliverable D2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina Review already acknowledged that the conflict in BiH, as well as the lack of the EU’s capacity to prevent and solve conflicts in the post-Cold War context – especially in its immediate neighbourhood – led to an increasing interest among the member states to develop common crisis management capabilities. In fact, BiH has sometimes been referred to as ‘testing ground’ for the CSDP, especially from the point of view of planning and coordinating two different crisis management instruments, since this was the first time when both, civilian and military capabilities were deployed in the same region, European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in 2003 and European Union Force Althea (EUFOR Althea) in 2004. Both missions were deployed in the post-conflict setting of the Balkan war to strengthen the development and stability of the region. However, deployment of the EUPM/BiH was also the first civilian crisis management mission ever launched by the EU, as well as the first EU-led Chapter VII operation, hence becoming a crucial test for the crisis management mechanisms of the EU in general.

EUPM/BiH was established in March 2003 and overtook responsibilities from the UN and its International police Task Force (IPTF), with the focus on institution-building at all levels of governance. BiH was directly relevant to two of the five threats later identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS) – state failure and organized crime – and the EU has seen restoring good governance, fostering democracy and enabling authorities to tackle organized crime, one of the most effective measures to deal with organized crime within the EU itself. BiH future mattered thus not only for the citizens of the country but also for the EU’s self-perception as a foreign policy and security actor. The mission was launched for an initial period of three years.
The initial three-year mandate included preserving the existing levels of institutional and personal proficiency; enhancing, through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting, police managerial and operational capacities; strengthening professionalism at high level within the ministries as well as at senior police officers levels through advisory and inspection functions; and monitoring the exercise of appropriate political control over the police. Upon the invitation by the BiH authorities, the Council of the EU decided in July 2005 that EUPM was to continue its action with revised mandate and in the second phase of the EUPM (EUPM-II), it was to only concentrate on supporting the local police in the fight against organised crime; conducting inspections and monitoring of police operations; and supporting the implementation of police restructuring. EUPM continued its mission with modified mandates and size until 30th of June in 2012.

In parallel to EUPM, in December 2004 the military operation EUFOR Althea in BiH was deployed. The launch of operation ALTHEA followed the decision by NATO to conclude its Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and the adoption by the UN Security Council Resolution 1575, authorising the deployment of an EU force in BiH. The UN Security Council Resolution 1575 mandate EUFOR Althea to exclusively inherit the role of SFOR and ensure the implementation and compliance with the Dayton Agreement’s Annex 2-a and 2. At the launch, Operation Althea was originally launched mostly to support the contribution to the maintenance of the safe and secure environment (SASE) in Bosnia and the compliance with the Dayton Agreement 1995.

With time, the mandate has evolved and shifted toward capacity building and training (CBT) with the Council decision of 2010, since the main elements of the post Dayton mandate have largely been fulfilled, and the security situation in BiH proved stable, hence the EUFOR Althea’s task to establish a ‘deterring’ presence, slowly evolved into providing ‘reassuring’ presence. BiH authorities already established a multi-ethnic and central professional army and a central police force. Moreover, the implementation of certain residual tasks, such as demining and transfer of competencies, has stalled, because of unfavourable political circumstances and the political structures of BiH. According to one EU official interviewed, the participating states also disagree on the scope and length of Althea’s mandate, especially in regard to withdraw the executive part of the mandate. However, the new, non-executive security sector reform dimension of EUFOR Althea was added to the persisting executive key military tasks and this has constituted the most important shift in the operation’s tasks since its deployment. Currently EUFOR Althea’s mandate consists of meeting the following key objectives: to provide capacity-building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, supporting them in their progress towards NATO standards; to provide continued compliance to the Dayton Agreement; and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH, in line with its mandate, and to complete core tasks in the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Table 4: Overview of EUFOR Althea and EUPM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/Operation</th>
<th><strong>EUFOR Althea</strong></th>
<th><strong>EUPM</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>December 2004 – ongoing</td>
<td>January 2003 - June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main function</strong></td>
<td>Military Executive mandate (UNSR) and non-Executive</td>
<td>Police mission Non-executive mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal basis</strong></td>
<td>(UNSC) Resolution 1575</td>
<td>Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>HQ: Camp Butmir, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina OHQ: Two- under Berlin Plus agreement in SHAPE, Belgium and another one in Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy.</td>
<td>HQ: Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Regional offices: Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main objectives</strong></td>
<td>•To provide capacity-building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina; •To support BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH; •To provided support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH.</td>
<td>•To strengthen the operational capacity and joint capability of the law enforcement agencies engaged in the fight against organised crime and corruption; •To assist and support in the planning and conduct of investigations in the fight against organised crime and corruption in a systematic approach; •To assist and promote development of criminal investigative capacities of BiH; •To enhance police-prosecution cooperation; •To strengthen police-penitentiary system cooperation; •To contribute to ensuring a suitable level of accountability.</td>
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</table>
This was the first time that the EU deployed simultaneously a civilian and a military crisis management operation in the same country. A new challenge presented itself – how to enhance coordination between the military and the civilian elements of the ESDP, later CSDP at different levels.

