Background Paper on

Interoperability in EU CSDP crisis management

Reference: IECEU D6.3 Review of the interoperability of resources

IECEU is proposing new approaches and solutions to long-term peacebuilding in EU external actions.

Analysing and assessing the CSDP on-going and past missions and operations. Learning from lessons provided by these missions and assessing the different options for conflict prevention. Providing new approaches and recommendations for EU to improve long-term stability.

The IECEU consortium is coordinated by Laurea University of Applied Sciences (Finland) and consists of a diverse group of research, governmental and private sector organisations.

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this document is to raise the understanding of interoperability in the field of the European Union CSDP military and civilian crisis management. The scope of this document is built in IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of the capabilities in EU conflict prevention) – project.

Interoperability relies on systems being able to both provide and accept services, units, tools and personnel, is the foundation of cooperation and pooling and sharing within crisis management. Poor interoperability or lack of interoperability leads to inefficiency, wasted resources and at the very worst, inability to act. There are several on-going processes and initiative within EU to increase interoperability. Strengthening interoperability is vital also within the civil-military environment, with the increasing focus on integrated crisis management operations and an even more complicated security environment in the European neighbourhood.

Through IECEU comparative analysis of interoperability in civilian CSDP crisis management missions (EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL RAFAH, EUBAM Libya, EUAVSEC South Sudan, EFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Congo) and CSDP military operations (EUFOR Althea, EUFOR Chad/RCA, EUFOR CAR, Operation Artemis (Congo)), IECEU has found potentials for enhancing interoperability in the current EU structures and practises. The seven key components of analysis on IECEU interoperability are:

(1) planning;
(2) staffing;
(3) shared services (mission support);
(4) equipment;
(5) command systems and information sharing;
(6) third state participation and cooperation;
(7) review systems.

Beyond the findings there are mechanisms to enhance interoperability, three main challenges for interoperability identified as part of IECEU project can be concluded into three main areas: i) divergent, non-standardised and sometimes contradictory national practices, which remain evident in CSDP operations and missions. ii) lack of a mind-set for increasing interoperability in practice especially in civilian missions, but also between civilian and military actors, even where increasing interoperability has no foreseen costs; iii) the current intergovernmental set-up of the CSDP crisis management operations, some of which, is based on the very foundations of the EU (including the Lisbon treaty), which hinders the development of interoperability.

These analysis, identified potentials and main challenges require political discussion on which alternatives are viable and which are not. To create a basis for policy dialogues, the interoperability study finally presented a list of discussion points for policy dialogues to be conducted in Policy Dialogue organised in 27th March 2017.

The policy dialogue will be held to analyse the potential in practice for pooling and sharing the EU capabilities. The analyses and assessments established during IECEU project aim to support the policy dialogue and discussions.
1 IECEU Research: Case Studies 2016-2017 and data collection

IECEU Consortium has examined (2016-2017) the effectiveness of EU capabilities in military and civilian crisis management operations by using common IECEU Conceptual Framework. The main data collection methods have been desk study research, active observation and interviews of personnel representing the EU CSDP operation, local authority, other international organizations, local population or EU institute (HQ)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Region</th>
<th>Operation(s)</th>
<th>Research completed by</th>
<th>Year of the field study</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>University of Ljubjana, Slovenia</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>National Defence University Finland</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Congo Operation Artemis</td>
<td>Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC Denmark)</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>EUVSEC South Sudan</td>
<td>Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, Austria</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>EUFOR Chad/RCA EUPOL CAR</td>
<td>National Defence University Finland</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>Crisis Management Centre Finland</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>National University of Ireland Maynooth— Kennedy Institute Ireland</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>Crisis Management Centre Finland</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In total

8 Case Studies 12 operations 2016-2017 265

Additional data collection relevant on interoperability:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Research completed by</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviews on civil-military synergies</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>National Defence University Finland</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey on Interoperability</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Enquiry</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interoperability is defined in the conceptual framework of the IECEU (DL1.5), where interoperability is one of the six capabilities examined part of IECEU Case Study research on the effectiveness of EU capabilities in CSDP missions and operations. D1.5 defines capabilities as 'resources plus competences' and gives an overall description what interoperability is in the context of the project as follows:

- Coordination;
- Cooperation/Collaboration;
- Civ-Mil/Civ-Mil-Mil synergies.
2 Introduction to interoperability in CSDP missions and operations

Interest in, and development of, interoperability has been a key focus of the European Union from its inception, as from an interoperability point of view, the institutional framework of the CSDP crisis management operations is challenging, as all 28 EU Member States, the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat, and the European Parliament (as budgetary authority) have their role to play. The impact of this complex decision making matrix varies between civilian missions and military operations.

On the military side, there is a clear argument for enhancing interoperability as promoting national interest, stemming from the post WW2 and cold war context. The need to cooperate, as ingrained by the Alliance and NATO, has become an integral part of a common defence culture extending to a mind-set where cooperation is enhanced by a common doctrine and a series of mechanisms from common training and exercises to equipment. The standardization process within NATO is very developed, with three standardization bodies, a NATO Standardization Documents Database (NSDD) and 231 (often very detailed) standards, whose implementation is facilitated through apps and training.

This acquis has been the starting point of the military component of the CSDP, giving it a competitive advantage over civilian missions, where both the rationale behind the CSDP missions as well as interoperability in general is a work in progress. Development of interoperability in the CSDP missions is also much less developed in terms of common doctrine and implementation hereof, as well as focus of the central organisation in charge of steering the process, but cooperation is also 50 years younger than on the military side.

Specifically, the development of interoperability is focused mainly on Council conclusions and strategies, whereas implementation in the field is equally vital, if not more so. In the field, interoperability is often quite detailed and technical, and lagging on the civilian side. Taking the example of pre-deployment training and capabilities of the CSDP-staff, one finding is that relying on the EU Member States resources leads to the result that staff is pre-deployment trained in 28 different ways, affecting both their level of preparedness as well as their ability to work on-site in a standardised way. Such an effect is much less noticed in military operations, where the benefits of the common defence culture nurtured by NATO (and now further enhanced by the EDA) are evident in the field.