The EU did not conceptualize the dividing line between police and military work in 2004. The European Commission and the Council of the EU concept papers from security system reform were completed after the mandates for EUPM and EUFOR were conceived. Still, the formal EU process that identifies lessons from EUFOR Althea shows similarities with the process conducted during the EUPM. The process focused mainly on the planning phase of the operation as well as the coordination and coherence between EUFOR Althea and EUPM.\footnote{Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned processes, Belgium 2012; Tobias Flessen kemper and Damien Helly et al., \textit{Ten Years After: Lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002-2012} (Paris: EUISS, 2013).} From the planning phase of the operation, a lesson identified proposed more training for personnel slated to work for the EU Cell at SHAPE.\footnote{Council of the European Union. “EU Cell at SHAPE – Manning Options Study”. Council document 8429/05, Brussels, 25 April 2005.} Another lesson identified referred to an unclear operational relationship between the EUSR and the EU military force.\footnote{Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, \textit{European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009)} (Paris: EUISS, 2009). However, it has been observed, especially by the political elements of the missions, that the mandates should be broad enough to leave some room for action for the Heads of Missions (HoMs) on the operational level. Having clear mandates would in this respect also enable the HoMs to concentrate on leading their own organisations, instead of having to create their own mission. See Jari Mustonen, “Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels, Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, \textit{CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies} 1 (2008).} In May 2005, these were addressed when EUMC issued a classified lessons identified report on the planning phase of EUFOR Althea.\footnote{Council of the European Union. “Op Althea – Consolidated Report on ‘Historical Lessons Identified’ from the Execution of Operation Althea”. Council document 14181/07, Brussels, 11 March 2013.} One clear lesson was that any potential overlap in the mandates and efforts of different EU actors (civilian and military) should be clarified as soon as possible.

However, when discussing the planning process, it can be stated that possible civilian–military synergies were destined to be lost from the outset, since the EUPM and EUFOR Althea, were planned in separate ‘pipelines’: there was no joint strategic planning or set of connecting...
The research material suggests that the first years of EUFOR Althea were plagued by an overlap of activities and only weak comprehensive approach. The civilian CSDP mission, the EUPM, did not have executive powers. That mission was mandated to assist the local police service — through monitoring and advice — in preparing and implementing a police reform, strengthening the accountability of the police forces, and fighting organised crime. On account of the scope of the problems and the modest civilian resources, EUFOR Althea was ordered to perform tasks that belonged to or were more suited to other authorities. The fight against organised crime shifted more and more toward being EUFOR’s ‘fundamental task’, making it appear as if the operation was operating on the EUPM’s turf. The so-called Mogadishu line, that divides the tasks between the army and civilian administration in Bosnia, was set too close to the exclusively military areas and did not protect the civilian part of the operation.

Rectification of overlaps was actually the responsibility of the then double-hatted OHR/EUSR, but this development was stopped only via the Council’s ‘Common Operational Guidelines for EUPM–EUFOR Support to the Fight against Organised Crime’ in 2006, which confined Althea’s tasks to support functions. The missions agreed on the delineation of tasks and coordination structures regulating their interaction. Moreover, in the same year, the revision of the mandate of EUPM (EUPM-II), brought about a necessary change in this regard, since it directed the EUPM to take “the lead in the coordination of policing aspects of the ESDP efforts in the fight against organised crime, without prejudice to the agreed chains of command”. The fact that the EU actors in the same country had diverging understandings of their own mandate caused confrontation that needed to be settled. The mandate of the EUPM itself did not change drastically, the perception of limits set by the mandate changed however — widening the role and the scope of possible actions

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118 Interviews no. 22, no. 23, no. 31, no. 32, no. 33, and no. 54.
120 The key military task of the first Force Commander of Althea, the UK’s Major General David Leakey, was to support the High Representative’s Mission Implementation Plan (MIP). The MIP addressed four elements (economy, the rule of law, police, and defence reform), all rather ill-suited to military leverage. The EUFOR Althea operation had to tackle phenomena such as smuggling, customs/tax avoidance, corruption, and crime networks. See Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007/2014), pp. 157–158.
122 Interviews no. 22 and no. 23.
of the EUPM on the matters of policing. Furthermore, the focus of the mission changed again, in 2007 the EUPM mandate concentrated on supporting the fight against major and organized crime\textsuperscript{124} with the Bosnian authorities. Consequently, EUFOR Althea scaled down its involvement. Furthermore, the coordinating role of the EUSR was upgraded, giving him more say over the coherence of the two operations. Because of these new procedures and structures, coordination and cooperation between the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR on the operational level in Sarajevo has improved. At the regional and field (tactical) level the cooperation and coordination also improved owing to the guidance the field presence receives from above.\textsuperscript{125}

4.3 Structures (liaison)

EUPM has been able to pursue connections and liaisons towards the NATO mission (SFOR) in the almost two years of operation, before the deployment of EUFOR. The EUPM headquarters had liaison personnel posted to each of the Task Forces to guarantee closer cooperation. However, before EUFOR was deployed, EUPM Head of Mission at that time decided to withdraw all the liaison officers from the Task Forces, leaving the responsibilities for cooperation and liaison to the regional headquarters. This lack of organic liaison personnel became very problematic when EUFOR finally arrived and in many cases, the link between EUPM regional and field offices was cut. In some areas, the relationship between SFOR and EUPM was even better than the relation between EUPM and EUFOR, which is surprising.\textsuperscript{126}

The lack of liaison structures caused the slowing down of the creation of relationships between EUPM and EUFOR in the field; since there was no specific responsibility and pressure to act as a point of contact for EUFOR by EUPM regional offices, it has become a matter of each officer's


\textsuperscript{125} Council’s Secretariat document 15376/06, 2006. The paper identified four key recommendations to further improve EU coordination and coherence in BiH: 1) The Secretariat should set up high-level training for key staff prior to deployment (including designated EUSRs and Heads of EU missions). 2) Precise guidance (using Crisis Management Concepts) and coordinating instructions should be provided to each actor. 3) The EUSR should have a strong coordinating role. 4) There should be consultation between military and civilian actors. See Jari Mustonen, “Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels, Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, \textit{CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies} 1 (2008).

judgement on how important the liaison should be. This in practice translated that no direct obligation to liaise with EUFOR existed, hence a liaison structure never appeared. The relationships between EUFOR and EUPM personnel were often only based on national basis – for this reason, the missions field actions varied greatly as well.

However, the need for liaising extensively in the field became a problem when the same issue of cooperation and coordination was faced in Sarajevo, when EUFOR pursued an active role of fighting against organized crime. EUFOR was conducting some of their operations without informing EUPM, which were mainly learning about them from the local law enforcement. EUFOR however, made an effort to connect with EUPM at the regional level, but mostly in order to gain information usable for their operation, not to provide information about them.

In the field level, LOTs were the principal EUFOR actors responsible for cooperation with EUPM – since it was a part of their function to contact local authorities, ergo local police, customs officials and border police when observing and maintaining situational awareness. However, after the deployment of EUFOR, LOTs were directly contacting the local authorities, losing the link of communicating with EUPM to reach to them. These controversies were the characteristic of the first year of the coexistence of both missions in the same territory. As these difficulties became more apparent, EUPM, EUFOR (and EUSR) agreed on the documents Seven Principles and Guidelines for Increasing Cooperation between EUPM-EUFOR and EUSR.

After the Agreement on the Seven Principles and the change in the mandate of EUPM, one of the first official step was towards the delineation of the tasks of organization. However, implementing new practices and tasks for EUPM and EUFOR demanded time and effort and the change did not happen overnight, as well as it varied in different regional and field offices. Reflecting the need to further clarify and detail cooperation, EUFOR and EUPM agreed on Common operational guidelines for EUPM-EUFOR support to the fight against organized crime in 2006. A significant change in comparison with the earlier Seven Principles was including liaison at tactical level, which meant that improved coordination and cooperation between the missions on the HQ level would also reach the field level. Common Operational Guidelines improved the coherence, especially from the point of view of EUPM. Moreover, coordination structures had improved. Every week there would be a coordination meeting between Heads of the Missions, which should coordinate the actions of the missions. On the lower levels, there were several regular meetings as well.
Common Operational Guidelines have been in many areas successful in passing down on the regional and field levels.\footnote{127}{Ibid.}

\section*{4.4 CMO findings}

When the EU replaced NATO mission in 2004, the interim period of adjustment between EUPM and EUFOR Althea had to emerge. EU member states and ESDP officials disagreed over prioritizing some or other strategies for assisting local authorities in a fight against organized crime, as mentioned above. Moreover, prior to a revision of the EUPM mandate in 2006, there was no comprehensive approach on how to tackle a specific topic, like organized crime in BiH, inside both EU operation and mission. EUFOR Althea also engaged in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and law-enforcement activities, which was a consequence of a clear mandate overlap and connected to the EUPM and its inefficiency in filling the law-enforcement void.\footnote{128}{Jari Mustonen, Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels: Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. \textit{CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies} 1, no. 1 (2008).}