Increasing interoperability is a key mechanism for the CSDP to improve its efficiency.

There is now the potential of renewed political will to increase interoperability as evidenced in the vision of ‘integrated CSDP crisis management operations’ in the 2016 Global Strategy, an increased focus on EUs neighbourhood as well as growing security concerns. Interoperability is a key enabler of Pooling and Sharing, both central mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of CSDP crisis management operations, as well as improving potential for cooperation between national actors. Although interoperability is often seen as mainly a cost saving mechanism, it builds common organisational culture and solidarity. Interoperability leads to more effective use of current capabilities and increases availability of resources for the States to deploy for EU, NATO, multinational or national purposes. In short: increasing interoperability is one of the key mechanisms that EU can use to improve its efficiency.

This understanding has not gone amiss within the EU in general, and there have been several positive initiatives to create greater interoperability. One applaudable example is the recent force generation planning...
guide for civilian CSDP missions that revised the existing job descriptions to ensure continuity within and between them for comparable functions across the missions. It is detailed and practical, with harmonised job descriptions, job categories and references to the European Qualifications Framework.

Other positive developments are taking place in mission support platform and the common warehouse initiative. By centralising assets that are used in missions, there are greater economies of scale, and speed for both deployment and liquidation of missions can be significantly enhanced. The centralisation creates a common rulebook, this time about the equipment and services needed for a crisis management operation. It establishes a de facto standard that ideally is again linked to the training system and national states. On the military side, a similar initiative is the work on the capabilities performed by the EDA. By developing European core operational concepts, that are both highly relevant in any crisis management operations and enable capabilities of 27 EU Member States to work together, interoperability is enhanced and the potential for pooling and sharing of capabilities is realised. Here too agreeing on a common rule book is a key part of the process.

However, it seems, and as IECEU study on interoperability shows, interoperability is seldom hampered by the lack of a joint rule book (as there are many) per se but rather by the lack of implementation and focus on interoperability in the field. Certainly, rule books themselves could be more comprehensive, tailored (e.g. for strategic, tactical and operational levels) and cover the crisis management operation lifecycle better. Indications from the field, however, show that the main obstacle to interoperability is in a mindset, where even when there are relatively simple potentials for increasing interoperability, these potentials are not acted on.

A new dimension to interoperability is both the potential of a greater number of integrated missions necessitating a higher level of civil-military interoperability as well as the increased need to include civilian components into military operations (generally to add expertise), and military components into civilian missions (generally to increase the security of the mission). Where military or civilian components are added, the mission/operation becomes somewhat integrated while remaining purely military or purely civilian in terms of organisation.

As the “soft-power” afforded to the EU in the form of its civilian missions is unique global asset for the EU, there are also clear limits to increased cooperation and integration between the civilian missions and operations to ensure that that “soft power” is not lost through lack of credibility as a civilian actor. Similarly, although the EU cooperates with many actors, third country and international participation and cooperation in CSDP is growing emphasis. The larger the number of actors, the more clearly challenges of interoperability become visible, and the more benefit EU has on increasing interoperability. Moreover, the more divergent EU practices are, the more challenging will cooperation be with external partners and the less likely it is to produce desirable outcomes.

This definition gives a very broad understanding of interoperability. To enable more in-depth analysis, this report will use a more detailed definition, provided in 2011 by the Presidency in a note issued to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, on the subject of Standardization and Interoperability. In this note, interoperability is identified as one of several levels of standardization described. The note defines interoperability in the context of CSDP crisis management operations as:

This definition is in use within the EU currently and as such provides a good basis for further analysis.

### 3 IECEU Comparative analysis: CSDP crisis management operations

The interoperability in civilian CSDP missions was analysed by focusing on seven mission components: (1) planning, (2) staff, (3) shared services, (4) equipment, (5) command systems & information sharing, (6) Third states participation in crisis management operations and (7) review systems. This categorization was the result of the content analyses conducted as part of the study on D6.3 Interoperability.

#### Planning

As part of this component the following areas were analysed both in civ-civ and mil-mil context:

- Planning documents (i.e. PFCA, CMC, CONOPS);
- Planning phases;
- Interoperability gaps in the implementation.

Based on the analyses, it can be concluded that the CSDP crisis management operation planning process is quite similar for civilian and military deployments. At political-strategic level it is initiated by the same organ, the PSC, which decides whether ‘EU-action is appropriate’.

Divergence starts at tactical and operational level, where the main observed divergence is procedural, i.e. the order in which steps are taken differ. For civilian missions, the CONOPS (Concept of Operations) is developed before the Council Decision is taken to establish a mission, whereas in military operations the Council Decision is first taken and then the CONOPS is developed on the basis of the initiating military directive. The drafting authorities for the CONOPS are also different, CPCC for the civilian side and the operational commander for the military side.

It is unclear how these differences impact cooperation in the field, as the case studies did not look at the planning aspect, as this is mostly done at headquarter level in Brussels. However, it is noted that aside from the joint development of the crisis management concept at PSC level, there are no standing civilian-military coordination structures at operational, field level. Civil-military coordination at the operational level needs to be arranged on a case-by-case basis. Basically, the jointly initiated crisis management concept, is developed in separate civilian and military pipelines, where only ad-hoc coordination is initiated.

Herein lies also the potential for further development of interoperability, i.e. the closer integration of the two civilian and military pipelines at planning phase. Once a crisis management operation is initiated, regardless whether it is civilian or military, both expertise should be structurally used in the planning, as this can lead to synergies, comprehensiveness and ultimately better planning.

**Interoperability potential:** Reinforce the jointly initiated crisis management concept with a more integrated, structured civilian/military operationalisation.

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Staffing

As part of this component the following areas were analysed both in civ-civ and mil-mil context:

- Recruitment & Selection of staff
- Training, education & exercises (including the training infrastructure, pre-deployment & in-mission training)
- Interoperability gaps in staff competences.