These previously mentioned blurred lines were visible in the field of staffing. EUFOR Althea conducted its operations throughout the area of the mission with almost all operational assets in its possession. However, an asset of EUFOR, the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) was often also used in this connection and it became a source of disagreement between EUPM and EUFOR. IPU is a military police force, with strength of approximately 500 troops and functions throughout the mission area under the command of EUFOR Commander. Its function is to provide support to SASE and can be used in police-like operations or for example civil disturbance operations or investigations. EUPM often claimed that IPU conducted its operations without even paying notice to EUPM or the local authorities; moreover, they frequently employed an excessive amount of force to conduct its operations.\footnote{129}{Although the IPU capacity supplied valuable expertise to EUFOR and its military contribution is not questioned, it has also relied on regular troops, which sometimes lacked the appropriate skill sets. Some officials explained that EUFOR was in search of a means to distinguish itself from NATO, while others suggested that EUPM was hiding behind its lack of an operational mandate and not being proactive enough, hence forcing EUFOR to fill a policing} Although the IPU capacity supplied valuable expertise to EUFOR and its military contribution is not questioned, it has also relied on regular troops, which sometimes lacked the appropriate skill sets. Some officials explained that EUFOR was in search of a means to distinguish itself from NATO, while others suggested that EUPM was hiding behind its lack of an operational mandate and not being proactive enough, hence forcing EUFOR to fill a policing
gap. However, with the implementation of the Guidelines, IPU has also been regulated and was then no longer an issue – when operating under the EU flag, IPU actions should be coordinated and in line with the guidance from EUPM.

However, with the revision of the EUPM-II mandate, a number of lessons learned were actually implemented, which also influenced the staffing. Improvements in the decision-making structure and the creation of Civilian Response Teams meant improved planning in the future. The lines between EUFOR and EUPM mandates were strengthened and EUPM’s leading responsibility in relation to the EUFOR in the fight against organised crime has been made clear. Its new planning and inspection powers were allowing more oversight by EUPM personnel. Nevertheless, the problems of recruiting qualified personnel and defining common standards and practices on policing appeared and persisted. Although EUPM II was more appropriate than EUPM I, the underlying challenge of policy coherence among the individual policy instruments remained.

It should be noted that the relevant guidelines, practices, activities and centres, which are addressing the civil-military cooperation in the field of shared services today, were mostly established after 2012, when the need for more standardized procedures in servicing of the civilian missions has been voiced by the European Council - but the EUPM mission ended on 30 June 2012, hence it enjoyed little of these new efforts. In the absence of these guidelines, the EUPM and EUFOR mission followed a more ad hoc logic.

However, with the establishment of the IPU forces, the guidelines for their operation were a must also on the level of civil-military interface, when it comes to the logistics and shared resources. The 2004 guidelines for rapid deployment of the aforementioned IPU (15956/04) , a robust and flexible military police force (which can be temporarily placed under the responsibility of the military authority) proposed two concepts, a framework nation and a lead nation concept. These derive from military CSDP operations, and are to be used as a concept for logistics tasks and responsibilities also in the EUPM civilian mission, when it comes to the need for rapid deployment.

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consequent availability of police forces and logistic assets at short notice. The two concepts are to be pursued in the non-crisis period. For example, when it comes to the functions like medical and health care support in the case of the shared units like IPU, lead nations must provide medical services able to offer at least immediate care, collection of casualties, initial treatment, stabilisation and MEDEVAC - inside the area of operations - to civilian or military facilities authorised to provide further treatment. EUPM should be the one managing the MEDEVAC from the area of operations to national facilities or to allied or friendly-nation facilities; the same logistic approach as for MEDEVAC will be applied, as far as possible, to casualty evacuation - CASEVAC.

When it comes to the use of specific equipment by the IPUs the guidelines state that: “Although IPUs are equipped to handle a broad spectrum of police operations, some situations may require very specialised or additional equipment that is not normal for IPUs (additional APCs, bulldozers, CBRN resources, helicopters, etc.) but is available within the military units. Close cooperation and coordination with the military units may alleviate this. This requires not only close cooperation while planning such deployment but also mastering the required techniques and other arrangements with regard to interoperability aspects.” Additionally, the IPUs should be able to respond with mobility and operating capacity, for certain logistic functions (e.g. maintenance of certain heavy equipment such as armoured vehicles, supply of some material or services). Again, this could possibly be provided through military logistic units (in order to minimise the police logistic footprint on the ground) if properly prepared and coordinated well in advance. Those aspects would have to be taken into consideration at an early stage in the planning for the operation.

However, also in terms of the shared resources between the two mission in general, an improved cooperation followed in terms of the practical assets that EUPM needed with the change of its mandate in 2005. When supporting the local authorities, which used to be one of the critical points that were not addressed with the EUFOR operation’s deployment, EUPM could assess the need for support in terms of resources and make the request to EUFOR, which then decided whether it will provide the support or not. The supporting unit then coordinated its actions directly with EUPM and local police. Again, the IPU was often used in this context as it possessed, for example, technical resources that local police forces lack and could also be provided by the military in advance.