Based on the analyses, it can be concluded that staff is a central capability of any (civilian or military) CSDP mission/operation. CSDP missions typically rely primarily and almost exclusively on well-qualified, well-trained and capable personnel for their success. Although military operations rely on expert personnel as well, the broader use of high-tech equipment, the hierarchies in the military as well as the larger number of personnel in military missions, the skill-sets of individual crisis management professionals or their lack are not as vital for the success of the operation as a whole.

Selection and Recruitment of CSDP Staff

When comparing the civilian and military procedures for the selection of staff for CSDP crisis management operations, commonalities and differences can be observed. In civilian missions, the basis for the selection is formally the job description, with the mission having a final say on the selection process and engaging the applicant staff member. Such a process enhances interoperability in the field, as the mission staff makes the assessment on whether the applicant is a fit with the mission environment, its goals and existing staff. In CSDP military operations, the process is more complex, with a differentiation between HQ and field level. At HQ level, the ‘EU concept of force generation’ is quite similar to missions, where job descriptions are drafted and the commander of the operation has the final say.

However, on the field level, the situation is slightly different, as EU Member States do recruit individuals participating to the operation themselves, based on own requirements (that are based on the ‘Statement of recruitment’ set by the operational commander, but interpreted by the EU Member States themselves). In practice this means that EU Member States introduce national caveat restrictions (i.e. what a mission member can and cannot do), which is observed to have a major impact on missions and the ability of forces working together. Basically, in the same operation, staff is selected on the basis of different rule books and this is continued in the field, as these rule books affect what they can and cannot do.

The potential of interoperability here lies in narrowing down the opportunities for EU Member States to develop own requirements. Ideally, for operations, the Statement of recruitment’ set by the operational commander should be copied 1:1 by the participating EU Member States, with no ‘time-out’ or caveats for EU Member States.

Interoperability potential: Discourage national (re)interpretation of the ‘Statement of recruitment’ used in CSDP military operations.

Pre deployment & Induction training of CSDP-CMO staff

In this area, there is a large potential for strengthening interoperability, by developing further a centralised pre-deployment training system linked to job descriptions within crisis management operations. Such a system should be informed by relevant experiences of missions and operations, and be mandatory before deployment. The system can be decentralised in its implementation, with courses held by existing training...
institutes, but should be centralised in terms of defining the terms of reference for the courses, attendees and include quality assurance system.

The comparison of the in-mission training for staff involved in CSDP crisis management operations leads to the observation that a number of commonalities exist between civilian and military practices. Both in mission and operations organise induction training for newcomers/incoming staff. Another point in common is that these trainings vary per crisis management operation size and there seems not to be one format for content of the training. Training typically covers both the host nation and context of the crisis management operation, but a common curriculum for such training does not seem to be adopted and depending on the size of the mission, less or more training is given.

**Interoperability potential:** Further develop a centralised/harmonized system of standardized pre-deployment training, linked to job descriptions.

**Interoperability potential:** Support joint civilian-military in-mission training where possible.

### Staff Capabilities

In terms of staff capabilities, the comparison of civilian missions and military operations leads to the observation that both mention two similar interoperability challenges, i.e. one relating to a common operations doctrine and another relating to the institutional memory of a mission.

As for the first point, a lack of unified understanding of fundamental missions concepts, relates to the finding that rather than relying on common pool of best practices, staff members often rely on their national best practices. For example, within one mission, different concepts of ‘Integrated Border Management’ were conveyed to local authorities. In terms of interoperability, the potential negative impact of different conceptual understandings are confusion as to tasks and priorities, competition over the correct interpretation of a concept, and diversion of resources from the tasks at hand to more foundational discussions as well as confusion at beneficiaries level. The potential for interoperability here lies in creating unified “working” versions of these concepts at Brussels level, in order to be mainstreamed over different missions in a uniform way. Ideally, these “working” concepts, would focus not on “What is integrated border management?” but rather on “What are the key elements that EU focuses on in promoting in CSDP integrated border management?”. In other words, translating these core concepts to the unique challenges of the CSDP-context and mainstreaming them into CSDP-staff trainings.

The second point relates to the currently existing rotation system (civilian missions: around 12 months, military operations: even as brief as 6 months), that hinders the interoperability of staff, as it leads to lack of continuity and negatively affects the ‘institutional memory’ of crisis management operations. Ideally, the institutional memory should be incorporated in the pre-deployment and in-mission trainings, strong standardised mission specific standardised operating procedures, information sharing mechanisms and compulsory hand-over notes, that are detailed and followed up by new staff.

**Interoperability potential:** Aim to harmonize “working” versions of key concepts

**Interoperability potential:** Create mechanisms to create and enforce institutional memory; Through training; Through standardized or near-standardized tools and ways of working; Through creating mechanisms for frequent, brief, and focused updates and hand-over notes.
Shared Services

When comparing the development of shared services in the civilian and military CSDP crisis management operations, a number of observations can be made in terms of interoperability.

Firstly, it seems that the civilian side is advanced in terms of putting the shared services concept into practice, with the establishment of the Mission Support Platform for civilian CSDP missions in April 2016. This platform is being developed, and aims to speed up the process of starting a mission, deployment and hand-over by defining standards for mission services, developing the mission capabilities such as common IT-systems and enabling the transfer of services. At military side, no such mission support platform exists. Only capability development initiatives are run by the EDA and intergovernmental funding mechanisms (e.g. Athena), covering common operational costs. Participating EU Member States can cover common costs like barracks or transportation through these initiatives. The impact hereof is that no common standards are developed and economies of scale are not reached.

The second observation is that in CSDP crisis management operations, an integrated civilian-military shared services platform does not exist. However, the EDA has taken several steps to develop such an integrated platform. One example is the procurement of commercial satellite communications services and the project ‘EU SatCom Market’. It pools and shares commercial satellite communications services for both military operations and civilian missions (lastly in EUTM Somalia). The EDA acts as a central purchasing body, managing framework contracts and related orders with a service provider on behalf of the contributing members. Another example is the EU Contractor Support to Operations Platform (CSO), which now serves the procurement-related needs of the military operations and mission, but could also serve the needs of the civilian missions and help to enhance the efficiency of the heavy procurement processes faced especially at the beginning of the civilian missions.

Furthermore, coordination of the civilian and military operation acquisition could help to identify new areas where dual-use capabilities could be developed, increase the cost-efficiency through better contracts, and shorten the acquisition processes for civilian missions. The potential of interoperability for shared services lies in the further development of this concept, where the main focus should be the development of common standards for civilian and military shared services, as this enhances intra-mission interoperability and builds economies of scale. Such a standard should consider the differences between both types of missions and their specific needs.

**Interoperability potential:** Develop common standards for civilian and military shared services.

Equipment

As part of this component the following areas were analysed both in civ-civ and mil-mil context:

- Availability of the equipment;
- Logistics;
- Communication and information systems architecture.

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5 The platform serves as a forum for interaction between experts from national authorities and potential or actual contractors, suppliers or service providers (economic operators) to exchange information in order to support the identification of commercial solutions for operational needs. The platform was launched by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in November 2013 as a successor of the Third Party Logistic Support (TPLS) Platform and consists of a publicly accessible and a restricted domain for registered governmental experts and economic operators. European Defence Agency, 2016. ‘EU Contractor Support to Operations Platform’, accessed 03 November 2016, at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/procurement-gateway/opportunities/if-you-are-industry-or-rto/eu-contractor-support-to-operations-platform
AVAILABILITY OF THE EQUIPMENT

The CSDP missions and operations share challenges related to generating sufficient resources to fulfil the key objectives. The permanent warehouse concept for the civilian missions is a recent innovation, addressing the challenges related to availability of the equipment needed in the missions. It is observed that such a concept does not exist in military CSDP operations. There is no joint logistics centre or warehouse, and the common equipment such as computer hardware, communication equipment, and safety equipment is acquired separately for each CSDP-operation by the countries contributing to the operations.

However, such a permanent warehouse developed for the civilian missions could also be beneficial for military CSDP operations, as it helps them to overcome many of the shortages faced upon deployment and termination of the operation. In addition, if it synergies are sought with the civilian warehouse, the additional benefit of economies of scale can be achieved, though this might be complex to pursue due to the different funding mechanisms and type of equipment needed.

Interoperability potential: Develop a common warehouse for military operations and consider to building synergies with the existing civilian warehouse.

LOGISTICS

Both civilian missions and military operations do face the same logistical challenges when mobilising and deploying abroad. However, currently, the civilian and military domains have remained separated and developed their own solutions. For civilian missions, these capabilities are usually acquired through contracting. For military operations, there are different institutional arrangements for setting-up an adequate logistics architecture (e.g. framework nation, multinational support arrangements, Host Nation Support) as well as contracting.

However, the logistics task is identical in civilian and military operations, as it is about planning, acquiring and testing mission movement and transport requirements, including infrastructure, organisation, facilities and equipment necessary for the deployment and movement of mission staff and assets. However, the interoperability between civilian and military domains remains limited, with only a few examples from shared logistics. For example, in the Horn of Africa, EU NAVFOR Atlanta transported EU CAP Nestor vehicles to Djibouti. In Somalia, the EU integrated compound in Mogadishu providing facilities for civilian and military mission operating parallel in the area. Furthermore, limited medical support is provided from the military mission to civilian mission in Somalia.

This is an area where further interoperabilities between the civilian and military sides should be explored, as it has potential benefits in economies of scale and efficiencies. In this regards, the concept Framework Nation or a Logistic Lead Nation (LLN), used both in military operations and civilian missions could be useful as it not only enhances economies of scale but is also a facilitator for the civil-military interoperability in the areas where for instance a police unit and a military force are deployed in parallel. However, the major challenge is to have a nation to want or capable to assume this role. Within military operation, to be a LLN

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6 The strategic CSDP warehouse for civilian crisis management missions was established with Council Decision 2012/698/CFS of 13 November 2012.
7 Interview with a former EU NAVFOR Atlanta Officer, 31 July 2015, in D1.3 Review on Civil-Military Synergies.
8 Interview with a former EEAS official, 8 September 2015, in D1.3 Review on Civil-Military Synergies.
9 The Lead Nation is the nation with the will and capability, resources, competence, and influences to organize and coordinate an agreed spectrum of logistic capability and/or service for all or part of the multinational force, including headquarters, within a defined geographical area for a defined period of time. The LLN could concurrently provide capabilities as Logistic Role Specialized Nation (LRSN).
10 LLN concept exists also for the EU police mission, (see 15956/04) and enables logistics to be managed by one nation.

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requires the nation to have the political will, the financial resources and the competence to organize and coordinate the spectrum of logistic capability or/ and services for the multinational force.\textsuperscript{11}

As such it raises the question, whether not a pan-European logistical solution should be sought, with a comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework. This framework would need to take into account the different functions and solutions seeking to improve cooperation between EU institutions, national governments and contracting companies with a view to ensure cost-efficiency, flexibility, and coherence of the CSDP logistics solutions. In the future, this strategy could be implemented through jointly developed doctrine fostering greater interoperability between the civilian and military sides, shared logistics and maintenance facilities, training and education establishments, and perhaps sometime far out in the future, through joint command and control structure.

**Interoperability potential:** Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework, addressing in a cost-effective way the logistical challenges of CSDP crisis management operations.

**COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE**

Communication and information systems need to be interoperable as they support the ability of the field units and agencies to talk and share data in real time, when needed and authorised. Such real-time data exchange is critical for the situational awareness and safety of CSDP-operatives in the field.

The case studies results indicate that field officers experience an inadequate CIS architecture in the field. Despite several concepts developed in the military and civilian sides (lead nation, private contractors), the divergences in communication and information systems remains an issue. Identified challenges are the rapid setting up of the secure and protected communications networks, availability, maintenance as well as, overall compatibility of computers and communication equipment. For instance, different mission, and nationalities tend to use radios that operate in various frequency bands.

Also, the equipment is often incompatible between the different CSDP missions and operations and there is no standard for an integrated civilian-military operation as both civilian missions and military operations have their own CIS-architecture.