EUFOR indeed played a role in the militarization of the law enforcement. EUFOR provided for gathering intelligence and information on the general security situation in the country and crime trends. Soldiers stationed in LOTs houses gathered open-source information, by EUFOR HQ in
Sarajevo and BiH law enforcement. Moreover, in the realm of border control, EUFOR helped to secure the BiH’s frontiers, providing aerial imagery military maps and night-vision goggles. In 2008 EUFOR support for border policing was scaled down, together with the overall strength of the mission itself, and as a consequence, there proposals to use EUFOR capabilities such as helicopters for border surveillance appeared.

However, securitization of law enforcement has been problematic. Some cases have been perceived as rather unconventional tasks, for example: “activities at the other end of the risk spectrum, such as helping citizens who had worked in Western Europe to fill out pension claim forms, were not appreciated by soldiers either.” Moreover, a major issue arising with EUFOR’s active participation in tackling organised crime, is that the operations itself were not executed in the compliance with the local law procedures, and in general nullified the results, since the evidence EUFOR had found, could not be used in court. Therefore their sole participation was problematic with regards to the results of the operation. EUPM personnel also complained about self-promotion, due to EUFOR’s “excessively robust and visible appearance in the course of these operations [tackling organized crime], which aimed at conveying a message of “taking action against the problems encountered”. Another concern with the EUPM was that EUFOR was in fact doing the job of the locals, and thus crushing the idea of enhancing local ownership, promoted by the EUPM. 

4.5 CivMil Interface in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Since this was the first time that the EU deployed a civilian and a military crisis management operation simultaneously in the same country, EU faced several challenges – only some of which have been resolved. It is clear that the EU had problems identifying the overlaps between the mandates, which were not addressed when the military operation EUFOR Althea was first launched in 2004, but rather after May 2005, when the first report on the lessons identifies was released. A clear example of this is the planning process, where it was obvious from the very beginning that the civil mission EUPM and the military operation EUFOR Althea did not have a joint

strategic planning and a common set of connecting structures was not provided for. No direct obligation to liaise existed and the lack of organic liaison personnel slowed down the creation of relationships between EUPM and EUFOR Althea in the field. Moreover, EUFOR Althea was ordered to perform tasks that belonged to or were more suited to other authorities (the fight against organized crime). Hence the first phase, the overlaps between the missions happened mainly due to the differing interpretations of the mission mandates.

With the changes in the mandates in 2006, the coordination became better over time, and new procedures and structures came in place between EUPM and EUFOR, as well as EUSR, which took on the coordinating role between the operations. Weekly coordination meetings between Heads of the Mission, coordinating the actions of both missions, as well as the regular meetings on the lower level, followed after the implementation of the Common Operational Guidelines in 2006. Coherence in the field was more difficult to achieve, due to the absence of the common comprehensive approach that would guide the different actors in the country, when they would be tackling the same issue-area, like organized crime. The blurred lines between the civilian and the military mission were visible in the field of staffing, especially when it comes to the EUFOR Althea’s reliance on IPU. After the implementation of the Guidelines, this has also been regulated. The demarcation lines between EUFOR Althea’s and EUPM’s mandates were strengthened after the change in EUPM’s mandate, however, the lack of the policy coherence in the field of staffing remained. When it comes to the both missions’ functions, especially activities performed by EUFOR Althea were quite unusual for the military to take on. EUPM also pointed out the problem of robust force used in these non-military activities by the EUFOR Althea’s troops. The lesson learned from this process is, that the mandates of the civilian and military mission need to be sufficiently clear and precise and provide for the delineation of the activities and tasks. Moreover, the mandates need to take into account the need for pre-determined structures of communication, coordination and cooperation; general directions concerning coordination between different actors in the same country are not sufficient and it should not be left solely up to the will of the actors to liaise and coordinate their activities. Clear structures and modalities for cooperation should be a defined responsibility for each person in the field, taken into account at the strategic level, before the deployment of the mission. Guidelines and guiding principles are also a lesson identified as a good practice to quickly improve
cooperation, without significant changes in the mandate – but the need for the actors in the field to even initiate such a process reveals the inability of the EU to promptly adapt to the problems and change the mandate accordingly.

All in all, the Bosnia and Herzegovina case study is a perfect example of how important the planning process is, but also the sole operationalization of it in the field, when it comes to the possibility of overlaps of the civilian and military efforts. The pre-established liaison structures and guidelines on practices of cooperation and communication can substantially reduce the overlaps and prevent possible gaps that would not be covered by any mission. However, the coherence can largely be improved with the creation of clear mandates and guidelines that emphasize cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military mission form the beginning. The possibilities of improvement of cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a process of learning by doing and even though that the cooperation has improved during the years of the missions’ functioning simultaneously, this does not imply that there is no room for improvement in developing the coordination between the different EU crisis management instruments.
5 CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE: DISCUSSING THE RESULTS

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have analysed the civilian-military interface from an EU perspective and at field level, with the case study BiH. The identified gaps and overlaps between civilian and military capabilities as well as potential/possibilities to strengthen the CivMil interface have been discussed in an online platform in which EU policy makers, practitioners and academics are represented. This was done in the form of online polls, pushed to this targeted audience in order to gather relevant feedback for the research findings. The results of the discussion in the online platform are presented below, but it must be stressed that these are initial discussion results and that in-depth discussions will take place during the policy dialogues planned in March-July 2017.

5.2 Methods

The chosen method to engage the target audience was to have an online poll, which would attract as much as possible answers in a brief period of time. The poll consisted of 5 closed questions (Yes/No and Agree/Disagree) that could be answered within 5 minutes. At the same time respondents were given the possibility to elaborate their answers in text fields. Respondents did not have to provide affiliation, in order to lower the threshold to reply as much as possible. The poll was distributed between 16 February 2017 and 24 February 2017 in two ways in order to reach a largest possible target audience:

(a) an online questionnaire, distributed via an emailing list to 82 email addresses, mainly practitioners in the field of CSDP at EU level. The list includes 42 representatives of an EU Institution, 19 of national ministries (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence of various countries) and 21 academic representatives.

(b) an online poll on the IECEU Twitter account, which has 348 followers, mainly academics, with also a number of NGOs, EEAS and ministries' representatives following.

The five questions asked in the online poll were:
Q1. What are the major obstacles for joint civilian-military crisis management operations (CMO’s)? Possible answers: Planning Process, Financing Joint CivMil CMO’s, Command of Joint CivMil CMO’s, Differences in Culture, Lack of Interoperability

Q2. Can more efforts be made to foster mutual understanding, trust and interoperability in CivMil? If yes, what can be done?

Q3. Are there political obstacles in developing joint CivMil crisis management operations?

Q4. Would staff exchanges be beneficial between the military and civilian institutions (EUMS, CPCC and CMPD)?

Q5. Is the current training ESDC-training system sufficiently addressing the Civ-Mil synergies?

5.3 Results of discussion in online platform

The online questionnaire got in total 19 responses from the target audience and the results show that the perceived main obstacles for joint civilian-military CMO’s are:

*Financing (76.5%);

*Command of joint civilian-military CMO’s (72.5%);

*Differences in culture (70.6%);

*Planning process (66.7%) and;

*Lack of interoperability (55.6%).

The qualitative comments mentioned that one of the issues is having different pipelines and military leadership. Leadership should be decided on the basis of what is best for mission. Another comment mentioned that joint CivMil crisis management is a ‘bad’ good idea. When implemented on the ground it does not work for far more many reasons than the ones listed in the online poll. A further comment was that one of the perceived obstacles is the hidden civilian agenda (described as an effort to have political impact i.e. like enhancing western culture).
A specific question was also asked to see whether the target audience felt there are political obstacles in developing joint CivMil crisis management operations. The results show that 72.2% of the target audience felt that this was the case. The explanatory comments given were that (1) obstacles are mainly of a political nature linked to rules for financing of military CSDP and (2) a cultural component was added observing there are negative attitudes against military organisations.

In terms of the common understanding in CivMil, 83.3% of the respondents answered that more efforts can be made to foster mutual understanding, trust and interoperability in CivMil. This is a high score and shows that the target audiences' perception that both sectors are still much divided and those bridges need to be built.

The sub-question what can be done also got interestingly a large number of qualitative observations that almost exclusively focused on the training system. Mostly the strengthening of joint exercises and work on harmonising SOP's, exchange programmes and joint training, joint planning was mentioned as way forward as they are ways of trust building and enhance understanding. It was also mentioned that this could be taken one step further, i.e. joint education of civilian and military experts in planning and conducting operations, not only in the formats of ESDC- run courses but also on the level of tertiary education, e.g. joint civil--military academies or joint European general staff officers' education.

These replies are in line with the question on the current courses in the ESDC--training system and whether these sufficiently address the CivMil synergies. 70.6% answered that this is insufficiently the case.

This perception that more can be done is confirmed by the answers to the question whether staff exchanges would be beneficial between the military and civilian institutions (EUMS, CPCC and CMPD). A nearly unanimous agreement is noted as 94.4% agreed with this (and only 1 respondent answered 'no opinion').

The Twitter poll was limited to one question, i.e. Q1 of the online questionnaire (What are the major obstacles for joint civilian-military crisis management operations). Also, it could only include a
maximum four options for an answer, which meant that one option had to be left out (i.e. financing).

The poll received 11 replies and 55% of respondents selected lack of interoperability as the major obstacle for joint civilian-military crisis management operations.

This is a slightly different result from the online questionnaire, which can be partly explained by observing that one key answer option was missing in the Twitter poll (i.e. finances). As such, from a methodological point of view, the results cannot be compared. Also, the online questionnaire and Twitter poll were addressed to different target audiences (practitioners versus academics). However, the data set is too limited to conclude that different perceptions exist between these two target audiences of what constitute major obstacles for joint civilian-crisis management operations.