The identified potential for interoperability here is defining a civilian and military CIS architecture with common procedures and standards that is addresses these issues, but at the same time takes into account the different civilian and military approaches in terms of security and access. An integrated CIS architecture could set standards in terms of type of equipment, frequencies, communication protocols, security, access control, thus creating interoperability as well as efficiencies and economies of scale as it would cover a larger spectrum of CSDP.

**Interoperability potential:** Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP CIS architecture

**Command Systems and Information Sharing**

This heading will explore the interoperability challenges in CSDP crisis management operations relating to command systems and information sharing. As part of this component the following areas were analysed both in civ-civ and mil-mil context;

- C2 systems;

\textsuperscript{11} EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led military operations, (8641/11), Council of the European Union.

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Command and Control systems

The Guidelines for Command and Control (C2) Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management\(^2\) establishes identical command structures for all civilian missions, with the CPCC director as the Civilian Operations Commander having operational command over all missions and each mission with their own Head of Mission. For military operations, there is no structure, but only a concept. The EU Concept for Military Command and Control\(^3\) sets out various options for setting up C2 structures, including autonomous EU operations as well as joint operations with NATO, with the possibility of national and ad-hoc headquarters. Basically, there is no standing military C2 structure as the establishment of command for military operations is done on a case-by-case basis.

The potential for interoperability here is that also the military side develops C2 structures for CSDP-operations, which ideally foresee in formal links with the civilian C2 structure at operational, tactical and strategic level. An additional challenge in developing such C2 structure is the relationship with NATO and the potential danger of duplication of efforts between the EU and NATO military structures. However, this is a design issue that can be solved, by ensuring that the C2 structure is also compatible with NATO.

Interoperability potential: Further develop a CSDP specific military command and control (C2) that caters both for synergies with the civilian C2 systems in use and is compatible with NATO structures.

Information sharing

In the case of information sharing the regulatory base is more standardized, as both missions and operations are subject to rules for protecting EU classified information. There is also substantive variation in communication practices in the field, as in practice all missions and operations develop their own communication systems, based on their needs. As such, the current state of CIS does not favour interoperable systems, but is rapidly changing.

Information sharing practices with partner organisations have been varied and problematic for both missions and operations, ranging from non-existent to functioning. While on the civilian side, the list of generic civilian CSDP tasks includes both information sharing with EU actors and external parties, it is unclear to what degree this is the case for the military. In practice, both the civilian and military review identified different case-specific issues in the sharing of information with other EU actors as well as external partners like the UN, hampering a comprehensive approach. It seems that there is a lack of clear common standards and their enforcement in the field level.

The role of unofficial communication channels have been identified as possible issues for both civilian missions and military operations. This is particularly the case in CSDP operations, where nominal command and control and relevant communication are centred on the operation, but parallel national communication channels also exist. Deployed units are funded and supplied by their national authorities and usually also report back to them. In addition, national agendas have been observed influencing the work of deployed

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units. The same is true to a lesser degree in civilian missions, where deployed staff is usually formed into national contingents, tasked with management and support of their national staff members. These structures usually also include a reporting element, where staff report to their seconding institutions on mission conditions. In both cases there is variation in practices between different participating countries.

In conclusion, clear gaps exist in CIS and information sharing in both the civilian missions and military operations, and particularly between them.

**Interoperability potential:** Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP CIS architecture (incl. training)

**Cyber security**

Cyber security has become an increasingly important part of CIS in recent years, both for the military and civilian sides. From a regulatory point of view there exists high potential interoperability between civilian missions and military operations in this regard, as both the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy\(^4\) and Cyberdefence Policy Framework\(^5\) highlight the importance of developing secure communications systems for both military and civilian actors.

Specifically, they highlight civil-military cooperation. Additionally, military operations have a specific Cyberdefence Concept, which the civilian missions currently lack. On the practical level, the various initiatives, including the satellite communications market and the operations centre concept can also support common cybersecurity approaches, but are still in their infancy. The establishment of the Mission Support Platform in April 2016 and its focus on developing common IT infrastructure for civilian missions can support the establishment of a common approach to cybersecurity, though questions on common civil-military standards still remain. While this work continues, CSDP missions have also already began developing the cybersecurity capabilities of their host nations.

As stated in the framework, the civil-military cooperation in the cyber domain will benefit from R&T, exchange of best practices, information exchange and early warning mechanisms, incident response risk assessments and awareness raising. The objective is to establish a comprehensive and cooperative European approach. The EDA has plays the key role in promoting the development of EU cyberdefence capabilities and technologies to address all aspects of capability development - including doctrine, leadership, organisation, personnel, training, technology, infrastructure, logistics and interoperability. The EDA activities, based on the recently adopted cyber strategy, focus on realistic deliverables within its remit and expertise: training and exercises, protection of headquarters, and Cyber Defence Research Agenda (focusing on dual use technologies).\(^6\) In addition, cyber defence is a domain where further cooperation with NATO should be done to avoid duplications of effort in times of budgetary constraint. The EU should explore possibilities on how the EU and NATO can complement their efforts to heighten the resilience of critical governmental, defence and other information infrastructures on which the members of both organisations depend.

**Interoperability potential:** Strengthen the EDA’s role in developing cyberdefence for CSDP crisis management operations and invest in building synergies with NATO.

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Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

An important part of information sharing is intelligence sharing. Although, intelligence is usually associated with the military operations, also the civilian missions need to maintain an adequate situational awareness throughout the mission. During the case studies, the need to strengthen the interoperability of intelligence capabilities was highlighted several times.

A current challenge is that there is no policy or guidance on early warning, situation assessments and legal aspects of the Computer Network Operations. All these domains are strongly interlinked to intelligence capabilities and further requirement work is needed to develop a capability that is interoperable, i.e. that enables the development of a common operational picture.

The European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) is one example how the EU seeks to address these capability shortfalls. The SatCen provides products and services based on exploiting space assets and collateral data, including satellite imagery and aerial imagery, and related services. It caters for the needs of both civilian and military operations. However, the case study findings indicate that there might be the need to have a robust geospatial capability in the operational headquarters, as from start of operations. In the case of EUFOR RCA, the importance of having timely geospatial intelligence readily available was highlighted.