### 5.4 Conclusions

The online platform provided an unique opportunity to validate initial findings with the target audiences in EU-institutions, national ministries and NGO’s. Measured in numerical numbers, the response rates are not high (around 25% for the online questionnaire), but the wealth of qualitative observations is considerable, indicating that the relevant target audience has been reached.

Also, the findings from the online platform confirm the findings of the research done in chapters 2 and 3 and indicate that major steps still need to be taken to further strengthen the civilian military cooperation and interface, in order to create synergies at strategic, tactical and operational level.

These initial results of the dialogue with key stakeholders will be further deepened in the following months, where a number of policy dialogues are planned to discuss the IECEU research findings more in detail and come to a better understand what possible conclusions can be drawn, what new approaches can be identified and how these can be tested.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Current State of CivMil and Prognosis

CivMil in the EU has developed positively since the inception of ESDP/CSDP, notwithstanding the various issues raised in this chapter. There is a good degree of interaction between the civilian and military institutions and individuals and the professional practitioners both at the strategic level and in the field continue to explore ways to further cooperate and coordinate. The separateness of structures and procedures at the Brussels level extend also to the field level. While at the tactical level in the field synergies are sought and implemented, this cannot make up for strategic shortcomings. However, it does generally lead to positive outcomes which in turn enhance mission accomplishment.

The search for CivMil synergies is an ongoing process. Increased cooperation and coordination are objectives of both sides, even if from different perspectives and with differing objectives. There are many serious challenges but there is also a clear determination to make the EU a more effective international player in Crisis Intervention. Based on the theoretical deliberations and taking into consideration the findings of the case study as well as the online poll, and in order to support these developments, the following conclusions and recommendations are offered:

Conclusions

- The major obstacles for the implementation of effective CivMil cooperation, coordination and synergies can be identified as the planning and decision-making process and financial and command aspects of CSDP missions.\(^{135}\) So far this has prevented the creation of joint military-civilian operations. While this is essentially true, it is also the case that no attempt or proposal has been made to do this. Given the difficulties posed by these particular issues, it may be more productive to focus efforts on areas which can be somewhat more easily resolved. While this approach may appear to be avoiding the really big issues, it could incrementally create

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situations which may make them more amenable to solutions in the longer term. In the interim it is also very likely to lead to improved efficiencies.

- Consideration should be given to a programme of staff exchanges between the military and civilian institutions, in particular the EUMS, CPCC and CMPD. This has been done before but should now be done in a planned fashion focusing on identified skill sets such as planning, logistics, intelligence, CIS.

- As a follow-up to staff exchanges joint training should be developed. This can be a combination of on-the-job training and participation in formal courses. There are many benefits to be reaped from this cross-training in terms of developing expertise in leadership, planning, logistics etc as well as in providing much greater understanding of the civilian and military approaches to these disciplines. An expanded ESDC could play a leading role in this initiative as well as the multitude of military, police and civilian training and education institutions in MS. Some cross-training exists already but it should be expanded and formalised.

- The current development under way in establishing a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) for non-executive military missions needs to be addressed with a degree of caution. There has to be unity of intent and effort by all actors. It is unclear exactly how the MPCC will develop - whether it will continue to be a component of the EUMS or something different; whether it is an interim step or an end in itself; what channels it will identify and develop in order to work with the CPCC; and what resources it will have to fulfil the mandate of the Council. It will be vital that all parties realise the enormous potential of this initiative both in the immediate matter of enhancing the military planning and conduct capability for small military missions but also for the potential it has to provide a giant leap forward in developing the CivMil interface. The greatest danger is that the end product will be unfit for purpose leading to a version of MPCC which will lack the necessary resources and may not achieve the desired objectives.

- The chains of command for civilian and military missions and operations are likely to remain separate and distinct and the challenge is, therefore, to develop effective coordination at all levels of command. This is essential not just in terms of deployed missions and operations, but work is also required to define and develop the relationships between deployed missions and operations and those who control other EU instruments, specifically, EEAS MDs, EUSRs,
HoDs and Commission representatives. This is necessary in order to de-conflict activities in the same theatre by actors representing different EU instruments.

- It is accepted that the CivMil is an integral and vital component of the CA and as such requires a focus by MS, the Council of the EU, the EEAS, the Commission and the EU Institutions. Other international organisations, especially the UN and NATO are working on related concepts and should be studied closely and consulted. In addition to existing liaison structures in place with the UN and NATO consideration should be given to the creation of a dedicated CivMil development unit.

- There has been much good work done in the decade and a half of ESDP/CSDP on CivMil with the creation of EU bodies and structures facilitating greater CivMil coherence. This work should continue. The concept of CMCO should be built upon with the CivMil as one of the central themes. Currently the EU Council stresses that developments must be within current structures and resources and this is fully understandable. However, it may not be possible to continue the positive development track of CSDP in this vein indefinitely. In the long term it may well be that additional structures and resources will be necessary.