Another current interoperability challenge that is not yet addressed is the absence of a common CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tool. Currently, the different organisations have their own systems which are often not compatible with the systems used by other EU missions or institutions. So far, perhaps the best example of a shared information platform exists in EU OPCEN, where the EU Command and Control Information System (EUCIS) is put in place. EUCIS is designed to be interoperable with the EU’s Goalkeeper Platform, which is non-classified software environment that serves EU Member States, headquarters and CSDP civilian missions by supporting training, recruitment, capability development and institutional memory of EU crisis management.

If utilized appropriately, these platforms can facilitate information sharing across the EU civilian and military missions. However, it will not solve the issue of intelligence sharing, since Goalkeeper is non-classified software. Yet, it can still be an important technological solution for tactical level civil-military information sharing.

Nevertheless, the EEAS currently seeks to address the challenges related to managing and distributing the intelligence by replacing the various stand-alone classified systems it inherited from the EU Council and EU Commission, and replace them with one integrated platform, the EEAS Corporate Classified Communication and Information System (ECIS). According to the EEAS this platform will take into account the technical constraints enforced by the EU Member States about classified information, and make the process of

19. Interview no. 2.
21. EUCIS is an information system composed of centralised applications, deployed on a network, accessible from the EU military and civilian staff user workstations and it is composed by a stable instance located in Brussels with the flexibility to be deployed everywhere in the world within a subordinated deployed Headquarters. Defence Aerospace. 2009. SELEX Sistemi Integrati: Completion of Increment 1 of the EUCIS (European Union Command and Control Information System), accessed at: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/106678/eu-accepts-increment-1-of-eucis-project.html.
passing of EU classified information between the different systems run more effectively. The platform is planned to be extended to also cover the CSDP missions and operations.

**Interoperability potential:** Consider developing a CSDP concept for so called CNO’s, enhancing the common operational picture and interoperabilities in the field.

**Interoperability potential:** Consider developing a CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tools on top of existing information sharing tools.

### Third Party Contribution to CSDP crisis management operations

The EU CSDP missions and operations often operate in complex environments alongside with other international actors. The EU established partnerships and cooperation with other organizations (both on political and mission level) e.g. with UN, NATO, OSCE, AU, ASEAN, etc. The levels of cooperation with various organizations differ depending on the context. In addition to inter-organizational cooperation, the EU also cooperates with non-EU partners by including 3rd countries in both its civilian and military missions and operations. The contribution of third, non-EU countries to CSDP-missions and operations adds an additional dimension to the interoperability i.e. that of third countries (staff) being interoperable with CSDP missions and operations.

A comparison was be made from two perspectives:

- The regulatory framework regulating the third countries participation in CSDP-crisis management operations;
- The crisis management operations.

As for the in-crisis operations/missions interoperability, it seems that this is currently not an urgent issue as since the share of third countries personnel in the analysed missions and operations is rather marginal, namely in the civilians missions. However, even this low third states staff count does lead to certain mission interoperability challenges. Nevertheless, knowledge on the EU values and procedures should be important to consider when non-EU countries contribute staff, especially for higher levels of the mission. Many of the challenges related to interoperability of troops contributed by the third states are similar to those of the multinational forces in general including the cultural and language barriers, doctrinal differences and technological differences.

Tackling these interoperability challenges at operational level and better incorporating third states in CSDP crisis management operations is important as it has economic benefits, force generation benefits and gives political legitimacy. Especially, the political aspects of such cooperation should not be overlooked as having third states participating in CSDP crisis management operations does give a stronger credibility and legitimacy to the EU CSDP missions and operations.

**Interoperability potential:** Strengthen third party participation in CSDP crisis management operations by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard operating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/interoperability.

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23 Progress Report on the implementation of the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises Action Plan 2015 (11409/16), Joint staff working document.
**Review Systems**

It is observed that existing CSDP civilian and military review systems are highly similar, with the civilian review process incorporated many practices from how the military and particularly NATO reviews its operations and conducts lessons learned processes.24

However, while both the civilian and the military lessons learned come together in the yearly CSDP lessons learned reports, the actual information gathering and analysis is siloed. Also, it is observed that the EUMS and CPCC use different IT-systems to report and manage lessons learned. The EUMS uses the European Lessons Management Application (ELMA), whereas its civilian counterpart, the Civilian Lessons Management Application (CILMA) is underutilized.25 In terms of interoperability, ideally, civilian and military platforms work together in the knowledge management of best practices through a joint database as this builds synergies and enhances the learning process of crisis management operations.

Also, the implementation of lessons identified is siloed as well. Noticeably, there does not seem to be any kind of standardized reporting for both sides on how the different actors have responded to the key lessons and recommendations presented in the yearly report. Instead, the actors report to the lessons management group based on the specific lesson/recommendation, which in turn reports to the PSC in the next lessons learned report. As lessons become learned only after implementation, it should be clarified as to what degree this review cycle reaches the missions and operations, or is just limited to the political-strategic level.

Analysis of the review systems in the military and civilian spheres of CSDP have shown that both lessons learned processes have also faced similar issues, with sources highlighting particularly access of information and implementation of lessons learned as specific obstacles.26 Further study is required to pinpoint underlying causes and their links. This study has not looked further into why this is the case.

In conclusion, there is a high degree of interoperability in review systems within the EU CSDP, as the processes, reporting practices and working methods for both civilian missions and military operations are broadly similar and contribute to a common lessons learned process. The development of a common lessons learned application will further enhance this interoperability. Both also face similar issues due to access to information and perceived lack of implementation.

**Interoperability potential:** Continue working on a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations.

**Interoperability potential:** Continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research and external evaluations.

### 3.1 Concluding remarks

A review of interoperability challenges within CSDP crisis management operations leads to the observation that although substantial work has been done and is ongoing to address them, there are still challenges left. IECEU report identified 19 potential points that could benefit from additional work.

The relevance of investing in enhancing interoperability is not entirely theoretical, as the findings from the case studies show that interoperability challenges do affect the efficiency and effectiveness of crisis management operations. In addition, as for civilian-military interoperability, future integrated/hybrid/joint

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24 Interview with an EEAS official, 28.11.2016.
25 Interview with a CSDP mission staff member, 12.12.2016.
missions are increasing in relevance, with the dissolution of traditional borders between civilian and military threats. A cooperative civil-military response to new security environment can mirror these challenges by adapted and integrated crisis management approaches.27 In such a context, closer integration of various stages of civilian and military crisis management (e.g. planning, equipment procurement, logistics, information sharing, etc.) makes sense. Military operations for example can benefit from civilian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civilian policing, etc.), building the dialogue with civil society and access to funding instruments for capacity building projects and development, to list just some of the reasons that go beyond the military oriented CIMIC28 concept. On the other hand, civilian missions can also benefit from closer integration with military elements (e.g. through provisions of security, logistics, strategic planning, etc.). Integration can thus support both civilian and military actors in achieving their objectives. Integrated approach also makes sense from the perspective of pooling and sharing of equipment between the civilian and military and potential for further exploration of dual use capabilities.29

However, there are still several significant obstacles or limitations, both on strategic/political and operational level that need to be addressed if the EU wishes to pursue a more integrated approach to security. One of the first limitations lies in various financial instruments30 that are used for financing civilian and military CSDP missions.31 Furthermore while significant progress was achieved in bringing together civilian and military planning (e.g. by establishing CMPD), the planning and command aspects of CSDP still seem to represent an important limitation for possible integrated missions. This is visible both on strategic planning and operational level (e.g. the issue of whether the possible integrated mission should be led by civilian or military commander32). Obstacles for integrated chain of command face both institutional challenges on the level of EU (e.g. “stove pipe approach”) and barriers on EU Member States level (e.g. constitutions of some states do not allow deployment of civilian staff in operations under military command).33

Harnessing the potential of integrated/hybrid/joint crisis management operations does require the development of a common strategic vision that not only goes beyond the traditional civilian and military demarcation lines, but also includes the power of other EU instruments (development aid, trade, etc.).

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28 Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation at operational and tactical levels between military components of EU-led military operations and civil actors including the local population and authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organisations and agencies - in support of the achievement of the military; Nik Hynek.
29 E.g. noted in the interview with former EUBAM Libya official, 11 September, in D1.3 Review: Civil-Military Synergies
30 Civilian missions are mostly funded from common CFSP budget while military operations are mostly burdens of participating members states.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
4 INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES

Within the EU the interoperability related discussion has mainly circulated around civil-military cooperation and coordination rather than military-military aspect. To ensure some degree of interoperability the EU has established procedures for international crisis management, which comprehends the whole mission cycle for both - civilian and military crisis management missions. Although, this civilian aspect and thereby EU’s Comprehensive Approach is the EU’s competitive advantage in comparison to other institutions, the military interoperability cannot be completely neglected. When studying the applicability of the NATO STANAGs to CSDP operations, it is also worth knowing the interoperability challenges that the NATO has faced while implementing its multinational peace support operations. Those include information sharing, language skills of the staff, command and control, force capability and readiness to act as a part of multinational force. The case studies carried out during the IECEU-project have also projected many of the same challenges.

In the military CSDP operations (the research shows that there are similar challenges in CSDP civilian side) the key strategic-level interoperability challenges are often related to the access restrictions, changing political objectives, Command and Control (C2), decision-making capabilities, as well as the force structure requirements. The disparities in technological capabilities, sovereignty concerns, differing national interests, cuts in defence spending are political in nature and can only be resolved by politicians at the strategic level. There are limits to what extend the nations are willing to trust another. These limits constrain openness and system interdependencies (i.e. intelligence, communications) which in turn affect interoperability. Nevertheless, these challenges tend to reverberate throughout the operational and tactical levels. Furthermore, when political motives are misaligned, no amount of interoperability, technological or otherwise, can mitigate the problem.

Operational level interoperability challenges are often related to force planning, C2, and battle management namely in terms of information exchange and security issues. In addition, some nations are likely to continue to maintain direct national control of their national assets rather than contribute them to a larger, shared pool under direct control of the Peace Support Operation Commander. These challenges concern commanders and political leaders who may face challenges in balancing each nation's political needs against the military requirements of the operation. This is particularly important when political guidance changes during an operation. Such tensions can complicate both C2 (the vertical dimension) and coordination (the horizontal dimension).

The tactical-level interoperability challenges relate often to performance capabilities referring to the capability of the humans and technology to operate as intended. They may include challenges related to logistics, information sharing; command, control and communication (C3); Doctrinal differences, and

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34 The new crisis management procedures were adapted in 2014. The revision process of crisis management procedures in the EU was stimulated by the contemporary reflection on lessons learned from the 24 CSDP missions and operations conducted by the EU over the last 10 years and is driven by three main purposes: (1) to enable a comprehensive approach to crisis management; (2) to align civilian and military planning process; and (3) to rebalance responsibilities between EU institutions, notably by the EEAS and EU Member States. Nicoletta Pirozzi. 2013. The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management, EU Crisis Management Papers Series, DCAF Brussels, (2013), 13.

35 Interview no. 3.


37 Ibid.

38 See for example; Ibid; NATO, Partnerships and cooperative security committee (PCSC) in interoperability platform - staff mapping study on how NATO interoperability tools help partners contribute to international crisis management. AC/340-N(2016)0010, 29 January 2016.

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resource gaps. Furthermore, sharing of the information in the field is seen to be challenging as a result of over classification of information. Also change or hand-over of information between the troop rotations and shift changes hampers the interoperability.

Teaching the doctrine and procedures used by one organisation, whether it is EU, NATO, can improve initial understanding and help ease the interoperability challenges when working as part of a multinational force. The troop contributing countries play the key role in the implementation process, and the EU and NATO need to ensure that the procedures and concepts employed by each organization do not contradict, or cause incoherence within the EU EU Member States.