- The EU Crisis Management Procedures, following the ToL and the de Kermabon Review, are more streamlined and more effective but require further ongoing review with the more difficult areas of decision-making, financing and command issues on the table. The introduction of the PFCA, which came out of the de Kermabon Review, was a positive step forward in developing the CivMil. It is important that periodic reviews on this scale are implemented in order to assess progress and identify pragmatic improvements.

- Financing of civilian and military missions and operations is likely to continue separately and with its current processes for some time. Within this constraint, the legal provisions underpinning it limit potential options for synergies. However, much can be achieved with flexibility. The case of the CBSD is a good example where dysfunctionality can be eradicated by a helpful interpretation of the constraints. This needs goodwill and political will by the owners of all the EU instruments.
The development of the PRISM concept will almost certainly lead to a better focus on CivMil by all parties. This should manifest itself in all the categories of PRISM but particularly within the Integrated Approach section. The EU may struggle with the age-old tension of CivMil but a continuous and constructive approach can lead to the most efficient and effective co-existence of the civilian and military capabilities. This can be achieved by politically supporting the professional staff working to improve the effectiveness of EU CSDP missions and operations and by a political resolve to remove the barriers that have grown up to prevent real CivMil coherence. Allied to this is the question of where the military instrument sits in the EU organisation. What is the realistic level of military ambition for the EU? Does it lie in persisting with the ambition of the HHG which speaks of standby forces of up to 60,000 troops, or is it limited to the EUTM type of military missions currently deployed, or is it somewhere in between? What kind of Air and Maritime missions are foreseen? These questions are intimately tied up with the position of military advice in the EU. Their determination should be a genuinely CivMil process at the highest levels of policymaking in the EU.

Recommendations

As a consequence of the previous analysis, the following pragmatic recommendations can be drawn in order to strengthen the CivMil interface. They are grouped in two categories, which are fundamental for improving the interface i.e. temporal (short-medium-long term) as well as political feasibility (low-medium-high). The following table therefore offers a diverse menu of how to possibly enhance the CivMil interface. Some of the recommendations seem to be currently set in place and the future will show how they will further develop. They also take into consideration the outcome of the online poll that was carried out within the framework of this workshop. As chapter 5 shows, within the expert and practitioner community planning and financing joint missions and operations were considered as most problematic in the CivMil interface.

To conclude, although several concrete recommendations as illustrated in table 5 can be made to strengthen CivMil cooperation, it very much depends on the political will that should be coupled with realistic levels of ambition for all aspects of CSDP capacities.
Table 5 Recommendations

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<tr>
<th>POLITICAL FEASIBILITY</th>
<th>Short term</th>
<th>Medium term</th>
<th>Long Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Enhanced flexibility and connectivity in the financing of civilian and military missions within the current processes – e.g. case of the CBSD</td>
<td>Explore greater coherence in the funding streams for military and civilian missions and operations</td>
<td>Explore the development of a unified Command and Control system for joint civilian and military deployments.</td>
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<td>Medium</td>
<td>Develop continuity and effective coordination across all levels of civilian and military command</td>
<td>Build upon the concept of CMCO, involving all EU instruments, with CivMil as one of the central themes</td>
<td>Be prepared to expend additional EU resources in the development of CSDP structures which will contribute the effectiveness in EU crisis management.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>De-conflict activities between different EU instruments in the same theatre by defining and developing the relationships between deployed missions and operations and those who control EEAS MDs, EUSRs</td>
<td>Creation of joint military-civilian operations</td>
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<th>High</th>
<th>and HoDs</th>
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<td>Develop a process of enhanced staff exchanges between the military and civilian institutions, in particular the EUMS, CPCC and CMPD</td>
<td>Consult relevant UN and NATO concepts on formal liaison structures and create a dedicated EU CivMil development unit</td>
<td>Ensure maximum levels of common understanding of culture, ethos, capabilities and interoperability between the civilian and military instruments. All initiatives should embrace these aspirations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a well-resourced and capable Military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) for non-executive military missions and for developing the CivMil interface.</td>
<td>Develop plans for the extension of the MPCC to cover larger executive military missions.</td>
<td>Conduct periodic and wide-ranging reviews of EU Crisis Management Procedures in areas of decision-making, financing and command</td>
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<td>Support EU bodies and structures facilitating greater CivMil coherence</td>
<td>Development, expansion and formalisation of joint training through a combination of in-mission training and participation in formal courses</td>
<td>Enhanced political support for professional staff efforts to develop the Integrated Approach, including the CivMil interface.</td>
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<td>Develop effective communication and coordination between the military and civilian chains of command at all levels from the strategic to the mission ground level.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure that political will is coupled with realistic levels of ambition for all aspects of CSDP capacities.</td>
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D6.2 Identification of the overlap

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