**Interoperability challenges affect the efficiency and effectiveness** of current crisis management operations. These interoperability challenges are likely to become even greater in the near future due to new security environment, closer civil-military cooperation, greater participation of 3rd states and future integrated/hybrid/joint missions. Moreover, in terms of efficiency, EUs military operations can benefit from a stronger civilian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civilian policing, etc.) and building the dialogue with civil society. Civilian missions can also benefit from closer integration with military elements through, for example, provisions of security, logistics, strategic planning. Integration can thus support both civilian and military actors in achieving their objectives as well as strengthen pooling and sharing.

The previous chapters explored in-depth how interoperability is experienced at field level in current CSDP crisis management operations for civilian missions, and military operations. A comparative analysis on missions and operations was made, which also found 19 potentials for increasing interoperability in the field. Through this discussion, underlying key challenges for interoperability emerge, which can be concluded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three central challenges for interoperability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) <strong>Divergent national practices and lack of implementation in the field</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) <strong>Weak Interoperability mindset</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) <strong>EUs Institutional CSDP-framework and its fragmentation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DIVERGENT PRACTICES**

First, divergent national practices, especially in terms of civilian missions, lead to more divergence in the field. Some standardization of national practices may be politically sensitive but much of the more practice-oriented, technical interoperability seems less so and would offer an easy beginning point for strengthening interoperability. However, political sensitivity can also be overestimated and thus processes of interoperability can be retarded even before it begins properly.

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40 Interview no. 3.
NATO has managed to create interoperable systems in the military realm, which extend to EU Member States own armies and equipment, and even non-NATO EU Member States; greater interoperability should certainly be possible within the EU. Moreover, although there are a number of policy initiatives to extend interoperability and rule books, the implementation of interoperability remains challenging. Certainly, common doctrine can also be strengthened, but the main focus should be on the implementation and mainstreaming of existing initiatives.

INTEROPERABILITY MINDSET

Secondly, the analysis from the case studies points to a weak interoperability mindset both within civilian missions and military operations but more significantly between actors involved in CSDP crisis management operations. Competition for resources, position, and general lack of willingness to cooperate or work towards common goals hamper the realisation of interoperability potentials even where there are benefits that could be gained from greater interoperability.

The political will to pursue interoperability as expressed in numerous Council Conclusions and Decisions seems not to be sufficient to make it really happen at tactical and operational level. The main obstacle is a mind-set where interoperability is a priority and sought after horizontally, in every action that is being taken both at headquarters level as in the field. For creating such a mindset it is necessary that all parties involved in CSDP crisis management operations have an internalised understanding of working together towards a common goal and act upon it in their daily business, by identifying obstacles, creating dialogues and common standards.

Such actions over time will be one of the founding principles for a common CSDP-crisis management operations culture, which integrates the national CSDP cultures. Ideally, over the coming years platforms should be created to discuss interoperability in different fields, fostering the dialogue needed to build the mindset and culture.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Thirdly, the CSDP crisis management operations complex institutional framework does cause challenges for interoperability. In essence, the CSDP is an intergovernmental form of cooperation, with Council, EU Member States and Commission steering the same ship. This makes it difficult to navigate, as depending on the type of operation, there are very different procedures to follow, with multiple actors involved (e.g. funding of equipment). Also, it does affect the creating of a common culture, as for instance staff is mainly trained nationally and seconded.

This fragmentation is ingrained in the Lisbon Treaty, and will influence the level of interoperability that can be achieved in CSDP crisis management operations in the long term, as no changes are foreseeable in the next 5 to 10 years. The recommendation is made that proposals aiming at enhancing interoperability should always include a paragraph with an analysis on what can be achieved in the current framework and what needs a modified institutional framework. Such an analysis can inform in the long run the cost-benefit analysis needed to justify modifications of the legal set-up.
5 Discussion Points

Below specific discussion points are listed, that will inform the policy dialogue planning in Q1 of 2017, with key CSDP-actors. Ideally, these discussions will lead to an even better understanding of interoperability and how to enhance it in the next years. The discussion points are categorized along the lines of the identified three underlying interoperability challenges and groups them in short-term, medium-term and long-term potentials.

DIVERGENT PRACTICES AND STRENGTHENING IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMON DOCTRINE

Q1) How can standardization of national practices, especially those related to mission/ operation support services be encouraged?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

Q2) How can the implementation of common doctrines be strengthened in the field?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

INTEROPERABILITY MINDSET: WORKING TOWARDS COMMON GOALS

Q3) How can a pro-interoperability mindset and an understanding of working towards common goals be strengthened?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND FRAGMENTATION

Q4) How can interoperability be strengthened within the limits of the present institutional context?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

Q5) What are potentials for institutional development for encouraging interoperability?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?
6 Conclusions

IECEU study of the interoperability aimed to analyse in depth how the concept of interoperability works with CSDP crisis management operations. By reviewing the findings of the case studies, covering civilian missions and military operations, a number of observations have been made about how interoperability works in the field.

This is a snapshot in time, as almost all case studies relate to CSDP crisis management operations that are finalised. However, this seems not to affect the validity of the observations as interviews with staff members in on-going missions and operations, literature analysis and document analysis confirm these observations.

Recently, a number of initiatives have been launched to strengthen interoperability and these are welcomed as it will affect positively the effectiveness of the 'boots on the ground'. However, much work is still needed, as symbolised by the 18 potentials this study has identified.
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Background paper on Interoperability

IECEU
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NATO. Partnerships and cooperative security committee (PCSC) in interoperability platform - staff mapping study on how NATO interoperability tools help partners contribute to international crisis management. AC/340-N(2016)010, 29 January 2016.


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Background paper on Interoperability

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Interview with EASS official. Phone interview. 2. December 2016.

Interview with a CSDP Mission staff member. Email interview. 12.12.2016.

Annexes

ANNEX 1: Analysis on interoperability in the context of Civilian CSDP Missions

ANNEX 2: Analysis on interoperability in the context of Military CSDP Operations